Saudi British relations, 1939-1953 by Aldamer, Shafi
Durham E-Theses
Saudi British relations, 1939-1953
Aldamer, Shafi
How to cite:
Aldamer, Shafi (2001) Saudi British relations, 1939-1953, Durham theses, Durham University. Available at
Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/4386/
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or
charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details.
Academic Support Office, Durham University, University Office, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP
e-mail: e-theses.admin@dur.ac.uk Tel: +44 0191 334 6107
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk
Saudi-British Relations, 1939-1953 
Shafi Aldamer 
A Thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International 
Relations and Strategic Studies of the Middle East 
University of Durham 
The Faculty of Social Sciences 
Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies 
2001 
The copyright of this thesis rests with 
the author. No quotation from it should 
be published in any form, including 
Electronic and the Internet, without the 
author's prior written consent. All 
information derived from this thesis 
must be acknowledged appropriately. 
1 7 SEP I 
"The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from 
it should be published without his prior written consent and 
information derived from it should be acknowledged". 
Table Of Contents 
Table Of Contents 1 
List of Maps 4 
Dedication 6 
Acknowledgments 7 
Abstract 9 
INTRODUCTION 10 
1. THE STUDY PERSPECTIVE lO 
A. The Framework of Analysis 10 
B. The Research Questions 14 
C. The Literature Review 17 
I . The Primary Sources 17 
I I . The Secondary Sources 20 
D. The Study Outlines 22 
2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 24 
A. The Diplomatic History of Saudi-British Relations up to 1930 24 
B. Critical Issues of the 1930s Concerning Saudi-British Relations 27 
I . Palestine and Saudi-British Relations in the 1930s -- 27 
I I . The Hashemites and Saudi Arabia 29 
I I I . The Saudi-British Dispute on the Arabian Southeast Frontier 30 
C. The Development of Saudi Arabia's Diplomatic History with other Powers 
than Britain Before 1939 31 
Notes 34 
CHAPTER ONE: C L O S E RELATIONS, 1939-1942 41 
A. Security Concerns and their Implications for Saudi Arabia's Foreign 
Relations 41 
I . The Saudi Enquiry and the British Response 43 
I I . The Saudi-German Connections 49 
I I I . Saudi Arabia and Italy 58 
B. The Palestine Issue and Saudi-British Relations -61 
C. The Consolidation of Saudi-British Relations at the Outbreak of the War —65 
D. The British Assistance to Saudi Arabia 70 
E. The Question of Saudi Arabia's Neutrality - 74 
F. Saudi Arabia and the United States of America 82 
Summary and Conclusions 86 
Notes 90 
CHAPTER TWO: TOWARDS CHANGING RELATIONS, 1943-1945 103 
A. The Advancement of Saudi-US Relations, 1943-1945 103 
I . The Lend Lease 103 
I I . The Ultimate Increase of USA Involvement in Saudi Arabia 106 
B. The State of the Anglo-Saudi Ties 111 
C. Anglo-American Quarrel over Saudi Arabia and its Implication for British 
Policy 116 
I . Troubled Relations 116 
I I . British Considerations 123 
1 
D. Saudi Arabia's Attitude Towards the Palestine Issue prior to 1945 124 
E. The Leaders' Summits 755 
I . Ibn Baud's meeting with Roosevelt, 14 February 1945 138 
I I . Ibn Saud's meeting with Churchill, 17 February 1945 141 
I I I . The Summits' Outlook 144 
Summary and Conclusions 147 
Notes 150 
CHAPTER T H R E E : CAUSES OF CHANGING RELATIONS, 1946-1948 ---163 
A. The Improvement of Anglo-American Relations in Regard to Saudi Arabia 163 
B. Saudi Arabian Ties with Britain and the USA and King Ibn Saud's Strategies 
Towards each Country, 1946-1947 169 
I . Saudi-US Economic Ties— 169 
I I . The Improvement of Saudi Arabian Income and its Further Impact on 
Relations with Britain as well as with the USA 171 
I I I . Saudi-British Ties 173 
V. Ibn Saud's Views and Strategies on Saudi Arabian Relations with the US 
and Britain 174 
C The Saudi-Has hemite Contention and its Implications for Saudi-British 
Relations, 1946-1948 180 
D. The Palestine Issue and its Impact on Saudi Arabian Relations with Britain 
and the USA, 1946-1948 199 
E. The Saudi-British Strategic Connections 206 
I . The Definition of the Security Concept by the end of 1947 206 
I I . The Proposed Treaty and its Development in 1948 208 
Summary and conclusions 215 
Notes 218 
CHAPTER FOUR: SHIFTING A L L E G I A N C E S , 1949-1951 235 
A. Strategic Issues, and the Status of Saudi-British Military Cooperation, 1949-
1950 235 
I . The Proposed Tripartite Treaty and its Consequences 235 
I I . The State of Anglo-Saudi Military Cooperation by 1950 239 
B. The Return of Ibn Saud's Anxiety About the Hashemites and its Impact on 
Saudi-British Relations, 1949-1951 241 
C. The Frontier Issue and its Complications for Saudi-British Relations, 1949-
1951 246 
I . The Reopening of a Complicated Dispute 246 
I I . The Continuity of the Frontier Issue in 1950, and the USA Role 253 
I I I . From the Complications of the Frontier Issue, with Establishment of the 
Trucial Levy Force to the Temporary Improvement at the End of 1951 256 
D. The Reinforcement of Saudi-US Relations 263 
E. The End of Saudi-British Military Cooperation by the End of1951 269 
Summary and Conclusions 272 
Notes 275 
CHAPTER F I V E : TROUBLED RELATIONS, 1952-1953 285 
A. The Failure of the Dammam Conference and its Aftermath 285 
B. The Establishment of a Saudi Arabian Authority in Buraimi, and its 
Consequences in 1952 294 
C. Firmness of Policies and Further Deterioration in the Buraimi Crisis 302 
D. The British Blockade of Hamasa 305 
E. The Aftermath of the Blockade and the 'Crisis Diplomacy' 312 
F. The Scope of Saudi-US Relations, and its Association with the Development of 
the Frontier Dispute 327 
G. Further Difficulty in Buraimi and the US Intervention 330 
Summary and Conclusions 338 
Notes 342 
CONCLUSION 362 
SOURCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY 369 
List of Maps 
MAP 1: T H E DISPUTED A R E A 247 
MAP 2: SAUDI ARABIAN CLAIM OF OCTOBER 1949 251 
MAP 3: PREVIOUS CLAIMS 252 
MAP 4: T H E 1952 CLAIMS 288 
MAP 5: BURAIMI OASIS 296 
I confirm that no part of the material offered has previously 
been submitted by me for a degree in this or any other 
University. 
Signed 
Dedication 
To those, who through their thought, feeling, and love toward me had the most 
positive influence on the course of my life: To my uncle (who I sadly lost during the 
conduct of this research), Prince Abdullah Aldamer (God rest his soul in peace); to 
my aunt. Queen Sita Aldamer (God give her happy and long life); to my father. Prince 
Abdulrahman Aldamer (God restore his health and give him long life). 
Acknowledgments 
It's sometimes difficult in a typical Middle Eastern culture, particularly that of the 
classical Arabian Peninsula, for someone to plainly express his sentiment towards a 
very close relative by the means of rhapsody. But, i f the scope of such an expression 
involves genuine gratitude - particularly what I personally call 'the principled 
academic gratitude' - then such expression is a must. In such a case realities must be 
observed by documenting the deeds of those that deserve sincere acknowledgement. 
My gratitude goes to the one who succeeded in putting me into the direction of a wise 
man that 'knows that he does not know what he does not know', the one who induced 
me to love God, love science, love knowledge, love perseverance, and love success. 
The one who directed the lost high school student to the right way, the one who 
profoundly supported the undergraduate, the masters, and the PhD student by all 
means including that of imperative moral, thought, spiritual supports. Without his 
generous and continuous support I would not have achieved what I desired, and what 
he desired for me to achieve. My thanks - which cannot repay such a worthy debt - go 
with love, loyalty, and sincerity to my professor, friend, and brother: Mohammed Ibn 
Abdulrahman Aldamer. 
Next to Mohammed, I am grateful to the entire membership of my family. Their care 
and support have brightened the difficult days during the undertaking of this research. 
Though I am in debt to all of them, some of them have supported me in a way that 
makes such a - moral - debt impossible to repay. I am grateful to my cousins: 
Albandari and Aljouharah daughters of King Khalid Bin Abdulaziz, Abdullah Bin 
Saad Alsaud, and to my other cousins: sons of my uncle Abdullah; and to my 
brothers: Fahad, Abdullah, Faisal, Bander, Abdulmuhsin, Khalid, Abdulaziz, and 
Hussam; and to my sisters: Aljazi and Sita. 
I am also in debt to my supervisor. Professor Tim Niblock. Without Tim's support, 
encouragement, and guidance this thesis would definitely have been the poorer. In 
fact without his considered comments and sage advice such a major research might 
even have fallen short of reaching its main objective. On various occasions when I 
faced certain difficulties during the undertaking of this research I found Tim standing 
by my side in a way that made his support unforgettable. Indeed, I was one of the 
most lucky researchers who was honoured to work under the supervision of one of the 
greatest scholars I have ever come across. My thanks go to Professor Niblock, whom I 
wil l be in debt to for the rest of my life. 
I am also grateful to many scholars who contributed with vital advice. I should like to 
thank amongst them Professor Raymond Hinnebusch, Professor Peter Sluglett, Mr 
Charles Reynolds and Dr Gerd Nonneman, for their constructive advice particularly 
during the early stage of this research. My thanks also go to Mr Graham Patchett, who 
kindly proofread the manuscript of my thesis in terms of English language at its final 
stage. 
The staff of certain institutions deserve my utmost gratitude. I am very grateful for the 
assistance of the archival staff at the Public Record Office at Kew, London. I am also 
thankful to the library staffs of the University of Durham, University of Exeter, 
School of Oriental and African Studies, and the British Library. 
I would like to thank the kind and helpful members of the Centre for Middle Eastem 
and Islamic Studies (CMEIS), University of Durham, who created the excellent 
academic environment in which I was able to conduct my research, and who were 
indeed helpful when it came to dealing with University affairs that concerned me. In 
particular I am thankful to Professor Ewan Anderson, Professor Anoushiravan 
Ehteshami, Dr Emma Murphy, Dr Colin Turner, Mrs Barbara Famworth, and Mrs 
Barbara Minto. I would like also to thank all my friends and colleagues at CMEIS and 
elsewhere, who successfully created the kind of social life that irrigated the dryness 
that usually exists during the seriousness of such an academic project. 
February 2001 
Abstract 
The present study attempts to understand the shift that occurred in Saudi-British 
relations by the year 1953. The tracing of such a shift is dealt with by investigating 
the development of these relations from 1939 and through to 1953. 
The research is drawn upon a documentary diplomatic history method reinforced by 
an analytical approach. Within the framework of analysis, the Realism approach to 
international politics is selected. Certain assumptions that most of - classical and 
modem - Realists agreed upon are in use, specifically the state-centric assumption, the 
rationality assumption, the unitary assumption, the anarchic assumption, and the 
security assumption. 
As is clear from existing secondary sources, Saudi Arabia and Britain enjoyed a kind 
of special relationship in the early 1940s, but by the last year of King Ibn Saud's reign 
(1953) these two states' relations had deteriorated into severe conflict. Though some 
existing sources have attempted to shed some light on that development, their findings 
are indeed modest. In fact, none of this literature has studied the topic from a purely 
Saudi-British perspective, nor has any of it explored and analysed the matter with the 
depth that it deserves. 
By focusing on Saudi-British relations the chapters of this thesis are endeavouring to 
answer profoundly a variety of questions that affected the main course of these 
relations. By questioning the impact of certain issues on Saudi-Anglo relations - such 
that of Saudi-US relations, the security concept, the Saudi-Hashemite problem, and 
the frontier conflict - the thesis will address its main theme. 
Introduction 
1. The Study Perspective 
At the beginning of World War Two, Britain was the only Great Power that had 
cordial, friendly, and close relations with Saudi Arabia. However, by mid-1953 the 
Saudi and the British governments were treating each other as foes. The explanation 
of this development provides the core theme of this study. Hence, the thesis seeks to 
explore and analyse the factors, the reasons, and the events that caused such a shift to 
occur. The theme will be dealt with by studying the broad context of Saudi-British 
relations from early 1939 through to November 1953. 
A. The Framework of Analysis 
In order to reach a satisfactory conclusion, a careful framework - that narrows the 
usual gap between academic theories and the reality of politicians' and diplomats' 
practices - will be used. The research draws upon a diplomatic history account 
reinforced by political analysis of the developments in Saudi-British relations. 
Based primarily on archival documents the thesis is intended to study and examine the 
details of the developments of Saudi-British relations from early 1939 to November 
1953. The study of the history of Saudi-British diplomatic interactions will be mostly 
based on the evidence obtained from the documents of both states leaders' 
correspondence, ambassadors' and foreign ministers' despatches, memoranda, 
minutes, etc' 
In addition to the documentary diplomatic history method the study will apply the 
realism paradigm.^ Particular attention will be given to certain assumptions that both 
classical and modem Realists (Neo-realists) adopt in their approach to intemational 
politics. In particular the following assumptions will be utilised:^ 
1. The state-centric assumption: States are the most important and dominant 
actors in intemational politics. Hence, the focus is on the behaviour of states 
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as the key unit of analysis rather than the behaviour of others such as 
international organisations or multinational corporations, etc. 
2. The rationality assumption: International politics can be analysed on the 
basis that states are rational actors. Thus, it would be assumed that states 
would pragmatically calculate the costs of alternative courses of action and 
seek to maximise their own national interests and ultimately their power and 
capabilities. States may do so even without having certainty and sufficient 
information about alternative courses of action, and thus may miscalculate. 
3. The unitary assumption: States can be conceptualised as unitary actors. 
Although foreign policy decisions may be taken by a number of individuals, 
states deal in the outside world as an incorporated unit. Connected to this 
assumption realists assume that as states rely on a single attitude in their 
foreign policy, the divisions of domestic politics are less important in 
explaining states' behaviour in the international arena. 
4. The anarchic assumption: That the nature of the international system is 
anarchic. Anarchy should not be confused with chaos. On the contrary, 
anarchy may be coherent, with stability, order, and regulated forms of 
interaction between independent states. Its meaning according to the realist 
school is that there is no super-authority or international government above 
states that could manage and regulate interactions between sovereign units. 
5. The security assumption: Security notions are always at the top of a state's 
agenda in international politics. Thus, states would seek to preserve and 
maximise security by all means such as strengthening their own capability or 
even seeking the support of other states to maintain their security or even to 
guarantee their survival. The priority of security matters does not necessarily 
neglect other interests which are not directly connected to security, such as 
maximising economic capabilities, but the assumption gives the security 
notion more importance. 
At this stage, an indication of the most important features that concerned Saudi-
British relations during 1939-1953 is desirable in order to lay a basis for the 
discussion of the study's theoretical framework. There were five outstanding features 
that characterised Saudi-British relations during the period under investigafion. First, 
relations between Saudi Arabia and Britain were in fact relations between a small 
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state that was rising economically and a great power that was declining economically 
and politically - in particular from the end of World War Two (W.W.II) onwards.'' 
Second, though the main states that were directly responsible for Anglo-Saudi 
relations were Saudi Arabia and Britain, other states - as this thesis will reveal - had a 
significant influence on the progress of this relationship. The most influential states in 
question were the USA from 1943 onwards, as well as the Hashemite States, 
particularly Jordan from 1946 onwards. Third, there were regional and intemational 
phenomena that occurred during this period and that were highly conceming to both 
Saudi Arabia and Britain, though in different degrees of importance. The cases in 
question were W.W.II and the Palestine issue. Fourth, Britain was the protector or the 
colonial power of some entities within the regional setting of Saudi Arabia, as was the 
case with India until 1947, and the Gulf Sheikhdoms throughout the study period. 
Finally, King Abdulaziz (Ibn Saud) as the absolute monarch of Saudi Arabia - until 
November 1953, where this study ends - gave the foreign policy of his kingdom the 
stamp of his own unique personality in many ways. The significance of King Ibn 
Saud deserves further explanation. 
Although, this study considers states as the dominant actor - and the key unit of 
analysis - that deals within the intemational system as an integrated unit, this does not 
mn counter to the assertion that Ibn Saud constituted the vital figure who spoke for 
the Saudi State. Without harming or contradicting either the state-centric or the 
unitary assumptions, this study will focus on Ibn Saud's involvement. The 
concentration on Ibn Saud as the chief actor for the State of Saudi Arabia is - in fact -
an enhancement of the realist model. Ibn Saud's political practices, in fact were 
themselves in natural harmony with realism.^  As the warrior and the politician who 
founded the contemporary Saudi Kingdom - subsequent to long stmggles - Ibn Saud 
naturally focused on security as a vital issue for the preservation of the state. 
Eventually, pragmatic rationality developed in Saudi Arabian foreign policy towards 
the great powers. Moreover, Ibn Saud's traditional styles of govemance created the 
basis for Saudi Arabia constituting a unitary actor in foreign policy matters. Thus, as 
an absolute monarch - who mled in a traditional Arabian Knight manner - all the 
foreign policies of the Kingdom were exclusively in the King's hands. He was the 
chief and central decision-maker for all the Kingdom's foreign policies. He did not 
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permit any of his officials to deal in any single aspect of the state's foreign affairs 
without his knowledge and instructions.^  
UUimately, significant effects flowed from Ibn Saud's dominance of Saudi Arabian 
foreign policy. First, Ibn Saud fashioned his own style in the diplomatic channels of 
contacts with Britain (as well as with the USA). Being the figure that primarily dealt 
with Britain, the King preferred, and became accustomed to, dealing with the British 
government through the British Ministers/Ambassadors in Saudi Arabia. In contrast 
with the Saudi Arabian Minister/Ambassador in London, the role of the British 
Ministers/Ambassadors in Jeddah was more significant.^  Second, Ibn Saud's 
dominance produced a kind of ambiguity in distinguishing between the concept of 
King Ibn Saud as the head of the state and the state itself This ambiguity was evident 
not only in Ibn Saud's personal point of view, but also in some of the British 
government's actions in dealing with him. Throughout this study it will become 
apparent that King Ibn Saud did not distinguish between himself and the state when 
he interacted with other states. In fact, it could be said that as a monarch and the 
founder of Saudi Arabia, the King considered himself and the state as a synonym.^  
Though it could be said that the British were to some extent able to distinguish 
between the two, still on various occasions they dealt with Saudi Arabia in a similar 
way - or at least not in contradiction - to Ibn Saud's belief The British behaviour on 
such occasions reflected in Ibn Saud's dominance, as well as his traditional method of 
ruling. The absence of a central bureaucratic authority within a modem government in 
Saudi Arabia during Ibn Saud's reign made some of the Brifish diplomats consider 
even the status of Ibn Saud - as a traditional mler - as an altemative for a government. 
For instance, in 1941 the Brifish Minister in Saudi Arabia, Mr Hugh Stonehewer-Bird, 
wrote that, "There is no Government as the word is understood elsewhere. King Ibn 
Saud is the Government".^  Nevertheless, this study, based on the foregoing realist 
assumpfions, will consider the state as the main unit of analysis, and will consider 
King Ibn Saud as the main political performer within the State of the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia. In most of the cases when the study refers to Ibn Saud, it will be 
referring to him as the head of the state and as the chief figure representing the 
Kingdom. Otherwise, a reference to the State of Saudi Arabia will be used.'° In 
addition, the study will use the term 'government' separately from the reference to Ibn 
Saud. During Ibn Saud's reign, there was a kind of governmental body. Though it was 
13 
not a central authority and not coherently organised, some departments did exist. 
There was at least a Foreign Affairs Ministry that contained officials who worked 
under Ibn Saud's command. There was a (rather nominal) Foreign Minister, Prince 
Faisal, who carried out King Ibn Saud's instmctions abroad. There were several 
counsellors or advisers who worked for Ibn Saud, etc." When this thesis refers to 
some or all of those who worked with Ibn Saud, the terms that will be used are Ibn 
Saud's officials or the Saudi officials, etc.'^ However, when the term 'the Saudi 
government' is used, it will generally be referring to Ibn Saud and/or his officials 
acting through the existing departments. 
B. The Research Questions 
In order to strengthen the focus of the study's theme, several research questions will 
be raised. With the assistance of the previously stated framework, the forthcoming set 
of questions should be solved by the time the research reaches its main conclusion. 
These questions will be categorised as main and sub-questions. The main questions 
wil l form fundamental parts of the study and the sub-questions will help to answer 
each of the main questions. Moreover, whereas the main questions will be targeting 
central aspects, some of the sub-questions will be left - comparatively - loose so they 
can interplay and interact freely with the other main aspects. The only exception from 
the categorisation of main and sub-questions will be the queries that concem the 
security aspect. As a fiindamental concept in the study's approach, all the questions 
within the latter sphere will be treated as main questions. 
First, was either state (Britain or Saudi Arabia) more responsible than the other for the 
deterioration of relations? Can the shift that occurred in relations be understood from 
this perspective? One of the main findings of a smdy on US-Saudi relations, 1933-
1953, specified, that "Abd al-Aziz through the years worked carefiilly to draw in 
American political interest where only private American economic interests were 
engaged".'^ While this finding is an excellent aid for the course of this thesis, still it 
does not fully and specifically answer the questions. It does suggest, however, that it 
was Saudi Arabia which was the leading actor in strengthening US-Saudi ties. Thus, 
by looking at the issue from the perspective of US-Saudi relations, the answer would 
be clear: that Saudi Arabia did play a major role. But, looking at the issue from the 
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Saudi-British side, the matter still needs to be examined. One could argue that i f Ibn 
Saud was the one who brought American political interests into Saudi Arabia, 
logically his efforts must have been made vis-a-vis British interests (or indeed to 
replace the British position in Saudi Arabia). While such an argument may be strong, 
it is not necessarily true. Sub-questions will be helpful in order to reach a satisfactory 
answer to the above questions: Did the King openly and frankly ask alternative 
powers to replace Britain? I f so why did he choose to do so? Did his experience of the 
general outcome of Saudi-British interactions (that included both cooperative and 
conflict interactions) effect his decisions? I f that was the case, was there any British 
responsibility in making Ibn Saud take this line? I f Ibn Saud was behind the division, 
was his position constant throughout the period under examination or did it change? 
Were there any countering factors - that resulted from specific issues or timing - that 
made Ibn Saud either change his mind temporarily about shifting away from Britain 
or at least slowing the speed of the process of such a shift? 
Second, was the deterioration of relations an effect of the development of Saudi 
relations with the United States of America? Can it be said that the positive progress 
of Saudi-US relations was a major, or indeed one of the main, factors that damaged 
Saudi-British relations? Sub-questions for this aspect will include: In comparison to 
Saudi-British relations, how did Saudi-US relations develop during the era in 
question, and in what framework?^"* How, when, and to what extent did it affect the 
main course of Saudi-British relations? What were the factors that made Saudi Arabia 
prefer the USA? Did increasing US involvement in Saudi Arabia bring about any 
confrontation between Britain and the USA in Saudi Arabia? I f so, when and how? 
And in which directions did the wind of 'the British-US relations in Saudi Arabia' 
lead to? Did it help the course of Saudi-American relations or the course of Saudi-
Anglo relations? 
Third, was the deterioration of relations an effect of differences over regional issues? 
What was the impact of the main developments in the Palestine issue on Saudi-British 
relations? What was the impact of Ibn Saud's relations with the Hashemites? What 
was the impact of Saudi Arabia's attitude towards the British Gulf Protectorates, 
particularly from 1949 onwards? In regard to sub-questions, several will be 
introduced: Did British government policy take account of Ibn Saud's anxiety about 
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the Hashemites? What impact did the development of Saudi Arabia's dispute with 
Britain over the frontiers issue with the Gulf Sheikhdoms have on Saudi-British 
relations? Can the regional decline in Britain's influence, at that time, as well as the 
British government's determination in protecting what was left of its influence and 
prestige, explain the worsening of the conflict? Can the matter best be explained by 
Saudi Arabian determination to achieve territorial gains? Or can it be explained within 
the scope of British determination to pursue its interests? 
Fourth, what was the impact of security concerns on the relationship between Britain 
and Saudi Arabia? How and when did this affect the course of Saudi-British relations? 
During the period under investigation, can the Saudi security concerns be 
characterised as an outcome of fears about the possibility of a security threat from 
other great powers? Or was it an outcome of Saudi Arabian anxiety over the 
possibility of regional threats? What was the impact of any of these concerns on 
Saudi-British relations? What were the fundamental security concerns that existed, 
from London's point of view, in connection with Saudi Arabia? Were concerns over 
Saudi Arabia set within the broader context of the global interests of the British 
Empire? I f so, did such concerns decline relatively after the British withdrawal from 
India in 1947? I f yes, what was the impact of this on Saudi-British relations? Did the 
British government's concerns regarding security issues - within the framework of 
Saudi-British relations - stem from the situation during W.W.II? I f so, did the end of 
the war and the ultimate end of such concerns affect the pattern of Saudi-British 
relations? 
Fifth, what was the impact of Britain's deteriorating economy and Saudi Arabia's 
economic growth have on the Saudi-Anglo relationship? How did these phenomena 
affect Anglo-Saudi relations, and in which direction and forms? Sub-questions on this 
should include: Did the increase of Saudi Arabian income from oil royalties after 
W.W.II lessen its need for close relations with Britain? In which aspect did it affect 
it? Did the decline in Britain's economy affect British-Saudi cooperation? I f so, how 
and to what extent? Prior to Britain's economic decline and to the concurrent 
improvement of that of Saudi Arabia, what was the scope of their economic 
connection, and how did it influence their relations? 
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C. The Literature Review 
I . The Primary Sources 
Most of the research documents were collected from the Public Record Office (PRO) 
at Kew, London. Al l the records that relate to the study were consulted, but it has to 
be emphasised - for the benefit of similar ftiture research - that nearly all the essential 
documents were in the files of the Foreign Office General Correspondence, 
particularly the political section FO 371. The good thing about the FO General 
Correspondence is not only its superb accessibility and order, but also its 
comprehensive collections. It contains almost the entire despatches, enclosures, 
reports, memorandums from the British Legation/Embassy in Jeddah, the Foreign 
Office outgoing despatches, minutes, etc., correspondence between the British 
government departments about Saudi Arabia, and above all the entire correspondence 
between the Saudi and the British authorities. In addition to the unpublished 
documentary sources, the study also benefited from published primary sources. Two 
published sources from the British records were the most useftil, namely, King Abdul 
Aziz; Political Correspondence: 1904-1953 by Archive Editions and The Buraimi 
Dispute: Contemporary Documents 1950-1961 by Jane Priestland.'^ Published US 
document sources that related to Saudi Arabia were also utilised. Worth mentioning 
among them are two remarkable collections by Ibrahim Al-Rashid: Saudi Arabia 
Enters the Modern World: Secret U.S. Documents on the Emergence of Saudi 
Arabia as a World Power, 1936-1949 and The Struggle Between the Two Princes: 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the Final Days of Ibn Saud.'^ 
It has to be pointed out that the major difficulties that occurred during the period of 
this research were to be found mostly over the primary source issue.'' Indeed, as has 
been noted by most archival researchers in general, and by scholars who conducted 
similar research to the present one in particular, the fiindamental problem in foreign 
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policy research usually lies in the primary source issue. Amongst other difficulties 
that were encountered by this research, three cases in respect to primary sources were 
most notable. 
17 
The first major challenge concerned the lack of some (and not all) of the Saudi 
Arabian primary sources. Though all the Saudi government correspondence with the 
British government was to be found in the British records, still the home records of 
Saudi Arabia, that particularly concerning the Saudi views prior to the adoption of an 
external act, do not exist. Hence, while all Ibn Saud's correspondence with Britain 
was available in the files of the PRO, yet Ibn Saud's thoughts and discussions with his 
own officials in regard to the course of action that Saudi Arabia took in its foreign 
policy were almost nonexistent. The lack of such materials could be attributed to 
several realities. Apart from the external correspondence. King Ibn Saud did not 
write, or keep, a record of his firsthand views - in the form of minutes, memos, etc. -
nor that of his conversations with his officials.'^ The lack of documented records in 
this particular case could be best explained in connection with the simplicity of the 
process of decision-making in Saudi Arabian foreign policy. The matter was simple 
when Saudi Arabia was about to conduct an action in the foreign sphere, particularly 
when the mastermind for such an occurrence was Ibn Saud himself^" Either King Ibn 
Saud directly took action based on his own unrecorded calculations and thoughts or, 
as became apparent during the investigation of this research, he talked to his 
counsellors before taking a final decision on a course of action.^' Moreover, the 
King's consultations with his counsellors took the form of un-recorded verbal 
conversations.^^ As the King did not keep records of his own thoughts he might have 
had the same reason for not recording his conversations with his officials. It could be 
said that the only records that Ibn Saud used to keep were his correspondence with 
foreign powers. This material was presumably kept because the King wanted to prove 
certain obligations by particular states with regard to the kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
Thus, the keeping of the correspondence was principally intended as a vital tool to be 
used when needed.^ ^ The publications of the Saudi government's memorials in regard 
to the Buraimi issue in the mid-1950s - and the contents of such documents - confirm 
that such records existed.^ '* 
I f it is assumed that Ibn Saud's keeping of such records was mainly intended as a 
guarantee or assurance against the possibility of certain actions by other states 
towards his kingdom, it could be also said in contrast that he would not reasonably 
keep records of his own thoughts and policies for the same purpose. Despite the logic 
of the foregoing argument, the researcher decided not to underestimate the possibility 
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of finding documents in Saudi Arabia itself that could invalidate this assertion. 
Attempts were made during fieldwork to locate relevant documentation in several 
documentation units that seemed likely to have such records. These attempts were 
carried out in a number of locations in Riyadh, such as the King Abdulaziz 
Foundation for Research and Archive (ad-Darah), King Abdulaziz Library and King 
Fahad Library.'^^ Al l these efforts were unproductive in terms of data, but further 
consolidated the previous argument. Beyond this difficulty, the issue became more 
complicated with the absence of any still-living Saudi personality who had been close 
to Ibn Saud during the occurrence of the events concerned. Unfortunately, by the time 
this study was carried out all the Saudi personalities that could have been interviewed 
as well-informed witnesses of the major developments of Ibn Saud's policies towards 
Britain had already passed away.^ ^ Thus, an attempt at interviews as an alternative 
was out of the question. 
Nevertheless, the researcher endeavoured to overcome this difficulty by the utilisation 
of alternative tools. Full use of all the available documents was a major gateway. 
Though all sorts of related documents were used in regard to this matter, it should be 
noted that particular attention was given to Ibn Saud's communications with the 
British government, as well as to the observations of the British 
Ministers/Ambassadors in Jeddah. Hence, the utilisation of Ibn Saud's direct 
correspondence with the British government was usefiil in reading the King's views 
and the possible available actions that he might have taken in retrospect. The 
observations of the British diplomats in Saudi Arabia - to be found mainly in their 
despatches to the Foreign Office - were also constructive in providing insight.^^ The 
King's frequent correspondence with the British government, along with the close 
contacts between him and the British diplomats in Jeddah, were the major bases used 
for establishing the King's views. In addition to the usage of the available documents 
for this, other research means were also exploited, such as secondary sources and the 
researcher's analytic understanding of Ibn Saud. 
The second central difficulty in regard to the primary sources was faced as a result of 
the closure of some of the PRO files that concern the present study. Though the 
closure of some of the PRO files under the fifty years closure status can be 
comprehended, the closure of some files that passed such a restriction is difficult to 
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understand. I f all the files that passed the period of the fifty years restriction were 
released on time, the present study would have benefited directly from the majority of 
the PRO resources up to 1950, leaving behind only about two unreleased files that 
concern the last two years of the period covered. However, the British government's 
practice of extending the restriction of any file that passed the fifty years, or even the 
thirty years, seems to be extensive. Among the methods used has been to place a file 
on 'permanent loan' to the departments which originated the file. Indeed, some files 
that relate to this study - and that included some from the 1940s and should have been 
released in the 1990s - were on permanent loan to the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office (FCO). When faced with such cases a prolonged correspondence took place 
between the researcher and the Library and Records Department at the FCO. In most 
cases this correspondence, which was time-consuming, usually ended without the 
researcher gaining any visible data.^ ^ The usual way of resolving such a difficulty was 
to concentrate the research efforts on all the files that might contain some of the 
restricted data. Usually, the effort in searching around such a file was satisfactory 
though it was certainly time-consuming. 
The third noteworthy difficulty in relation to the primary sources was the treatment of 
the documents in the files of the PRO in general. The studying and the writing up of 
the contents of the documents are usually difficult tasks in comparison to the same 
efforts when dealing with secondary sources. Extensive efforts need to take place in 
studying massive numbers of documents in order to gain few facts. Moreover, in most 
of these cases it appeared that though the studying of a massive number of documents 
was needed in order to come out with a satisfactory result, the effort usually ended up 
with considering only a few of these studied documents as worthy of reference. In 
brief, the usual outcome of the studied documents might appear small when compared 
to the massive data that had to be investigated. 
I I . The Secondary Sources 
Before reviewing the secondary sources two matters ought to be illuminated. First, the 
current study is the first attempt that comprehensively covers Saudi-British relations 
from 1939 through to 1953.^° Second, as the study mostly relied on archival 
documents, and as it was intended to be a reliable source for fiirther studies, its 
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treatment of the secondary sources was cautious.'" Although, the secondary sources 
that were used were trustworthy, problems arose due to a contradiction between 
secondary sources. The only exception here were the works on Saudi-US relations 
and those based on the US records. This exception was possible because of the 
extensive available literature that covers Saudi-US relations. The variety of sources on 
this topic made it possible to resolve any uncertainty by comparing several secondary 
sources. 
Though this sUidy is the first of its kind to cover Saudi-British relations from 1939 to 
1953 in depth, previous works had touched on the topics that concerned Saudi Arabia 
and Britain in general. During the era prior to the one covered here, two remarkable 
works ought to be mentioned. The first is The Birth of Saudi Arabia; Britain and 
the Rise of the House of Sa'ud by Gary Troeller.^^ Troeller's study covers Saudi-
British relations up to the mid-1920s, giving an extensive historical account of the 
early stages of Ibn Saud's connections with Britain. The second study is Britain and 
Saudi Arabia 1925-1939 by Clive Leatherdale." As revealed in its title, 
Leatherdale's study deals with Anglo-Saudi relationship from the end of the era that 
was covered by the Troeller study until the point at which the current study begins. 
The other studies that dealt with the issues that involve Saudi Arabia and Britain were 
the extensive works on the frontier issue. Three studies focused on the issue, namely: 
Eastern Arabian Frontiers by John Kelly, The Evolution of National Boundaries 
in the Southeastern Arabian Peninsula; 1934-1955 by Abdulrahman Al-Shamlan, 
and Arabia's Frontiers; The Story of Britain's Boundary Drawing in the Desert 
by John Wilkinson.^'' Parts of these three studies dealt with the issue that the present 
study is dealing with as well, specifically the frontier dispute from 1949 onwards. 
Even so, it should be noted that the differences between these studies and the current 
study are significant. These writers dealt with the frontier issue from diverse 
viewpoints, and their linkage between the dispute and the nucleus of Saudi-British 
relations was generally weak. By focusing on the frontier dispute with strong 
emphasis on its relation to Saudi-British political ties this study will emphasise a 
dimension that has not been properly covered in previous studies, not just in its 
analytical process but also in the outcome of its findings. 
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Unlike the case of Saudi-British relations which suffers from the absence of any 
comprehensive secondary literature in the era from 1939 onwards, the Saudi-US case 
is rich. The most notable study that comes close - to some extent - to the idea of the 
present study, is Isadore Gold's doctoral dissertation; The United States and Saudi 
Arabia, 1933-1953: Post-Imperial Diplomacy and the Legacy of British Power.^ ^ 
With strong emphasis on US-Saudi relations. Gold touched on the diplomatic 
supremacy that shifted in Saudi Arabia from Britain to the USA. In a similar way to 
nearly all the studies that looked at this issue from the US-Saudi relations dimension. 
Gold's study almost repeated the 'stereotype' exaggeration of the American factor. 
The fundamental dissimilarity between the existing study and Gold's study stems 
from the dimension on which each study is organised. The current study looks into the 
issue primarily from an angle that has not been previously studied, namely the British-
Saudi dimension. Hence, its expected outcome would vary from the previous studies. 
Among other literature on Saudi-US relations, Irvine Anderson's study Aramco, the 
United States, and Saudi Arabia: A Study of the Dynamic of Foreign Oil Policy 
1933-1950 and Aaron Miller's Search for Security; Saudi Arabian Oil and 
American Foreign Policy. 1939-1949 are both remarkable.^^ They both give a 
comprehensive account of the progress of US involvement in Saudi Arabia. Finally, it 
should be pointed out that this thesis has benefited greatly from the massive 
secondary sources that were available on Saudi-US relations and that were 
constructed on US primary sources." The consultation of these sources together with 
the published US documents eliminated any need for turning directly to the US 
records. 
D. The Study Outlines 
Within this introductory chapter a brief look at the historical background of Saudi-
British relations up to 1939 will be provided. Following that, the study will trace the 
shift that occurred, by studying the development of Saudi-British relations from early 
1939 to November 1953 in five main chapters and a final conclusion. 
The study's main theme, along with the adoption of the diplomatic history method, 
led the focus on a specific period of time in Saudi-British relations. Ultimately, the 
chronology of the period became the most appropriate technique in dividing the thesis 
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and its main chapters. In sequential order, each of the main chapters will focus on the 
development of Saudi-British relations during a certain period. Without deserting the 
aspects that concern the entire study, each chapter will focus within its period on the 
development of certain events. As each chapter focuses on a different era and 
examines certain events that took place within that limit, each of these chapters could 
hang by itself However, this independence is not an absolute, as the study theme, 
framework, and questions tie these chapters strongly together as one coherent body. 
Hence, the relation between these chapters is strong, and usually these relations are 
stronger in regard to adjacent chapters. Likewise, it should be noted that, while some 
of the chapters will answer certain questions that are under consideration 
independently, full and precise answers to all the study's queries will be clearer when 
all these chapters are pulled together. 
The first main chapter will study Saudi-British relations from early 1939 to the end of 
1942. Generally, the chapter is an examination of Saudi-British relations and the 
phenomena that were affecting it before, during, and after the outbreak of W.W.II. 
The second chapter will examine Saudi-British relations, from the outset of 1943 
through to the end of 1945. In general, the chapter will study Saudi Arabian 
interactions with Britain and the USA along with American and British rivalry in 
Saudi Arabia and the impact of these developments on Saudi-British relations. The 
third main chapter will focus on Saudi-British relations in 1946, 1947, and 1948. On 
the whole, the chapter will survey Saudi Arabian interactions with Britain and the 
USA and the impact of these interactions on Anglo-Saudi relations. Moreover, the 
chapter will study the Saudi-Hashemites issue, the Palestine question, the 
improvement of the Saudi Arabian economy, and the implications of these 
developments for Saudi-British relations. The fourth chapter will investigate Saudi-
British relations from the beginning of 1949 to the end of 1951. Overall, the chapter 
will study Saudi-British relations alongside Saudi-US relations, the Saudi-British 
dispute over Saudi Arabia's southeast frontiers, the Saudi-Hashemites issue, and the 
implications of these subjects for the whole of Saudi-British relations. The last main 
chapter wil l study Saudi-British relations in 1952 and 1953. Mostly, the chapter will 
concentrate on the collapse of Saudi-British relations over the frontier dispute as 
being the last phase of a series of deteriorations that occurred in the progress of these 
relations.^^ 
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2. Historical Baclcground 
A. The Diplomatic History of Saudi-British Relations up to 1930 
According to Gary Troeller, "the first mention of British relations with the Wahhabis 
occurs with the rise of Wahhabi power in the Arabian Peninsula . . . in the early 
nineteenth century".^^ However, the first well-known written document to be 
exchanged between the Saudi rulers and the British was a written declaration sent by 
Imam Abdullah Ibn Faisal to the British government on 21 April 1866. In that 
declaration Imam Abdullah assured the British government that he would not oppose 
or injure any British subjects in the Saudi territories or attack or injure the territories 
of those Arabs who were in alliance with the British.''" After this declaration, Saudi-
British contacts did not resume until the beginning of the twentieth century when 
Abdulaziz Ibn Abdulrahman Ibn Faisal Alsaud (Ibn Saud) re-established the (third) 
Saudi State."" 
Soon after Ibn Saud took Riyadh in 1902, he initiated contacts with the British 
government. His aim was directed towards establishing a political link similar to those 
maintained by the Gulf Sheikhdoms. The establishment of such a link was crucial for 
Ibn Saud, as he was in need of the British government's recognition and support. 
Though there were other powers in the area to which Ibn Saud could have turned, he 
preferred Britain. There were possible reasons for this. First, he believed that Britain's 
relations with the Gulf sheikhs had been in the interest of the rulers concerned.'*^ 
Second, the British Empire was viewed as the greatest power in the Middle East, 
according to Ibn Saud's calculiations.'*^ That power could protect Ibn Saud's state 
against any threat, and supply it with subsidies and weapons. Finally, the British 
Empire was the only power in the area that had no direct interest in conquering any of 
Ibn Saud's territories at that time. 
At the end of 1903 Ibn Saud sent an envoy to Captain Prideaux, the British political 
agent in Bahrain. This envoy informed Prideaux that Ibn Saud had not given 
consideration to a Russian offer of establishing political relafions with him, because 
he preferred the British. Although Ibn Saud's envoy had made great efforts to 
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convince the British political agent of the importance of Britain establishing a 
political link with his master, he had to return to Riyadh without any commitment."*^ 
In 1906, Ibn Saud made three similar overtures to the British government, but all his 
overtures were turned down."*^  
In addition to Ibn Saud's efforts, some British officials tried without success to 
convince their government to establish a political link with Ibn Saud. In June 1906 the 
British Ambassador in Istanbul wrote to the Foreign Office about the importance of 
Ibn Saud, and the need for a friendly agreement with him. Similarly the British 
Resident in the Gulf, Sir Percy Cox, wrote to the 'British controlled' government of 
India in November 1906, advising it to establish a relation with Ibn Saud."** As it had 
been the policy of the British government to confine their interest and influence to the 
coasts of the Gulf at the beginning of the century, Ibn Saud's case was not considered 
despite all these efforts.'*' 
Even, when Ibn Saud reached the Gulf Coast after his seizure of Al-Ahsa, in May 
1913, the British government still did not decide on his case. At this time, the British 
government was very careful in its policy towards Ibn Saud, particularly as the 
establishment of any kind of relationship with him might have damaged London's 
relations with Istanbul. The British government "viewed Ibn Sa'ud as a figure of 
minimal importance in the context of general Anglo-Turkish relations"."* 
The British government policy towards Ibn Saud did not in fact change until Turkey 
declared war on the Allies on 30 October 1914.'*' The British goverrmient then 
embarked on a series of communications and negotiations with Ibn Saud, starting in 
December 1914. This culminated with the signing of the Anglo-Saudi Treaty on 26 
December 1915.^ " 
The Anglo-Saudi Treaty put an end to the traditional British policy of avoiding Ibn 
Saud. Thus, by its ratification, official connection - then relations - between Saudi 
Arabia and Britain commenced. Though it was clearly mentioned in the first article of 
the treaty that Britain recognised Ibn Saud as an independent ruler, the treaty gave the 
British government control over his country's external relations. In return, the treaty 
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gave Ibn Saud guaranteed aid against any external aggression. '^ In addition, Ibn Saud 
started receiving monthly subsidies and some light arms from Britain.^^ 
The new Saudi-British relationship was not that of equals, rather it was a kind of 
imperial connection similar in many respects to the British government's link with the 
sheikhdoms of the Gulf There was no appointment of a British diplomat in Riyadh, 
or a Saudi diplomat in London. The channel of communication between Ibn Saud and 
the British government was through the High Commissioner in Iraq, Sir Percy Cox, 
and the political agent in Bahrain.^ "* 
Interactions between Ibn Saud and the British Empire and its protectorates increased 
dramatically after the Anglo-Saudi Treaty. Thus, in November 1916 a conference was 
held in Kuwait between Ibn Saud, the Sheikh of Kuwait, the Sheikh of Mohammerah, 
and the British government representative, Percy Cox.^ ^ In addition, Britain tried to 
fix Ibn Saud's boundaries with his northern neighbours: the Najd-Iraq frontier was 
settled in two stages, in 1922 and in 1925; the Najd-Kuwait frontier was fixed in 
December 1922, and the Najd-Transjordan one on 2 November 1925.^ ^ 
During the Najd-Hijaz War (1924-1926) Britain chose to remain neutral in what it 
considered a religious war.^ ^ However, the result of this war was crucial to the history 
of Anglo-Saudi relations.^^ Following the end of the war, on 15 February 1926, 
Britain recognised the new political status of Ibn Saud as 'king of Hijaz, Sultan of 
Najd and its Dependencies'.^ ^ 
Because of this new political order it became clear that the earlier Anglo-Saudi Treaty 
of 1915 was out of place, and therefore should be reconsidered. Therefore, the British 
government embarked on new negotiations with King Ibn Saud leading to the Treaty 
of Jeddah, which was reached on 20 May 1927.^° 
In the new treaty, which annulled the old one, Britain recognised the absolute 
independence of the dominions of Ibn Saud. In return Ibn Saud had to cooperate with 
the British government in the suppression of the slavery trade, to facilitate the 
pilgrimage of British subjects, and to maintain friendly relations with the Gulf 
Sheikhs.^' 
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When Britain recognised the 'Kingdom of Hijaz, Sultanate of Najd and its 
Dependencies' in February 1926, the British Consul in Jeddah became London's 
representative to the new state.^ ^ However, after the ratification of the Jeddah Treaty 
the Foreign Office appointed Sir Andrew Ryan in May 1930 as the first British 
Minister to the 'Kingdom of Hijaz, Najd and its Dependencies'." Ibn Saud appointed 
Mr Hafiz Wahba as the first Saudi Minister to London in the same year.^ 
B. Critical Issues of the 1930s Concerning Saudi-British Relations 
I . Palestine and Saudi-British Relations in the 1930s 
According to Clive Leatherdale, "Prior to the 1936 disturbances Ibn Saud had paid 
little attention to events in Palestine".^ ^ However, during the 1936 Palestinian strike 
King Ibn Saud became highly concerned about the Palestinian issue. Ibn Saud's 
awareness of the situation by then had motivated him - alongside his own 
population's encouragement - to prevent the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. In 
addition, Ibn Saud was asked by the Palestinian mufti Hajj Amin Al-Husayni, on 28 
April 1936, to help in countering what Al-Husayni called "British Zionist policy" 
against the Arab nation.^^ 
In April and again in June 1936, Ibn Saud contacted the British government 
explaining that he was in a difficult position in relation to the Palestine issue. Hence 
from one side he was being pressed by his ovra population and by the Arab nations to 
do something in favour of the Palestinians. From the other side he was obliged to 
maintain his good relations with the British government, who in this regard were seen 
as working against Palestinian interests.^' 
On 23 June 1936, Saudi Arabia suggested to Britain that it would use its influence to 
mediate between the British government and the Palestinians in order to bring an end 
to the 1936 strike. Ibn Saud suggested that Saudi Arabia would, with Iraq and Yemen, 
jointly make an appeal in order to make the Palestinians stop the "campaign of 
flCl 
violence". The British government welcomed Ibn Saud's proposal enthusiastically. 
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After successful contacts between Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Iraq, the heads of these 
States together with Amir Abdullah of Jordan, sent an appeal to the Palestinians on 10 
October 1936. This appeal urged the Palestinians to restore order, to stop violence and 
to rely on the "good intentions" and cooperation of the British govemment.^ ^ When 
this appeal, supported by the Arab Higher Committee, ended the Palestinian strike 
successfiilly, the British government formally thanked Ibn Saud for his efforts in 
solving the dilemma.^" 
In November 1936 the British government formed the Royal Commission of Inquiry 
on Palestine. This Commission, which was also known by the name of its president. 
Lord Peel, started to investigate the situation in Palestine as soon as it was formed.'' 
While the Royal Commission was working on its investigations in Palestine, Ibn Saud 
sent a proposal to the British government on 6 February 1937. Ibn Saud suggested 
four points which he believed should form part of the recommendations: to grant a 
complete amnesty in Palestine; to suspend Jewish immigration; to introduce 
legislation protecting Palestinian landowners; and to set up a constitutional Palestinian 
government.'^ On 28 March 1937, Ibn Saud again emphasised the need for the 
creation of a Palestinian national government in which the rights of minorities, 
including those of the Jews, would be protected under a national pact.'^ 
In June 1937 the Royal Commission recommended the creation of a Jewish state and 
an Arab state in Palestine, with the Jerusalem area remaining under British 
administration. Ibn Saud and the Arab leaders rejected these proposals, and argued 
instead that one Palestinian State should be created.''* 
From this moment onward, it seems that Ibn Saud was not satisfied with the British 
government policy in Palestine. Without announcing his dissatisfaction to the public, 
he sent London several suggestions. One of these was his memorandum of 6 
September 1937, in which he suggested a final settlement of this issue on a similar 
basis to the proposals he made at the beginning of 1937. On the same lines, Ibn Saud 
also sent the British government a letter on 15 January 1938, explaining the justice of 
granting the Arabs their rights in Palestine, and explaining further why the partition 
plan was unjust.'^ 
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The deteriorating situation in Palestine, along with the Arab world's condemnations 
of the Royal Commission's recommendation, led to the establishment of another 
British Royal Commission. This new Royal Commission recommended in October 
1938 the abandonment of the previous partition plan.'^ In addition to this, the British 
government called for a conference on Palestine in order to reach a reasonable 
solution to its problem. This conference was to be held in London in early 1939." 
I I . The Hashemites and Saudi Arabia 
The development of Saudi-British relations during the period that will be under 
extensive study in this thesis cannot be fully comprehended without taking into 
consideration the impact of Ibn Saud's anxiety about the Hashemites. Hence a look at 
the background of this issue is essential in order to examine its impact on Saudi-
British relations. 
Though the main rival of King Ibn Saud, King Hussein Bin Al i (the former King of 
Hijaz), died in June 1931 and also his son King Faisal of Iraq died in 1933, the 
Hashemites continued to be a problem for Ibn Saud. The second son of Hussain Bin 
Al i , Amir Abdullah of Transjordan, was the surviving enemy in King Ibn Saud's eyes, 
particularly as Abdullah himself had fought battles against Ibn Saud before the 
Hashemites were pushed out of the Hijaz.'^ 
Abdullah's attitude towards Ibn Saud before 1933 was hostile in general, particularly 
when he "refiased to contemplate any act that would imply recognition of Ibn Saud", 
and when he was believed to be behind the Ibn Rifada tribal revolts in the north west 
of Hijaz in May 1932.^° 
Because of the fear of the possible negative impact of Abdullah-Ibn Saud's relations 
on Saudi-British relations, as Britain was responsible for Transjordan foreign 
relations, the British government urged both parties to sign a friendship freaty. In 
April 1933 Ibn Saud and Abdullah formally recognised the political status of each 
other and a treaty between them was signed in the summer of the same year.*' 
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Despite the fact that Ibn Saud signed the 1933 treaty with Abdullah, he was always 
worried about any gain that the Hashemites could make in the Arab world. He thought 
that i f the Hashemites became stronger, they could threaten his own security, 
particularly in the Hijaz. On various occasions, Ibn Saud's feelings in this respect 
were made apparent. For example, when there were strong rumours in 1936 that 
France was going to appoint a Hashemite monarchy in Syria, Ibn Saud "viewed the 
Syrian throne going to Abdullah, or any other Hashemite prince, as a hostile act and a 
threat to his independence".*^ Moreover, when the report of the Royal Commission on 
Palestine was made public on 22 June 1937, Ibn Saud was less worried about the 
partition of Palestine than about Abdullah being given full independence and being 
appointed as a king of both Jordan and the proposed new Palestinian S ta te . In 
addition, Ibn Saud was always anxious about Abdullah's Pan-Arab plans, in particular 
his ambitions for a Greater Syria.*"* 
It always suited Ibn Saud, according to Leatherdale, to have "his personal rivals 
conspicuously under British control", particularly when "Abdullah's independence, i f 
coupled with a British subsidy . . . would weaken Saudi Arabia's security".*^ In this 
respect Ibn Saud knew that, "it was only the British mandate which kept Abdullah's 
intrigues in check". Ibn Saud's intention was to make sure that Jordan and Palestine 
were to remain under mandatory control in order to prevent Abdullah becoming king 
of Jordan or indeed king of Palestine.*' 
I I I . The Saudi-British Dispute on the Arabian Southeast Frontier 
Although Saudi-British relations continued towards the W.W.II era on a friendly 
basis, a dispute on the southeastern Saudi border erupted between Saudi Arabia and 
the British Gulf protectorates in the 1930s. Britain and Saudi Arabia tried to reach 
agreement about this dispute during several meetings between their governments' 
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representatives in September 1934 and in April and November 1935. Nonetheless 
the negotiations broke down and were suspended until after W.W.II, when the border 
dispute broke out again in 1949.*^ Although the frontier quarrel did not damage 
Saudi-British relations during this period, it was to have a significant impact on it 
during the 1950s, a matter, which this study will discuss in its last two main 
chapters. 
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C. The Development of Saudi Arabia's Diplomatic History with other Powers 
than Britain Before 1939 
Ibn Saud's new political situation after 1926 opened the door for him to create 
relations with the rest of the world. In addition to his newly created relations in 1926 
with, among others USSR, France and the Netherlands, Ibn Saud tried to build ties 
with other powers, such as the USA, Italy, and Germany. A brief look at the 
background of these developments is necessary in order to comprehend their later 
impact on Saudi-British relations. 
Although Ibn Saud sought USA recognition in 1928, he did not receive that 
recognition until 1 May 1931.^' Furthermore, it was not until the American oil 
companies gained oil concessions in the country,'^ that the U.S. government signed a 
provisional agreement with Saudi Arabia on 7 November 1933 regarding its future 
diplomatic and consular representation.^'' 
The US policy towards Saudi Arabia before W.W.II swung between two tendencies: 
its traditional policy of isolation and its newly developed economic interest in the 
region. Hence, due to its traditional policy it did not recognise Saudi Arabia until 
1931, five years after the UK, USSR, and France had done so; and its new economic 
interest made it sign the 1933 agreement. Because of the dominance of the isolationist 
policy, the USA kept its relations with Saudi Arabia to a minimum up to the war 
period. So, despite the fact that it signed the 1933 diplomatic agreement, the first USA 
representative to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia did not arrive in Jeddah until after the 
beginning ofW.W.II.^^ 
Saudi-Italian relations began in February 1932, when Italy signed a Treaty of 
Friendship with the 'kingdom of Hijaz, Najd and its Dependencies'.^^ From 1934 
onwards, when it embarked on consolidating its presence in the Red Sea, Italy 
strengthened its relations with Saudi Arabia. Examples could be seen in such dealings 
as Rome's offer to train a group of Saudi youths in aviation techniques in Italy, the 
expansion of the Italian Legation in 1935, the establishment of an Italian Air Mission 
in Jeddah, and the gift of six Italian airplanes to Saudi Arabia in 1936.^ ^ 
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Despite the outlook of the Saudi-ItaHan interactions, it should be noted that the Saudis 
were anxious about the strengthening of the Italy's power in the area.'^ Hence, by 
allowing their connections with Italy to increase, the Saudis were in fact endeavouring 
to prevent the potentiality of any kind of Italian aggression against the Kingdom.'^ 
Indeed, Italy's actions against the Arabs of Libya, and its obvious territorial ambitions 
in the area, had caused Ibn Saud to suspect the real intentions.^ ^ Despite, the Anglo-
Italian Rome Agreement of 1927, Ibn Saud had regarded Britain as a guardian against 
any potential Italian hostility.'"" Nevertheless, the signing of the - new - Anglo-Italian 
Agreement on 16 April 1938, which was seen as a kind of collaboration accord 
between those two powers in the Middle East, had disappointed King Ibn Saud."" In 
fact, the Italian-British understanding in the Middle East was a matter of concern to 
Ibn Saud and eventually had an impact on his foreign policy.'"^ 
Ibn Saud's most significant diplomatic contacts with Germany occurred on 5 
November 1937, when his personal secretary, Mr Yusuf Yassin, met - in Baghdad -
the German Minister to Iraq, Dr Fritz Grobba. Saudi Arabia sought from that meeting 
to promote German help for the Arabs in regard to Palestine and to encourage 
Germany to open a Saudi-German diplomatic channel. After discussing the 
Palestinian problem, Yassin requested Grobba to ask his government for diplomatic 
support for the Arabs in this matter. Furthermore, Yassin stated that, "King Ibn Saud 
would greatly welcome having Germany send [a] diplomatic representative to Jidda 
[Jeddah]".'"^ 
At the time when Anglo-Italian correlation was increasing and the situation in 
Palestine was deteriorating, Saudi Arabia increased its contacts with Germany. In the 
spring of 1938 Khalid Al-Qarqani was sent by Ibn Saud to Berlin in order to conclude 
an arms deal, as well as to initiate closer ties with Germany. Though Al-Qarqani's 
mission failed to conclude an arms deal by August 1938, the question of Saudi-
German diplomatic relations was kept open.'"'* 
On 29 September 1938 the German government decided to establish diplomatic 
relations with Saudi Arabia. It requested the Saudi Minister in Cairo inform his 
government that the German Minister in Baghdad would be accredited to Saudi 
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Arabia as well.'"^ The German government's decision had brought about major 
diplomatic interactions between Saudi Arabia and Germany on the eve of the war, as 
the following chapter will demonstrate.'"^ 
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Notes 
' In addition to the primary documents the study wil l also make use of - only reliable - secondary 
sources that are available. See the literature review in the following pages of this introduction. 
^ Several scholars had used the combinations of the diplomatic history and the realist model. See for 
example Kieft, David Owen. British Foreign Policy and France. 1868-1880; A Study in Great 
Power Diplomacy (Russia, Germany, Egypt. Turkey). Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Minnesota, 
1998, pp. 1-9. Also, see Hurrell, Andrew. The United States and Latin America: Neorealism re-
examined. In Woods, Ngaire. Explaining International Relations since 1945. Oxford: Oxford 
University press, 1997, pp. 155-178. In addition a study on the nineteenth century Saudi-Anglo 
relations had applied the realist model. See Al-Nuaim, Mishary. ie.\J : c j . ^ j » ^ l ^ i i J i J j L a l l 
1866-1800 ^ " ^ a j j ^ l - A B U J I j j j a J ("Political Analysis Foundation: various reading for the roots of 
the Saudi-British relations 1800-1866) . In j?^'! f w ^ ' ^ ' ^ ' j ^ (Journal of the Gulf and 
the Arabian Peninsula Studies). Vol. 84, winter 1997, pp. 213-231. Though this study relies on the 
realism paradigm - as indicated in this chapter - it should be noted that such a conduct would not 
completely ignore the association of the ideological aspect to Saudi Arabian foreign policy over the 
Palestine issue. The purpose of this exception would be only for the sake of 'further understanding' for 
the development of the Saudi-British relations over this particular case. For more details, see section D 
of chapter three. 
^ The organisation of these assumptions was as a result of various readings about realism and neo-
realism in several books including the following: Holsti, K. International Politics: A Framework for 
Analysis. Englewood Cliffs (new Jersey): Prentice Hall, 1995 (Seventh Edition), pp. 5-6. Also, Viotti, 
Paul & Kauppi, Mark. International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism. Globalism. London: 
Allyn and Bacon, 1993 (Second Edition), pp. 5-7 & pp. 35-66. Also, Keohane, Robert. Theory of 
World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond. In Viotti, Paul & Kauppi, Mark. op. cit., pp. 186-196. 
Also, Brown, Michael & Lynn-Jones, Sean & Miller, Steven. The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary 
Realism and International Security. London: The Mit Press, 1995, pp. ix-xiii. Also, Frankel, 
Benjamin. Realism; Restatements and Renewal. London: Frank Cass, 1996, pp. xiii-xx. Also, Buzan, 
Barry. The Timeless Wisdom of realism. In Smith, Steve & Booth Ken & Zalewski, Marysia. 
International Theory; Positivism & Beyond. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 47-
63. Also, Rosenau, James & Durfee, Mary. Thinking Theory Thoroughly: Coherent Approaches to 
an Incoherent World. Oxford: Westview Press, 1995, pp. 9-29. Also, Dougherty, James & Pfaltzgraff, 
Robert. Contending Theories of International Relations; A Comprehensive Survey. New York: 
Longman, 1997, pp-58-93. 
"* The main aspect of growth within the Saudi Arabian economy was the increase of its income from the 
oil royalty in the period from 1946 onwards. In addition, there was a growth of a relatively modest 
aspect of infrastructure development approximately during the same time that the oil production was 
increasing. In regard to Britain, the main aspect of economic decline that concerns this study was the 
deterioration of Britain's foreign aid as a tool of foreign politics after W.W.II. The political decline was 
mainly within the British Empire, in particular the withdrawal from India in 1947 (an eariy indication 
of further deterioration). See Chapter three of this thesis. 
^ Particularly, with the realist assumptions that are in use in this thesis. 
^ See Al-Zarkali, Khairaldin. j j>JI tilUlt '»jj>^l ^ (The Peninsula during the reign of King 
Abdulaziz). Beirut: fJ»Ji J\ 1992, p. 369. It became a custom for Ibn Saud to give specific 
instructions to his officials when they undertook official missions abroad. See for example. King Ibn 
Saud's instructions to Prince Faisal before attending London Conference on Palestine in 1939. A l -
Zarkali, Kiiairaldin. op. cit., pp. 770-774. As well as, King Ibn Saud's instructions to Crown Prince 
Saud before leaving for the USA in 1947, Al-Zarkali, Khairaldin. op. cit., pp. 775-781. 
' As this thesis demonstrates through all its main chapters, Ibn Saud frequently contacted Britain 
diplomatically through the British Ministers/Ambassadors in Jeddah. Nevertheless, occasionally Ibn 
Saud instructed the Saudi Minister/Ambassador in London, Hafiz Wahba, to call on the Foreign Office, 
but that was usually when it was a less important issue or when the British Minster/Ambassador was 
not in Saudi Arabia (on leave) or when Wahba flew with instructions from Saudi Arabia. 
* For a clear example see section E of chapter five. For Ibn Saud this synonymity was sometimes 
definable in both ways when any issue was in focus; that's to say: he is the state and the state is himself 
as well. It could be said that Ibn Saud's view of not distinguishing between his own position and the 
concept of the state was also reflected in his internal politics. This notion caused the King to deal 
within his kingdom's components in a very relaxed - and perhaps traditional - way. Hence, the land 
became his own property and he became the political father of the population. Thus he ruled them in a 
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simple personal way that allowed traditional personal contacts at all levels, and allowed him to take 
care of their needs, even i f it would be at the expense of the state's poor economy. This - alongside 
other unique factors that relate to Ibn Saud and Saudi Arabia - could explain the King's popularity 
among the vast majority of his subjects, particularly from the mid-1930s onwards. Also, see Al-Zarkali, 
Khairaldin. op. cit., pp. 835-836. 
' From F. H. W Stonehewer-Bird (Jeddah) to Foreign Office, Review of the situation in Saudi Arabia 
in 1940, 20 March 1941, FO 371/27261. 
Al l the terms that normally refer to Saudi Arabia would be in use as a reference to the state, 
including the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom, etc. Though Britain is a Kingdom 
as well, the use of the Kingdom - by itself as one noun - would be referring to Saudi Arabia; otherwise 
reference to Britain as a kingdom would be clarified in most cases with a second noun. The definition 
of the state in this study is the one that is generally recognised within social science. However, I define 
state as "a political entity that has a definite territory, permanent population, stable ruling authority, and 
should be independent and sovereign". 
" See Al-Zarkali, Khairaldin. op. cit., pp. 365-369. Also, see Ibid., pp. 1011-1014. 
Surely this is meant to be when a reference would be made without mentioning a particular official 
name. Otherwise, the personal name of such an official would do by itself 
Gold, Isadore Jay. The United States and Saudi Arabia. 1933-1953: Post-Imperial Diplomacy 
and the Legacy of British Power. Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University, 1984, p. 315. 
Though this study wil l look into the development of US-Saudi relations from 1939-1953, it must be 
stressed that it wil l not be covered in the same degree as Saudi-British relations. Beside, the point in 
covering the developments of Saudi Arabia relations with the USA is mainly to determine its impact on 
Saudi-British relations. 
King Abdul Aziz: Political Correspondence: 1904-1953. Chippenham (UK): Archive Editions, 
1996. Priestland, Jane. The Buraimi Dispute: Contemporary Documents 1950-1961. Oxford: 
Archive Editions, 1992. Moreover, the study also used these Published sources: Schofield, Richard & 
Blake, Gerald. Arabian Boundaries: Primary Documents 1853-1957. Famham (UK): 1988. Saudi 
Arabia. Memorial of the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Place of issue is not 
recorded, 31 July 1955. Saudi Arabia. A J J J X ^ I A j j j x l l <1L^I i^J^ (The Proposal of the 
Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia). Cairo: i-ijUJl J\ 31 July 1955. Foreign Office 
Annual Reports f rom Arabia 1930-1960. Chippenham (England): Archive Editions: 1993. Tuson, P 
& Burdett, A. Records of Saudi Arabia: Primary Documents. 1902-1960. Oxford: Redwood Press 
Ltd, 1992. Tuson Penelope, & Quick Emma. Arabian Treaties: 1600-1960. Oxford: Archive Editions, 
1992. Hodgkin, E. Two Kings in Arabia: Sir Reader Bullard's Letters f rom Jeddah. Reading: 
Ithaca, 1993. Kamlah, Taysir. The Role of the Saudi-Hashemite Conflict in the loss of Palestine: 
From the British Foreign Office Documents. London: Al-Rafid Distributing & Publishing, 1996. 
There are many published titles but most of the documents that the study is based on are still in the 
Public Records Office. The answer is simply that no single collection of printed materials could cover 
all the required documents unless it concentrates on one narrow topic and a shorter period of time. For 
example, I found the first two works (King Abdul Aziz: Political Correspondence: 1904-1953 and 
The Buraimi Dispute: Contemporary Documents 1950-1961) more usefiil - than the others - simply 
because the first one just concerned Ibn Saud's correspondence (though I must say it still could not 
cover all of them) and the second one concentrated on Buraimi in ten massive volumes and within a 
shorter period (i.e., eleven years) in comparison with Schofield and Blake collections (Arabian 
Boundaries: Primary Documents 1853-1957 ). During my research at the Public Record Office 
(PRO) I compared the unpublished materials with these titles, I must say I was highly satisfied with 
Priestland, Jane collection (The Buraimi Dispute: Contemporary Documents 1950-1961). On the 
other hand, I was dissatisfied with Tuson, and Burdett, collection (Records of Saudi Arabia: 
Primary Documents. 1902-1960.1 must say I could not see this collection until the latest stages of my 
research). The reason is simple as indicated eariier, Tuson and Burdett tried to cover all the documents 
that were related to Saudi Arabia in more than 58 years in a single title. In short, during my comparison 
of this title and what was available at the PRO, I found that this title was very selective indeed; 
approximately it does not even contain 10% of what is available. Nonetheless, these kinds of 
collections might still be usefiil for research that is not as specific as the current study; such as i f 
someone was researching Saudi-Italian relations and wanted to consult the British record briefly, 
otherwise a researcher must think twice before relying on such collections. 
Al-Rashid, Ibrahim. Saudi Arabia Enters the Modern World: Secret U.S. Documents on the 
Emergence of Saudi Arabia as a World Power. 1936-1949. Salisbury, N.C.: Documentary 
Publications, 1980. Al-Rashid, Ibrahim. The Struggle Between the Two Princes: The Kingdom of 
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Saudi Arabia in the Final Days of Ibn Saud. Chapel Hil l , N.C.: Documentary Publications, 1985. In 
addition, other published US documents were used such as; U.S. Department of State, Foreign 
Relations of the United States; The Near East and Africa. 1943. Also, Hurewitz, J C. The Middle 
East and North Africa in World Politics; A Documentary Record. London: Yale University Press, 
1979. Moreover, other related published documents were also consulted, such as the German 
Documents that were captured and published by the Allies at the end of W.W.II, i.e. Documents on 
German Foreign Policy; 1918-1945. Series D. 
" The following notes should not be taken as a discouragement for further similar study, but should be 
observed in the early plans of such study. Indeed, the benefit of such research is remarkable for Ph.D. 
students. Hence in addition to its original contribution to knowledge, such a study - in my opinion - is 
the best academic front that lets the student master his skills in the field of the academic research. 
See for example Leatherdale, Clive. Britain and Saudi Arabia 1925-1939. London: Frank Cass, 
1983, pp 4-5. Also, Wilkinson, John. Arabia's Frontiers; The Story of Britain's Boundary Drawing 
in the Desert. London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 1991, pp. xxxii-xxxiii. 
" Though it should be mentioned that, in some cases Ibn Saud used to write down instructions for the 
Saudi officials' assignments abroad. See for example Al-Zarkali, Khairaldin. op. cit., pp. 775-781. 
°^ Also, see section 1: A of this chapter. 
^' In most of these cases, Ibn Saud used to turn to his advisers for the sake of non-obligated 
recommendations. That is to say, Ibn Saud used to consult them in order to enhance his knowledge, as 
well as to achieve the best alternative among several policies that concerned a particular case, without 
necessarily putting most of the feedback that he got into practice. Also, see Al-Zarkali, Khairaldin. op. 
cit., p. 569. For example of such cases see Wahba, Hafiz. "»•>!•>• iJ a_y^ (Fifty years in the 
Arabian Peninsula). Cairo:,^Mi .^ii^ij^, 1960, pp. 108-109. 
This fact was observed in most of the cases that were researched in this study. 
This should be acknowledged beside the fact that Ibn Saud obviously would keep the texts of Saudi 
Arabian treaties and agreements with other states in safe places, hence providing a place for other 
importance correspondence to be saved as well. 
In addition, the same memorials do not give any indication about the existence of internal specific 
minutes of thoughts in regard to the policies that were externally taken during Ibn Saud's reign. See 
Saudi Arabia. Memorial of the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Place of issue is not 
recorded, 31 July 1955. Also, Saudi Arabia. V ^ S a . p^jc- (The Proposal of the 
Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia). Cairo: ^-ijU^I J j , 31 July 1955. 
Despite the valuable collection of these units, no visible data result was obtained for this study. 
Moreover, it should be noted that the holding of King Abdulaziz Information and Document Center - at 
King Abdulaziz Foundation for Research and Archive (ad-Darah) - was generally outstanding in regard 
to the internal history of Saudi Arabia, particularly, the collections of original documents on the local 
affairs of Saudi Arabia. In regards to the external correspondence of the Saudi government, particularly 
to the cases in relation to this study, the collections of all these units, is less comprehensive than that of 
the PRO. Hence, this study was mainly fed by the extensive Saudi correspondence that were founded in 
the PRO. The researcher is gratefiil for the help and the assistance of the staffs of ad-Darah, King 
Fahad Library, and King Abdulaziz Library. 
See Al-Zarkali, Khairaldin. op. cit., pp. 366-369, & pp. 1012-1014. 
Indeed, it could be said that the uniqueness of Ibn Saud's practises in regard to Saudi Arabian foreign 
policy - as stated earlier - were tremendously helpfiil in countering this major difficulty. See section 1: 
A of this chapter. 
The use of the secondary sources was carefully kept within the limits indicated in the following 
section. See section 1: C: I I of this chapter. The use of the current researcher's academic familiarity 
regarding Ibn Saud was also vigilant and conditional in not contradicting any of the evidence obtained. 
Besides, the researcher's task in this specific case was rather analytical than as a source. Though the 
researcher cannot consider himself as an expert nor a specialist in regard to Ibn Saud's political status 
(I believe this matter should be left to the readers' judgement), it is still worth mentioning the 
researcher's familiarity of such a topic. As a Saudi Arabian, whose upbringing was in an environment 
that shared the same location but not the same time as Ibn Saud, a basic knowledge about Ibn Saud was 
formulated prior to undergraduate studies. Benefiting, from uncountable conversations with various 
personalities that lived - and in most cases politically dealt with Ibn Saud - during the King's reign, a 
political opinion was continuously formulated during undergraduate as well as postgraduate academic 
life. Moreover, as a student of Political Science at undergraduate level and a student of Middle Eastern 
Politics at Master level, the researcher produced several essays that focused on Saudi Arabia in general 
and Ibn Saud in particular. Finally, it could be said that the undertaking of this particular research had 
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tremendously sharpened the researcher familiarity in regard to Ibn Saud's traditions in the 
determination of Saudi Arabian foreign policy during the last fifteen years of the King's reign. Before 
ending this note, it should be noted that the researcher was careful not to include any fiindamental 
opinion into the pages of this thesis until the research had reached semi-final drafts. 
Nevertheless, it should be mentioned that the librarian staff at the FCO, were helpfiil in most of the 
cases in giving verbal hints, in regard to some of these files contents or to directions in finding similar 
contents in open files at the PRO. The researcher is grateful for their help in such cases. 
°^ It is worth mentioning that Professor Jamal Qasim of Ain Shams University (Cairo), had presented a 
paper to the conference on 'the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 100 years' (Riyadh 24-28 January 1999), 
entitled 'Saudi-British relations in the Arabian Gulf during King Abdulaziz reign'. In thirty-five pages 
Professor Qasim attempted to cover Saudi-British relations in regard to the Gulf, from 1902 to 1953. 
Though it might be said that paper had filled an empty gap - in such an important matter - in that 
conference, still this modest attempt cannot be considered as a comprehensive study in regard to Saudi-
British relations as whole. The length of the period that was covered, the sources, the study theme, and 
the limit of its contents are indeed denying such character for that paper. See Qasim, Jamal. Saudi-
British relations in the Arabian Gulf during King Abdulaziz reign. Paper presented to conference 
on 'the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 100 years', Riyadh 24-28 January 1999. Professor Qasim who is a 
distinguished scholar and writer in the Arab world is not blamed here, but in fact mentioned in order to 
acknowledge his work. 
^' The references for the secondary sources here include the sources under review within this section, 
as well as those listed in the thesis bibliography. 
Troeller, Gary. The Birth of Saudi Arabia: Britain and the Rise of the House of Sa'ud. London: 
Frank Cass, 1987. 
" Leatherdale, Clive. op. cit. 
Al-Shamlan, Abdulrahman. The Evolution of National Boundaries in the Southeastern Arabian 
Peninsula; 1934-1955. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Michigan, 1987. Kelly, J. Eastern Arabian 
Frontiers. London: Faber and Faber, 1964. Wilkinson, John. Arabia's Frontiers: The Story of 
Britain's Boundary Drawing in the Desert. London: LB. Tauris & Co Ltd, 1991. 
Gold, Isadore Jay. op. cit. 
Anderson, Irvine. Aramco. the United States, and Saudi Arabia; A Study of the Dynamic of 
Foreign Oil Policy 1933-1950. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1981. Miller, Aaron 
David. Search for Security: Saudi Arabian Oil and American Foreign Policy. 1939-1949. Chapel 
Hil l : The University of North Carolma Press, 1980. 
In addition to the reviewed secondary sources on the US-Saudi relations, the list goes on, for 
example see Grayson, Benson Lee. Saudi-American Relations. Washington. D.C.: University Press of 
America. Inc., 1982. Also, Al-Nairab, Mohammad. i ^ j x ^ \ djlaSUIl (Saudi-American 
Relations). Cairo: i^ji^ 1994. Also, Long, David. The United States and Saudi Arabia: 
Ambivalent Allies. London: Westview Press, 1985. Also, Hart, Parker. Saudi Arabia and the United 
States: Birth of a Security Partnership. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998. 
For further details see the introduction of each chapter. 
Troeller, Gary. op. cit., p. 14. 
See the document in Tuson Penelope, & Quick Emma. Arabian Treaties: 1600-1960. Oxford: 
Archive Editions, 1992, Vol. 4. p. 17. Also, in Al-Shamlan, Abdulrahman. op. cit., p. 407. The mention 
of this well-known document, as an example, does not necessarily deny the other correspondences 
between the Saudi and the British in the nineteenth century. For the other correspondences see Al -
Nuaim, Mishary. op. cit., pp. 213-231. Also, see Troeller, Gary. op. cit., pp. 14-15. 
Shortly after this declaration, a conflict for succession erupted between Imam Faisal Ibn Turki's sons 
(Abdullah and Saud). This conflict brought an end to the second Saudi State and forced the survivors of 
the Alsaud dynasty (Ibn Saud and his father) to seek exile in Kuwait from 1891 to 1902. See Troeller, 
Gary. op. cit., pp. 18-21. Also, see Al-Nuaim, Mishary. op. cit., pp. 229-230. 
""^  Ibn Saud personally witnessed the benefit and the advantages of the Kuwaiti-British Treaty of 1899 
during his exile in Kuwait. Also, see Qasim, Jamal. op. cit., p. 1. 
« Ib id . 
Hamadi, Abdulkarim. Saudi Arabia's Territorial Limits: A Study in Law and Politics. Ph.D. 
Dissertation, Indiana University, 1981, p. 14. See also, Troeller, Gary. op. cit., pp. 21-22. 
Troeller, Gary. op. cit., p. 24. Furthermore, Ibn Saud did not give up the hope of establishing a link 
with the British government. Thus, he started building personal relations with some of the British 
officials, such as Captain W. H. I . Shakespeare, the Political Agent in Kuwait. His relations with 
Captain Shakespeare started during his visit to Kuwait in 1910 and lasted until 1914. During 
37 
Shakespeare's several informal visits (such as in 1911, May 1913 and July 1913), Ibn Saud appealed to 
him to convince the British government to consider his case. See Ibid., pp. 36-39. See also, Lacey, 
Robert. The Kingdom. (Arabic edition) London: Interprint, 1987, pp. 67-78. 
Troeller, Gary. op. cit., p. 24. Also, Hamadi, Abdulkarim. op. cit., p. 15. & p. 32. 
Particulariy, when the Najd territories were limited to central Arabia before 1913. Troeller, Gary. op. 
cit., p. 24. 
Troeller, Gary. op. cit., pp. 35-36. It should be noted that at that time there were negotiations 
between the British govenmient and the Turkish government regarding the Arabian Peninsular, over 
the delineation of their respective spheres of influence, which resulted in the signing of the Anglo-
Turkish Convention of 29 July 1913. See Al-Shamlan, Abdulrahman. op. cit., p. 327. & pp. 408-416. 
Also, Troeller, Gary. op. cit., pp. 44-62. 
For the date only see Williams, Ann. Britain and France in the Middle East and North Africa. 
1914-1967. London: Macmillan, 1968, p. 159. When Turkey joined the war with the Central Powers 
(Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, etc.) against the Allies (Britain, France, Russia, Italy, USA, 
etc.) the traditional British policy of maintaining the Ottoman Empire collapsed overnight as Britain 
became at war with it. Ibid. Also, Leatherdale, Clive. op. cit., p. 16. 
°^ See Fitzsimons, M . A. Empire by Treaty. London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1965, p. 23. See also, 
Seton-Williams, M . V. Britain and the Arab States; A survey of Anglo-Arab Relations. 1920-1948. 
London: Luzac and Company, Ltd. 1948, pp. 289-290. & p. 182. See also, Lacey, Robert, op. cit., pp. 
78-79. The negotiations started when the British govemment sent Captain Shakespeare in December 
1914, but because he died in the Jrrab battle between Ibn Saud and Ibn Rashid in January 1915, the 
negotiations froze until December 1915. Ibid., pp. 87-88. 
" See the ful l text of the treaty in Troeller, Gary. op. cit., pp. 254-256. 
Ibn Saud continued to receive the monthly subsidies until terminated by the British govemment on 
31 March 1924. See Leatherdale, Clive. op. cit., p. 18. & p. 33. See also, Troeller, Gary. op. cit., p. 101. 
& p. 216. See also, Sluglett, Peter & Farouk-Sluglett, Marion. The Precarious Monarchy: Britain, Abd 
al-aziz Ibn Saud and the Establishment of the Kingdom of Hiiaz. Naid and its Dependencies. 1925-
1932. In Niblock, Tim. State. Society and Economy in Saudi Arabia. London: Croom Helm, 1982, p. 
50. 
" Ibn Saud's territories became "a veiled British protectorate" like that of the Gulf sheikhdoms and 
was agreed and promised not to enter "into any correspondence, agreements or Treaty with any Foreign 
Nation or Power". Sluglett, Peter & Farouk-Sluglett, Marion, op. cit., pp. 49-50. Also, Troeller, Gary, 
op. cit., p. 255. 
The communication was with the former between 1915 and 1922, then with the latter until 1926. See 
Troeller, Gary. op. cit., pp. 196-197. Although Ibn Saud appointed a British subject, Dr Mann, as his 
personal representative in London in 1922, all his dispatches continued to go through Baghdad and 
Bahrain, because the appointment of Dr Mann was purely nominal. See Ibid., pp. 196-197. 
At this conference the attending Arab leaders promised cooperation with the British Empire. Seton-
Williams, M . V. op. cit., p. 182. See also, Troeller, Gary. op. cit., pp. 99-100. 
Ibid., pp. 188-189. 
" Troeller, Gary. op. cit., p. 216. 
Ibn Saud defeated the King of Hijaz 'Hussain Ibn A l i ' and thus became "the King of Hijaz, and 
sultan of Najd and its dependencies" on 8 January 1926. See Seton-Williams, M . V. op. cit., p. 187. 
Also, Williams, Ann. op. cit., p. 160. 
" It should noted, that the British recognition of Ibn Saud's new political situation came after that of 
the USSR, France and Netheriands. Leatherdale, Clive. op. cit., p. 62. Also, Troeller, Gary. op. cit., p. 
231. It should be also noted that the official name of Saudi Arabia was changing from time to time 
according to the expansions of the Kingdom, thus it was 'Sultanate of Najd and its Dependencies' up to 
January 1926 when it then changed to 'Kingdom of Hijaz, Sultanate of Najd and its Dependencies'. In 
November 1927 the name changed to 'Kingdom of Hijaz, Najd and its Dependencies' finally in 
September 1932 to 'Kingdom of Saudi Arabia'. Al-Damer, Shafi. The Development of the 
Consultation Issue in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Master Dissertation, University of Exeter, 
September 1993, p. 12. & p. 21. 
*° Troeller, Gary. op. cit., p. 236. 
See Troeller, Gary. op. cit., p. 236. Also, Leatherdale, Clive. op. cit., pp. 380-381. This Treaty was to 
run for seven years, however, it was renewed in October 1936 for a fiirdier seven years. See ibid. p. 72. 
" Leatherdale, Clive. op. cit., p. 84. 
" Ibid., p. 86. Reader Bullard, became the second British minister to Saudi Arabia (1937-1939). See 
Ibid., p. 87. 
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" Ibid., pp. 86-87. Also, Troeller, Gary. op. cit., p. 237. 
Leatherdale, Clive. op. cit., p. 267. 
^ Al-Anqari, Abdulrahman. The Palestine Issue in Saudi Arabian Foreign Policy: 1936-1981. Ph.D. 
thesis. University of Exeter, 1989, pp. 135-136. 
*' lbid. ,p. 137. 
Kamlah, Taysir. op. cit., p. 16. Also, Leatherdale, Clive. op. cit., p. 269. 
Al-Anqari, Abdulrahman. op. cit., p. 138. Also, Leatherdale, Clive. op. cit., p. 271. 
™ Al-Anqari, Abdulrahman. op. cit., p. 139. 
" Ibid., p. 139. Also, Leatherdale, Clive. op. cit., p. 273. 
Al-Anqari, Abdulrahman. op. cit., p. 143. 
" Ibid., p. 144. 
Ibid., p. 139. Also, Leatherdale, Clive. op. cit., p. 274. 
Al-Anqari, Abdulrahman. op. cit., pp. 140-143. & pp. 145-146. 
Leatherdale, Clive. op. cit., p. 278. 
" Ibid., p. 279. Also, see section B of chapter one of this study. 
™ Seton-Williams, M . V. op. cit., p. 186. Also, Brenchley, Frank. Britain and the Middle East: An 
Economic History 1945-87. London: Lester Crook Academic Publishing, 1989, p. 104. 
™ Such as the battle of Turaba in 1919. See Wahba, Hafiz. op. cit., p. 128. Also, see Troeller, Gary. op. 
cit., pp. 142-143. 
'° Leatherdale, Clive. op. cit., p. 122. Also, Wilson, Mary. King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of 
Jordan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987, p. 110. The exiled leader of the Belly Tribe, 
Hammed Ibn Rifada, who left Hijaz in 1928 after disagreement with Ibn Saud, entered northem Hijaz 
through Transjordan, with a group of rebels. Ibn Saud easily crushed the movement shortly after its 
outbreak in the northwestern towns of Hijaz. See Al-Zarkali, Khairaldin. op. cit., pp. 557-560. 
^' Leatherdale, Clive. op. cit., pp. 122-123. 
Ibid., p. 284. 
Kedourie, Elie. Great Britain and Palestine: The Turning Point. In Kedourie, Elie. Islam in the 
Modern World. London: Mansell, 1980, p. 144. & p. 150. 
^ Leatherdale, Clive. op. cit., p. 282. 
Ibid., p. 275. 
Ibid. 
«'lbid. 
Al-Shamlan, Abdulrahman. op. cit., p. 65. & pp. 97-112. 
Ibid., p. 186. 
See chapter four and chapter five of the current study. For the details of this dispute during the 1930s 
see Al-Shamlan, Abdulrahman. op. cit., pp. 55-155. Also, see Leatherdale, Clive. op. cit., pp. 221-250. 
Also, see Saudi Arabia, A J J J X ^ I Ajjj^JI i^j^ o:^^^ (The Proposal of the Government of the 
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Chapter One: Close Relations, 1939-1942 
This chapter will study the development of Saudi-British relations from the outset of 
1939 to the end of 1942. As the peak of cordial relations existed during this period, 
the chapter will attempt to highlight the foundations on which the strengthening of 
these relations was based. Certain subjects that were directly related to the 
relationship between Saudi Arabia and Britain will be carefiiUy dealt with. 
Saudi Arabian security concerns at the beginning of 1939 and the implications for the 
development of Saudi-British relations will be dealt with alongside Saudi Arabian 
relations with each of Germany and Italy. The Palestine issue and its association with 
Saudi-Anglo relations will be investigated. The consolidation of British and Saudi 
Arabian relations at the outbreak of the war will be examined. British assistance to 
Saudi Arabia and the question of the Saudi Kingdom's neutrality will both be 
researched. Before ending the chapter a brief look at Saudi-American relations will be 
provided. 
A. Security Concerns and their Implications for Saudi Arabia's Foreign 
Relations 
By the first day of 1939, several decisions that were supposed to formulate a new 
approach for the foreign policy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia were already under 
consideration by its founder and leader, King Ibn Saud.' Two particular developments 
were behind the precise timing when the King launched his efforts on this. First, 
Saudi Arabia was just about to establish a new - formal - political relationship with 
Germany, as the German Minister in Baghdad, Dr Fritz Grobba, was preparing to 
visit the Kingdom for this particular purpose during the early months of that winter.^ 
Second, the Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister, Amir Faisal, was just about to leave the 
Kingdom in order to attend the London Conference on Palestine, an opportunity that 
allowed the King to enquire about his Kingdom's vital issues with the highest level of 
authority in London, the British Prime Minister.'' 
On 2 January 1939, the King of Saudi Arabia signed "a very important message" that 
was to be sent to the British Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon. Neville Chamberlain.'' It 
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could be argued that, at that particular time, Ibn Saud was - for the most part - keen to 
find out the extent to which he could rely on Britain over the Saudi Kingdom's 
security issues. In view of that, he was also attempting to detect the ideal extent -
particularly that of a security nature - in which he should build the Kingdom's 
newborn relations with Germany upon. 
As it happened, the King might have been in darkness on the scope of his Kingdom's 
relations with Britain at that specific time. Certain developments in the 1930s could 
be held responsible for the existence of this kind of gloominess in Ibn Saud's 
thinking. Indeed, the Saudi-British misunderstanding on the Kingdom's southeastern 
frontier, the Saudi-Hashemite frictions, and British policy on the Palestine issue, 
might have shaded negative impacts on Saudi-British relations.^ 
Nevertheless, it could be argued that the conclusion of the 1938 Anglo-Italian 
Agreement was the most important occurrence, which caused Ibn Saud to be at such a 
standpoint by the beginning of 1939.^ Furthermore, it could be argued that this 
agreement had brought about the tendency for the King to consider the setting up of a 
new order with an alternative power - to Britain - for the assurance of the Kingdom's 
security. This was the case, when King Ibn Saud was inclined to suspect the British 
and the Italian intentions upon the conclusion of such an agreement. 
There were certain reasons behind Ibn Saud's comprehension of this particular aspect. 
First, he knew that the Anglo-Italian agreement had covered issues that concerned the 
Red Sea States.' Second, while he was allowed by the British to see certain articles of 
the 1927 - Rome - agreement, he was denied to see any article of the new agreement.^  
Third, he was aware that the British officials, who were opposing cooperation with 
the Italians, were in apparent disagreement with their government's decisions over the 
endorsement of the 1938 agreement.^ Fourth, he had witnessed visible signs of 
Anglo-Italian cooperation in the area, such as that which was conducted by the Italian 
Arabic propaganda, hence instead of the usual anti-British propaganda; the Italian -
Arabic - Radio began transmitting material friendly to Britain. Broadly speaking, Ibn 
Saud feared the ultimate results of the Italian-British collaboration on the security of 
his Kingdom.'° 
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I. The Saudi Enquiry and the British Response 
Faisal - who was given the responsibility of communicating Ibn Saud's 
correspondence to Chamberiain - left Saudi Arabia in the first week of January 1939, 
with the hope that he would reach London sooner rather than later. However, he did 
not arrive in London until 2 February. The prolongation of the discussions that took 
place between the Arab States' representative in Cairo - a meeting which was 
arranged so they could adopt a common policy on Palestine prior to their attendance 
of the London Conference - had in fact delayed Faisal's arrival until that particular 
day." Due to the importance of Ibn Saud's message Faisal had to submit it to the 
British authorities on the same evening of his arrival in London.'^ 
With stress on the Saudi-Anglo friendship, and with a reference to security matters, 
King Ibn Saud emphasised the importance of his message: 
"you are fiilly alive to the danger points in the Near East generally, and in the 
Arab countries more particularly, and are aware of the strong ties and 
traditional friendship between us and the British Government, we thought of 
taking the opportunity of the presence of our son Faisal in London to convey 
to Your Excellency this important note, which we hope will receive all the 
consideration and attention which the present situation demands, and which 
the friendship of our two countries and their mutual interests require".'^ 
It was also explained that the Anglo-Italian Agreement had necessitated a case in 
which the British government were obliged to explain the implications of such accord 
to the Saudi government: 
"At this moment, when Great Britain has taken a somewhat definite stand as a 
result of her undertakings in the Anglo-Italian Agreement, we think it 
imperative to approach the British Govenmient on this matter, so as to come to 
a clear understanding".''* 
To Chamberlain Ibn Saud explained that the note, which was "to shed some light on 
certain points and clarify others", was written "in the hope that your [Chamberlain] 
reply will be such as to reassure us and definitely establish our exact position".'^ The 
43 
most essential points that Ibn Saud needed "to come to understanding" with the 
British upon, were summarised by him as follows: 
1. "To ascertain the opinion of the British Govemment in the case of an act 
of aggression committed against us, whether as a result of imperialistic 
designs, or because of our negative attitude towards certain powers, or for 
any other reason, unprovoked by us".'^ 
2. "To ascertain the opinion of the British Govemment on the question of a 
mutual agreement to consult each other from time to time on all events 
affecting the Arab countries".'^ 
3. "To agree not to introduce any change in the status quo of any Arabic 
speaking country which may adversely affect our interests, without first 
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affording us an adequate opportunity to express our views". 
4. "To agree on the definite stand which will be taken by both of us towards 
the effect which the policy of a third party may have on our common 
interests".'^ 
5. "To come to an agreement defining the exact meaning and extent of the 
Anglo-Italian Agreement, so far as it affects the Arab countries and limits 
the British Government's freedom of action and the reaction which this 
may give rise to in the Arab countries generally".^" 
More broadly it seems that Ibn Saud's message to Chamberlain was intentionally 
aiming to achieve five main goals and one ultimate outcome. First, to find out about 
the Brifish govemment stance on certain practical aspects of Saudi-British relations, 
such as mutual consultations. Second, to - indirectly - assure the British govemment 
of Saudi Arabia's benevolent attitude towards Britain, during a critical time in which 
the Saudis were just about to start off a new political relationship with Germany. 
Third, to bring about a clear vision of the extent of protection that Britain was willing 
to undertake in case of any potential external threat to the security of Saudi Arabia. 
Fourth, to assure Saudi Arabia about the British government's prospective attitude 
towards the status quo of some of the Middle East countries, in particular that of the 
Hashemites. Fifth, to lead to a clear-cut understanding of the latest Anglo-Italian 
agreement. Ultimately in Chamberlain's reply the Saudis were expecting to find 
themselves on clearer ground in which they could determine the boundaries of the 
intended relations with the Germans. 
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Though the Saudis were hoping to get a quick response, Faisal did not in fact receive 
a reply until when he met Chamberlain on 23 March 1939.^' In response to Ibn 
Saud's inquiries about the attitude of Britain, if Saudi Arabia was to be a victim of 
aggression. Chamberlain replied: 
"As long as relations between Great Britain and the Arab countries remain as 
they are at present, it is difficult to envisage any aggression on Saudi Arabia 
by her neighbours. Nor can it be supposed that, leaving aside the possibility of 
a general war in which the position of Great Britain as a world power was 
being challenged, any European power would wantonly attack Saudi Arabia, 
especially as the Government of the United Kingdom have made it clear how 
deep is the interest that they take in the preservation by Saudi Arabia of her 
independence and integrity. The declarations of the Government on this 
subject correspond to one of the major interests of British Imperial policy, and 
I personally think that these declarations are sufficient by themselves to deter 
potential aggressors, (except, as I say, in the possible eventuality of a general 
challenge to Great Britain), since the nature of this policy and the grounds on 
which it is based must be apparent to the Governments of all other States ".^ ^ 
The British Prime Minister welcomed the King's proposal for mutual consultations on 
matters affecting Arab countries by stating that: 
"Your Majesty is aware that the Government of the United Kingdom desire at 
all time to obtain your views on such matters. They will welcome every 
opportunity to consult with your Majesty on all questions involving the 
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common interests of the two countries". 
In response to Ibn Saud's request of being "given an opportunity" of expressing his 
views before any change took place in the status quo of any Arabic countries. 
Chamberlain replied: 
"So far as the Government of the United Kingdom can judge, there is no 
prospect (apart from Palestine . . . whose fiiture status is now under 
discussion) of a change in the status of any Arabic-speaking country. But 
should the Arab countries at some fiiture time desire closer union or some 
form of federation, Great Britain would consider this to be a question for 
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negotiation and decision among the Arab States themselves. Certainly the 
Govemment have no intention of taking any initiative in this question, more 
especially as it will scarcely be practicable for Palestine or Syria to participate 
in a federation for a considerable time. It is possible, however, that Your 
Majesty, in framing this question, was thinking less of federation than the 
fiiture status of Transjordan. The Govemment of the United Kingdom cannot 
tie their hands in regard to a question for which they are responsible to the 
League of Nations, by giving undertakings about this quesfion to third parties. 
But should the possibility arise of changes in Transjordan, they will certainly 
remember that any changes in a neighbouring territory of this kind must 
always be of especial interest and concem to Your Majesty and will take this 
factor into account in framing their policy".^'' 
With respect to Ibn Saud's suggesfion that Britain and Saudi Arabia "should decide 
beforehand on the attitude to be adopted towards a third State whose policy may 
affect" the Saudi-British "common interests", Chamberlain replied that: 
"The Goverrmient of the United Kingdom, while they would welcome mutual 
consultation on such points as may arise, feel that in view of the impossibility 
of foreseeing what action a third State may take in the future, it would be 
unwise and dangerous for the two Governments to attempt now to lay down a 
common policy to meet all eventualities".^^ 
For a definition of the exact meaning and extent of the 1938 Anglo-Italian 
Agreement, Chamberlain replied that, "this Agreement is an agreement between 
Great Britain and Italy alone. No other power is asked to recognise or to be bound by 
it".^ '' He added that: 
"The relations between Great Britain and Saudi Arabia are therefore govemed 
by their treaties and by their friendship alone, and the Anglo-Italian 
Agreement does not indicate the slightest pretension on the part of the 
Govemment of the United Kingdom to restrict the liberty of action of Saudi 
Arabia".^^ 
Finally, the Brifish Prime Minister did not end his letter to the Saudi Arabian King 
without making positive remarks on Saudi-Anglo relations: 
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" I would conclude by assuring Your Majesty . . . how highly the Government 
of the United Kingdom value the relations of confidence that so happily exist 
between Your Majesty and Great Britain. I have little doubt that Your Majesty 
wil l share my view, that this confidence and the clear community of interests 
that exist between our two countries are the best assurance for the 
maintenance of those good relations".^^ 
During discussions at the Foreign Office On 24 March Amir Faisal followed certain 
points in the Prime Minister's reply with the Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, and his 
Deputy, Sir Lancelot Oliphant. Evidently Faisal's concerns were mostly directed to 
those of a security nature.^° With reference to the Prime Minister's reply, Faisal 
inquired "in what form, and how quickly Saudi Arabia might expect help should a 
situation arise in which the community of interests between Saudi Arabia, and Great 
Britain led to their being faced with a common enemy"^'. Faisal did not receive a 
definite answer to this question, however he was told that this inquiry had to wait 
until the Foreign Office had in due course consulted the Air Ministry and the 
Admiralty.''^ 
Referring to the phrase "potential aggressors", - in the Prime Minister's reply - Faisal 
asked i f it was "the opinion of the Foreign Office that in the present unstable state of 
the world some form of aggression might be exercised against Saudi Arabia?".^^ On 
this, Oliphant told Faisal that: 
"any act of aggression in the near future seemed very doubtful. Indeed, Hen-
Hitler's recent activities could not have been welcome to those who had 
hitched their chariot to his star, and it was unlikely that any country which had 
done so would willingly undertake intensive activity in Arabia. But in Hen-
Hitler's case it was no longer a question of dealing with a normal, logical 
man, and it was always possible that he might incite those whom he regarded 
as his friends to follow him even now. It might, however, be doubted whether 
Italy . . . would simultaneously show any aggressive action in the East".^ '* 
Following the conclusion of the Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister's conversations in 
London, it was recorded at the Foreign Office that: 
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"Although the Emir Feisal [Amir Faisal] did not ask for a guarantee of a 
formal and binding character, it is evident from this conversation and from 
other reports that Ibn Saud attaches the greatest importance to the point 
whether he can count on material as well as moral support from H.M.G. in the 
case of aggression against Saudi Arabia".^^ 
The overall British government response seemed to be overly vague for the Saudi 
government. Apart from the warm terms in Chamberlain's letter - which in fact had 
caused Faisal to state to Oliphant that "it was very nice to see such friendly feeling 
put in black and white"''^ - and the positive response to the suggestion of mutual 
consultations, it could be said that the Saudis could not obtain clear-cut answers to 
their other queries. Indeed, as the foregoing pages have revealed, the British response 
was positive and clear on non-security matters, however when it came to security 
issues it was generally abstruse. 
Despite the fact that the British had explained some of the aspects concerning Saudi 
Arabian security, still the Saudis did not get a straightforward solution for their 
security anxieties. In fact, the Saudi query on the most important issue, the Anglo-
Italian agreement was almost left out of any forthcoming answer. Notwithstanding 
Chamberlain's assertion that aggression towards Saudi Arabia was unlikely, the 
British goverrmient's response as a whole - including Oliphant's reply to Faisal -
cannot be regarded as a far-reaching assurance that completely satisfied the Saudis. 
Though the British response had stated that it would take Saudi Arabia's interests into 
consideration when any changes to the status quo took place in the Arab world, still 
Chamberlain did not admit the need for consulting the Saudis on "the ftiture status of 
Transjordan"; a matter of high concern to Ibn Saud. Besides, Chamberlain had 
considered - at that time - the Saudi suggestion on forming an upcoming Saudi-British 
policy vis-a-vis any prospective negative policy that might be taken by a "third party" 
as inappropriate. Although, neither the Saudis nor the British had referred - while in 
London - to the recent Saudi-German contacts, yet the Saudis might have hoped that 
their recent contacts with London would possibly prevent any harmftil impact of such 
a development on Saudi-British relations.^^ 
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All in all, it could be concluded that the outcome of the Saudi-British communication, 
was not that which the Saudis might have looked for. In fact, its upshot did not help 
the Saudis to identify a clear way in which they could a count on Britain when it came 
to Saudi Arabian security. In other words. King Ibn Saud's hopes for a clear and 
precise British reply were not met, a matter that left the King on a vulnerable base for 
the establishment of his Kingdom's "exact position". Hence, a further Saudi slide in 
the direction that led to a search for an alternative partner was just a matter of time.''^ 
Indeed, the Saudi-British correspondence in the eariy months of 1939 did not form 
any obstacles for further developments on the Saudi-German diplomatic front; i f not 
the contrary. Besides, one could say that Chamberiain's reference to the possibility of 
"a general challenge" to the "the position of Great Britain as a worid power", may in 
fact have influenced Ibn Saud to consider the importance of friendly relations with 
Germany in case such a situation materialised. 
I I . The Saudi-German Connections 
In addition to fear of the Anglo-Italian Agreement, there were other motives which 
encouraged Saudi Arabia to create closer ties with Germany. The Saudi Arabian 
requirement for quality arms was driving a move towards Germany. This was the 
case, as Britain according to Sir Reader Bullard, the British Minister in Saudi Arabia 
then, "was an unsatisfactory supplier of arms, both in kind and in quantity".^' The 
Saudis believed in the superiority of the quality of German weaponry. Hence, as they 
were about to form the new diplomatic relationship with Germany, they were also 
eager to acquire some quantities of German arms.'"' 
In the period from 21 January to 18 February 1939, the German Minister to Iraq made 
a visit to Saudi Arabia. Though Grobba had come to Jeddah mainly to meet with King 
Ibn Saud, the German diplomat had to wait for twenty-two days before he was able to 
see the King. From their end the Saudis had explained to Grobba that Ibn Saud was 
extremely busy with pilgrimage affairs in Mecca.'" However, it was apparent that the 
Saudis were tactically manoeuvring in order to win some time before the 
commencement of their obligated discussions with the Germans. Indeed, they were in 
need of some time until Faisal reached London to convey Ibn Saud's message to 
Chamberlain, and send the reply back home."*^  Such speculation can be supported by 
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Bullard's ability to meet Ibn Saud near Mecca on 27 January, while Grobba was not 
given a similar chance at that time. In Bullard's words, "Dr. Grobba seemed surprised 
and slightly armoyed when I mentioned that the King had asked me to meet him at 
Shumaisi on January 21^"!^^ Nevertheless, the end of the pilgrimage season had 
exhausted the Saudi excuse; hence by 11 February Ibn Saud meeting with Grobba 
became - diplomatically - a must."*^  Likewise, by that date Ibn Saud was not in the 
right position in order to prolong the time-wasting tactics. Indeed, despite the fact that 
he had not yet received Chamberlain's "critical" reply, Ibn Saud was still in no 
position to jeopardise the opening of his serious business with the Germans. Above 
and beyond, Ibn Saud might already have predicted - by that day - a kind of 
unenthusiastic reply from Chamberlain. Indeed, almost nine days had gone by, since 
Faisal had submitted - on 2 February - what Ibn Saud had considered - in writing - as 
an "important note", yet there were not any noticeable efforts, which could tell that 
his letter had been given "all consideration and attention".''^ 
On 11 February 1939 Dr Grobba presented his credentials to King Ibn Saud as non-
resident Minister to the Saudi Kingdom.''^ On the following day the Ibn Saud-Grobba 
discussions on Saudi-German relations had begun, which lasted until 18 February.'*' 
In addition to Ibn Saud's position which had caused him to slide further in the 
German direction, it should be noted that Grobba's enthusiasm - for the creation of 
Saudi-German political ties - was also reflected in the development of the Jeddah 
discussions.'*^ The German diplomat's enthusiasm had in fact caused him to go all the 
way and to assure Ibn Saud that "Germany wanted Saudi-Arabia to be strong so as to 
be able to maintain her independence".'*^ 
Subsequent to his dialogue in Jeddah, Grobba reported to Berlin the success of his 
mission, and recommended an immediate consolidation of the newly created ties.^° In 
his despatch to the Foreign Ministry on 18 February 1939 Grobba argued that the 
general impression of Ibn Saud being a British tool in the Middle East was "wrong".^' 
In fact Ibn Saud felt that he was: 
"Encircled and oppressed by England and has the desire to free himself fi-om 
this encirclement i f possible. Out of prudence he assumes a friendly attitude 
towards the British, but in the depths of his heart he hates them and complies 
with their desires only reluctantly"." 
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In the same despatch Grobba summarised the upshot of his conversation with the 
Saudi Arabian King as follows: 
"Saudi Arabia and Germany have a common mortal enemy, namely the Jews, 
and that, moreover, both are defending themselves against British hostility . . . 
The common nature of their interests requires that the two countries cooperate 
. . . For Germany the aim is a strengthening of her position in the world by 
wirming friends on whom she could rely even in wartime . . . The aim of . . . 
Saudi Arabia is the preservation of complete independence . . . [an objective 
which can be attained] only with outside help . . . therefore [Saudi Arabia is] 
turning to Germany to request her support, both moral support in case of 
possible foreign oppression and material aid by means of arms deliveries. . . 
She is offering Germany her sincere friendship in return and promises at least 
benevolent neutrality, i f not more, in case of war"." 
In addition, Grobba reported that Saudi Arabia desired the conclusion of a friendship 
treaty, a commercial treaty, and an agreement on the exchange of goods produced in 
both countries. He also added that this "close cooperation with Germany which Saudi 
Arabia desires must be very discreet, so that it might not cause other countries to take 
countermeasures". '^' 
Trying to encourage his government to recognise the significance of close 
cooperation with Saudi Arabia, Grobba asked the Foreign Ministry - in the same 
despatch of 18 February - to consider the importance of Saudi Arabia strategically, 
politically, and economically." 
According to Grobba's analysis Saudi Arabia was important strategically as it 
occupied most of the Arabian Peninsula. Thus its territory would be vital for 
Germany in case of war with Britain, "because England's air and sea communications 
with Iraq and India pass along its borders and therefore can be threatened from 
here".^ ^ Additionally, Grobba added that Saudi Arabia included the land of Hijaz, the 
important area that rose successfully against Turkey in World War One. On this, the 
German Minister reckoned that i f close ties were established with Saudi Arabia this 
51 
vital area (Hijaz) could become useful for Germany and its friends in any war 
efforts." 
Grobba urged the Foreign Ministry to consider the importance of Ibn Saud's 
influence on other Arab and Muslim countries. Thus, "in case of war his attitude will 
be of immense interest for the entire Mohammedan world and will be decisive for 
many".^^ Grobba assumed that at the outbreak of war German diplomats "would be 
interned or expelled" in the other Arab countries. However, Saudi Arabia would 
"permit them to stay and even to carry on political activity . . . [in] which we can 
influence the other Arab and Mohammedan countries politically".^^ 
Economically, Grobba stressed the importance of Saudi Arabia's oil in war and in 
peacetime. Additionally, he forecast a bright future for European goods in the market 
of Saudi Arabia, as the country's revenue would increase dramatically from oil 
income.^" 
At the conclusion of his report, Grobba asked his govenmient for a quick decision 
about the rearmament of Saudi Arabia, as Ibn Saud was in a great hurry and a quick 
decision would make him recognise German confidence in him. Grobba indicated that 
i f Germany delayed this matter Ibn Saud could indeed look for an alternative 
elsewhere.^ ^ The Minister argued that i f the German government "neglect replying to 
Ibn Saud's proposals or simply reject them it would be a severe disappointment for 
Ibn Saud, especially in view of the confidence he has shown in us"." Grobba 
remarked that i f this should happen, "it would be practically impossible for us ever 
again to undo the consequences. He [Ibn Saud] would surely turn away from us 
permanently"." 
While their discussions were taking place, both Ibn Saud and Grobba informed 
Bullard, that the new Saudi-German relationship was not anti-British.^ Grobba 
argued during a meeting with Bullard that the German government has "no object 
except to establish friendly relations with Saudi Arabia and to increase German 
exports [to her]".^^ Despite that, Bullard concluded in his despatch to the Foreign 
Office on 18 February 1939 "that the object of the German Government in appointing 
a representative to Saudi Arabia at this juncture is mainly anti-British".^^ As can be 
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seen from the Ibn Saud-Grobba conversations Bullard's speculation about the 
German government's intention's was true. The actual negotiations between Ibn Saud 
and Grobba were in direct opposition to British interests.^ ^ However, it should be 
noted that the British were not that much alarmed by Saudi-German contacts at this 
stage, nor even at later stages, when they believed that the Saudi-German contacts 
were mainly directed towards arms sales. In fact the British officials thought that it 
would be advantageous for Saudi Arabia to get hold of some German arms, 
particularly as Britain could not fiilfil its requirement on this. Indeed, the British 
government admitted that it understood King Ibn Saud's "motives, and will continue 
to bear him the same friendship as before".^^ 
The German Foreign Ministry was in no apparent hurry to reply to Grobba. 
Moreover, when the reply was received - two months later - on 18 April, it expressed 
the opposite of Grobba's views. The Under State Secretary, Woermann, stated that: 
"Although we continue to place great value upon friendly relations with the 
Kingdom of Ibn Saud - we have given an open demonstration of this by 
accrediting you in Jidda [Jeddah] - nevertheless, . . . we have no interest in 
taking up closer ties with him".^^ 
Moreover, Woermann stated that, "The question of arms deliveries to the Arabian 
Peninsula i s . . . out of question", given that the German government does "not for the 
present think of undertaking any fimdamental change in the policy . . . [that it has] 
hitherto followed in the Arabian Peninsula". 
Not being satisfied by the Foreign Ministry reply, Grobba wrote again to Woermann 
on 2 May.^' He argued that the opportunity posed by Ibn Saud's hatred of the British 
should not be wasted, thus diverting his close ties from Britain to Germany. He told 
Woermann that, " I have gained the definite impression that he hates the British and is 
trying to extricate himself from their influence as far as possible",''^ stressed again his 
previous views of the importance of Saudi Arabia to Germany, and asked Woermann 
to reconsider the question of arms.^ ^ 
It is apparent from the Ibn Saud-Grobba discussions and the Grobba-Woermann 
correspondence, that until May 1939, there was a split in the German side, with 
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Grobba supporting closer Saudi-German ties but Woermann opposing the move. 
However, being convinced by Grobba's despatch of 2 May and, because of the 
changing situation in the Middle East - particularly, as the British position was 
becoming stronger there - the German Foreign Ministry revised its previous decision 
of turning away from Ibn Saud.''* 
At beginning of summer 1939 one of the Royal Court consultants, Mr Khalid Al-
Qarqani, made an official visit to Germany as King Ibn Saud's special envoy.'^ 
During his visit Al-Qarqani had several meetings with German officials, including the 
Foreign Minister, Joachim Ribbentrop, and the German Chancellor, Adolf Hitler. 
During their meeting on 8 June 1939, Al-Qarqani and Ribbentrop expressed the 
importance of Saudi-German relations, and acknowledged the mutual interests that 
tied Germany and the Arab world. In addition, Ibn Saud's special envoy expressed 
Saudi Arabia's desire in working closely with Germany, in order to strengthen the 
Kingdom's defensive capability against any potential external threat. In this regard, 
Al-Qarqani asked for German armoured cars and anti-aircraft guns, and requested 
German assistance in building a small rifle and munitions factory in Saudi Arabia. At 
the end of the meeting the German Foreign Minister expressed his government's 
agreement to collaborate on this matter and referred Al-Qarqani for further detailed 
negotiations to the head of the Political Division VI I , Von Hentig.'^ 
On 17 June 1939, Al-Qarqani met Hitler and handed him a letter from Ibn Saud.'' In 
this personal letter Ibn Saud expressed his gratitude for the appointment of Grobba in 
Jeddah, a matter, which he believed would strengthen Saudi-German relations. 
Moreover, the King indicated that one of his "dearest wishes" was to see the ties of 
warm friendship between the Saudi and the German government extending to their 
"maximum".'^ During the subsequent conversation. Hitler stated that, "we entertain 
warm sympathies for Arabs for two reasons: 1) because we have no territorial 
aspirations in Arabia, and 2) because we have the same enemies . . . .[as] we are 
jointly fighting the Jews"." The most important part of the conversation was Hitler's 
promise to give Saudi Arabia active assistance. Hence, after indicating that he was an 
admirer of King Ibn Saud's personality, Hitler said that he was willing to assist him 
genuinely.^" Subsequently, the German government agreed to offer Saudi Arabia a 
credit of 1.5 million marks for the purchase of 8,000 rifles, 8 million rounds of 
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ammunitions, a small munitions factory to be built in Saudi Arabia, light anti-aircraft 
guns, and armoured cars. '^ 
Despite the positive side of the Al-Qarqani mission, unexpected developments had in 
fact soured the mission's success, and thereafter the ultimate progress of Saudi-
German ties. The press coverage, which had exaggerated Khalid's task in Beriin, was 
one of these developments. The second was, the frequent alteration in the German 
government attitude towards the delivery of the agreed arms to Saudi Arabia. The 
third was the general situation in Europe and the outbreak of World War Two. 
The Al-Qarqani-Hitler meeting was the main event which had drawn the attention of 
the press to the Saudi-German link. On 18 June, the German official press broadcast a 
news item on the meeting. Ultimately, the news became a suitable entry for mass 
media rumours and exaggerations. Most of the European press had dealt with the A l -
Qarqani-Hitler meeting as a new orientation in the Saudi Arabian foreign policy 
towards closer ties and cooperation with Germany. Furthermore, the aim of the 
meeting was misrepresented as being directed against Britain interests. At the peak 
of such a development the official German propaganda had even used the event as 
frontline publicity in its anti-British campaign.^'' Being alarmed by this development, 
Ibn Saud had telegrammed Al-Qarqani to request the German authority to bring the 
press coverage to a halt; otherwise he would consider the cancellation of the whole 
deal.^ ^ Nonetheless, by then it was impossible even for the German Foreign Ministry 
to suppress such coverage as the matter was getting out of its hands.^ ^ 
By 20 July, King Ibn Saud had considered the exaggerated propaganda as a threat to 
his political position in general and to his relations with Britain in particular, therefore 
he asked Khalid to return to Saudi Arabia i f the Germans did not speed up the 
completion of the arms deal.^' Nevertheless, Henfig promised Al-Qarqani a swift 
move in the completion of the arms transaction.** Additionally, the German 
government had also increased the proposed credit of 1.5 million marks to 6 million 
marks, and promised to give the Saudis a gift of four thousand rifles and 
ammunitions.*^ By doing so, it seems that the German government was manoeuvring 
to win Saudi Arabia to its side through the means of providing it with the needed 
arms. But the Germans were not willing to fulf i l such arrangements without making 
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sure that the Saudi govenraient would be either on their side, or at least not on their 
enemy's side. Therefore, fiirther bargaining, which had caused Hentig to drop his 
previous promise of swift action, was on line.^" 
After questioning Saudi-British relations, Hentig told Al-Qarqani that the German 
government was inclined to believe that the Saudi government was acting alongside 
the British against the Axis.^' Therefore, and in order to win German confidence, and 
so as to finalise the agreed arms deal, Saudi Arabia had to either sign a neutrality 
agreement with Germany, or agree to delay the arms transaction until when the 
international situation eased.^ ^ 
By the beginning of August 1939, Ibn Saud became confident that the German 
government was using him and was intending to use him fiirther. The propaganda 
campaign, and the new conditions on the already agreed arms deal, were clear signs. 
Furthermore, it became obvious that by raising the new bargains, the Germans were 
attempting to damage Saudi Arabian relations with Britain, a matter, which Ibn Saud 
was not agreeable to tolerate. Indeed, by then he was determined to protect his 
Kingdom's relations with Britain; particularly when he experienced - through the 
development of the Saudi-German connection - that such relations were irreplaceable. 
Nevertheless, because of the Kingdom's necessity for the German arms, the King had 
no choice but to look at the first option.^^ 
Considerately, Ibn Saud exploited the conditions for the goodwill of Saudi-British 
relations and not the opposite, given that, he ftally consulted the British government 
on this particular matter. In reply, the British government informed Ibn Saud that it 
was better for Saudi Arabia to remain neutral in the event of a war between the Great 
Powers.^ '* In addition, the King was advised not to sign any formal agreement 
regarding neutrality with Germany, because the signing of such an agreement could 
be interpreted as an indication of his sympathies with the Axis.^^ Instead of signing 
such an agreement the British government advised King Ibn Saud to send an oral or 
informal message to the German government, telling them that: 
"he does not agree that friendship for Great Britain is inconsistent with 
friendship for Germany or any other State, that his policy aims at friendship 
with all States alike, that he has signed no freaty of alliance with any great 
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Power and that so far as he is concerned the question of taking sides in any 
conflict between the Great Powers has not even arisen".^ ^ 
When Al-Qarqani conveyed the King's views - which was similar to the British 
government advice - the German government then dropped its conditions for the arms 
transaction.^^ It seemed that the German government, which was facing an 
accelerating situation towards war with Britain, was not willing to lose its new ties 
no 
with Saudi Arabia that easily. Nevertheless, the outbreak of the war on 3 September 
1939, had brought about a dramatic end to the Saudi-German arms deal, and 
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according to Bullard "it is unlikely that any arms were delivered [to Saudi Arabia]". 
The German government was not able to deliver the arms to Saudi Arabia by then, 
not just because of the difficulty of a sea shipment, but also because of German needs 
for all its produced arms.'°° 
It could be said that the Saudi-German coimections, particularly that of the second 
half of 1939, had provided King Ibn Saud with certain experience that evidently 
reflected the assessment of his Kingdom's policy towards Germany. Eventually, such 
experience had matured and contributed - alongside other factors - to the 
formalisation of a Saudi Arabian policy towards the development of the war."" 
Indeed, the Saudi policy, which was formulated by the first week of September 1939, 
was that of "benevolent n e u t r a l i t y " . I n this way, such a policy was formally 
recognised as being neutral, but confidentially, was in fact sympathetic to the cause of 
the Allies.Nonetheless, King Ibn Saud did not want to demonstrate any noticeable 
sign that would let the German government find out about the reality of the 
Kingdom's policy on this. Hence, he demonstrated the Kingdom's policy in a 
cautious way, in order not to bring the Saudi-German link to an entire end, just in 
case he might need it i f the war developed in an unexpected direction. In due course, 
Saudi-German relations were not even broken off until after German defeat had 
become evident - at the end of the war - in 1945.'°'* 
At the opening of the war when Grobba was requested to leave Iraq, he applied to the 
Saudi government for permission to travel by land to Jeddah.'°^ Fearing the 
possibility that Grobba was intending to resume the anti-Allies activities - including 
that of propaganda - from Jeddah, Ibn Saud was reluctant to allow him to come to the 
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Kingdom."'^ However, because he did not want to show any sign, which might let the 
Germans assume that he was acting against them, and because Grobba was formally 
accredited to Saudi Arabia, Ibn Saud was forced to grant Grobba the necessary 
permission."" Nevertheless, the Saudis tried to make it difficuU for Grobba to cross -
through the northern land of Saudi Arabia - to Jeddah. With hopes that the German 
Foreign Ministry, would not allow Grobba to make such a journey, the Saudi 
government warned that; "the tribes on the route, excited by the talk of hostilities and 
particularly by the news that Iraq had entered the war, might make some regrettable 
mistake". The German Foreign Ministry looked at the Saudi government warning 
in just the way that the Saudis wanted, hence, it considered Grobba's journey to 
Jeddah by land as a danger to his life, therefore Grobba was asked to travel directly to 
Berlin instead. 
In December 1939, once again the German government informed the Saudi 
government - through the Italian Legation in Jeddah - of its wish to send Grobba to 
Jeddah. In order to show the British that he was truly on their side, Ibn Saud sought 
their confidential consultation on this. The ultimate British reply was not in favour of 
opening the German Legation in Jeddah, as it was only meant to be an instrument of 
propaganda."*' Ibn Saud was also reluctant at that time to let Germany open such a 
post. He was convinced that the Germans were going to use his Kingdom in order to 
fiilfil their anti-Allies plans, a matter, which would not bring any thing, but trouble 
and intimidation to his state security. King Ibn Saud replied to the German 
government - through the Italian legation in Jeddah - that the recent international 
circumstances had made it difficult for him to consider the opening of the German 
Legation in Saudi Arabia, particularly when the attitude of his country was that of 
neutrality. At the same time, Ibn Saud informed the Germans that he would like to 
continue his cordial relations with them, and he would consider the opening of the 
Legation whenever the circumstances permit.'" 
I I I . Saudi Arabia and Italy 
Despite the fact that it was Italy which had alarmed Saudi Arabian security concerns, 
Saudi-Italian diplomatic relations remained intact throughout 1939. The Saudi 
government might have been considerate in keeping the formal relations ongoing as a 
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minimum measure to ensure the continuity of the least amount of friendship between 
the two States. Hence, such a minimum friendship could have been assessed as the 
means that might prevent any manner of Italian hostility against the Kingdom."^ 
Moreover, in order to avoid irritating the Italian government the Saudis had tried their 
best to avert any kind of major disagreement with the Italians. For example, when it 
became apparent in early 1939 that the small Italian Air Mission - which was training 
some Saudis pilots in Jeddah - was not that useful, the Saudi government was carefiil 
to end its operations without angering the Italian government.'On this, the Saudi 
government did not harshly dismiss the mission, nor did it ask for its immediate 
withdrawal. Instead, the Italians were told that due to a new arrangement with "an 
Egyptian civil aviation company" all the Saudi pilots were to be sent to Egypt "for 
further training"."'' Consequently, when the Italians realised that "there would be 
nothing for the air mission to do" they had to withdraw it by themselves."^ 
The only kind of plain protest that the Saudi government had conveyed to the Italians 
was the note that was sent to the Italian legation in Jeddah at the beginning of 1939. It 
was stated in that note that; "the Anglo-Italian Agreement was not to be regarded as 
binding on the Saudi Government"."^ Additionally, it was explained that Saudi 
Arabia did not agree and will not agree to any article that might bring any kind of 
limitations to its sovereignty and freedom. Hence, as the Saudi government was not a 
part of this agreement, and as it was in darkness of its actual text, any item that may 
relate to Saudi Arabia was therefore invalid."^ 
The Italian Minister in Jeddah, Signor Silitti, conveyed to the Saudi government in 
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mid-February, what Bullard regarded as a "strong assurance". Unexpectedly, Silitti 
had assured the Saudis that it was "the desire of the Italian Government that Saudi 
Arabia should be strong and independent"."^ Despite such assurance. King Ibn Saud 
was not so convinced about Italian intentions.Indeed, the King's apprehension 
about the possibility of an Italian hostile move against the Kingdom was difficult to 
remove. As a matter of fact, Grobba - who did meet Ibn Saud in the same week as the 
Italian assurance was conveyed - realised that the King was "fearful of the Italians 
intentions on Hijaz, and the shores of the Red Sea".'^' 
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In spite of the fact that the Italians assurance did not change Ibn Saud's point of view, 
it seems that - at least - it caused the Saudis not to completely exclude Italy from the 
arms search.'^ ^ On "very favourable terms" Saudi Arabia had signed an arms 
agreement with Italy in August 1939.'^ ^ Unlike the unfulfilled arms agreement with 
Germany, Saudi Arabia started to receive the Italian arms in November 1939.'^ '* 
By June 1940, when Italy formally declared war on the Allies, Saudi Arabia was 
already closer to Britain. Besides, the status of war between Italy and Britain was in 
fact a fiirther consolidating factor in Saudi-British relations, as it brought the Saudis 
suspicion of the Anglo-Italian Agreement to an end. Even at such a stage, the Saudi 
government tried not to demonstrate any obvious acts that would make Italy realise 
the reality of the Saudi Arabian neufrality. In fact, even the situation of the Italian 
legation in Jeddah remained the same as before.'^^ 
Nevertheless, when a number of Italian warplanes bombed Bahrain and Dhahran oil 
fields on the night of 18-19 October 1940, the Saudi annoyance was difficult to 
hide.'^^ On 20 October, the Saudi Foreign Minister delivered a sfrong protest to the 
Italian Minister in Jeddah. In response Silitti convincingly apologised and told Faisal 
that the Dhahran bombing was accidental. But still unsatisfied with the Italian 
Minister's apology, Faisal demanded an official apology from the Italian govenmient, 
as well as a guarantee against any similar fiiture accident.'^' 
Though this incident did not affect the formality of Saudi Arabia's neufrality and 
though the Saudi government did not immediately alter the state of affairs for the 
Italian representation in Jeddah, Saudi cautiousness towards Italian movements in the 
area had increased more than ever before. Correspondingly, Saudi-Italian relations 
became chilly, culminating in the Italian legation in Jeddah being closed in February 
1942.'^ ^ Despite the fact the Italian legation had closed in 1942, it should be noted 
that, just as in the case of Saudi-German relations, Saudi Arabia did not formally 
break off diplomatic relations with Italy unfil March 1945.'^ ^ 
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B. The Palestine Issue and Saudi-British Relations 
Though - up to 1939 - Ibn Saud was not generally satisfied with British policy in 
regard to Palestine, still he was willing to understand the constraints under which the 
British government opera ted . I t could be said that Realpolitik and its principles 
were the most acceptable explanations for Ibn Saud's perspective on this. A closer 
look at some of the Saudi-British communications on Palestine, during 1938, would 
clarify this case further. 
On 19 May 1938 the British government sent Ibn Saud a message inquiring whether 
what it heard of Yusuf Yassin was true or not. Yusuf Yassin was alleged to have said 
in Damascus that King Ibn Saud would break off diplomatic relations with Britain 
unless the British acceded to the Arab demands in Palestine. Yassin was also alleged 
to have said that Ibn Saud would also cut off trade relations with Britain, and would 
supply the Palestinians with money and arms.''" 
Even before getting in touch with Yusuf Yassin, Ibn Saud sent an urgent message to 
Bullard in Jeddah denying the existence of such a "fabricated story".'^^ He explained 
that no rational politician would think that Saudi Arabia should cut off its relations 
with Britain; instead he argued such an attempt would not be in the interest even of 
the Palestinians. The overall point of Ibn Saud's message was to give the impression 
that he would never consider such a step in relation to the Palestinian situation.'" 
Moreover, when the British government inquired on 1 June 1938 about the rumours 
that Ibn Saud was supplying the Palestinians with arms he replied, denying the 
allegation completely. He explained his policy regarding this issue as follows:'^'' 
" I f I tell you that I do not have any reason which makes me fight the Jews, I 
would not be telling you the truth. I f it were only the Jews who were involved 
in this issue I would sacrifice everything in order to prevent any Jewish gain in 
Palestine. However the responsibility in this issue is that of the British 
government, and not only the Jews. In addition to the mutual interests, which 
my country shares with Britain, we do have written friendship treaties. I 
believe that the best for the Arabs - for their present and future interests - is to 
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have a permanent friendship with Britain. I f the people of Palestine listened to 
me they would had taken peaceful means as the only way of demanding their 
rights from Britain. I have received a lot of requests asking me to help and 
supply the revolution in Palestine. However I would assure you that I will not 
perpetrate any act which might shake my treaties with you".'^^ 
Though the impact of the Palestine issue on Saudi-British relations was controllable 
by realist values, yet it has to be said that ideological values were also noticeable in 
the orientation of Saudi Arabian foreign policy towards the same issue.'^ ^ Such a 
matter put the whole issue into a dilemma position as far as the Saudis were 
concerned. Indeed, it was Britain that disappointed them on Palestine, but at the same 
time it was also Britain that they were looking to in regard to vital concerns, such as 
the preservation of the Kingdom's security. 
The Palestine question was not omitted from Ibn Saud's important correspondence 
with Chamberlain in early 1939. It was stated, in the message that Faisal conveyed to 
Chamberlain before the opening of the London conference on Palestine, that: 
"We confidently hope that the Palestine Question will be settled at the London 
Conference in such a way as will conserve the rights of the Arabs in their own 
country. This is one of the most important questions which exercise a potent 
influence on the relations of the British Government with the Muslims 
generally, and the Arabs more particularly".'^' 
The British Prime Minster acknowledged this statement when he replied that: 
"The Government of the United Kingdom fully realise the importance of this 
question in its effect not only on that country but also on relations between 
Great Britain and the whole Arab world. The Government of the United 
Kingdom are now considering the question of policy in the light of the 
Conference on Palestine".'^^ 
The London Conference began on the 7 February 1939 at St James's Palace with the 
presence of Palestinian and Jewish representatives. In addition to the Palestinian 
representatives Arab delegations came to the conference from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, 
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Transjordan, Iraq, and Yemen. Arabs and Jews refused to sit at the same table, thus 
British officials dealt with them separately during the conference.'^^ 
The conference, which aimed "to study the basis of a settlement by negotiations", 
started to face difficulties during the third week.'''^ The Arabs could not agree to more 
Jewish immigration and would not expect anything but its "complete cessation". On 
the other side, the Jews would go no further than the 1937 Royal Commission 
proposal.''" Thus, the conference came to an end without any constructive result on 
17 March 1939.'^ ^ 
Keen to win Arab support when Europe was likely to slide into a war, the British 
government armounced a new policy favouring the Arabs regarding Palestine. On 17 
May 1939 the British government announced the White Paper on Palestine."*^ This 
proposal marked a turning point in British government policy towards Palestine. 
Rejecting the previous partition plan, the White Paper went some way towards 
meeting the major Arab demands on the issue of Jewish migration into Palestine, the 
future Palestinian state, and the restrictions of the sale of land to Jews.''*^ 
According to the White Paper, for five years the number of Jewish immigrants would 
not be more than 75,000, after that "no further Jewish emigrafion will be permitted 
unless the Arabs of Palestine are prepared to acquiesce in it".'''^ Moreover, the sale of 
land to Jews would be restricted, by prohibiting and regulating its transfers. Most 
importantly the British government announced its intention of giving Palestine 
independence within ten years. The change was to happen in gradual steps, starting 
with the appointment of heads of departments in the mandatory government from 
amongst the present Palestine population of Arabs and Jews, and ending with 
independence.'''^ 
The initial Arab reaction to the White Paper was mixed. The Egyptian Prime Minister, 
Mohammed Mahmmoud Pasha, thought that the Arabs should accept the proposal 
because refusing it would be an indirect help to Zionism. King Ibn Saud also agreed 
to the principle that the proposal should be accepted, as "it has some acceptable 
features, and as it was in the wrong for the Arabs to reject every offer that had been 
offered to them".'''^ However, at the end when it became apparent that the majority of 
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the Arabs were not in favour of such a proposal, no Arab state had formally approved 
it.'''^ In spite of everything, according to Wahba, "Ibn Saud did not accept or reject the 
proposal, in fact he considered it as an open option, and endeavoured to convince the 
British government to bring it closer to the direction of Arab demands".'''^  Though, 
the "immigration clauses of the white paper were not so enthusiastically received", 
still the "King expressed great satisfaction at the assurance that Palestine would never 
become a Jewish State".'^" 
As Britain was concerned about the impact of its policy towards the Palestine 
question on its relations with the Arab world, it tried to follow a very careful policy 
in Palestine at the beginning of the war.''' Since the implementation of the White 
Paper was the only way that could show that Britain was at least taking some of the 
Arab demands into consideration, the British government started to implement its 
first two points. Thus, it restricted Jewish immigration, and began to put the sale of 
land regulations into practice.''^ 
Indeed, in spite of "the refusal of any Arab state to approve it, the 1939 British 
White Paper was the governing document for Palestine during the next six years".'" 
The Foreign Office instructed British representatives all over the Middle East to 
indicate that Britain intended to implement the White Paper. The representatives 
were instructed to avoid over-mentioning this, but were asked to let the British 
actions in this regard speak for themselves.'''' The British government thought that 
i f it repeatedly announced a desire to implement the White Paper its intention might 
be misunderstood, thus causing the Arab States to think that Britain's critical 
situation at the beginning of the war would make it give more concessions.'^ ^ 
From the summer of 1940, Palestine became a secondary issue to almost all parties 
concerned, as the development of the war fi-onts in Europe and elsewhere became 
the central point. Besides, Ibn Saud did not contact the British government during 
the war about Palestine. In this regard Ibn Saud did not wish to trouble the British 
govenmient about the issue, nor did he attempt to raise any other potentially 
antagonistic issues such as his border dispute with the Gulf protectorates. In Ibn 
Saud's opinion, all these matters had to wait until when the war was over. It was 
stated, in the British legation review for 1940, that the: 
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"King realises and has advised Arab statesmen in surrounding countries that 
present efforts must be concentrated on winning the war, and that it is the 
duty of all Arabs to refrain from any action which might impede Britain's 
effort. He has refiased to consider joint action with neighbouring countries, a 
section of whose statesmen have thought that advantage should be taken of 
Britain's present difficulfies to further Arab aspirations".'^^ 
C. The Consolidation of Saudi-British Relations at the Outbreak of the War 
The Saudis conferred with the British in August 1939 on the German request for a 
neutrality agreement sequenced positively for the course of Saudi-British relations. 
The initial constructive outcome was manifested within the contents of the British 
reply: 
"His Majesty's Government are most grateful for the opportunity of 
expressing their views upon the message from the German Government. 
This mark of confidence is a further signal proof of the friendship which the 
King has shown to His Majesty's Government in so many ways in the 
past"'^ ^ 
Additionally, the King, who might have been looking to find out about the British 
government views on his Kingdom's attitude towards the prospective war, was 
given an up-front answer. In this way, the British government advice for Saudi 
Arabia to maintain neutrality had made it clear to the King that his close ties with 
Britain may not necessarily jeopardise the security of his Kingdom i f the war broke 
out.'^* Besides, the reply had made it easy for the King to see the differences 
between the German and the British governments' policies towards the country. 
While he saw that the Germans were determined to use the immature Saudi-German 
relations for their own interests, he noticed from the genuine British reply that the 
latter were not even thinking to use their mature relations with Saudi Arabia for the 
same purposes. The British government statement on the propaganda case had 
clarified this as follow: 
"His Majesty's Government ask nothing better, as the Kings knows, than 
that he should maintain strict impartiality between all countries. He has, they 
understand, set his face resolutely against propaganda on behalf of foreign 
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governments, no matter what these governments may be. His Majesty's 
Government consider that this is a right and natural course for the King to 
pursue".''^ 
There were no indications in that message, which required Saudi Arabia's 
involvement in the forthcoming war, other than, the "hope that in the event of actual 
hostilities he [Ibn Saud] would feel able to make it clear that in his view the victory 
of the Allied Powers was desirable in the interests of the Arab States".'^° 
As King Ibn Saud was no longer in good faith with Germany by then, the 
opportunity of replying to such a fairly positive message was not wasted. Thus, he 
communicated to the British government almost all the correspondence "in which 
his envoy related the progress of the negotiations with the Germans".'^' Moreover, 
in a message - that was coincidentally received in London on the same day that the 
war was officially declared - on 3 September 1939, Ibn Saud assured the British 
government "that he would never give any undertaking or take any secret or open 
action with any . . . foreign government which might damage British interests or 
affect his relations with His Majesty's Government".'^^ 
In addition to the previously mentioned reasons, there were other reasons that had 
encouraged Ibn Saud to formulate the attitude of "benevolent neutrality". It could be 
said that the considerable military, economic, and political power that the British 
Empire enjoyed had influenced the Saudis - not just to maintain fiiendly relations 
with Britain, but also - to adopt such an attitude. Indeed, at that time the Saudi 
government comprehended that its interest was placed with that of Britain.'^'' 
As said by Bullard, "it is the pilgrimage that matters to Jedda [Jeddah] and indeed to 
Saudi Arabia as a whole, and for that the country is largely dependent on Great 
Britain".'^ Besides, it was British vessels, which not just carried the majority of the 
pilgrims, but also carried almost all the important commodities that Saudi Arabia 
consumed.'^' This all goes without the need to mention that the majority of the 
pilgrims originated from territories that were controlled by the British. Moreover, 
the British military presence in the area had made Britain almost the only suitable -
friendly - power, which Saudi Arabia could rely on in the event of danger. 
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Furthermore, British political control in the countries that neighboured Saudi Arabia 
had caused the Saudi interests to be seen as tied in British hands. As a matter of fact, 
certain unsolved issues, such as that of the Saudi problem with the Hashemites, 
were still requiring a solution with the British government.'^^ In fact, the Saudi-
Hashemites issue had played a major role that influenced King Ibn Saud to be closer 
to the British - and the Allies - at that specific time. Further clarification of such an 
issue is vital, not just for further understanding of the consolidation of Saudi-British 
relations at that time, but also for the scope of this study. 
King Ibn Saud's worries about the Hashemites were heartfelt in June 1939, when 
Amir Abdullah of Transjordan spread a rumour over the Middle East that he was 
about to be chosen - by the French - for the throne of Syria.'^^ By that time, Ibn 
Saud was inclined to believe that the Hashemites were already "cherishing designs 
of encirclement against Saudi Arabia".'^^ The King feared the worst when it came to 
Hashemite intentions and to the security of his Kingdom. He suspected that they 
"would first. . . [acquire] the Syrian throne . . . then do the same in Palestine, and 
perhaps the Hejaz [Hijaz]: and might even endeavour [through Iraq] to secure the 
Persian Gulf, and ultimately Nejd [Najd]".'^^ 
The Saudi-Hashemite issue was further worsened in August, when one of the chief 
supporters of Ibn Saud in Syria, Kamil Al-Qassab, passed to Riyadh certain letters 
that were written to the latter by A b d u l l a h . I n these letters, which distrusted Ibn 
Saud's role as a monarch, Abdullah was intensely critical of the King's policy in 
respect to Hijaz.''" Likewise, in the same month, a large number of pamphlets were 
posted from Bludan in Syria to various addresses in Hijaz. The printed circulars, 
which were purported to come from "The Party of Free Hejazis", had incited "the 
people of Hejaz to rise and throw off the yoke of their present oppressors''.'^ ^ 
In opposition to the Hashemite intrigues, Ibn Saud approached the British as well as 
the French.'^^ In order to curtail French sympathies for the Hashemites, Saudi 
Arabia decided to establish a legation in Paris. According to British sources, "It is 
more than probable that Ibn Saud's main object is to urge the claim of his family to 
the throne of Syria".'^'^ Nonetheless, King Ibn Saud explained to the British that: 
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"he did not want Syria or any thing else outside Saudi Arabia: he only feared 
lest addition of Syria to Trans-Jordan or Iraq should facilitate Hashimite 
[Hashemite] designs on the Hejaz or Najd: He wanted a balance of power in 
the Arab world. As long as no Hashimite ruled Syria, let the Syrians choose 
for themselves whether to remain under a mandate, or have a republic, or a 
King from outside".'^' 
It seems that Saudi-French contacts did not bring any confirmation of the Hashemite 
rumour. In fact, according to the British, Ibn Saud "must have been flattered when 
the French High Commissioner sounded Fuad Bey about making one of the King's 
sons King of Syria".'^^ Still, the Saudis were waiting to get what they perhaps 
considered as an important response from the British government. Indeed, though 
the French role was vital when it came to the ftiture of Syria, the British role was 
also vital when it came to Transjordan and the future of Abdullah's status. 
On 13 October 1939, the British Minister delivered an important statement to King 
Ibn Saud in Riyadh on this issue. It was stated that the British government: 
"knows of no ground on which the Amir Abdullah could possibly suppose 
that he is likely to be chosen for the throne by the French Government. In 
these circumstances His Majesty's Government hope that His Majesty will 
accept their advice not to worry himself further about a question which, as 
far as they know, has no reality . . . His Majesty's Government wish to state 
emphatically that they have never expressed any views as to the suitability or 
unsuitability o f . . . any . . . possible candidate".'^^ 
The statement had also covered the questions of Abdullah's letters and the Bludan 
pamphlets. The British government expressed "regret that propaganda directed 
against His Majesty still continue, e.g. the circulars posted from Bludan to persons 
in the Hejaz . . . this was mentioned to the French . . . [and] that such activities will 
cease".'^ ^ It was further stated that Abdullah's action in writing the August letters, 
"was unwise and discourteous".'^^ The British statement concluded that; "His 
Majesty's Government feel that His Majesty's long friendship for His Majesty's 
Government will enable him to realise that they entirely disapprove of attacks upon 
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his dignity and will always do their best to stop such attacks". 
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On 29 October 1939, Bullard wrote to the Foreign Office, informing that "Ibn Saud 
showed great satisfaction at the statement".'^' In the Minister's own words: 
"My impression that Ibn Saud was pleased with the statement was borne out 
by Shaikh Yusuf who informed me next day that the King had said that all 
he wanted was to be secure in his own possessions, and had expressed 
satisfaction at the statement I had made to him ("very pleased indeed" was 
the expression used)". 
Soon Ibn Saud saw a positive improvement in his case with the Hashemite. Indeed, 
as soon as the British government endeavoured to keep Abdullah's activities "in 
check", the latter had brought his anti-Saudi conduct to a standstill.'^^ In effect, 
Abdullah had given assurances that he would not consider any anti-Saudi 
propaganda. He even wrote to Ibn Saud through the British, "that he had no 
knowledge of the pamphlets until the British Resident brought them to his 
notice".'^'' Furthermore, Abdullah proposed to Ibn Saud that they should meet in 
order to improve their relations; however, the latter replied that "circumstances" did 
not allow for such a meeting.'^^ It seems that King Ibn Saud had obtained all he 
wanted; as far as Abdullah's "childish indiscretions can be kept in check" by the 
British.'^^ 
The overall outcomes of the Saudi-Hashemite issue in 1939 were constructive for 
Saudi-Anglo relations. The good effect of the British government's performance in 
such an issue was to be reflected in improvements in relations. Even for the overall 
Saudi Arabian attitude towards the Allies, there was a gain. Next to the Kingdom's 
diplomatic representations in only Allied capitals, the establishment of a Saudi 
Arabian legation in Paris was viewed as positive.'^' On this, Bullard remarked, "it 
can hardly fail to be advantageous to the Allies that the only legations maintained by 
Ibn Saud abroad should all be in allied countries - Great Britain, France, Egypt and 
Iraq".'^« 
In addition to British government action on the Saudi-Hashemite issue, Ibn Saud 
was also given assurances on an issue that concerned him at that time: the essential 
sea-lanes and shipments of goods to Saudi ports. On this it was conveyed to the 
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King that the British government would do its best to ensure the continuity of 
foodstuff shipments to the Kingdom, particularly those that came from or through 
India and Egypt.'^^ Likewise, the British would do all they could in order to keep 
the sailing of Indian pilgrim ships as usual.'^° 
Al l in all, gains that were directed towards the goodwill of the Saudi-British 
relationship were not that difficult to see. Subsequent to a visit to Riyadh Bullard 
remarked: 
" I found the King not at all inclined to sit on the fence, waiting to see how 
the war in Europe would go, but outspoken in his sympathy for the Allies 
and anxious to do all he could to ensure that there should be nothing to 
prevent the Arabs . . . from co-operating with them".''' 
By the last week of October 1939, Bullard was in no doubt about the sincerity of Ibn 
Saud's stance. In fact, the British Minister was certain that the King was desiring 
and believing in a British victory. On a statement, in which the king had said, 
"When I heard that that battleship of yours had been sunk I felt as though one of my 
own sons had been drowned",''^ the British Minister commented: 
"It would be possible to belittle this statement as diplomatic exaggeration, or 
perhaps as the remark of a man whom a son more less makes little 
difference, but I am sure that the utterance was genuine. The King has gone 
so far in supporting us that a blow to us is a blow to his own pride and 
honour. We must win, not only in our joint interests but to vindicate his 
reputation as a statesman; and he is cheerfully convinced that we shall 
win".' '^ 
D. The British Assistance to Saudi Arabia 
At the beginning of 1940 the British government was informed about Ibn Saud's 
apprehension that the war might jeopardise the security of Saudi Arabia. With a 
reference to the potential for an Italian aggression against the Kingdom, the King 
requested "for assurance . . . and material assistance".'''' 
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Due to the fact that the Anglo-Italian Agreement was still valid, the British 
government could not give Saudi Arabia a specific assurance against Italy.'' ' 
Nonetheless, it was explained to the Saudi Arabian King that, "His Majesty's 
Government regarded his interests as their own"."^ Hence: 
"For their own sakes they want him to maintain his present dominions, to 
retain his own power within those dominions, and in due course to pass on his 
power undiminished to his son. Al l their influence will always be exerted to 
these ends, for i f things happened otherwise the ensuing confusion would be 
very dangerous for themselves and their policy . . . Their ultimate aims are the 
same as his, to preserve the independence and integrity of Saudi Arabia"."^ 
Despite the fact that the British government was willing to assist Saudi Arabia 
financially, it was reluctant to furnish it with war materials."^ In a dispatch to the new 
British Minister in Jeddah, Mr Hugh Stonehewer-Bird, on 31 January 1940, the 
Foreign Office concluded that: 
"By comparison with most countries . . . Ibn Saud is in no danger of foreign 
attack. Unless therefore you [Stonehewer-Bird] have serious ground to think 
that his internal security is in danger owing to lack of arms, His Majesty's 
Government must continue for the present, with minor exceptions, to use war 
material at their disposal for countries nearer fighting line. His Majesty's 
Government are ready, however, to help Ibn Saud in financial sphere"."' 
Ultimately, it was agreed in February 1940 that the British government would finance 
Saudi Arabia with a subsidy of £200,000 during 1940.^°° Nonetheless, it became 
obvious at a later stage that the economic crisis that the Kingdom was facing required 
further financial assistance. 
In the summer of 1940 the Saudi Arabian economy started to suffer badly from the 
consequences of the war. The economy as whole declined when the small free trading 
markets of Saudi Arabia's towns felt the consequence of the war, and also when 
government revenues declined. The disorder in the mechanism of the trading market 
occurred when the prices of commodities rose in response to the shortages of basic 
commodities, in particular rice and flour. The scarcity resulted from the falling 
numbers of shipments to the Middle East as whole. The market disorder multiplied 
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when the merchants' confidence fell and they started to withdraw their gold and cash 
from i t . ' ' " 
Government revenues started to diminish badly when the war hit the main sources of 
income: the pilgrimage revenue, the custom's revenues and the oil royalties. First, the 
number of pilgrims from the Islamic worid had fallen to about half; from about 
64,000 in 1939, to 37,000 in 1940.'°' Second, the government customs revenues had 
fallen as a result of the sharp cut in imports. Finally, the newly started oil royalties of 
1939 had dropped just a few months after the beginning of oil exports, because of the 
shortages of the necessary production technology and the lack of sufficient crude oil 
shipments the quantity of oil production had been sharply reduced.'"^ 
While the economy was declining, Ibn Saud's needs were increasing rapidly. He was 
in need of immediate cash and foodstuffs in order to replace the shortages; otherwise 
there was a fear that the state might face political disorder. From the first week of 
August 1940 onward, the case of financial assistance for Saudi Arabia began to be 
taken more seriously at all levels in the British government. Indeed, by then the 
British Minister at Jeddah was convinced of the necessity of providing Saudi Arabia 
with further financial assistance. He wrote to the Foreign Office on 1 August that, 
"unless he [Ibn Saud] receives very considerable financial assistance he will be 
unable to pay his officials their salaries or to distribute the usual gifts to his 
tribesmen".''*'' Stonehewer-Bird added, "As [you are].. . aware it is only by means of 
this annual distribution of food and money that Ibn Saud is enabled to maintain order 
among his tribesmen".'"^ Stonehewer-Bird suggested that the British government 
offer Ibn Saud a further amount of subsidies of £600,000 payable in instalments of 
£200,000 every two months.'"^ 
On realising the possible consequences of the Saudi Arabian economic crisis, the 
Foreign Office started to encourage the idea of assisting Saudi Arabia financially. A 
Foreign Office minute of August 1940, stated, "because Ibn Saud really needs the 
money and because a loan or subsidy is the only way by which we [the British 
government] can show our appreciation of Ibn Saud's continued friendship and 
loyalty".'"^ In order to strengthen its argument, the Foreign Office referred to the 
suggestion made by the Chiefs of Staff Committee on 14 June 1940, which read, "Ibn 
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Saud should be encouraged in every way including "material" encouragement to a 
greater extent than heretofore to demonstrate his friendship to this country".^"^ 
After considerable correspondence between the Foreign Office and the Treasury, the 
former convinced the latter on 4 October 1940 to offer Saudi Arabia immediate credit 
of £200,000 and thereafter £200,000 every two month, up to a total of £800,000.^°' 
The British government action, which was highly appreciated as it came at a "critical 
time" according to Amir Faisal's acknowledgement, had by all means helped the King 
to maintain order and stability in his Kingdom.^'^ 
Nonetheless, during the first quarter of 1941 the Saudi government started to realise 
that the British government's financial assistance was becoming harder and more 
complicated to obtain. First, the British government faced the problem of giving 
Saudi Arabia financial assistance in currency, as it was technically difficult to mint 
Riyals at that time. The Saudi government was disturbed to hear from the British 
government that the currency minting would take at least five months.^" Second, the 
Foreign Office informed the Saudi government in March and in April 1941 that there 
are no plans at the time to increase the promised financial assistance of £800,00, 
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which would be completed in April 1941. 
As a result of these developments. King Ibn Saud refrained from asking the British 
government for further help despite his urgent needs.'^ '^  But instead he directed all his 
efforts towards obtaining financial credits from new channels: which were the Oil 
Company and the US government. He thought that he would get a result through the 
new channels, particularly when he had just received the loan of $3 million from the 
Oil Company.^'^ 
However, in November 1941 the Foreign Office changed its point of view 
dramatically about financial assistance to Saudi Arabia. Thus it urged the Treasury to 
send immediately £250,000 to the Saudi government and to consider increasing the 
total amount of British financial assistance.^" This dramatic change came as a result 
of two factors: first, the American government's requests to the British government to 
help Saudi Arabia,^'^ second, the British Minister at Jeddah, Stonehewer-Bird's 
recommendation to his government to help Saudi Arabia immediately because of the 
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fear of comprehensive collapse of its regime - "a collapse whose consequences might 
well cost HMG more millions than those required to maintain i t " . " ' 
Consequently, the Treasury agreed on 27 January 1942 to provide Saudi Arabia with 
£3,000,000 for 1942."^ Initially, the Foreign Office thought the proposed amount too 
much, using the comparison with the previous year. However, in the end it agreed to 
the £3 million proposal, to help Ibn Saud's regime overcome a potential breakdown at 
this critical time."^ 
The impact of the British help was notable, particularly in assisting the Saudi 
government to maintain political order and preserve security. Moreover, such 
assistance caused Ibn Saud's attitude to become fiirther favourable towards the British 
government. Examples of King Ibn Saud's stance was crowned by his open 
acknowledgement of his special relationship with Britain, in his Hajj speech in 
December 1942, when he thanked the British for their help: 
"Indeed, i f we compare the state of this country [Saudi Arabia] in the present 
world war with its state in the past world war, we can see how great is the 
difference. Al l this comes from the graciousness of God, and secondly, as a 
result of the help given by the friendly British Government"."" 
E . The Question of Saudi Arabia's Neutrality 
The question of Saudi Arabia's attitude towards the war was debated between the 
Foreign Office and the India Office in June 1940. This discussion came just a few 
days after Italy had declared war on the Allies. Before embarking on the details of the 
debate, it is necessary to look closely at the British government's policies towards the 
question of Saudi neutrality prior to June 1940. 
When Ibn Saud consulted the British government in August 1939 regarding his 
neutrality in event of war between the Great Powers, he was advised to maintain a 
neutral position.'" The Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, regarded Saudi neutrality to 
be to Britain's advantage in many ways. First, the Saudi territory would be of a little 
use to the British forces in the event of hostilities. Second, the Saudi armed support 
would be valueless to the British Empire, especially when it was small in number and 
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weak in equipment. Third, Saudi Arabia produces no important commodity which the 
British government could not obtain without "indulging in unneutral conduct".^ ^^ 
In addition, the British Foreign Secretary thought that Ibn Saud would seek a price in 
return for a declaration of war against Germany. According to Halifax's speculation, 
Ibn Saud could ask for arms and money supply, and he would also expect British 
forces to protect his state. Moreover, he would expect rewards of a different form in 
the event of the allies' victory, including territory from some of his British-protected 
neighbours.^ ^^ 
In accordance with Halifax's account it was concluded then, that "There seems . . . to 
be no reason at first sight why His Majesty's Government should wish Ibn Saud to do 
anything but maintain his neutrality in the event of a general conflict".^^'* Hence, "so 
far as they [the British] could see, they would prefer Ibn Saud to remain neutral in a 
future conflict and yet keep in mind the possibility of persuading him to depart from 
neutrality should they find any reason".^ '^ 
Even with regard to a public declaration of Ibn Saud's sympathies to the Allies, the 
British government preferred - in December 1939 - not to let Saudi Arabia announce 
its sympathies publicly, but "to let Ibn Saud's attitude speak for itself, as we [the 
British] feel sure it will do in time".^^^ It was stated in a despatch from the Foreign 
Office to the British Legation in Jeddah that; "His Majesty's Government needs little 
from him [Ibn Saud] at present, except that he should be strong in his own territory 
and adopt a general attitude of benevolent neutrality".^^' 
In June 1940 when Saudi Arabia offered to cooperate with Iraq in the event of an 
Italian attack on Iraq's territories, the Foreign Office and the India Office had 
different points of view.^^^ The Secretary for India, Mr Leopold Amery, argued that it 
was in British interests for Saudi Arabia to join the war for several reasons. First, Ibn 
Saud's declaration of war against Italy would be most heartening in Iraq, Palestine, 
Syria and Egypt. Amery thought that Ibn Saud's neutrality would be "most 
disheartening" to all the British friends in the area.^ '^ Second, the use of Saudi 
Arabian ports, coastal waters and land could be vital for British forces in the event of 
their attacking the Italians in Eritrea and the Red Sea.^ '^' Third, Saudi Arabia should 
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be on the British side in case the British forces were pushed out of Egypt, such that 
Britain's position in the Middle East would not be "gravely prejudiced". Fourth and 
most importantly, Ibn Saud's declaration of war with the Allies would have a great 
effect on Muslim opinion in India.'^' Amery's dispatch to HaUfax concluded "we 
should welcome the earliest possible entry of Ibn Saud into the war on our side. After 
all, it would be a sign of confidence in our ultimate victory which would influence a 
wider world even than that of Islam".'^' 
The Foreign Secretary had a different point of view. In a reply, Halifax refuted his 
colleague's arguments. Although Halifax agreed that Ibn Saud's declaration of war 
would have a heartening effect upon the other Arab countries, he did not agree that 
his neutrality was disheartening for them, because it was well known that Ibn Saud's 
attitude was pro-British.'^^ Regarding the use of Saudi Arabia's ports, coastal waters 
and aerodromes, the Foreign Secretary argued that the service departments had never 
"appeared to attach any particular importance" to this issue.'^ '* Over the possibility of 
British forces being pushed out of Egypt, Halifax argued that i f such a disaster 
happened it would mean the end of the British Empire in the Middle East and at that 
time even i f Ibn Saud were on the British side that would make no difference. Halifax 
gave the fourth point regarding the effect of Ibn Saud's involvement upon the 
Muslims in India the fullest weight, stating that " i f Indian opinion or Moslem opinion 
generally showed dangerous signs of veering away from us, we might have to 
reconsider our attitude towards Ibn Saud's neutrality on this account alone".'^ ^ 
The Foreign Secretaiy added that Saudi Arabia's "participation in the war would be a 
very nominal one", particularly when the country was poor and without resources.'^ ^ 
In addition, Halifax still believed that Ibn Saud would ask for a price in retum for 
joining the war, and that such a demand would include a substantial amount of 
subsidies, armed protection, territorial compensation, and a final solution to the 
Palestine issue.'''' Summing up his message to Amery, Halifax stated that: 
"You wil l see from what I have written that I should be reluctant to go so far 
as to make it clear straight away that we should welcome the earliest possible 
entry of Ibn Saud into the war on our side. I do not underrate the advantages 
of such a move . . . but I still think that the disadvantages would be 
considerable and that it is not yet clear that they [the disadvantages] would be 
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outweighed by the advantages. I will , however, have the question carefully 
examined with the departments concemed".^ ^^ 
On 8 July 1940, a memorandum on the question of Saudi Arabia's neutrality was sent 
from the Foreign Office to the War Office Official Committee for Questions 
Concerning the Middle East.^ '^ It was stated in that memorandum, which included the 
Foreign Office-India Office correspondence, that: 
"The problem might possibly be considered under two main heads; (a) the 
general effect on other Arabs and Moslems of Ibn Saud's entry into the war; 
and (b) the actual material assistance which could be derived from Ibn Saud's 
forces and from the use of his territory".^'"' 
On 10 July 1940 the Committee, which comprised representatives from the Colonial 
Office, Foreign Office, India Office, War Office, Treasury, Admiralty and Air 
Ministry, held a meeting on the matter concerned. After discussions the Committee's 
conclusion agreed with the Foreign Secretary, that at the present time and in the 
existing circumstances the disadvantages of Saudi Arabia's declaration of war would 
outweigh the advantages. However i f circumstances changed the assistance which Ibn 
Saud maiy give "might be of value" for two future issues. The first would be to stop 
any Italian-Yemeni aggression against Aden. The second was that, in the event of 
trouble in Iraq it would be valuable to use a route from Kuwait to Amman through the 
north part of Saudi Arabia.^"" 
The British Minister at Jeddah was informed on 24 July 1940 by a despatch from the 
Foreign Office about the conclusion, which had been reached by the War Office 
Official Committee for Questions Concerning the Middle East. It was stated in that 
message, "that no attempt should be made at the present time to induce Ibn Saud to 
enter the war as an ally" unless circumstances change.^ ''^  It was added, "Meanwhile 
continuance of Ibn Saud's benevolent neutrality is of highest importance". '^'^  The 
Foreign Office also asked Stonehewer-Bird about his views whether there were any 
other steps, which might be taken to ensure this benevolent neutrality.^'^ In his reply 
to the Foreign Office on 1 August 1940, Stonehewer-Bird stated that, " I entirely share 
the view that the disadvantages deriving from a declaration of war by Ibn Saud far 
outweigh any possible advantage".^'" He also added: 
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"The best way to ensure continuance of Ibn Saud's benevolent neutrality is, I 
feel, to show him in every possible way that His Majesty's Government have 
his interests at heart and will endeavour to ensure that he and his country 
suffer as little as possible from the consequences of war".''*^ 
Though, it could be said that up to the summer of 1940 the majority of the British 
government departments were in agreement with the Foreign Office point of view on 
the question of Saudi Arabia's neutrality, it has to be mentioned that some change 
would became noticeable later. Such a change could not have occurred without Saudi 
Arabia being given some strategic considerations. The proposal of Kuwait-Amman 
Route was the core point that provided the Kingdom with some kind of strategic 
importance. 
Based on a rudimentary study by Captain Gerald De Gaury, the former Political 
Agent in Kuwait, and a note by the British Air Headquarters at Habbaniya (Iraq); the 
British Minister at Baghdad, Mr Basil Newton, suggested on 1 October 1940 the 
implementation of a "British right of way between Transjordan and Koweit [Kuwait] 
across Saudi Arabia".''" 
In a detailed memorandum Newton argued that this route had a political, strategic and 
economic importance.'''^ According to his account, the Iraqis always attempted to 
take advantage of Britain because Iraq believed that it was a vital link of 
communication between the Gulf and the Mediterranean. However, by establishing 
this new route the Iraqis would then realise how dependent they were on Britain, and 
not the opposite. In addition to the Iraqi dimension, Newton thought that the route 
would strengthen the British position throughout the Middle East. Strategically, the 
existence of the new route would deter any attempts to close or abstract the line of 
communication through Iraq. Furthermore, the route would be useful according to 
Newton "as an emergency route i f the safety of Palestine . . . were in doubt".'''^ He 
pointed out that the route was the most direct between the Gulf and the Suez Canal. 
Newton argued that the short course of the route would save time and oil for both 
aeroplanes and motorcars. In addition, the route might be of value to transport oil 
from the fields in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and south of Iraq to Palestine and Egypt.'^° 
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Therefore, the British Minister in Iraq advised his government to obtain a right to 
establish this route due to its "great potential value".^^' The right, in his point of view, 
"should include the use, development, and control of all methods of communication 
i.e. by land, air, pipe-line, telegraph etc".'^ ^^  
Newton's recommendation was carefully looked at in London. On 12 October 1940, 
the War Office considered the "sufficient potential value" of this new proposed route 
"as alternative or supplementary to the Basra-Baghdad-Haifa route".^ ^^ On that day, it 
was argued in a letter from the War Office to the Foreign Office that, "in view of the 
uncertainty of the situation in Iraq and Syria, it seems by no means certain that we 
would be able to rely on the Iraq route being available".^^'' 
There is a little doubt, that the potential use of the proposed route would give Saudi 
Arabia more strategic importance in the eyes of British foreign policy makers. It 
would not just allow Saudi Arabia to play a more important role in the event that it 
joined the allies, but also it would cause the British government to give more weight 
to the value of such an alliance. As the following pages will reveal, the proposed 
route had set off a significant circumstance that changed the balance of the 
advantages and the disadvantages in such a question. 
In November 1941 the British govenmient appointed De Gaury as Political Officer at 
Riyadh, to be near Ibn Saud and to report to the British Legation in Jeddah. De Gaury 
discussed various topics and issues with Ibn Saud and his officials during his stay in 
Riyadh between 12 and 20 of November 1941; these discussions included issues of 
concern to both States in the Arab world. When De Gaury found out that Ibn Saud's 
attitude was satisfactory in general for the British, he requested his government 
withdraw him from Riyadh.^" De Gaury advised his goverrmient to let Ibn Saud 
declare war with the Allies' without delay. 
According to De Gaury's recommendation, the Chiefs of Staff Committee at the War 
Office (CSCWO) sent telegrams on 12 December 1941, to the Commander-in-Chief 
Middle East (CCME), and the Commander-in-Chief India (CCI), requesting their 
views on an open alliance with Ibn Saud. Based on the replies of the CCME and the 
CCI, the CSCWO recommended on 23 December 1941 that an open alliance be 
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agreed with Saudi Arabia.^" The alHance would bring the following advantages, 
according to the CSCWO: 
"(1) The opportunity of developing an alternative land . . . [route] from 
Kuwait to Amman. 
(2) The more effective policing of Trans-Jordan-Iraqi-Saudi frontier and the 
Saudi-Yemen frontier. 
(3) The opportunity of developing and using aerodromes on the Saudi Arabia 
Persian Gulf coast and in northern Saudi Arabia. 
(4) The opportunity of developing air routes across Saudi Arabia. 
(5) Increased security against Axis activities in the Red Sea area. 
(6) A useful counter to Axis propaganda in the Moslem world. 
(7) An open declaration by Ibn Saud would have a steadying effect upon the 
attitude of Arab tribes in the Middle Euphrates and in southern Iraq and upon 
the Syrian nomad tribes with all of whom his influence is considerable".^ ^^ 
It was concluded by the CSCWO that, in all, the advantages outweighed the 
disadvantages from the military point of view, especially as Ibn Saud's request for 
arms in retum for his declaration of war would not be great as his army was small in 
number.^ ^^ 
In addition to the military point of view, it became apparent to the Foreign Office by 
the end of December 1941, that "all the political authorities consulted", including the 
government of India, "take the view that such a step by Ibn Saud would have an 
admirable effect" on the British "war efforts".^^° The Foreign Office counsellor, Mr 
Charles Baxter, minuted on 31 December, that: 
"It is evident . . . that both military and political experts are in favour of 
pursuing this suggestion and I do not suppose that the Foreign Office would 
wish to take any other view, though we may perhaps think that the advantages 
may have been rather over-estimated".^^' 
Subsequent to fiirther consultations between the Foreign Office and the British 
diplomats in the Middle East, it was decided that Saudi Arabia should be invited "to 
declare a state of war against the Axis".^^^ On 9 February 1942, Stonehewer-Bird was 
asked to approach King Ibn Saud, and invite him to take such a step.^ ^^  
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On 25 February, the British Minister cabled the Foreign Office - from Riyadh -
stating that; "After three long conversations with me and much anxious thought, Ibn 
Saud has decided that it is neither in his interest nor in that of His Majesty's 
Goverrmient for him . . . to declare war on the Axis".^^ Stonehewer-Bird summarised 
Ibn Saud's reasons as follow: 
"(a) Interests of his own country. He is completely unprepared for war and a 
declaration of war might result in some immediate action by the enemy, e.g. 
bombing of one of his cities. His people would in this event immediately rise 
against him and he would have to go. Nor would his people stand for any 
warlike preparations made by us for his protection. His land was of two parts: 
The Nejd where wild men lived whom he could not hope to convince of the 
need for him to go to war when he was not threatened, and the Hejaz whose 
inhabitants would not forgive him and from whom he could expect no support 
i f he exposed the Holy Land to the dangers of war. A delegation from Hejaz 
had recently visited him to express deep appreciation of his ability to keep the 
Holy Land fi-ee from the threat of war. (b) His Majesty's Government's 
interests. He did not agree that a declaration of war by him would have the 
effect His Majesty's Government expected. On the contrary, it would be 
interpreted not only by our enemies but by his enemies in the Moslem world 
as proof that he was merely the tool of the British who had betrayed Islam and 
exposed the Holy Land to danger in British interests only".^^^ 
The Foreign Office reacted positively to Ibn Saud's argument. On 28 February, 
Stonehewer-Bird received a telegram from London, stating; "There is much force in 
Ibn Saud's arguments and His Majesty's Govenmient do not propose to re-open the 
question, anyway for the time being".'^ ^^ 
Though Ibn Saud's lines of reasoning were forceful as they were given, it could be 
said that, at that time there was one more certain reason which could have caused him 
to be determined regarding Saudi Arabia's neutrality. However, the King was in no 
position to include such a reason among his explanations to the British Minister. This 
was the case when such a reason was related to the war theatre in the Middle East and 
to the possible changes in the balance of powers near Saudi Arabia.^^^ As a matter of 
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fact, at the time when the British Minister was talking to the King in Riyadh the 
forces of Field Marshal Rommel were just within 70 miles of Alexandria.'^ ^^ Indeed, 
the King, who was fanatical in maintaining the security of his Kingdom fi^om any 
threat, was in no mood to join the Allies when the possibility of a German invasion of 
Egypt was not that remote. In fact, it was noticed that the King was even prepared to 
revive his diplomatic link with the Germans as soon as they "occupied Suez".^ ^^  
Despite the fact that Ibn Saud did not join the war beside the Allies explicitly, he 
supported them implicitly by all means. Examples of his support to the Allies in 
general and to Britain in particular, were included in the British Legation - in Jeddah -
report to the Foreign Office on events in Saudi Arabia during 1942: 
"In many . . . ways Ibn Saud's loyalty to His Majesty's Government has been 
manifest throughout the year. He has frequently communicated to us 
information regarding the situation in Europe and elsewhere obtained from his 
agents abroad; he has given us two machines of his tiny air force in the hope 
that they would be useful for carrying passengers and mails; in the summer 
when the position was most critical in Egypt he ungrudgingly allowed the 
Middle East Command to take over without payment seventy-five cars and 
lorries for which he had paid and which he required most urgently himself; he 
has agreed to British and American aircraft crossing Saudi Arabia from the 
Middle East to Persian Gulf. . . [moreover] he has taken no important move 
without consulting His Majesty's Government at every point. Indeed, Britain 
in all her long history can seldom have had such loyal support from a foreign 
power either in adversity or in success".^ "^ 
F. Saudi Arabia and the United States of America 
Without the progressive development of the American oil interests in Saudi Arabia 
during the last two years of the 1930s, and without the continued pressure from 
American oilmen; the US government might not even have considered the situation of 
its diplomatic relations with the Kingdom at the end of that decade. This was the case, 
when the dominant US foreign policy makers were inclined to believe that up to 
1937, the American interests did not deserve the establishment of a diplomatic 
representation.^'^ In fact, it was concluded at the State Department, in May 1937, to 
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"let matters stand as they now are until such a time as American interests in Saudi 
Arabia have made further developments".^ ^^ 
Nevertheless, the positive progress of the US oil interests in Saudi Arabia in 1938-
1939 helped the efforts of the oil companies' executives in persuading the State 
Department to take affirmative steps. The discovery of oil of commercial quantities in 
1938, the new additions to the CASOC (Califomia Arabian Standard Oil Company) 
oil concession in May 1939, and the ultimate growth of American oil related 
businesses, caused the majority of the State Department officials to realise the 
necessity of safeguarding such increasing interests.'^ '^' 
Subsequent to the recommendation of the State Department, President Roosevelt 
approved on 30 June 1939 the accreditation of the US Minister in Cairo, Judge Bert 
Fish, as non-resident Minister to Saudi Arabia.^^'' On 4 February 1940, Fish visited 
Jeddah and submitted his credentials to Ibn Saud.^ ^^  Despite such a step, it could be 
said that the US government remained practically indifferent to Saudi-US ties. Even 
when the Kingdom faced the economic crises, it was Americans oilmen and 
individuals who had to convince Washington to be more concerned in regard to Saudi 
Arabia. 
In April 1941, the chairman of Standard Oil of Califomia (SOCAL), Mr James 
Moffett, submitted a formal proposal to President Roosevelt, requesting the 
establishment of US direct assistance to Saudi Arabia.^^^ In that proposal Moffett 
urged, "Unless King Ibn Saud receive financial assistance at once there is grave 
danger that this . . . Kingdom cannot survive the present emergency".^ ^^ In addition to 
Moffett's proposal the US mining engineer, Mr K Twitchell, who was working in 
Saudi Arabia mines for Ibn Saud, also suggested to the US government in May 1941 
that it should extend direct aid to Saudi Arabia.^'^ Furthermore, upon Ibn Saud's 
request, Twitchell urged the US government to send an American agricultural mission 
to study the viability of developing the agricultural and water resources of Najd.^'^ 
The British government did not object to any efforts which would lead to direct US 
assistance to Saudi Arabia when it was informed about the idea by the US 
govemment.^ ^^ In fact the British tried to encourage any tendency from the US 
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government in that direction, because of the need for American cooperation in the 
Middle East in general, and in Saudi Arabia in particular.^^' British officials 
expressed the hope that the USA would become involved. Mr Nevile Butler, the 
Minister-Counsellor of the British Embassy in Washington, suggested in July 1941 
that the US government give a loan to Saudi Arabia, which would let Ibn Saud realise 
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that both the British and the Americans were his friends. 
Nevertheless, on 18 July 1941 Roosevelt instructed the State Department to "tell the 
British I hope they can take care of the King of Saudi Arabia. This is a little far afield 
for us".^ ^^  Despite objections by American Middle East diplomats about such a move, 
most of the US officials in Washington were in agreement with the President's idea. 
In fact, the Secretary of the Navy, the head of Lend-Lease, and the Federal Loan 
Administration, all supported Rooseveh's decision.^ '^* The decision confirmed the 
US's policy at that time, that it regarded Saudi Arabia as being located in an area in 
which British interests were much greater than those of the US, especially in the 
political and the strategic aspects.^ *^  
Following the US government decision not to assist Saudi Arabia directly, but to 
leave such a task to the British goverrunent, American oil executives became more 
"active in encouraging fear and suspicion of British policy". For instance, on 27 
November 1941, Mr Fred Davies of CASOC told the State Department that "his 
company would make further financial advances to Ibn Saud for the following year", 
especially when, "his company desired to avoid, i f possible, having the British be the 
only source of income to the King for fear that they would attempt to enact certain 
quid pro guos". 
Subsequent to the US declaration of war in December 1941, the US government had 
fiirther disclosed the supremacy of the British power over the area in which Saudi 
Arabia is located.^ ^^ In early March 1942 the British and the US governments agreed 
to divide the world into three different zones, in which each of them would exercise it 
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military responsibility: 
1. The Pacific area, where the USA would be the senior partner. 
2. The Atlantic and Europe, where both would be responsible. 
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3. The 'middle area' which started from Singapore across India, the Gulf, the 
Red Sea, and the Mediterranean, where Britain would be the senior power. 
Therefore, the defence of the Middle East - including Saudi Arabia - would be 
formally recognised as being under Britain military responsibility. 
It could be generally concluded that up to the end of 1942, Saudi-American relations 
remained insignificant, particularly when compared to that of Saudi-Anglo relations. 
Despite the fact that some interactions were visible between Saudi Arabia and the 
USA in 1942, such as the conclusion of a commercial and technical agreement on 22 
April, the appointment of Mr James Moose as a resident consul at Jeddah on 1 May, 
the arrival of the proposed US agriculture mission on 10 May, the impact of the 
course of Saudi-American relations on Saudi-British relations was almost 
2 9 1 
nonexistent. 
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Summary and Conclusions 
It was apparent from their actions at the beginning of 1939 that the Saudis were very 
cautious when it came to the necessity of preserving the security of the Kingdom. 
Indeed, King Ibn Saud's apprehension about the consequences of the 1938 Anglo-
Italian Agreement had caused him to consider the need for the creation of strong ties 
with Germany. Still, while he was considering that, the King did not fail to inquire 
about British perspective on Saudi Arabian security. 
King Ibn Saud's anxiety over the security of his Kingdom had enabled Grobba, who 
was - like the King at that specific time of early 1939 - keen to create a strong Saudi-
German link, to emerge from the Jeddah talks with a promising perspective for the 
new relations. Likewise, the ambiguous British response to the Saudi inquiry had led 
the Saudis to keep the progress of their connection with Germany ongoing. However, 
by the summer of 1939, it became evident to King Ibn Saud that the development of 
his new relations with the Germans was moving towards goals that were not 
compatible with his Kingdom's interests. The German government's abuse of certain 
aspects of the Saudi-German connection, such as the use of the Berlin talks for an 
anti-British propaganda campaign, had rather persuaded the King to reorient his 
efforts towards closer ties with Britain. Indeed, by September 1939, the King's 
experience of Saudi-German relations had led him to realise that Saudi-Anglo 
relations were in fact irreplaceable. 
Though it was Italy which caused the Saudi security concerns, the Saudi govenmient 
did not alter the status of the Italian representation in Jeddah during the first two years 
of the war. In fact the Saudis had avoided any action that could cause the Italians to 
consider any negative attitude towards the Kingdom. Despite the fact that Italy's 
entrance into the war against Britain had caused Saudi suspicions over the Anglo-
Italian Agreement to become history, still the Saudis did not neglect the possibility of 
an Italian aggression against the Kingdom's territories. As a matter of fact, the 
accidental bombing of Dhahran oilfields by the Italians in October 1940 had made it 
difficult for the Saudis to forget about such a possibility. Though the Saudi 
government did not facilitate the opening of a German legation in Jeddah, and that the 
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Italian legation was closed in 1942, Saudi Arabia did not formally break its relations 
with either country. Perhaps as a precaution, just in case the war developed in 
unexpected directions, the Saudi government did not show the Axis any sign, but that 
which gave the impression that it would consider the opening of their legations in 
Jeddah at any appropriate stage. 
Although ideological values were not unobserved in Saudi Arabia's attitude towards 
the Palestine issue, yet realpolitik values had kept the impact of the same issue under 
control as far as Saudi-British relations were concerned. Following the failure of the 
London Conference, the British government adopted a moderate proposal in order to 
solve the Palestine question. Despite the fact that the Arab countries did not formally 
approve the White Paper, still it could not be neglected that the British government 
had at least come closer to some of the Arab demands when it started to implement 
such a proposal. With the grave development of the war, King Ibn Saud had decided 
to refrain from any action that might obstruct Britain's war efforts, even i f it was 
related to Palesfine. 
Beside the failure of the Saudi-German attempt to develop closer links, there were 
other causes that had helped the consolidation of Saudi-British relations at the outset 
of the war. The intention of the British government of not letting Saudi Arabia risk its 
security by entering into the war had caused the King not just to adopt benevolent 
neutrality, but also to further strengthen his Kingdom's friendship with Britain. 
Moreover, the realisation of the compatibility of the Saudi and the British interests 
was also accommodating fiirther consolidation. Saudi Arabian reliance on the British 
Empire, particularly that which was related to pilgrimage affairs and the sea 
shipments as well as the British military and political presence in the area, were 
addifional grounds that helped the course of Anglo-Saudi relations. Besides, the 
British government's swift action over Ibn Saud's anxiety about certain actions by the 
Hashemites had made the King put his faith in the goodwill of his Kingdom's 
relations with Britain. Likewise, the British government assurances about its 
intentions in maintaining the sea-lanes shipment that carried pilgrims and foodstuff 
were also heartfelt. Additionally, Britain assurance "to preserve the independence and 
integrity of Saudi Arabia", as well as the notable financial assistance which in fact 
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helped the Saudis preserve security and order during the crucial years of the war; 
were a practical reality that greatly eased the path of Saudi-Anglo relations. 
There were three occasions during the period that was covered in this chapter in 
which the question of Saudi Arabian neutrality arose. The first occurred before the 
outbreak of the war in August 1939, when Ibn Saud consulted the British government 
regarding the German request to him to sign a formal agreement on his neutrality. The 
second arose when Saudi Arabia offered, in June 1940, to assist Iraq in case of an 
Italian attack. British officials brought up the third, in 1942. On the first two 
occasions the Foreign Office point of view was firm; that Saudi Arabia should remain 
neutral despite contrary views of other departments in the British government. 
However, in the third, the Foreign Office was influenced in considering that Saudi 
Arabia should declare war on the Axis. Despite the fact that the King did not express 
an obvious and an explicit indication that would reveal that he was ready "to declare a 
state of war against the Axis", he was approached by the British Minister to do so in 
February 1942. In response, the King had argued that it was neither in Saudi Arabian 
nor British interest that he should adhere to such an action. By doing so it was 
obvious that Ibn Saud was determined to keep his Kingdom away from all kind of 
risks that the war might bring, particularly when the development of the warfront in 
North Africa was not yet showing any signs of an Allied victory. 
The discussions that took place within the British government in regard to King Ibn 
Saud's stance in the war, had confirmed the significance that Britain had given to 
Saudi Arabia. Indeed, there was a significant role for Saudi Arabia in regard to the 
preservation of security and order of the British Empire. Such an importance was not 
just related to that of a strategic concept, but also to that which was related to the 
impact of Ibn Saud's benevolent conduct on the British Empire Muslim populations. 
Despite the accreditation of an American Minister to Saudi Arabia in 1940, Saudi-US 
relations remained insignificant. Though interested Americans were pushing the US 
government to give further consideration to Saudi-US relations, and though the 
British government was also encouraging such a move, the US government was in 
fact unwilling to do so. Such an attitude did not just weaken the development of 
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Saudi-US relations, but also enabled the progress of Saudi-British relations to stay 
free of any kind of obstruction. 
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Chapter Two: Towards Changing Relations, 1943-1945 
Together with the studying of the broad context of Saudi-British relations from early 
1943 through to 1945, this chapter will also attempt to trace some of the factors that 
facilitated the occurrence of change in relations between Britain and Saudi Arabia. 
Within this course and in order to comprehend the subsequent developments that 
occurred in Anglo-Saudi relations, a number of subjects will be researched. 
The expansion of Saudi-American relations will be investigated, starting from the 
lend-lease extension and through the increase of USA involvement in the Saudi 
Kingdom. A survey of the state of Saudi-Anglo ties will be provided, before 
comprehensively inspecting the developments and the implications of the Anglo-
American rivalry over Saudi Arabia. Prior to the exploration of Ibn Saud's summits 
with each of Roosevelt and Churchill in 1945, Saudi Arabia's attitude to the Palestine 
issue will be looked at. 
A. The Advancement of Saudi-US Relations, 1943-1945 
I. The Lend Lease 
Unlike the situation in 1941, the US administration decided in February 1943 to 
extend direct aid to Saudi Arabia. Several reasons can be put forward for such a 
development. The strategic importance of Saudi Arabia's oil, the consequences of the 
US's entrance into war, and the continuity of the oilmen's efforts in persuading 
Washington about the importance of the Kingdom.' 
When the US administration declined the arrangement of direct aid to Saudi Arabia in 
July 1941, the US strategists were not only acknowledging that the USA was a net oil 
exporter, but also that they did not appreciate "the extent of the Saudi [oil] fields".^ 
Nevertheless, matters began to change through to 1943, as the Saudis' oil "began to 
assume new importance in American war and postwar planning".^ As a matter of fact, 
the Americans' interest in the Saudi Arabian "petroleum was heightened by a growing 
concern about the situation in the United States", regardless of "dramatic increases in 
[USA] domestic production and refining capacity, rising industrial and military 
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requirements in 1943 and anticipated increase for 1944 indicated the possibility of 
future shortages".'* In response to this realization US officials urged the president to 
look at "the future of the United States with respect to oil", particularly as the USA 
"must have extra-territorial reserves to guard against the day when steadily increasing 
demand can no longer be met by . . . [its] domestic supply".^ 
The consequence of the USA's involvement in the war had brought the Saudi-
American connection to further consideration in Washington. The "broadening" of the 
US "combat role in Europe and the Pacific" at the beginning of 1943, gave Saudi 
Arabia further importance.^ Hence, it emphasised the importance of gaining the 
support and the goodwill of King Ibn Saud, as the strategic location of his Kingdom 
was considered by the Americans to be "vital air and supply links connecting North 
Africa and the Far East".' It was viewed at the Department of State that the "the 
King's prestige and the strategic location of his realm might aid substantially in 
prosecuting the war".^ 
The American oilmen's "arguments were clearly important in shaping the thinking of 
policy-makers", in particular, the arguments that emphasised the danger of increasing 
British influence in Saudi Arabia.^ By the beginning "of 1943, the Department of 
State, led by the Division of Near Eastern Affairs [NE], . . . press for a more active 
American role in Saudi Arabia . . . officials were becoming more and more concerned 
about relations with the British in Saudi Arabia".'" Indeed, by then "American 
perception of British intentions began to change. Eager to safeguard the American 
stake in Arabian oil, officials grew increasingly wary of Britain's predominant 
position in Saudi Arabia"." 
On 9 January, the assistant secretary of state, Mr Dean Acheson, wrote to lend-lease 
administrator, Mr Edward Stettinius, "requesting that Saudi Arabia be declared 
eligible for lend-lease aid".'^ Acheson reminded Stettinius, that though Saudi Arabia 
was important to the USA, it was the only "major political unit" in the Middle East 
"not yet eligible for lend-lease".'^ On 11 of January, "Stettinius sent the department's 
request on to the president, recommending its acceptance".'" Ultimately, on 18 
February 1943, President Roosevelt issued Executive Order number 8926, which 
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declared that "the defence of Saudi Arabia is vital to the defense of the United 
States".'^ By that declaration Saudi Arabia became eligible for lend-lease assistance.'^ 
The extension of lend-lease to Saudi Arabia in 1943 was a crucial turning point not 
only for Saudi-US relations but also for Saudi-British relations. In fact, a new positive 
era in the history of Saudi-American relations had begun in that year, at the expense 
of Saudi-Anglo relations. Dr Clive Leatherdale, who researched Saudi-British 
relations from 1925 to 1939, agreed that "it is that year [1943], not 1933 when 
S O C A L won the Hasa concession, which marks the begirming of American political 
interest in Saudi Arabia, and the substitution of her predominance in Saudi affairs at 
the expense of that of Britain".'^ Leatherdale emphasised that the "passing of the 
Lend-Lease Act provided the spur to American involvement" in Saudi Arabia, an 
involvement that was "less out of the short-term aims of winning the war, than with 
long-term aims with regards to the future".'^ Indeed, the extension of lend-lease to 
Saudi Arabia, which was a substantial "step by the United States toward securing and 
preserving its stake in Arabia oil", did also "indicate a significant shift in the 
American attitude toward Saudi Arabia".'^ 
In April 1943, the US Minister in Egypt, who was also credited to Saudi Arabia then, 
Mr Alexander Kirk, visited Riyadh especially to explain - to the Saudis - the details of 
the lend-lease programme.^" Additional discussions - on the lend-lease - were held 
when General Patrick Hurley visited Riyadh in the last week of May. Hurley's 
discussions with Ibn Saud and his officials included the urgent need for food supplies, 
communications (wireless stations and transportation machinery), and currency 
supplies (in gold and silver coin), etc.^' 
Within less than a year of the extension of the lend-lease, Saudi Arabia had received 
more than 15,000,000 Riyals in silver, along with "adequate supplies of foodstuffs, 
transport and essential commodities", from the USA.^^ In 1944 the US govemment 
became an equal partner - on a fifty/fifty basis - to the British govemment in assisting 
Ibn Saud's Kingdom.'^ ^ In 1945 when Britain reduced its part of the assistances, the 
USA kept increasing the total amount of its assistances to the Kingdom.^'' The US 
direct aid for Saudi Arabia "continued into early 1946, beyond the general termination 
date for Lend Lease".^^ 
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II. The Ultimate Increase of USA Involvement in Saudi Arabia 
As was to be expected after the extension of lend-lease, US-Saudi ties were enhanced 
considerably. The reality of such enhancement was even reflected at the diplomatic 
representation level, when the US government elevated the status of its representative 
in Jeddah, Mr James Moose, to the position of Minister Resident on 19 May 1943.'^ ^ 
Though King Ibn Saud was welcoming the enrichment of the American-Saudi 
relationship, he was also careful to avoid any negative impact of such a development 
on Britain's attitude towards his Kingdom. 
Prior to the Kirk visit of April 1943, King Ibn Saud approached the British for 
consultation on the meaning of the lend-lease, and "whether he should agree" to it or 
not.^' According to the British account: 
"The King has all along been reluctant to travel either fast or far along the 
road leading to closer contact with the United States. The United States 
Government is still rather an unknown quantity for him, and he is anxious 
concerning the possible repercussions of extensive American activities''.^^ 
In addition to the probability of King Ibn Saud's apprehension about the likelihood of 
negative implications of the lend-lease extension on his dominance, there seemed to 
be a further reason that motivated him to consult with the British. He might indeed 
have wanted the British government to know that Saudi Arabia still considered Britain 
as the main great power partner, despite the new American approach. This was the 
case when it was still obvious to the King that almost all the issues that were related 
to his Kingdom's security were tied to Britain. By all means, he was "most anxious to 
avoid the appearance of deserting His Majesty's Government in favour of the United 
States Govemment".^^ In its turn the British government, which in fact did not object 
to the new US attitude, reassured the Saudi government and advised it that the lend-
lease was in the best interests of Saudi Arabia.^" 
Even at his discussion with Hurley in May 1943, Ibn Saud was careful not to let the 
event lead to any misunderstanding between Saudi Arabia and Britain. In reply to Ibn 
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Saud's request that the US govemment send the silver direct to Saudi Arabia, Hurley 
stated: 
"The United States of America always send their products and the things the 
Allies need to Britain and Britain distributes them herself to the Allies . . . I 
myself have suggested to my Govemment that they should themselves 
undertake the distribution of this material to the Allied countries".^' 
Fearing that this might harm Saudi-British relations if it was passed to the British by 
any chance. King Ibn Saud responded immediately - to General Hurley - by 
clarifying: 
"We are not complaining about Britain, she is our friend, and her treatment of 
us is as friend to friend . . . but the development of the war in the Middle East 
recently and her ovm need of transport and supplies has obliged her to take 
certain measures. The truth is that Britain has done her duty and more than her 
duty but circumstances will not shape themselves according to our desire, and 
silver is one of those circumstances. Britain has found it impossible to let us 
have riyals we need because she has not got the silver".^^ 
It could be said that the only issue which was intentionally hidden from the British 
govemment was the Saudi inquiry on US govemment policy towards the countries of 
the Middle East, particularly that which was associated with King Ibn Saud's anxiety 
about the possibility of Hashemite intimidation against his Kingdom.''^ 
When Amir Faisal and Amir Khalid (the second and the fourth sons of Ibn Saud) 
visited the USA in the autumn of 1943, King Ibn Saud was already suspecting his 
northem neighbours' intention towards the Saudi Kingdom. Indeed, the Prime 
Minister of Iraq, Nuri Al-Said's Pasha, proposal of a union between the Fertile 
Crescent countries was seen in Riyadh as nothing but as Amir Abdullah's scheme of 
Greater Syria.^'* Eventually, such an issue became "the principal matter" that the 
Saudi visiting party discussed with the Americans in Washington at the opening of the 
talks on 1 November 1943.^ ^ 
With his insistence that such a talk "would be held in strict confidence", Faisal stated 
that King Ibn Saud was "very much interested in American policy in the Near E a s t . . . 
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The King was not quite clear as to the trend of American policy with respect to some 
of the Arabic countries".^ ^ Explaining and enquiring about the matter that highly 
concerned Saudi Arabia, at that particular time, Faisal stated that: 
"King Ibn Saud had information that the Hashiniite family was trying to add to 
the territory under its control. . . [particularly as they were] working toward a 
union of Palestine, Iraq and Syria . . . The King . . . had the strong opinion that 
the Hashimite House was trying to surround Saudi Arabia and to strangle it. 
The King did not know the policy of the Allies with respect to the expansion 
of the Hashimite territories. I f it was the policy of the Allies to support this 
expansions move, he could do nothing to stop it. Nevertheless, he would look 
upon such support with great regret".^' 
In response, Mr Adolph Berle, the Assistant Secretary of State, assured Faisal that the 
United States "had no interest in making dynastic alliance against his father or anyone 
else. Neither did the United States have any interest in furthering aggressive designs. 
Certainly it would have no part in any movement intended to encircle Saudi 
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Arabia". Berle further explained the core of the US policy by remarking "What we 
had at heart in the Middle East, as in other parts of the world, was building up a 
"Good Neighbor" policy, not only as between the United States and those countries, 
but also among those countries themselves".'^ ^ In addition, Berle added that the US 
government "had no knowledge that any of the Allied powers were seeking any 
dynastic changes" in the area.'*" After remarking that he had understood the US policy 
on this issue, Faisal "hoped" that the US government "would continue to keep" Saudi 
Arabia "informed if any changes took place" in such a policy. In his turn Berle 
assured Faisal that the US government would keep the Saudi government updated."" 
When the US government sought consent in November and December 1943 to 
establish a consulate at Dhahran, Ibn Saud replied that he "had no objection to the US 
Government appointing a commercial agent", but not a consul at Dhahran.'*^ 
Moreover, Ibn Saud put a condition on the appointment of such an agent, stipulating 
that he should not interfere in the relations between the Saudi government and 
CASCO.'*^ 
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Ibn Saud's rejection of the USA proposal of a consulate at this particular time was 
due to three reasons. First, he did not want the US government to interfere in his 
relations with the oil company. Second, he did not want to establish a precedent for 
any permanent representation in his country other than in Jeddah. Third, he thought 
that if he approved such a proposal he might damage his relations with Britain, which 
objected to any foreign posts in the Gulf'*'* 
Ibn Saud's worries about the consul's interference in Saudi relations with the oil 
company receded later when he realised that the consulate's main work would be to 
look after American citizens' affairs (paper work, passports, etc), rather than concern 
itself with oil company matters. Ibn Saud also realised that even if he gave consent to 
the establishment of a US consulate in Dhahran no other state was likely to seek a 
similar situation, as the USA was the only country with such a large number of 
nationals in Dhahran. Thus Ibn Saud's own interests were not the problem. The main 
reason that kept him from giving his consent was the possible British objection. Thus 
when this question was raised again by the USA in February 1944 - with explanation 
of its urgent needs, particularly as the number of US citizens was increasing monthly -
Ibn Saud confidentially sought the British government's advice."^ 
Both the British Legation at Jeddah and the Foreign Office agreed to the 
establishment of a US consulate at Dhahran, on the ground that the US was the only 
country with a large number of citizens and commercial interests there.'*^  When the 
British government "advised Ibn Saud to accede" to the American request, Ibn Saud 
informed the US government of his consent.'*' Therefore, the US Legation at Jeddah 
started to set up a consulate at Dhahran, which was finally opened on 2 September 
1944."^ 
In early 1945, the US president had approved in principle a huge assistance plan for 
Saudi Arabia. This plan, which was worked out by the State-War-Navy Coordinating 
Committee (SWNCC), included a massive infrastructure development programmes, 
military assistance, etc. Alongside such a plan SWNCC urged for the necessity of the 
"acquisition and construction" of a US airfield in Saudi Arabia."*^ 
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It was stated in the SWNCC paper of 7 Febmary 1945 that the existence of a US air 
base at Dhahran would be a "deterrent to other nations which might consider 
aggression toward Saudi Arabia and her vast oil reserves in which American interests 
now hold a predominant concession".^^ Furthermore, it was illustrated that the 
acquisition of such a military airfield "is considered an urgent necessity for use in 
redeployment of US forces to the Far East and to increase the efficiency of present 
and contemplating military air transport through the Middle East".^' 
The necessity behind such an airfield had been proposed in greater detail by the War 
Department and the Air Transport Command advised, a year earlier (in mid-1944). 
They argued that it would be in the American national interest to constmct an airfield 
in Saudi Arabia, in order to:^ ^ 
1. Facilitate the ferrying of planes to the Pacific theatre of operation. 
2. Shorten the flying distance to Karachi. 
3. Provide a necessary reftielling point. 
4. Permit planes to carry more supplies. 
5. Support the growing American oil facilities in the area. 
6. Establish American aviation in and over Saudi Arabia in its own right. 
According to Grafftey-Smith, Ibn Saud was not willing to accept the USA proposal of 
the Dhahran airfield without the British endorsement when the US govemment raised 
this question again in May 1945.^ ^ Ibn Saud was aware of a possible British objection; 
therefore he sought their opinion in this case. After recommendations by the British 
Chiefs of Staff, the British Minister at Jeddah was instmcted to endorse the US 
request, and he therefore addressed a note to the Saudi Arabian govemment on 6 May 
1945.^ ^ After gaining the British government's support, a US delegation arrived in 
Saudi Arabia on 19 May and started negotiating an agreement about the airfield.^^ On 
6 August 1945, agreement had been reached for the constmction of the airfield. In the 
agreement the US govemment agreed to turn over the air base to Saudi Arabia at the 
end of a three-year operation period after the war.^ ^ The constmction took place in 
less than a month, following the agreement.^' 
The constmction of the Dhahran airfield marked the beginning of a strong US military 
involvement in and around Saudi Arabia. Moreover, it highlighted the importance of 
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Saudi Arabia to the USA. Although the British government endorsed the construction 
of the airfield, it could be argued that - in the long run - its creation was a 
disadvantage to the British interests in Saudi Arabia and an advantage to the 
American interests there, as it would facilitate more American involvement. 
The advancement of the Saudi-American ties - that started by the extension of the 
lend-lease in early 1943 - was crowned before the end of 1945 by the opening of the 
Saudi Legation in Washington, in which the former Saudi Minister to Baghdad Asad 
Al-Faqih became the first Saudi Arabian Minister to the US.^ ^ 
B. The State of the Anglo-Saudi Ties 
King Ibn Saud's consultations with the British were not only limited to issues that 
concerned USA involvement in the Kingdom, but also they included consultations on 
issues that concerned Saudi Arabia regionally. The King's anxiety and suspicion of 
the Hashemite activities were the subject of consultations between the Saudi and the 
British governments. Whether it was intended or not, such an attitude gave the Saudis 
the opportunity of being closer to the British government and its policies towards such 
concerns. 
Though in accordance to the Saudi-British communications of 1939 mutual 
consultations were welcomed between both of them, Ibn Saud had requested a further 
confirmation on this.^^ In February 1943, King Ibn Saud inquired through the British 
legation in Jeddah; "whether His Majesty's Government welcome his consulting them 
on all details of his relations with . . . Arab states or whether they find such 
communications unnecessary and burdensome".^ *' In a positive reply that re-
welcomed any kind of consultation request from Saudi Arabia, Ibn Saud was told that 
the British government "were at all times glad to have the benefit of . . . [his] views 
and advice on all Arab matters".^ ^ 
Nuri Al-Said's proposal in early 1943 for an Arab unity that was supposed to be 
formed on a union between the Fertile Crescent countries was "regarded by Ibn Saud 
as a device to advance the fortunes of the Hashimite family, and . . . [was] in 
consequence very distastefiil to him".^^ Though Ibn Saud admired the idea of Arab 
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unity, he was deeply opposed to any kind of exclusive union between the Levant 
States. Not just because of his fears that Hashemites' would dominate such a union, 
but also because such a union would eliminate the emergence of an independent 
Syrian State. Indeed, King Ibn Saud was "particularly interested in Syria, in the hope, 
possibly, that a strong and independent Syria will provide him with a useful ally 
against. . . [the Hashemite]".^^ 
King Ibn Saud's suspicions of the Iraqi Prime Minister's proposal came at a time 
when the Saudi-Iraqi relations were deteriorating.^ Incidents in and around the Saudi-
Iraqi borders in which the Iraqi authority had mistreated Saudi tribesmen, and the 
"failure of the Iraqi Government to pay any attention to any of Ibn Saud's protests 
produced an angry outburst".^^ Moreover, when "considerable unrest amongst the 
Shammar [tribe] and people of Hail" occurred in the spring of 1943, the Saudis 
angrily suspected that it was "stirred up by Hashimite and Iraqi intriguers''.^^ The 
attention and the help that the British government had provided the Saudis with in 
these cases, became a further consolidation to the course of the Saudi-British 
relations, and an encouragement for Ibn Saud in keeping the British fully consulted in 
all matters that were related to his position in regard to the development of the Arab 
unity projects.*' 
When the Prime Minster of Egypt, Pasha Mustafa Nahas joined efforts with Nuri Al -
Said in a call for "Arab Congresses" to discuss the Arab unity project, Ibn Saud 
became restless. He wrote to the British government on 26 April, that "He trusts none 
of them", as they both were "playing their own hands and in order to strengthen their 
position in their countries, and he considers His Majesty's Government would be well 
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advised to do the same". In that message. King Ibn Saud explained that he: 
"is as always, a sincere supporter of all legitimate Arab aspirations but he 
prefers to keep aloof from all these intrigues. He trusts only His Majesty's 
Government and he will only act in concert with them. I f his Majesty's 
Government consider it advisable in genuine interests of all concerned, he is 
prepared to do what he can. He would in that case be prepared to take part in 
proposed conferences etc., provided . . . [that the British government] assure 
him that it would not be contrary to his interests".*^ 
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In a reply on 4 May, it was explained that the British government had made its view 
"plain" as in the British Foreign Secretary's statement in the House of Commons that: 
"they would view with sympathy any movement among Arabs to promote 
their economic, cultural or political unity, but they consider that the initiative 
should come fi-om the Arabs themselves. I f the Arab Governments and 
leaders, wish to enter into discussions to work out a plan, His Majesty's 
Government would therefore have no objection".'" 
Nevertheless, it was also explained that the British government was in "doubt whether 
a conference is the most suitable method of approaching this problem".'' In its 
opinion "much spade-work should first be done and that for this essential purpose 
confidential discussions through diplomatic or specially accredited agents would be 
more fitting, and they [HMG] have left the Iraqi Prime Minister in no doubt on this 
point".'^ It was added in the reply that the British government: 
"would not wish to dissuade His Majesty [Ibn Saud] from taking such part as 
he thought fit in any discussions that may take place between Arab 
Governments and leaders. Indeed, they are confident that his participation 
would be as much in the interests of His Majesty's Government as of the 
Arabs themselves".''^  
When the idea of the fiill conference was discarded in favour of "confidential talks 
between Arab leaders". King Ibn Saud "consented to move".''* In September he 
received an envoy fi-om the Egyptian Prime Minster, and sent Yusuf Yassin for 
fiarther talks with Nahas.'^ While the King had embarked on such a course he kept 
concentrating on building a unique relationship with the Syrian leaders. In addition to 
his efforts in supporting the independence of Syria, he made fiirther efforts to make 
sure that the formation of an Arab organization did not weaken such independence.'^  
Throughout 1944 and into 1945, Ibn Saud "adhered closely to his policy of consulting 
His Majesty's Government on all matters relating to Arab affairs, particularly Arab 
unity"." The King's regional policy was carefiilly designed, particularly "to maintain 
his won position in the Arab world and accept domination by nobody . . . [and] to 
'JO 
avoid the creation of a bloc of Arab States against him". Consequently, Saudi 
Arabia did not sign the covenant of the Arab League on 22 March 1945 without some 
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reservations; among these reservation was the crucial one which insisted that "Syria 
and the Lebanon should continue as independent republics".'^ 
According to the British records. King Ibn Saud's consultations with them were very 
rewarding for Saudi-British relations. The British diplomats in Jeddah regarded the 
King's conduct as "evidence of his friendship and complete trust in His Majesty's 
Government".^" As a matter of fact, such practises were considered as a clear sign of 
the cordiality of Saudi-British relations 81 
The Saudis, who in fact desired such a consequence, were also appreciating the 
benefit of their counsels with the British. This was particularly the case when such 
counsels were related to Middle Eastern political entities that were linked in one way 
or another to Britain. Indeed, King Ibn Saud was fully aware of the meaning and the 
affect of the consultations on the British government policy towards his concerns. 
More than ever, he regarded Britain as the power of upper hand policy in the Middle 
East, and he regarded the Hashemites as nothing but a British satellite in the area. For 
instance, in a message to the British government in June 1943, Ibn Saud remarked, 
"that the present rulers of Iraq derive their authority, under God, from the British 
Government alone, and, leaning on the British Government, they have a strength that 
they would not otherwise possess".^ ^ There is little doubt that such a dimension had 
caused Ibn Saud to ensure the continuity of cordial relations with Britain, whether 
through continuing consultations or otherwise. Hence, despite the fortification of the 
Saudi-American relations, the Saudi-Anglo remained therefore imperative. 
In the same line of the British-Saudi consultations, it was Britain who advised the 
Saudi King at the end of February 1945, to become a founder member of the new 
world organisation, the United Nations (UN). Hence, with regard to the British 
government advice, Saudi Arabia declared war on the Axis and became a founder 
member of the UN in March 1945.*^ 
In addition to the foregoing, other developments associated the progress of Saudi-
British relations in the same era. Being satisfied with the Treaty of Jeddah, which was 
signed on 20 May 1927 and renewed on 3 October 1936, the Saudi government 
suggested giving it a more permanent character by making its renewal automatic at 
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the end of each seven years. By the 3 October 1943 the agreement on the automatic 
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renewal was in force when both governments exchanged notes on the matter. 
The British government continued financing Saudi Arabia throughout 1943. 
£2,700,000 was provided for purchasing supplies. In addition, further funds of 
5,000,000 riyals and 400,000 sovereigns were forthcoming.^* Moreover, food 
supplies, transport, and important commodities were regularly given during 1943 
through the Middle East Supply Centre (MESC)" in which not only the British 
government but also the USA government participated.^^ 
In 1944, when the British government was considering a reduction to the amount of 
its subsidy to Saudi Arabia, the US government was - at the same time - considering 
an increase of the subsidy from its side. As such a subject was concerning both of 
the British and the US governments, several discussions were held between their 
representatives about it. During talks at the MESC headquarter in Cairo the 
Americans argued that " i f the financial and economic stability of the country [Saudi 
Arabia] were to be maintained on a reasonable basis greater assistance was needed".^ " 
During further talks in London, in the spring of 1944, the US and the British 
governments agreed on the creation of a joint assistance programme, in which the 
subsidy would be shared equally.^' Ultimately, they agreed on a joint supply 
programme for Saudi Arabia in that year.^ ^ 
In addition to the joint assistance programme, the British and the Americans provided 
the Kingdom in 1944 with a joint "gift" of arms and military equipment. The 
Americans supplied "rifles, automatic weapons and transport", and Britain provided 
"heavy equipment such as armoured cars, anti-tank guns and mortars".^^ Instruction 
of the Saudi army personal in the use of these - arms and the equipment - was 
conducted by "an American and a British training team", which was established in 
Taifin June 1944. '^' 
Britain's financial crisis during the last stages of the war was a major influence on its 
financial policy towards Saudi Arabia. In early 1945 when the Treasury proposed a 
reduction of Britain's share of the joint subsidies (with the US) from £2.5 million as 
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was given in 1944, to £1.25 million in 1945, the Foreign Office agreed immediately.^^ 
On that line a minute written by one of the Foreign Office economic advisers stated: 
"In our present impoverished position . . . we are no longer able to use finance 
as one of the ordinary weapons in our diplomatic armoury. Subsidies and the 
like can only be used in the most exceptional circumstances. We are now the 
greatest debtor nation, and are at present dependent on others for a good deal 
of the food we eat".^ ^ 
The British government's proposal was communicated via its Embassy in Washington 
to the Department of State on 17 April 1945.^' The need for the reductions was fiirther 
justified by the Foreign Office by the improvement of Saudi Arabian revenues from 
oil and the pilgrimage. London tried to invest every effort to persuade the US 
government to reduce its contribution in line with the British proposed share.^ ^ 
However, when the effort failed to preserve the principle of a fiill 50-50-basis 
subsidy, because the US government was calling for a higher contribution, the British 
then convinced the Americans to make any additional contributions in different forms 
and in separate programmes.'"^ 
Following the agreement between London and Washington on the amount of the Joint 
Subsidy Programme for 1945, they jointiy communicated the matter to Saudi Arabia. 
It was indicated that the joint programme for 1945 would be in the region of $10 
million, which equated to £2.5 million.'"' For 1946, King Ibn Saud was advised - by 
the British government - to expect no financial or consumption subsidies fi-om Britain, 
but instead services and technical advice would be provided.'"^ 
C. Anglo-American Quarrel over Saudi Arabia and its Implication for British 
Policy 
I . Troubled Relations 
Despite some kind of cooperation between the British and the Americans in Saudi 
Arabia, the Anglo-American relations in the Kingdom were also subjected to an 
extensive confrontation, as the following pages will illustrate. 
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American concerns regarding the danger of the British influence on the US interests 
in Saudi Arabia did not simply ease by the extension of the lend-leas in early 1943, 
but in fact, it went beyond.'"^ With such increasing concerns signs of a forthcoming 
Anglo-American friction in the Kingdom were apparent even during 1943. For 
example, when the British government informed Saudi Arabia in April that any 
requests for military supplies "should be directed through London", the State 
Department urgently instructed Moose to inform the British Minister in Jeddah that 
"the Saudis could make direct inquiries for arms under lend-lease through the 
American Legation". 
Throughout the year, the concerns increased within the US government until it burst 
out at the highest level in early 1944. On 18 February President Roosevelt cabled 
Churchill about the need for a meeting on oil, particularly as there were rumours of 
the British eyeing the American reserves in Saudi Arabia.'"^ In his turn, Churchill 
cabled Roosevelt on 20 February that "there is apprehension in some quarters here 
that the United States has a desire to deprive us of our oil assets in the Middle 
East".^°* Two days later, the President responded that he was also worried about the 
rumour "that the British wish to horn in on Saudi Arabian oil reserves".'"' Roosevelt 
added "we are not making sheep's eyes at your oil fields in Iraq or Iran".'"^ On 4 
March Churchill replied to Roosevelt's message, saying "Thank you very much for 
your assurances about no sheep's eyes at our oilfields at Iran and Iraq. Let me 
reciprocate by giving you fullest assurance that we have no thought of trying to horn 
in upon your interests or property in Saudi Arabia". The Churchill-Roosevelt 
correspondence, which emphasised the need for Anglo-American discussions about 
the Middle East oil at cabinet level, had also confirmed the two governments 
inclination in holding such talks as soon as possible. 
At the same time as Roosevelt and Churchill were corresponding. Moose was 
suspecting the activifies of his British colleague in Jeddah, Mr Stanley Jordan.'" 
Jordan's plan of reforming the Saudi government's financial system was the core 
point that worsened Anglo-American relations in regard to Saudi Arabia at that time. 
It was apparent by the outset of 1944 that "Saudi Arab currency requirements were 
getting increasingly out of hand; deficits grew despite increasing . . . subsidies' 
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According to Jordan "certain amount of extravagance and corruption" were the most 
accountable for such a problem."^ In a report to the Foreign Office, Jordan warned 
that the Saudi government should "regulate its expenditure" in accordance "within the 
limits of its income"."'' Otherwise, undesirable consequences will be "inevitable"."^ 
The British Minister suggested that the Saudis should be "advised to take measures 
for the reorganisation of their finances and economy in order to avoid any crisis likely 
to arise from a drastic reduction, or indeed, a cessation of subsidies in the immediate 
post-war period which might threaten the internal stability of the country"."^ 
Jordan's suggestion received a 'listening ear' in the Foreign Office; ultimately, he was 
requested to sound Ibn Saud about it. " ' Upon an audience, "Jordan's view carried 
heavy weight with" King Ibn Saud, who in fact admitted a vital need for such a 
financial reform."^ The King showed his desire in taking the British Minister's 
suggestion by dismissing the Director of Mines and Public Works, Mr Nejib Salha, 
who was working for his own ends according to Jordan."^ In accordance with 
Jordan's plan, Ibn Saud asked for a British Sunni Moslem financial adviser in order to 
help Saudi Arabia improve its financial system, and a British Sunni Moslem military 
adviser in order to "train and establish" the Saudi Arabian "small army on sound of 
modem lines".'^° 
Jordan's ideas about the reform of Saudi Arabia's financial system brought him into 
direct conflict with the Americans. This was evident when Moose reported to the 
State Department about Jordan's activities. In his report on 30 March 1944, Moose 
told the State Department that Jordan was trying to extend the British influence in 
Saudi Arabia by establishing control over its economic system. Such a move, 
according to the US Minister, was clear when Jordan persuaded Ibn Saud to accept a 
"British economic adviser and possibly a petroleum adviser".'^' Moose also reported 
that Jordan was interfering directly in the internal affairs of Saudi Arabia by being 
responsible for the removal of the Saudi Director of Mines and Public Works, who 
was an advocate of closer American-Saudi ties.'^^ Moose's anxiety was taken 
seriously in Washington; on 3 April the State Department wrote to the US Legation at 
Jeddah, asking to be kept informed about Jordan's activities. In addition the State 
Department assured Moose that it would "take all appropriate steps to safeguard vital 
American interests in Saudi Arabia".'^^ 
118 
The State Department tried to safeguard US interests in Saudi Arabia, when the 
Secretary of State, Mr Cordell Hull, submitted a memorandum proposed by the Office 
of Near Eastern and African Affairs (NEA) to the US president in April 1944.'^ *^ It 
was stated in the NEA memorandum that "it i s . . . necessary . . . to extend additional 
financial and economic assistance to Saudi Arabia in order to safeguard adequately 
the American national interest in the great petroleum resources of that country".'^^ 
The State Department concluded that the US government should at least share the 
subsidy on an "over-all equal basis" with the British government in order to counter 
its polifical danger.'^ * 
Despite such tensions, preparations for the proposed Anglo-American discussion were 
already underway in London. It was stated in a preparation note - by the Eastern 
Department at the Foreign Office - that "American influence is bound to increase as 
compared with the British influence, and it seems probable that sooner or later the 
United States will became the foreign power most concerned with Saudi Arabia 
affairs".'^' In view of that, the present period was considered as one of "transition", 
and should be carried out "as painlessly as possible". It was predicted that the 
Americans would suspect any British activity in Saudi Arabia, such as providing 
military and financial advisers, as i f the British were trying to exclude them from 
Saudi Arabia.'^^ Ultimately, the British negofiators supposed to give the Americans 
"the definite impression" that the British government recognised the fact that the US 
would "become the foreign power with the largest commercial interest in Saudi 
Arabia", and that the British would cooperate rather than oppose them in Saudi 
Arabia.'•'° The note did, however, make it clear that "the Americans must recognise 
that we have a very large political interest in Saudi Arabia, particularly so long as Ibn 
Saud continues to hold his outstanding position among Arab leaders, and in the 
Islamic world".'^' In relation to this, the note continued, "his [Ibn Saud] support is too 
important to us, in view of the large Muslim populations with which we have to 
deal".'^^ 
The discussion meetings were held in London between 11 and 24 of April 1944. Mr 
Wallace Murray, the director of the NEA, headed the US delegation and Sir Maurice 
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Peterson, the deputy under-secretary of state, who was in charge of the Eastern 
Department at the Foreign Office, headed the British delegation.'^^ 
In a positive move at the commencement of the conversations, the participants 
"established that there was a general community of aims and outlook between the 
Foreign Office and the State Department in Middle Eastern questions".'^'' 
Furthermore, it was agreed that it "would be great advantage" for the British and the 
Americans to cooperate closely in their fiiture policy in that region. Additionally, it 
was recognised "that the policy of His Majesty's Government is inevitably influenced 
by their commitments for the administration and defence of certain territories in the 
area".'''^  Likewise, "it was recognised that the United States Government, like His 
Majesty's Government, have economic interests in the Middle East which are bound 
to affect their policy".'^^ Ultimately, both party interests should not conflict, and that 
"Anglo-American relations in the area should be conducted on a basis of co-operation 
and mutual frankness".'^' 
In the special discussions on Saudi Arabia, both sides agreed that the US government 
was "principally concerned in the oil industry".'''^ They also agreed that: 
"Relations with Saudi Arabia are of importance to the British commonwealth 
of nations because of its proximity to vital sea and air communications, in 
view of Ibn Saud's special position as keeper of the Moslem Holy Places and 
on account of the pilgrimage which affects the large numbers of Moslems in 
the British Empire".'^^ 
The British delegations gave assurances that "there was not and never had been any 
intention on the part of His Majesty's Government to undermine or to prejudice 
American oil rights in Saudi Arabia".''"' The positive atmosphere, which existed 
during these discussions, had caused the participants to reach agreements in principle 
on the creation of a joint assistance programme and a joint military mission.''" 
Despite the success of London discussions, friction between British and American 
diplomats continued on certain issues over Saudi Arabia. In fact, while the discussions 
were taking place in London, Moose and Jordan were still in conflict in Jeddah.'''^  On 
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12 April, Moose informed the State Department that Jordan was still "pursuing a 
policy calculated to be detrimental to American interests in Saudi Arabia".'''^ 
When the Americans formally complained about the behaviour of the British Minister 
at Jeddah to the British government, the Foreign Office requested an explanation from 
Jordan about the allegations. In his reply to the Foreign Office on 12 May Jordan 
defended himself against the American criticisms by illustrating that he had 
cooperated with the Americans on various issues. He argued that he was responsible 
for greater British-American collaboration, including keeping his American colleague 
informed about the process of the British supply to Saudi Arabia.''*" Jordan's despatch 
to the Foreign Office gave the impression that he was cooperating fully with the 
Americans and that the only problem was the US misunderstanding of Britain's 
special position with Ibn Saud. He argued that the "preferential position which His 
Majesty's representatives enjoy in this country [Saudi Arabia] and to which the 
American object . . . we [the British] do enjoy Ibn Saud's confidence in larger 
measure than the US and this is anathema to them".''*^ Despite Jordan's argument, the 
American criticisms kept on. In June 1944 Hull informed Halifax - the then British 
Ambassador in Washington - that the British Minister at Jeddah was doing his "best to 
injure the American Government's relations with the King".''** 
The Foreign Office sided with Jordan against the criticisms, arguing that Jordan was 
fiiUy cooperating with his American colleague. The Foreign Office referred to the 
problem as a misunderstanding by the Americans of the "preferential position of His 
Majesty's representatives in Jedda".''" When London was informed that there was a 
plan to replace Moose with another diplomat (Colonel Eddy), the Foreign Office 
hoped that the new American Minister "wil l show more understanding of the 
position", and instructed Jordan to fully cooperate with his "American colleagues".'''^ 
When the British government was about to appoint the British Sunni Moslem 
financial adviser to Ibn Saud, the State Department took a stand against the 
appointment, particularly when there was a rumour that the proposed adviser, Mr 
Zahid Hussain, was to be paid by the British government.'''^ Furthermore, at a joint 
meeting between the State and the Treasury Departments' representatives in July, 
Murray argued that in order to safeguard the huge US interests in Saudi Arabia, the 
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British must not be allowed to implement any currency or banking reform alone.'^° In 
July 1944 Hull sent a message to Peterson, stating that: 
"The reason it was proposed that the head of any financial mission or that a 
single financial adviser fiimished to the Saudi Arabian Government be an 
American is that the preponderant interest in the Saudi Arabian economy is 
unquestionably American in character and will presumably remain so for 
many years to come".'^' 
When the British-US conflict about Saudi Arabia started to injure British-US relations 
in the Middle East, the British government temporarily dropped the question of the 
financial adviser.'^ ^ Besides, the Foreign Office tried to cool the situation by assuring 
the State Department on 22 July that "we [the British government] have made it 
perfectly plain that we have no wish to oppose increased American influence in Saudi 
Arabia so long as it does not seek to crowd us out".'" However, the same 
correspondence continued, the Americans had to "realise that they cannot hope to 
achieve overnight quite the same position that we have built up over years''.'^'' 
Upon instructions from London and Washington, the new US Minister to Saudi 
Arabia, Colonel William Eddy, and Jordan held a meeting in Jeddah in the first week 
of September 1944.'^ ^ The Eddy and Jordan convention was designed to "discuss the 
viewpoints of . . . [both] respective Governments with a view to laying a solid 
foundation for close and friendly collaboration in the future".'^^ 
Eddy explained to his British colleague the US government "intentions with regard to 
Saudi Arabia".'^' The US government was not prepared to accept the British 
government's standards as a means of evaluating Saudi Arabia's needs and 
requirements. According to Eddy, the British were not giving Ibn Saud sufficient 
assistance. He argued " i f the King stated, as he had done with some vehemence, that 
the amounts allocated to his country were insufficient, was it not better to give him 
additional supplies rather than incur his displeasure and risk . . . his internal 
dissension".'^^ Unlike Britain, Eddy remarked that "the United States hoped to raise 
the standard of living in this country [Saudi Arabia] and assist it over its difficulties 
until such time as it could stand on its own feet".'^^ The US Minister added that his 
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government also intended to improve Saudi Arabia's infi-astructure, such as those in 
the fields of communications, road building, agricultural development, etc.'^ " 
On the differences that were related to Saudi Arabia's financial system Eddy saw no 
problem in forming a joint American-British economic mission in the Kingdom. 
However, Jordan doubted the desirability of such a mission, and elucidated that the 
enclosure of non-Muslim advisers would be impracticable, particularly as the location 
of the majority of the Saudi financial institutions were in the Holy Cities. Eddy did 
not agree with Jordan, and argued that "entry into Mecca or Medina was not essential 
for . . . the reorganisation of the country's finance and economy . . . which would be 
administrated from Jedda. I f it were necessary to employ inspectors to enter the Holy 
Cities these could be Moslem". '^' 
It appeared to Jordan that, "the point at issue" between the US and the British 
governments was "much more profound than the question" of such a mission, 
according to him it was "rather a question of principle and appreciation".'^^ On this 
Jordan pointed out to Eddy that: 
"as the greatest Moslem power in the world we had a very close political 
interest in Saudi Arabia, that Ibn Saud had been extremely usefiil to us in the 
past, particularly during the years of war, and that anything which might 
detract from his position and influence would naturally be anathema to us".'^ ^ 
Although Eddy saw the force of Jordan's argument, he did not comment on it, but 
instead stressed that the Moslem world should be gratefiil for the US for improvement 
in Saudi Arabia.'^'* By this stage of the conversation Jordan lost his enthusiasm in 
arguing the British case vis-a-vis what Eddy was saying. It looked as i f the British 
diplomat became preoccupied by the thoughts that he reported to London 
afterwards.'" 
I I . British Considerations 
In his report on the discussions to the Foreign Office, Jordan included a new kind of 
British thought. In what seemed to be a result of his conversation with Eddy, Jordan 
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brought about fresh considerations to the basis of Anglo-American relations in Saudi 
Arabia, as well as to the basis of Britain's assistance to the Saudi Kingdom.'** 
The British Minister thought that it would be "increasingly difficult, i f not 
impossible" for the British government to continue the "policy of fifty/fifty" 
assistance programme to Saudi Arabia i f the US government intended to do what 
Eddy said.'*'Jordan explained: 
"At present, our financial responsibilities are limited to the agreed subsidised 
supply programme, which we [the British] had hoped would be progressively 
and eventually extinguished in the course of the next couple of years. As far as 
I can judge from Colonel Eddy's statements, however, the United States have 
no such intention and their policy of assistance to this country [Saudi Arabia] 
will spread over many years and is likely to become increasingly expensive for 
a considerable time ahead. Unless we are to be drawn into this spate of 
philanthropy I feel that we should put a limit to our financial responsibilities, 
or indeed cease any subsidy to this country, as soon as our present obligations 
are liquidated. Should we continue, it appears obvious to me that we can only 
do so as a junior partner towed along in the wake of the Americans, who will 
set the pace".'*^ 
Jordan emphasised that the "position of a junior partner being towed along in the 
wake of the Americans is, in my humble opinion, a very undignified one for His 
Majesty's Government to accept".'*^ Besides, he argued that, while there was a reason 
to justify the profitability of the increasing American assistance to Saudi Arabia, there 
could be no equal reason for the British in doing so: 
" I f the Americans wish to sink millions of dollars in the desert sands of Saudi 
Arabia I do not think that we would be justified in endeavouring to prevent 
them from so doing since they will be taking billions out of the same sands in 
the form of oil, but I see no reason why we should be drawn into this vortex 
since we have little or nothing to gain from it"."° 
Therefore, Jordan suggested to the Foreign Office that "in the wider interests of 
Anglo-American collaboration we [the British] should abandon our present fifty/fifty 
policy and leave the United States to her own economic and philanthropic designs in 
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this country".'" By following this course of action he believed that Britain had little 
to lose politically, economically and strategically. According to Jordan, Britain had 
littie to lose: 
"Politically, as long as the British Empire continues to harbour the majority of 
the world's Moslems and so long as our interests predominate in other Middle 
Eastern countries we must continue to be the predominant political factor in 
the mind of Ibn Saud or his successors"."^ 
Economically, he thought that Britain would lose little, because "India is the 
traditional market for the scanty requirements of Saudi Arabia and it is unlikely . . . 
that the United States will be able to supplant that source of supply in the cheaper 
lines''."^ He concluded up, "True, America will probably become the chief supplier 
of mechanical equipment and motor transport", but in this case "she has [already] 
held" an advance "position for some time"."'* 
Strategically, Jordan remarked that the British government should not "fear fi-om the 
presence of increased United States participation in Saudi Arabian affairs, even 
though that country [Saudi Arabia] lies alongside our principle line of imperial 
communications"."^ He added to this: 
"it is no doubt of considerable advantage to us that America should enlarge 
her interests in the Middle East. In case of another European conflagration she 
would have interests to protect in the Middle East and thus either directly or 
indirectly assist us in the protection of our interests in this part of the 
world". 
At the Foreign Office Jordan's suggestions were carefiilly assessed. There was a clear 
agreement with "Jordan's diagnosis of the situation that the Americans tend to view 
the question of aid to Saudi Arabia in quite a different light from" the British, "and 
that in consequence it may be difficult [for the British government] to maintain in the 
fiiture the fifty-fifty basis on which the Anglo-American subsidy is at present 
given".'" However, the Foreign Office was "most reluctant to abandon the fifty/fifty 
basis at this moment", particularly when it was viewed that "the next year will be 
vitally important in the Middle East", and when "it wil l be of great value" to the 
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British government "to retain Ibn Saud's friendship during these important 
times"."^ 
There was a disagreement with Jordan's suggestion that Britain "shall necessarily 
continue to be the major factor in the mind of Ibn Saud or his successors irrespective 
o f . . . [its] attitude to Saudi Arabia problems"."^ In regard to this, it was contended 
that: 
"it is very necessary and most important for British interests that we [the 
British government] should continue to maintain a friendly and sympathetic 
interest in Saudi Arabia and continue to ensure so far as possible that Ibn Saud 
uses his undoubted position of leadership among the Arabs in a way which 
will be conductive to our interests. It is no doubt true that the prestige of His 
Majesty's Government does not depend entirely on the amount of the subsidy, 
and that their political influence will not necessarily be impaired by American 
expenditure on a vastly greater scale . . . [However] we might well lose our 
influence in Saudi Arabia i f we ceased to give any assistance at all to Ibn Saud 
and thereby appeared to have lost interest in his country".'^" 
Therefore, the Foreign Office argued the importance of the continuity of British 
assistance to Saudi Arabia. Such an argument was put on next to the valuable help 
that King Ibn Saud provided Britain with during the war: 
"He has throughout the war loyally exerted his influence . . . on our behalf I f 
Ibn Saud had not been favourable to us during the critical war years, we might 
certainly have expected to have much internal trouble among Arabs [and 
Muslims] . . . The valuable help which Ibn Saud rendered, at a time when it 
was by no means certain that we should succeed in holding the Middle East, 
may well have proved decisive, in view of the internal security commitment 
which might have been involved had local conditions been less favourable". 
In accordance with all of that, the Foreign Office pursued the following policy: 
1. The continuity of the fifty/fifty basis during 1944-1945. 
2. I f the USA desires to increase its assistance, the British should then 
persuade it to make the additional subsidy by a different means, such as 
developing Saudi Arabian agriculture and communications. 
126 
3. I f it became impossible to maintain the fifty/fifty basis in the future, or i f 
the Americans insisted in increasing their share, the British government 
then should maintain its subsidy at a fixed level with the explanation to Ibn 
Saud that the British "continue to wish him well and do not wish to stand 
in the way of his receiving increased help from America".'^^ 
It could be said that Jordan's radical point of view, of ending the British subsidies to 
Saudi Arabia at once, might have left "the United States to her ovm economic and 
philanthropic designs" in that country, and might possibly have ended the Anglo-
American friction there as well.'^^ Nonetheless, the moderate policy, which was 
pursued by the Foreign Office in regard to the assistance matter, had left the 
potentiality of such a friction to be on. As mentioned earlier, the British government 
tried first to persuade the Americans to reduce the total amount of the joint Anglo-
American subsidies to Saudi Arabia.'*'' Nevertheless, when this attempt failed, the 
British then - and in accordance to the Foreign Office foregoing policy - endeavoured 
with success in convincing the US government to provide any extra subsidy to the 
joint programme through different means. Though such a policy had succeeded in 
keeping Britain's share of the "joint subsidy programme" on an equal basis to that of 
the USA - but obviously not on an equal basis to the total of the whole assistances -
still such a policy did not eliminate the continuity of the American-Anglo trouble in 
Saudi Arabia. 
As soon as Jordan's successor, Mr Laurence Grafftey-Smith, settled down in Jeddah, 
he was asked, on 6 March 1945, to put to the Foreign Office his "views and 
recommendations" over Anglo-American relations in Saudi Arabia.'*^ In response on 
17 March, Grafftey-Smith referred to the question of the "Surmi Moslem Financial 
Adviser", as the principal problematic issue still unsolved with the Americans.'*^ 
Though, Grafftey-Smith admitted that he was "eager to establish a good working 
understanding with . . .[his] American colleague" in Jeddah, he also "ventured to 
make to the Secretary of State" not to abdicate Britain's political and military role in 
Saudi Arabia.'^* On these lines he stated that: 
"We have recognised the considerable economic role to be played in Saudi 
Arabia by the Americans - ( . . . in territory which is the spiritual metropolis of 
hundreds of millions of British Muslims...) - and now we look like abdicating 
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political and military influence as well, by accepting the American veto on this 
or that course of action here. I f this process became habitual, we shall have 
just that much less credit left with Ibn Saud on which to draw when the 
moment comes for uncomfortable political decisions".'^^ 
Grafftey-Smith urged his government not to be indifferent to what happened to Saudi 
Arabia; "This is not Panama or San Salvador. We cannot remain indifferent to what 
happens to the Muslim Holy Places".'^ " The British Minister did not think that such a 
view was - in any case - anti-American; " I do not think this point of view is either 
chauvinistically anti-American or unduly alarmist. We have interests in Arab 
goodwill which have nothing to do with oil-politics, but which can be gravely 
prejudiced by American indiscretion".'^' 
Though on the whole Grafftey-Smith's argument could be seen as being driven by an 
objectivity that singly takes Britain's interests into the account, other elements could 
not be completely denied. In the same despatch to the Foreign Office, the Minister 
admitted that he - or indeed any other British diplomat in the area then - could not 
cope with the "new" American phenomena in Saudi Arabia. Being disturbed by the 
increasing American intervention Grafftey-Smith frankly admitted; "American 
economic imperialism in Saudi Arabia is a new phenomenon to me, and anything 
unfamiliar is apt to disturb".'^^ Indeed, the speed of the development of American 
relations with Ibn Saud was impossible to grasp for a typical British diplomatic mind 
such as that of Grafftey-Smith. He wrote - on another occasion - on this; "to one who . 
. . last knew this territory in the days of King Hussein, the recent American invasion 
of the Arabian political and economic scene is a remarkable and somewhat disturbing 
phenomenon".'^^ Describing the US determination for a policy of strong involvement 
in Saudi Arabia, Grafftey-Smith remarked: 
"the tempo of the American advance upon Saudi Arabia greatly increased, and 
a new forcefulness informed their policy here. It would not, perhaps, be an 
over-simplification of this policy to describe it as pivoting on the 
consideration that nothing must be done to weaken, and everything must be 
done to strengthen, the American hold on Saudi Arabia oil. Whatever altruistic 
presentation the policy may have, and whatever by-products of value to 
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American interests it may breed, the oilfields at Dhahran explain it and, to the 
Americans, amply justify it".'^'' 
Apparently, the Foreign Office agreed with Grafftey-Smith that the British "must 
keep" their "end up vis-a-vis the Americans".'^^ However, it was also admitted that 
"the fact remains that they are in Saudi Arabia for keeps and that we, for reasons of 
high policy (. . . [such as] the Russians . . .) are very glad to see them with a 
considerable stake in the Middle East. We must therefore be prepared to be 
accommodating at times".'^^ But in any case - the Foreign Office informed Grafftey-
Smith that - the financial adviser question was seen for the time being as "no worse 
than a drawn game. While [temporarily] giving up the idea of our own man, we did 
not agree to the appointment of an American". '^ ^ 
In the autumn of 1945, the Anglo-American relations over Saudi Arabia were further 
worsened by an American propaganda campaign. When the US media - in particular; 
magazine and newspaper - and officials in the USA criticised the British in October, 
as obstructing American oil interests in Saudi Arabia, Grafftey-Smith termed the 
accusations "mendacious" allegations. Defending the British officials - in Saudi 
Arabia - Grafftey-Smith pronounced that; "American complaints about the lack of co-
operation by British officials in Saudi Arabia are pathological in origin. Iniative 
[Initiative] in the aggregate has always come from them. They then consider our self-
defence offensive and call for doormat co-operation". 
A fiirther development in the same autumn had additionally persuaded the British 
government to reconsider the whole case of Anglo-American relations in Saudi 
Arabia. It was King Ibn Saud's request, in early November, for a permanent British 
military mission - for the training of the Saudi Arabian Army - which reproduced such 
a consideration.^°° Thus, it could be said that the continuity of the unresolved 
financial adviser issue, the American criticism of the alleged British anti-American 
behaviour, and the Saudis latest request, had influenced London to reset the whole 
phenomena that related to Anglo-American tensions in Saudi Arabia. 
In a memorandum of 30 November 1945 by Mr Thomas Wikeley, The Foreign Office 
official directly in charge of Saudi Arabia affairs, both British and US relations with 
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and in Saudi Arabia were assessed and compared.^ '^ Wikeley asserted that British 
interests in Saudi Arabia were political, strategic, and commercial. The "most 
important" interests were political, which could be divided into two main aspects: the 
first was "Ibn Saud's political influence in the Arab world", and the second was "the 
safety and comfort of British Moslem pilgrims".^^^ The first aspect, which is 
considered to be temporary as far as Ibn Saud was mortal, was explained as follows: 
"Ibn Saud's influence in the Middle East is very great, and it has been used 
consistently for a number of years in support of our policy. This happy 
position has come about principally because Ibn Saud is convinced that we are 
the only great Power who has the real interests of the Arabs at heart, and the 
only great Power who can be trusted not to abuse its strength where weak 
States are concerned. He has repeatedly said that only in association with the 
British can the Arabs hope to achieve a settled and prosperous life in fiiture. 
He realizes of course that our motives are not purely altruistic, although he 
gives us credit for a considerable measure of altruism, but that the friendship 
of the Arabs is an essential requirement of our foreign policy. He therefore 
regards us as the only Power to which the Arabs can safely look for help and 
guidance until such time as they are strong enough to stand by themselves. 
This is the cardinal point of Ibn Saud's foreign policy".^°^ 
To this Wikeley added views that were in one way or another not exactly like that of 
the Foreign Office in the former year: 
"These considerations of general policy have, in Ibn Saud's mind, been 
reinforced during recent years by a powerfiil personal motive for keeping in 
with us, viz: the financial and other assistance we have been giving him since 
1941. The fact that we are now unable to continue this assistance except on a 
very modest scale will no doubt have its effect on his mind, but it will not alter 
to any appreciable extent his general policy as explained in the preceding 
paragraph. Furthermore, the increase of his oil royalties and the probability 
that he will soon be receiving greatly increased revenue fi-om the pilgrimage 
should operate to mitigate any disappointment which the cessation of our 
subsidy may cause him. We can, therefore, confidently expect that Ibn Saud 
will continue to exercise his political influence more or less in conformity with 
our wishes for as long as our attitude to the Arab states remains what it is".^°^ 
130 
On the second aspect of the British political interests in Saudi Arabia, Wikeley 
explained, that the safety of the pilgrimage was likely to be the only permanent 
political interest. In any case, it would not be difficult to ensure the proper treatment 
of the British pilgrimage particularly when this matter would concern all powers 
interested in the pilgrimage.^^^ 
Unlike views during the war, Wikeley considered the strategic interests, as 
insignificant; "Our strategic interests in Saudi Arabia are small. The country, indeed, 
lies across our lines of communication, but it offers no scope for improving those 
communications except perhaps by air". Even air routes crossing Saudi Arabia are 
not very vital as far as it was only "alternative, and possibly shorter, routes than those 
already established to the North and South".^ ^^ In addition the advancement of air 
warfare had almost abolished the importance of keeping Saudi Arabian tribes under 
proper control, as desert riders could quickly be caught by aircraft.^°* 
According to Wikeley, there was a British commercial interest in the Saudi Arabian 
goods market. Nonetheless, this market "is small and it is unlikely to increase greatly 
in importance for some time to come".^°^ 
Regarding the US political interest, it was stated that "the Americans have no intrinsic 
political interest in Saudi Arabia at aH".^'° However, oil as "the basis of American 
interest in the country, invariably has a political aspect".^" The American oil interests 
should not worry the British government as far as it had been agreed that the US 
"should have carte blanche in regard to Saudi Arabian oil".^'^ Nevertheless, a possible 
friction could occur in the fiiture on the border between Saudi Arabia and the Gulf 
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Sheikhdoms "where oil is suspected to exist in large quantities". 
Commercial motivation was the major American interest in Saudi Arabia, involving it 
in the "production of oil". As Wikeley suggested: "to this they [the Americans] attach 
the very greatest importance and from this spring, directly or indirectly, all their other 
interests in the country".^''* Nevertheless, as this field of commercial activity was 
solely the preserve of the Americans "there is therefore little likelihood of a clash in 
this sphere".^ '^  In the other field of commercial interests, which is the Saudi Arabia 
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market, competition was thought possible between British and American goods. But, 
because the market was small and therefore irrelevant "this should not cause much 
trouble".^'^ 
Wikeley recognized the Americans strategic interests in Saudi Arabia. He illustrated 
that these interests were increasing with the construction of a US airfield at Dhahran 
and through a recent plan to build a telecommunications station as well. '^ '^  
Wikeley asserted the frictions, which existed on specific subjects originated from the 
action of the Americans and the reaction of British. On this subject he stated: 
"The divergencies of opinion which have arisen in the past over specific 
subjects (e.g. the . . . Financial Mission) derive essentially from the American 
desire to bring Ibn Saud more and more within their orbit and our fears that 
such a process may lead to the loss of his independence and, therefore, of his 
political utility to us". '^* 
Although a large quantity of Ibn Saud's revenue was coming from the production of-
the American managed - oil and although his fiiture source of subsidies would be 
from the USA, he was unlikely to lose his independence to the Americans. According 
to Wikeley, Ibn Saud was "by nature and training of ruggedly independent character" 
and also he held the "trunip card" of the possibility of oil concession cancellation.^'^ 
Therefore, Wikeley asserted the British government did not need to be worried about 
the independence of Ibn Saud vis-a-vis the Americans.^^° 
It was suggested that, in order to reinforce Ibn Saud's resistance to the American 
encroachments, the British government should put in practice a long-term scheme of 
technical and services assistance. At that time there were two handy reinforcement 
schemes. The first was Ibn Saud's request for a military mission and the second was a 
recent - British - proposal of offering Saudi Arabia a small civil aviation unit. In 
addition to the benefit to Saudi Arabia, Wikeley remarked that "it would certainly 
serve our essential political purpose of providing Ibn Saud with a prop against the 
Americans, of reassuring him regarding our intentions, and of mitigating any 
disappointment he may feel at the cessation of our subsidy".^^' 
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American opposition to those schemes would be concerted unless the British could 
provide the necessary sugar to "sweeten the pill in some way or other".^ ^^ In this 
sense Wikeley recommended that the British "should allow, and even encourage, the 
Americans to "penetrate" Saudi Arabia to their heart's content".^ ^^ By adopting such a 
policy, "we can, therefore, offer to barter our Military Mission, and, i f possible, our 
aviation scheme against their Financial Mission and all the other activities in which 
they apparently wish to indulge".^ ^"* 
On 11 December 1945, the memorandum was submitted to a special meeting at the 
Foreign Office between the British governments departments concerned with Anglo-
American relations in regard to Saudi Arabia. In this meeting various views were 
expressed "on the proposals formulated in the Foreign Office Memorandum".^^^ 
The Treasury representative, Mr Pinsent, welcomed the proposal of technical and 
services assistance to Saudi Arabia instead of consumption subsidies, as that would fit 
better with the British government position. He remarked: 
"Not only would this be of greater ultimate value to Saudi Arabia, but it would 
accord better with our own position. We cannot afford to do much in the way 
of a direct subsidy, but we can and should make every effort to utilise our 
knowledge and experience of the Middle East to the mutual advantage of 
Saudi Arabia and ourselves".^ ^^ 
Pinsent stressed that Britain should also provide the Sunni Moslem financial adviser, 
"considering that the greatest service we could render Saudi Arabia would be to try to 
bring some order into the chaos of Saudi Arabia finances by the appointment of a 
financial adviser".^ ^^ Into this he added "Not only have we much experience in this 
field, but we are the only Power who could provide a Moslem financial adviser of the 
requisite training and experience".^ ^* The adviser however, should be "a servant of 
Ibn Saud, who could and should oppose us i f he considered it necessary (as in the case 
of the British financial adviser in Iraq)".^^^ Moreover, Pinsent wished for consensus 
rather than conflict with the Americans over Saudi Arabia; "our relations... [should 
be] placed on a fresh footing. Instead of the confused jealousies and rivalries of the 
past, we should endeavour to reach an agreement whereby our joint efforts to assist 
Ibn Saud should be complementary and not conflicting".^^" To this end, he remarked, 
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"that we [the British] should invite the Americans to a general discussion" as soon as 
possible.^^' 
Colonel Atkinson, as the War Office representative, welcomed the proposal of 
providing British Military Mission for Saudi Arabia and stated that the War Office 
"would be happy" to provide such a mission. Likewise, the Ministry of Civil 
Aviation representative, Mr Dunnett, welcome the idea of offering Saudi Arabia a 
"civil aviation unit". He further suggested that Ibn Saud should be informed as soon 
as possible about the scheme, in order to lay the foundations before a similar 
American proposal.^ ^^ 
Mr Mason of the Foreign Office agreed that they "should have a general discussion 
with the Americans regarding Saudi Arabia at an early date". '^''' He also believed that: 
"the Americans are willing to admit our [the British] political and military pre-
eminence in the Middle East. What they fear is that we may use our political 
and military position to thwart their commercial schemes. I f we can allay their 
suspicions on this point we should have no difficulty in getting them to agree 
to our military mission in Saudi Arabia".^^^ 
In conclusion, the meeting adopted the following resolutions, which became the basis 
of the British policy with regard to Anglo-American relations in Saudi Arabia:^^^ 
1. The Americans should be invited to a general discussion on Anglo-
American relations in Saudi Arabia. 
2. American agreement should be obtained regarding the British Military 
Mission and the British civil aviation unit to Saudi Arabia. 
3. The importance of an efficient - British - financial adviser to Ibn Saud 
should be stressed. 
D. Saudi Arabia's Attitude Tovyards the Palestine Issue prior to 1945 
According to the British record, "From September 1939 through 1944, Ibn Saud's 
attitude on the Palestine issue was carefiilly unprovocative".^^' King Ibn Saud 
"preferred, and he advised all and sundry among the Arabs, to refrain from words or 
action embarrassing to Great Britain while at war and to trust in the integrity of His 
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Majesty's Government's undertaking in the White Paper of 1939".^ ^^ On these lines, 
the King continued his policy in refraining from troubling the British government 
with such a controversial issue. Besides, when Ibn Saud saw the necessity of 
contacting the US government on Palestine in 1943; he did not do so without 
obtaining the British government consent.^ ''^  
In early 1943, the Arab States - including Saudi Arabia - began to realize the extent of 
Zionist influence in the USA. The ever-increasing Jewish activities in America, 
including that of effective propaganda campaigns, were noticeably turning the whole 
political ground in that country for the benefit of Zionism. The danger that the Arabs 
realised was not just that which was related to the Zionist influence over American 
public opinion, but also to the Zionist influence over the US government.^ '**' 
In February 1943, King Ibn Saud and other Arab leaders recognized the need to bring 
the US government into the true "picture" as they saw it. Subsequent to a Saudi 
inquiry, the British government replied, in March, that it "would raise no objection" i f 
Saudi Arabia or any of the other Arab States wrote about their concerns directly to the 
US government.^'" Ultimately, when Ibn Saud received Kirk in mid-April, the latter 
was asked to bring the following to the attention of President Roosevelt: 
"because of vast wealth at their disposal and their influence in . . . the United 
States Jews were steadily encroaching on Arabs. I f this trend was allowed to 
continue it could only be expected that Jewish-Arab conflict would became 
more acute, which would be deplorable from Arab standpoint and would also 
cut across Allied war effort".^"^ 
Likewise, King Ibn Saud sent President Roosevelt a written message on 30 April 
1943.^ *^^  Again, Ibn Saud brought Roosevelt's attention to the core problem, but at this 
time with a further explanation: 
" I have been alarmed, as have other Moslems and Arabs, because a group of 
Zionists are seizing the opportunity of this terrible crisis [WWII] to make 
extensive propaganda by which they seek on the one hand to mislead 
American public opinion and, on the other hand, to bring pressure upon the 
Allied Governments in these critical times in order to force them to go against 
the principles of right, justice and equity . . . By so doing the Jews seek to 
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compel the Allies to help them exterminate the peacefiil Arabs settled in 
Palestine for thousands of years. They hope to evict this noble nation from its 
home and to install Jews from every horizon in this sacred Moslem Arab 
country. What a calamitous and infamous miscarriage of Justice would, God 
forbid, result fi-om this world struggle, i f the Allies should, at the end of their 
struggle, crown their victory by evicting the Arabs from their home in 
Palestine, substituting in their place vagrant Jews who have no ties with this 
country except an imaginary claim which, from the point of view of right and 
justice, has no grounds except what they invent through fraud and deceit".^ ''^  
In replies to both of Ibn Saud's messages, Roosevelt repeated his desire that this issue 
be settled peacefiiUy among Arabs and Jews.^ ''^  The President also assured the King 
that no settlement would be reached without fiilly consulting the interested parties: 
"it appears to me highly desirable that the Arabs and Jews interested in the 
question should come to a fiiendly understanding with respect to matters 
affecting Palestine through their own efforts prior to the termination of the 
war. I am glad of this opportunity, however, to reiterate my assurance that it is 
the view of the Government of the United States that, in any case, no decision 
altering the basic situation of Palestine should be reached without full 
consultation with both Arabs and Jews".^ '*^  
Roosevelt's philosophy in bringing about a "friendly understanding" between Arabs 
and Jews seemed to be a bit extreme compared to that of Ibn Saud. In August 1943 
President Roosevelt sent his idea to King Ibn Saud via a special envoy. Colonel 
Harold Hoskins. '^*'' In Riyadh Hoskins enquired, whether the King "considers it 
advisable or usefiil to meet Dr. Weizmann . . . or any other person designated by the 
Jewish Agency".^''^ It was explained to the King that, the purpose of such a meeting 
would be to seek out a "solution of basic problems affecting Palestine acceptable to 
both Arabs and Jews".'^ ''^  In reply, Ibn Saud pointed out that "his views regarding 
Palestine are the same as those expressed in his [previous messages] . . . to the 
President", Al l he wants "is to ensure that Arab rights in Palestine are not swallowed 
up by the Jews".^^° He trusts that the United States "will not, as a result of ignorance 
of the situation, be false to those ideals of justice and humanity for which she is 
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fighting and that she will not associate herself with Jewish attempt to obliterate Arab 
rights in Palestine".^^' He added that it would be "impossible" for him: 
"to take part in solving [the] Palestine problem otherwise than by expressing 
his views and by giving his advice unless and until he has ascertained the 
views of interested parties who have authority in the matter. I f the President 
wishes, Ibn Saud is prepared to approach the Arabs and ascertain their views 
and this might assist in reaching a solution".^^^ 
In respect to the proposed meeting, the King indicated that he did not "trust" 
Weizmann, and was not willing to hold any kind of discussions with him or even with 
any of his representatives.'^" It was expounded to Hoskins that: 
"Ibn Saud considers Dr. Weizman as his personal enemy for it was he who 
had the outrageous insolence to approach Ibn Saud and to ask him to be a 
traitor to his religion and his country. This approach was made in the first year 
of the war when Dr. Weizman sent a certain European with request that Ibn 
Saud should abandon the Arabs of Palestine in return for £20,000,000 to be 
guaranteed by President Roosevelt himself. The man dared to put this base 
suggestion to Ibn Saud and to suggest that the President would guarantee such 
a dishonourable proposal. Could anything be baser or more criminal than 
this?".^ '^* 
When Hoskins reported Ibn Saud's views to Roosevelt, the President "expressed fiill 
understanding of the reason for the King's refiisal to meet with Weizman".^ ^^ 
Roosevelt "also showed irritation that his name had been mentioned as a guarantor, 
for which, he said, there was no basis in fact".^^^ In any case, it was apparent from 
Hoskins mission that Ibn Saud was "opposed to the idea of any Jewish state in 
Palestine", unless he was convinced "otherwise".^^' To this end. President Roosevelt 
did not lose all hope of finding a solution for the Palestine problem through King Ibn 
Saud. Nonetheless, the general outlook of Hoskins' mission had caused the President 
to delay his efforts on the King until the final days of the war. 
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E . The Leaders' Summits 
I . Ibn Saud's meeting with Roosevelt, 14 February 1945 
On 12 February Ibn Saud and his party left Jeddah for the Great Bitter Lake - of the 
Suez Canal - on board the destroyer U.S.S. Murphy. Two days later the U.S.S Murphy 
tied up alongside the U.S.S Quincy at the Lake, thereafter Ibn Saud and Roosevelt 
held their historic meeting.^ ^^ After establishing very friendly personal relations, the 
two heads of state concentrated on various topics including the Palestine problem, the 
problem of Syria and Lebanon, and the British attitude towards Saudi Arabia.^^° 
According to the US President's closest adviser, Mr Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt was 
inspired "to talk to Ibn Saud about Palestine" in person.^ '^ Besides, he was 
"particularly interested in seeking Ibn Saud's assistance in resolving the problem of 
Palestine".^ ^^ Nevertheless, the course of the discussion on this particular issue took a 
line that was closer to Ibn Saud's wishes rather than to that of Roosevelt's. Such a 
development was due because Roosevelt adapted a relaxed attitude during the 
conversation, where as Ibn Saud was more determined - as usual - to oppose any 
Jewish gain in Palestine. 
Perhaps because Roosevelt "had been repeatedly warned by his own experts" about 
the difficulty of altering Ibn Saud's views on Palestine, the President initiated the talk 
on this question as a humanitarian issue.^^ By doing so, the President might have 
believed that he could possibly succeed in softening the King's position. In this 
direction, Roosevelt asked Ibn Saud for "his advice" about the problem of Jewish 
refugees who had been driven from their home in Europe.^ ^^ King Ibn Saud's reply 
was simple but firm: 
"in his opinion, the Jews should return to live in the lands from which they 
were driven. The Jews whose homes were completely desfroyed and who have 
no chance of livelihood in their homelands should be given living space in the 
Axis countries which oppressed them".^ ^^ 
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Seemingly convinced by the King's response, Roosevelt remarked that "Poland might 
be considered a case in point. The Germans appear to have killed 3 million Polish 
Jews, by which count there should be space in Poland for the resettlement of many 
homeless Jews".^ ^^ Subsequently Ibn Saud "expounded the case of the Arabs and their 
legitimate rights in their lands, and stated that the Arabs and the Jews could never co-
operate neither in Palestine nor in any other country".^^^ King Ibn Saud also called 
attention to "the increasing threat to the existence of the Arabs and the crisis which 
has resulted from continued Jewish immigration and the purchase of land by the 
Jews".'^ ^^  He also added that "the Arabs would choose to die rather than yield their 
lands to the Jews".'^^° Stressing the importance that the Arabs gave to the US role, Ibn 
Saud stated that "the hope of the Arabs is based upon the word of honour of the Allies 
and upon the well-known love of justice of the United States, and upon the 
expectation that the United States will support them".^'' 
In a positive reply, Roosevelt assured Ibn Saud that "he would do nothing to assist the 
Jews against the Arabs and would make no move hostile to the Arab people".^ ^^ 
Roosevelt also reminded Ibn Saud that "it is impossible to prevent speeches and 
resolutions in Congress or in the press which may be made on any subject. His 
reassurance concerned his own fiature policy as Chief Executive of the United States 
Govemment".^^^ It seemed that Roosevelt might "have been more convinced" by Ibn 
Saud's arguments "than vice versa, judging from the President's famous subsequent 
comment that he learned more about the Palestine problem in five minutes with the 
Saudi King than he might have from an exchange of several dozen letters".^ '^* 
Though King Ibn Saud did not mention his anxiety of possible Hashemite 
intimidations, he did not miss the opportunity to mobilise the occasion for the purpose 
of the emergence of fully independent Levant States. Hence, after mentioning the 
importance of Syria and Lebanon to Saudi Arabia, Ibn Saud asked what "would be the 
attitude of the United States Government in the event that France should continue to 
press intolerable demands upon Syria and the Lebanon".^ ^^ Roosevelt replied "that the 
French Government had given him in writing their guarantee of the independence of 
Syria and the Lebanon and that he could at any time v^ite to the French Government 
to insist they honour their word".^^^ Roosevelt continued "in the event that the French 
should thwart the independence of Syria and the Lebanon, the United States 
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Government would give Syria and the Lebanon all possible support short of the use of 
force"."^ 
The subject that involved the British attitude was discussed in strict confidentiality. 
This confidentiality had caused the Saudis and the Americans to omit such a subject 
from the "agreed memorandum of conversation", which was later passed to the 
British. With a "smile" Ibn Saud could not agree more to Roosevelt's "jovial 
confidence about the English", when the latter said: 
"We like the English, but we also know the English and the way they insist on 
doing good themselves. You and I want freedom and prosperity for our people 
and their neighbors after the war. How and by whose hand freedom and 
prosperity arrive concerns us but little. The English also work and sacrifice to 
bring freedom and prosperity to the world, but on the condition that it be 
brought by them and marked 'made in Britain'."^^^ 
In more serious manner, Ibn Saud fiilly used the British case - apparently - in order to 
encourage the Americans to fiirther strengthen the Saudi-US partnership, as well as to 
ease the monopoly of the British sphere of influence in and around Saudi Arabia. 
Toward such objectives. King Ibn Saud stated: 
"What am I to believe when the British tell me that my fiiture is with them and 
not with America? They constantly say, or imply, that America's political 
interest in Saudi Arabia is a transitory war-interest; her aid as short-lived as 
lend-lease; that Saudi Arabia lies in a path bounded with sterling conttols, 
connected by British communications; defended by the Royal Navy and 
Army; that my security and economic stability are bound up with British 
foreign policy; and that America, after the war, will return to her 
preoccupations in the Western Hemisphere. In short, they tell me that the joint 
'partnership' in Saudi Arabia is temporary, and that Britain alone will continue 
as my partner in the fiiture as in the early years of my reign. On the strength of 
this argument they seek a priority for Britain in Saudi Arabia. What am I to 
believe?"^*" 
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By using such an argument Ibn Saud was looking and hoping for a very profound 
answer, however, such a profundity was not fully met. But at least, Roosevelt 
presented - what could be regarded as - a reasonable response: 
"plans for the post-war world envisage a decline of spheres of influence in 
favor of the Open Door; that the United States hopes the door of Saudi Arabia 
wil l be open for her and for other nations, with no monopoly by anyone; for 
only by free exchange of goods, services and opportunities can prosperity 
circulate to the advantage of free peoples".^*' 
Monitoring Ibn Saud's immediate reaction to the reply, William Eddy recorded "The 
King expressed gratification over this prospect, but it was evident that he expected 
British pressure to continue as before to claim a sphere of influence around and over 
his country". Eddy also recorded his own thoughts on this subject, "This fear is no 
doubt well-grounded and will be dispelled when and i f the United States gives 
material substance to plans for long range economic and political accords with Saudi 
Arabia to open up the Open Door".^ *^ 
Despite the fact that the Palestine issue was the most noticeable motive that 
encouraged the US President to seek a conference with the Saudi King, it could be not 
neglected that the summit had indeed reflected the increasing awareness in both states 
for the necessity of reinforcing their mutual relationship. Mr Aaron Miller, who 
researched Saudi-American relations from 1939 to 1949, illustrated that: 
"Roosevelt's conversations with the Saudi King seemed to reflect the United 
States' growing awareness of its interests in Saudi Arabia - i f not the entire 
Middle East. Similarly, for Ibn Saud the meeting held great significance. For 
the first time since the formal establishment of his Kingdom, Ibn Saud had 
journeyed beyond his borders in search of an ally to support . . . the political 
independence of Saudi Arabia".^*" 
I I . Ibn Saud's meeting with Churchill, 17 February 1945 
On 16 February King Ibn Saud and his party left the U.S.S Murphy at Ismailia for the 
Hotel du Lac in Fayoum - approximately 100 km south from Cairo - where the King 
had his meeting with Churchill the following day.^ *^  The Ibn Saud-Churchill 
141 
conversations, which were interrupted by lunch, started at 12.30 p.m. and ended at 
3.30 p.m. Beside the King and the Prime Minister, the conversation was attended by 
Mr Anthony Eden, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr Stanley 
Jordan, the British Minister at Jeddah, Mr Hafiz Wahba, the Saudi Arabian Minister 
in London, and Sir Walter Smart form the British Embassy in Cairo.^ *^ 
At the opening of the conversation, Churchill asked Ibn Saud for "information 
regarding his conversation with President Roosevelt".^ ^^ Instead of briefing the Prime 
Minister verbally, the King handed out a copy of the memorandum of his 
conversation with Roosevelt; a copy that obviously did not include the Saudi-
American conversation on Britain.'^^^ After reading the memorandum, Churchill 
commented "that President Roosevelt had expressed further views to him on the 
subject of Palestine", and that fiirther compromise was necessary in order to reach a 
consistent solution for such a complicated issue.^ '^ In response Ibn Saud explained 
that: 
"His position was very difficult. The Jews in Palestine were continuously 
increasing in number; they were even forming a sort of Government of their 
own, with a Prime Minister, a Foreign Minister and a Minister of Defence. 
They also had formed a military force of 30,000 men with modem arms and 
equipment. They had thus become a great danger to the Arabs. I f it was only a 
question of Jews and Arab the Arabs would fight the Jews, and, even i f they 
were not victorious, they would not mind because they would go to Paradise. 
He had continually counselled moderation to the Arabs in this question, but he 
feared that a clash might come and then he would be in great difficulty. He did 
not wish to get involved in such a conflict, which would also bring him into 
conflict with [the British]".^^° 
In assurance, Churchill said that the British government "would not allow the Jews to 
attack the Arab with armed forces. We had confrol of the seas and could easily 
deprive them of supplies".^^' However, unlike the USA President, the British Prime 
Minister insisted that "the Jews must have a place to live in - that is to say, in 
Palestine".^'^ Churchill clarified his view on this by saying that "He had never been in 
favour of Palestine being a National Home, but of a National Home in Palestine". '^^  
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Churchill hoped that "he might count on the assistance of His Majesty [Ibn Saud] to 
promote a definite and lasting settlement between the Jews and the Arabs''.'^ ''' 
Being unhappy about Churchill's emphasis on the needs of a Jewish national home in 
Palestine, Ibn Saud tried to avoid answering Churchill's request to him in promoting a 
settlement. Thus instead of answering Churchill directly, Ibn Saud emphasised "the 
difficulty he would have restraining his own people if conflict occurred between the 
Jews and the Arabs".^ ^^ 
Before concluding their talk on Palestine, Ibn Saud remarked "that he counted on the 
British fiiendship with the Arabs and on British justice".^ '^  Ultimately, Churchill 
"assured him of . . . [the British] friendship with Arabs".^ ^^ But oddly the Prime 
Minister used the wrong argument, of the British-Arab friendship, as far as Ibn Saud 
was concerned. On this, Churchill "pointed out that... [the British] had done a lot for 
the Arabs since the last war in establishing Arab States in Iraq and Transjordan".^ '^  
Nonetheless, he also stated that "in the event of any decision being taken regarding 
Palestine, [the British government]... would keep Ibn Saud informed beforehand".^°° 
When the British Prime Minister "felt that he could not altogether satisfy Ibn Saud 
regarding Palestine" he turned the talk towards Syria and Lebanon.^ "' However, 
before the end of the first session of talks, Ibn Saud once more raised the issue of 
Palestine, when he expressed his desire to talk about the immigration into Palestine 
and the sales of land there. However, the meeting was interrupted by lunch at that 
stage and neither leader returned to the issue of Palestine.^°^ It could be that Ibn Saud 
felt that Churchill could not satisfy him on Palestine, thus he made no effort to return 
to the issue after lunch.'^ ''^  
Regarding Syria and Lebanon, Churchill said "we are determined to maintain the 
independence of Syria and Lebanon and to prevent the French from using force to 
upset this independence".^ "'* At the same time, Churchill thought that it was necessary 
that Syria and Lebanon should conclude treaties with France, giving France some 
privileges.^°^ Ibn Saud explained that there would be no problem in giving the French 
some privileges in education, culture, railways and commerce, but he thought that the 
French would demand more, on a par with the British position in Egypt and Iraq.^ °^  
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Concluding this issue, Ibn Saud suggested that the British government "should ask the 
French to say exactly what they wanted in the way of privilege".^ "^ Eden at this 
particular junction remarked that "the French had already been asked to formulate 
their requirements and we are waiting for their answer".^ *'^  
The Hashemite question was raised after lunch, when Churchill asked Ibn Saud if he 
wanted to discuss any other issue. After giving a brief of his relations with the 
Hashemite, Ibn Saud said that "he had every regard for them as descendants of the 
Prophet, but that, as we knew, the Amir Abdulla [Abdullah] was a talkative person 
and often said undesirable things".''°^ Ibn Saud remarked that at the present 
Abdullah's intrigues seemed to be suppressed by the British, a matter which the King 
hoped would be lasting. At this point Churchill "expressed the hope that Transjordan 
would not make difficulty for Saudi Arabia".^ '" 
III. The Summits' Outlook 
Ibn Saud was an admirer of both leaders. He told Eddy sometime after when he 
returned to Saudi Arabia, that he had "never met the equal of the President in 
character, wisdom and gentility".^ " Furthermore, he told Hafiz Wahba that "the high 
point of. . . [his] entire life is . . . [his] meeting with President Roosevelt".'''^  About 
the British Prime Minister, the King told Jordan during the journey to Ismailia that 
"he had always known that Mr Churchill was a great man and a great leader but now 
that he had met him he found him an even greater man than he had ever imagined".^  
With regard to the talks, Ibn Saud was more satisfied about his talk with Roosevelt 
than his talk with Churchill.^ ''* He compared both leaders' attitudes during the talks, 
by saying to Eddy in less than a week after the summits that: 
"The contrast between the President and Mr. Churchill is very great. Mr. 
Churchill speaks deviously, evades understanding, changes the subject to 
avoid commitment, forcing me repeatedly to bring him back to the point. The 
President seeks understanding in conversation; his effort is to make the two 
minds meet; to dispel darkness and shed light upon the issue".^ '^  
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In a private audience with King Ibn Saud in Jeddah on 20 February 1945 Eddy was 
asked to tell his government of the King's dissatisfaction over his conversation with 
Churchill. In a long oral statement, which Eddy paraphrased, the King described the 
details of his conversation regarding Palestine with Churchill as follows: 
"Mr. Churchill opened the subject confidently wielding the big stick. Great 
Britain had supported and subsidised me for twenty years, and had made 
possible the stability of my reign by fending off potential enemies on my 
frontiers. Since Britain had seen me through difficult days, she is entitled now 
to request my assistance in the problem of Palestine where a strong Arab 
leader can restrain fanatical Arab elements, insist on moderation in Arab 
councils, and effect a realistic compromise with Zionism. Both sides must be 
prepared to make concessions and he looks to me to help prepare the Arab 
concessions".^ '^  
Ibn Saud's paraphrased statement continued: 
"I replied that, as he well knows, I have made no secret of my friendship and 
gratitude to Great Britain, a friend I have always been ready to help as I shall 
always help her and the Allies against their enemies. I told him, however, that 
what he proposes is not help to Britain or the Allies, but an act of treachery to 
the Prophet and all believing Muslims which would wipe out my honor and 
destroy my soul. I could not acquiesce in a compromise with Zionism much 
less take any initiative. Furthermore, I pointed out, that even in the 
preposterous event that I were willing to do so, it would not be a favor to 
Britain, since promotion of Zionism from any quarter must indubitably bring 
bloodshed, wide-spread disorder in the Arab lands, with certainly no benefit to 
Britain or anyone else. By this time Mr. Churchill had laid the big stick down . 
. . In turn I requested assurance that Jewish immigration to Palestine would be 
stopped. This Mr. Churchill refiised to promise, though he assured me that he 
would oppose any plan of immigration which would drive the Arabs out of 
Palestine or deprive them of the means of livelihood there. I reminded him that 
the British and their allies would be making their own choice between (1) a 
friendly and peacefiil Arab world, and (2) a struggle to the. death between Arab 
and Jew if unreasonable immigration of Jews to Palestine is renewed. In any 
case, the formula must be one arrived at by and with Arab consent".^ '' 
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It was obvious that King Ibn Saud was more pleased with his conversation with 
Roosevelt on Palestine rather than his conversation on the same topic with Churchill. 
Not just in accordance to the King's complaint to the Americans, which was obvious, 
but also in accordance to the comparison of the two talks. Indeed, it was evidently 
clear that King Ibn Saud's meeting with President Roosevelt was more constructive 
than his meeting with the British Prime Minister. Roosevelt's promises and 
Churchill's demands might, indeed, have caused Ibn Saud to believe that the former 
would be more helpful in the future on this issue rather than the latter. Likewise, such 
a matter might have also caused Ibn Saud to believe that future dialogues - on this -
would be more constructive with the Americans rather than with the British, 
particularly when it involved the highest level of authority. Ultimately, the King 
might have considered that the US government - rather than the British government -
was the one who could possibly come to a full understanding on the Arabs rights in 
Palestine. Hence, this could explain why the Saudi King had thought of complaining 
to the Americans about his discussion with Churchill, rather than any vice versa 
attempt. 
While the preceding phenomenon was obvious, it should be noted that at the same 
time as King Ibn Saud desired to strengthen his ties with American, he was also keen 
not to create any problem for his relations with the British. Such a course of action 
was further imperative as the Saudi Monarch could not obtain a profound American 
will to strengthen the Saudi-American commitments. Indeed, even if he was 
dissatisfied in his talks with Churchill over the Palestine issue, the King continued to 
recognise that his Kingdom's interests - particularly those concerning security - were 
still up to then tied to Britain rather than to the USA, as, for instance, the British 
government had managed to keep Ibn Saud comfortable vis-a-vis the possibility of 
Hashemite intimidation, such as that of Abdullah's of Transjordan. 
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Summary and Conclusions 
1943 marked the beginning of the real involvement of the United States of America in 
Saudi Arabian affairs. It was the extension of the lend-lease in February 1943 which 
initiated such a new chapter in the history of Saudi-American relations. In that year, 
Saudi Arabia started to receive direct aid from the US government, a permanent US 
legation that was headed by a minister was established in Jeddah, and several 
significant visits took place between the two states capitals. In the following years, 
US direct aid to the Kingdom increased, as did the posts of representation when a US 
consulate was established in Dhahran in 1944 and when a Saudi legation was 
established in Washington in the following year. In addition, a US strategic interest in 
the Kingdom was also created, in 1945, by the construction of an American airfield in 
Dhahran. 
In 1944 America became an equal partner to Britain through the joint assistance 
program. Later when the USA increased its assistance to Saudi Arabia, Britain 
became a junior partner in the share of overall assistance that Saudi Arabia received 
from both countries. Britain failed to increase its financial assistance not just because 
of its own critical economic situation at the end of the war, but also because the 
Americans were willing to give more. 
At the same time while US-Saudi ties were enhanced. King Ibn Saud paid special 
attention to his relations with Britain. Throughout the period covered in this chapter, 
the King succeeded in maintaining his Kingdom's special relationship with the United 
Kingdom. The association of the Saudi Arabian interests with Britain had persuaded 
the King to preserve the Saudi Kingdom's relations with the British Kingdom, 
particularly when the core of those interests were related to Saudi Arabia's security. 
King Ibn Saud's methods in preserving his Kingdom's relations with Britain took 
many forms, but most notably he managed to keep the cordiality of the relations 
through the means of genuine consultations. In this regard, he did not just consult the 
British government over the Kingdom's relations with the USA, but he also consulted 
London on his Kingdom's regional policy. Ibn Saud's consultations with the British 
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government in regard to his fear of the Hashemite activities in the Arab unity schemes 
were beneficial for the course of Saudi-Anglo relations, as well as for the assurance of 
Saudi Arabia's security. In additional to this, Ibn Saud benefited from being closer to 
the British government's policy towards his regional concerns. 
The gradually increasing American interests vis-a-vis the existing British interests 
placed both countries in a conflict over Saudi Arabia. The conflict which was first 
instigated by the anxieties of the American oilmen was fiirther worsened by the 
British Minister's plans for the reform of Saudi Arabia's financial system in early 
1944. Despite the fact that the US and the British governments had endeavoured to 
improve their relations in Saudi Arabia by means of discussions, their relations 
continued to conflict in that country. In spite of the fact that the American-Anglo 
relations over the Saudi kingdom were at odds, some kind of cooperation, such as that 
of the creation of a joint assistance program, could not be ignored. Interestingly, by 
the end of 1945 - as the next chapter will fiirther illusti-ate - the continuity of the US-
British intentions in Saudi Arabia caused the British government to reconsider its 
position not just in regard to US-British relations in Saudi Arabia but also in regard to 
the British policy towards Saudi Arabia. 
The problem of the Palestine issue was raised in 1943 between the Saudi and the US 
governments. In response to the Saudi King's worries about the ever-increasing 
Zionist influence in the USA, the US president suggested resolving the Palestine 
problem through mutual understanding between the Arabs and the Jews. Roosevelt 
suggested to Ibn Saud to initiate direct talks with Weizmann, nevertheless, when the 
President's plan was not accepted, Roosevelt waited until the first opportunity of a 
personal conversation with the Saudi King. In his historic meeting with Ibn Saud, 
Roosevelt could not convince the Saudi monarch on the Palestine issue, in fact it was 
Roosevelt who was convinced by the Ibn Saud argument on the same topic. 
In addition to the Palestine issue, several topics were discussed during Ibn Saud's 
meetings with each of Roosevelt and Churchill. Despite the fact that the Saudi king 
tried to mobilise his conversations with the American President for the benefit of the 
Saudi-American relations, it could be said that the President's conservative statement 
in this regard was not the deep answer that Ibn Saud was looking for. Therefore, the 
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King realised that his Kingdom's interests, particularly those of a security nature, 
were still linked to Britain. Yet, it was the head of the British government who did not 
satisfy Ibn Saud during the February 1945 talks in regard to the Palestine Issue. 
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Chapter Three: Causes of Changing Relations, 1946-1948 
With special emphasis on some of the sources that have facilitated the occurrence of 
changing relations between Saudi Arabia and Britain, this chapter will attempt to 
discover the implications of several developments in the main conduct of Anglo-
Saudi relations during 1946 and through to 1948. Within this perspective and in 
accordance with the research questions, theme, and framework, certain developments 
wil l be focused upon. 
The end of the Anglo-American conflict in respect to Saudi Arabia and its impact on 
Saudi-British relations will be studied. The development of Saudi Arabian ties with 
both Britain and the USA will be examined alongside the improvement of Saudi 
economic income and King Ibn Saud's strategic thinking towards each of them. The 
Saudi-Hashemite problem and its impact will be comprehensively researched. The 
development of the Palestine Issue and its general implications will also be examined. 
Finally, the f i i l l panoply of Saudi-British strategic connections will be surveyed 
before reaching the chapter conclusion. 
A. The Improvement of Anglo-American Relations in Regard to Saudi Arabia 
The preceding chapter revealed that enhancing US-Saudi ties had led to tension 
between Britain and the USA over Saudi Arabia and that the discord had forced the 
British goverrmient to assess its policy in this regard. By the end of 1945 the British 
govenmient had decided upon the implementation of a collaboration policy with the 
US government in respect to Saudi Arabia. The subsequent developments through 
1946 and into 1947 led to full understanding, as the following pages will demonstrate. 
As proposed by the British governments departmental special meeting at the Foreign 
Office on 11 December 1945,' the British Ambassador in Washington, Lord Halifax, 
was instructed on 22 December 1945 to invite the Americans for general talks on 
Anglo-American relations in regard to Saudi Arabia.^ Halifax was asked to "sound" 
the director of the NEA, Mr Loy Henderson, i f he would be able to visit London for 
the talks. Alternatively, Halifax would be able to carry out the discussions in 
Washington, pending further detailed instructions from London. The Foreign Office 
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dispatch (to the British Embassy in Washington) underlined the objective of the 
proposed talks as follow: 
"We are convinced that there is no valid reason for any serious differences of 
opinion between us and the Americans in regard to Saudi Arabia. Our 
respective interests in that country do not conflict, and we have a common 
interest in ensuring the stability and prosperity of the country. We know that 
Ibn Saud needs both British and American help, and the main object of the 
proposed talks would be to assign to each country the contribution it can best 
make towards the welfare of Saudi Arabia".^ 
It was explained in that dispatch that though "a great measure of co-operation" 
between the State Department and the Foreign Office in Saudi Arabia "has been 
achieved" during recent years, still there had been "regrettable manifestations of 
jealously and rivalry".'* Hence in order to avoid the occurrence of such contentions, 
"we should like now to place our relations with the Americans on a fresh and more 
satisfactory footing".^ In the future the British and the Americans, "must endeavour to 
regard [themselves] . . . and each other [in Saudi Arabia] as fellow workers on a 
common task".^ In order to achieve that, the British and the US governments should 
consult and inform each other before any of them "puts forward a scheme for 
assistance to the Saudi Arabian Govenmient or receives a request for assistance from 
that Government".' Moreover, it was illustrated that "in view of the [present] financial 
position" of Britain and the USA, it seems that Saudi Arabian financial requirements 
"should be provided mainly by the United States Government, especially as American 
interests are the only [one that derives]... profits from . . . [the] exploitation of Saudi 
Arabian oil".^ On the other hand British assistance to Saudi Arabia would "have to be 
largely limited to contributions to the provision of services and technical advice".^ 
The primary topics of the proposed talks would include - alongside the need for 
general understanding - the subjects of providing Saudi Arabia with a British financial 
adviser, and a British Military Mission.'° 
At the beginning of January 1946, when Halifax initially talked to Henderson, the 
question of the financial adviser abstracted a smooth arrangement for the proposed 
talks.'' The NEA director was at once uncomfortable with the idea of the British 
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adviser. Halifax reported back to the Foreign Office Henderson's reaction on this 
particular matter, as follows: 
" I f the Americans are to furnish by far greater share of financial assistance to 
Ibn Saud, such a request would inevitably look like an attempt on the part of 
His Majesty's Government to obtain financial control without incurring 
financial sacrifice, and that the position would be rather hopelessly invidious 
one".'^ 
On 9 January 1946, Halifax received a dispatch from the Foreign Office controverting 
Henderson's misunderstanding of British government intentions in regard to the 
financial adviser matter.'^ The Foreign Office message, which was to be explained to 
Henderson, stated: 
"We are not seeking to control Saudi Arabian finance by means of such an 
appointment, and we very much hope that the Americans have no such 
intentions either. What we are anxious for is that Ibn Saud should be given 
disinterested technical advice on financial matters by the person best qualified 
to give it irrespective of nationality. This person should be Ibn Saud's own 
servant and under no obligation to any other party; we would even expect him, 
i f he thought it necessary in Ibn Saud's interests, to oppose the wishes of his 
own government".'" 
When Halifax illustrated the contents of the message to Henderson on 19 January, the 
latter assured the Ambassador, "that he himself fully appreciated that . . . [the British] 
Government . . .[was] not seeking to control Saudi Arabian finance by the 
appointment of an Indian Sunni Moslem financial adviser".'^ However, "it was 
unfortunately true that others [within the US government] would never be brought to 
believe this".'^ Henderson argued that the appointment of such an adviser would be 
unfair not only to the USA, but also to Saudi Arabia and Britain. Exemplifying his 
argument, Henderson, stated that i f such an adviser was "compelled to give financial 
advice to Ibn Saud which was unpleasing . . . to any American interests . . . or was to 
the advantage o f . . . [the British], it would inevitably be said that he was influenced 
b y . . . [the British] Government".'^ 
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Despite the British government aspiration towards improving American-Anglo 
relations in regard to Saudi Arabia, it could be said that the issue of the British 
financial adviser was about to revive the conflict i f it was to be pushed further. 
Indeed, this issue which had already delayed the preparations for the proposed talks 
was seen even by Halifax as the vehicle that could "greatly complicate . . . [British] 
relations with Americans over Saudi Arabia".'^ On the other hand it became apparent 
that Ibn Saud could be no longer in need of the services of such an adviser. On 23 
January 1946, Grafftey-Smith wrote to the Foreign Office, explaining that Ibn Saud 
may well not accept a British financial adviser " i f offered" one at the present time.'^ 
In his dispatch, the British Minister stated that the King's request which was "made in 
1944 was wrung from him by circumstances which are no longer valid. He has not 
(repeat not) ever referred to the matter since".^° Though, Grafftey-Smith's and 
Halifax's views alongside the American resistance could logically abandon the idea of 
the financial adviser, still the Foreign Office was not completely convinced in leaving 
it aside. '^ 
Nevertheless, the development of Anglo-American relations over Saudi Arabia in 
March 1946 could be considered as the decisive test that provided a resting place for 
the issue of the financial adviser as far as the Foreign Office was concerned. King Ibn 
Saud's rejection, on 21 March, of an American loan offer, was the cause of some 
irritation to British-US relations in Saudi Arabia.^^ Though the King's refusal was 
mainly due to the terms of the offer, the Americans suspected a British contribution 
over this.^'' When Eddy and Mr Richard Sanger, State Department Official in Charge 
of the Saudi Arabian desk, called upon the British Embassy in Jeddah in the last week 
of March, "it was at once apparent" to Grafftey-Smith that they both suspected the 
British over this development.^'' Meanwhile, Halifax cabled the Foreign Office on 29 
March explaining that "It is clear that the State Department are not entirely able to 
dismiss the suspicion that [the] British . . . may have encouraged the King to refiise 
United States loan with some sort of alternative proposition of their own".^^ 
No doubt that the Foreign Office, which was determined to improve Anglo-American 
relations in regard to Saudi Arabia, had been faced with an untoward situation. 
Indeed, the American suspicion towards the British had occurred in a similar 
'scenario' to the Henderson example of 19 January, but it happened even without the 
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engagement of a British financial advisor. It could be said that this development did 
not just end the idea of the British financial adviser, but also that it made the British 
govenmient more determined to improve relations with the US government in Saudi 
Arabia. 
From the first sign of American suspicions, Grafftey-Smith took the initiative and 
endeavoured to dispel their doubts, a step that was blessed and followed by the 
Foreign Office. Halifax was also asked to reassure the State Department about the 
goodwill of British govenmient policy towards US interests in Saudi Arabia. 
Furthermore, the British government decided to let its benevolent policy in this regard 
speak for itself. Hence, practical steps identical to the Foreign office explanations to 
Halifax on 22 December 1945 were immediately put into action. Frankness with the 
Americans in regard to British government assistance schemes in Saudi Arabia was a 
core point in this approach. Thus, instructions in this concern were sent to Britain's 
representatives in both Jeddah and Washington.^^ 
At the end of May 1946 - when the Saudi government was pressing the British 
government for a final reply in regard to the proposed British Military Mission -
London took a constructive step. As the proposed US-British meeting had not yet 
been held, the British government informed the US government about the scheme and 
its details. On 9 July 1946, the British Embassy in Washington was informed that the 
US government had no objection to the British Military Mission to Saudi Arabia.^' In 
a similar way the British government kept the US government informed about the 
other scheme regarding the British Civil Air Training Mission. 
Broadly speaking, the development of US-British relations in regard to Saudi Arabia 
had improved from April 1946 onwards. Moreover, the matters that concerned the 
British government and that were motivating it to press for American-British talks at 
the beginning of the year had become obsolete by the end of July 1946. Hence, it 
could be said that a special discussion on Saudi Arabia was not considered an urgent 
issue by the end of the summer. In fact such discussion was delayed until when talks 
between the Americans and the British regarding the Middle East as a whole, took 
place in Washington in October/November 1947.'^ ^ 
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In Washington talks, which opened on 16 October and closed on 7 November 1947, 
the Americans and the British had reached a number of conclusions regarding the 
Middle East in general, and Saudi Arabia in particular.^" The general conclusion in 
regard to the whole area stated that: 
" . . . the security of the Middle East . . . is vital to the security both of the 
United Kingdom and of the United States, and to world peace; that neither the 
U.K. nor the U.S. can implement a policy of this nature without the support of 
the other; and that each country should therefore cooperate with the other in 
the area, giving each other assistance and support and abjuring any sense of 
rivalry or desire for one country to replace the other".^' 
In regard to Saudi Arabia the US and the British government representatives^^ had 
reached a conclusion on the following lines of understanding: 
"The British Government regarded it as most important that their ties of 
friendship with King Ibn Saud should be maintained and further strengthened. 
Advantage might be taken of the friendship of King Ibn Saud for the purpose 
of arriving at regional security anangements in the Middle East . . . At the 
same time the British Government looked with favour on the position which 
the United States had established for itself in the country and wished for the 
closest cooperation between themselves and the United States Government... 
The British and the American Government should keep each other closely 
informed regarding their respective policies and activities in Saudi Arabia".^^ 
The US-British understanding, which was finalised by the 1947 agreements, is 
advantageous for the general scope of their relations in Saudi Arabia. These 
agreements - i f fiiUy put into practice - would eliminate the usual rivalry that existed 
between them (in regard to Saudi Arabia), thus ending the potentiality of ftiture 
trouble for both of them there. On the whole, it could be said that the improvement of 
Anglo-American relations over Saudi Arabia was rewarding i f it was evaluated from 
the dimension of Britain's and the USA's mutual relations. 
Nevertheless, the impact of this development on Saudi Arabian relations with both the 
USA and Britain could be assessed differently. Two outcomes of the US-British 
understanding could help clarify its main impact on Saudi-British relations as well as 
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on Saudi-US relations. First this development resulted in a gain for Saudi Arabia; as it 
asserted the importance of its security for both Britain and the USA, and as it 
facilitated the freedom of Saudi government preferences in choosing between either 
party for further cooperations.^'' Second, this agreement opened up the door for either 
the USA or Britain to penetrate Saudi Arabia economically, politically, militarily, etc. 
It could be said, that the broad result of this development would be advantageous to 
the power that is intending and capable in increasing its influence in Saudi Arabia. 
Moreover, such a development would be advantageous for the power that Saudi 
Arabia was wishing to increase and to strengthen its ties with. The pages of this 
chapter and the chapters to follow will reveal, that it was the USA who was willing, 
capable, and welcome to practise such a matter in Saudi Arabia. Hence, it could be 
concluded that this development would generally benefit the course of Saudi-
American relations rather than the course of Saudi-Anglo relations. 
B. Saudi Arabian Ties with Britain and the USA and King Ibn Saud's Strategies 
Towards each Country, 1946-1947 
I . Saudi-US Economic Ties 
From the end of 1945 onwards, Saudi-US economic ties advanced in scope and 
content. Thus in addition to the involvement of American oil companies, US financial 
institutions, such as the Export Import Bank, became involved in Saudi Arabia. 
Furthermore, the US's economic interest intensified as more American commercial 
companies were drawn into the country. 
Although Ibn Saud was keen to get closer economic ties with the USA at all levels, 
still his enthusiasm did not let him neglect risk factors. In March 1946, King Ibn Saud 
refused an offer of a US loan of $25 million.^^ The King's refusal of the Export 
Import (EXIM) Bank loan was due to specific reasons. The bank's condition on 
having the right to call and control the oil royalties for the repayment was 
unacceptable. The conditional terms that would give the Bank the right to permit and 
check the purchases as well as the projects were undesirable.^^ Moreover, a religious 
reason was an obstacle, as Ibn Saud was unwilling to undertake a financial loan that 
clearly and plainly required the 'payment of interest'. Finally, the size of the loan. 
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which would force Saudi Arabia to fulf i l a "long-term arrangements for repayment" 
had also inclined the King to dislike taking on such a commitment.^^ 
Apart from his diligence in avoiding unneeded obligations, Ibn Saud was seeking and 
welcoming further enhancement to Saudi-American economic links. Hence, shortly 
after the refusal of the March 1946 offer, the Saudis embarked on new negotiations 
with the Americans, hoping for less tough terms and conditions, for a loan of $10 
million.^^ The outcomes of the second negotiations were fruitful. On 9 August 1946, 
the Saudi Arabian Finance Minister, Mr Abdullah Ibn Sulaiman, and EXIM Bank 
officials concluded - in Washington - an agreement that was suitable for Saudi 
Arabia.^^ 
In addition to the loan, the Saudi government also tried to convince the US 
Administration to finance a railway project, running from the eastern coast of the 
Kingdom to Riyadh. Despite the fact that the US government had provided a team of 
experts, who examined the visibility of the venture in 1946, the Saudi government 
was told - later - to fUnd the project from private sources."*" Even though the US 
government was willing to provide the Kingdom with certain direct finance, and 
though it was supporting the involvement of the American private sector there, still 
the governmental economic tie between the USA and Saudi Arabia had some limits. 
The Saudi government, in its turn, was favouring fiiU and exclusive economic ties 
with the USA, at all levels, official and non-official. During the Saudi Arabian Crovm 
Prince's - Saud Bin Abdulaziz - visit to the USA in January 1947 the US officials 
were informed that Saudi Arabia desired to "turn exclusively" to the US in all aspects 
concerning the Kingdom's economy.'" 
American private companies provided the "principal expression" of US involvement 
in the Saudi Arabian economy.'*^ Several American companies - such as Bechtel - had 
undertaken development projects in Saudi Arabia. As facilitated by the EXIM Bank 
loan, the increase of Saudi Arabian income thereafter, and the Saudi as well as the US 
governments desires, the Kingdom had provided opportunities for the American 
private sector to participate in. Ahnost all the projects of building the country's 
infrastructure - such as roads, airports, public building constructions, etc. - became 
exclusive to Americans companies.'*^ Furthermore, larger contracts were exclusively 
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handed to American firms. In October 1946 the Saudi government signed an 
agreement with TWA for the creation and the operation of a Saudi Arabian airline.'*^ 
Moreover, in July 1947 the Saudi government signed a massive contract with the -
newly formed - Trans Arabian Pipeline Company (TAPLINE) to construct a pipeline 
from the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia to the Mediterranean Sea."*^  
It could be said that the expansion of the American commercial enterprises was a 
major setback to the relatively smaller British interests in Saudi Arabia. For instance, 
in September 1946, the British firm, Gellatly and Hankey, lost a tender for Jeddah 
electricity, because the Saudi government prefened to hand it to the American 
Company, Bechtel.'*^ In the same year when the Saudi government took the final 
decision in regard to the oil concession of the Saudi-Kuwaiti Neutral Zone, "it was 
not surprising" to see an oil company that "was acting in partnership with British 
interest" losing out to - for the benefit of - a company that was associated with 
American interest.'''' 
Though the impact of the increasing American involvement in the Saudi economy 
was apparent to the British government by the autumn of 1946, the matter was no 
longer a gateway for US-British rivalry, as the UK govermnent was already 
determined by mid-1946 to improve its relations with the US government in Saudi 
Arabia.''^ Whatsoever, it could be said that the increasing Saudi-US economic 
relations would have a long-term impact on Saudi-British relations, particularly, when 
the scale and the scope of the Saudi-US ties were developing in a newer and higher 
volume that were facilitated by the improvement of Saudi Arabian incomes, the Saudi 
as well as the US governments desires, and the begiiming of a decline in the Saudi-
British relations, etc. 
I I . The Improvement of Saudi Arabian Income and its Further Impact on Relations 
with Britain as well as with the USA 
As was predicted in the early 40's, the economy of Saudi Arabia started to improve 
after the end of W.W.II. Oil royalties were escalating steadily, as it reached the total 
of $12 million in 1946, $19 million in 1947, and $40 million in 1948."^ Furthennore, 
the income from pilgrimages was also increasing with the rise in the number of 
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pilgrims from overseas. Foreign pilgrims who visited Mecca were over 62,000 in 
1946 and 1947 respectively, "a fifty percent increase" in comparison with 1945. 
Above and beyond, the number reached 93,000 in 1948, with estimation of the 
continuity of gradual increases thereafter.^" 
The rapid growth of Saudi Arabian income had weakened the necessity - that used to 
exist during wartime - for financial assistance. Consequently, the importance of the 
substance that used to be in the hands of Britain and the USA was severely lessened in 
the post-war era. For instance, the figure for Saudi Arabian income from oil royalties 
in 1946 had exceeded - and replaced - the sum of the joint US-British assistance 
programme to the Kingdom during 1945. '^ 
Furthermore, Saudi government methods in funding its financial deficit had also 
changed in a way consistent with the increase of its income, and with the 
transformation of its desires and policies. Indeed, the strong prediction of a bright 
future for Saudi Arabian income - as early as 1946 - could explain why Ibn Saud was 
endeavouring to finance the Kingdom through means of loans from the USA, and why 
he was not pushing - keenly, as he used to do during the war period - for financial 
subsidies. 
The alteration of the forms of the British-Saudi cooperation from that of direct 
financial assistance into that of technical cooperation - as the following pages will 
explain - can be further understood by Britain's economic difficulties at the end the 
war. However, the suppression of Saudi government financial needs, which abolished 
the vitality of its financial connection with Britain, could be further understood by the 
growth of Saudi Arabian income. Hence, the expansion of Saudi Arabian income 
could not be regarded as a helpful factor for the general progress of the Saudi-British 
relations. 
Nevertheless, the grovrth of Saudi Arabian income could be seen as a helpful factor 
for Saudi-US relations, i f the matter was to be analysed alongside other factors within 
Saudi-American ties. As revealed earlier, the increment of Saudi Arabian revenues, 
had facilitated the participation of the American private sector in the country, a matter 
that could bring about further American interests in the Kingdom. Hence, another 
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point could be added to the negative impact of this development on the general scope 
of Saudi-British relations. 
I I I . Saudi-British Ties 
As was suggested in the Foreign Office memorandum of 30 November 1945, Britain 
had embarked from 1946 onwards on long-term technical assistance to Saudi 
Arabia.^^ By providing such assistance the British government was hoping to reassure 
Ibn Saud of its good intentions, and to mitigate any Saudi disappointment about the 
cessation of financial subsidies." Britain did not want the cessation of the subsidies to 
affect its relations with Saudi Arabia. Particularly, when the matter was concerned "a 
country where all decisions reflect the moods of a most politically-minded potentate, 
[as] even the simplest economic developments are politically interpreted". '^* 
By May 1946, the British government was arranging for a military mission to be sent 
to Saudi Arabia in order to train and create the foundation of a Saudi army.^ ^ The 
provision of a military mission was viewed in London as an essential issue, 
particularly as it was "about the only form of assistance . . . [Britain] can contemplate 
offering to . . . Saudi Arabia" at that certain time.^^ Furthermore, the British Foreign 
Secretary, Mr Ernest Bevin, attached: 
"great importance to the provision of this Mission, . . . as a valuable means of 
strengthening the British position in Saudi Arabia and as a material 
contribution towards the preservation of stable internal conditions in that 
country, with consequent benefit to the large number of British pilgrims who 
visit it and to the peace of the Middle East as a whole".^' 
Additionally, the British also viewed that fiimishing Saudi Arabia with such a mission 
would "represent a certain counter-weight to the growth of United States influence in 
Saudi Arabia . . . and would help to enhance . . . [Britain's] prestige in the Middle East 
as a whole".^^ 
In Januaiy 1947 the British Military Mission (BMM) was established in Taif and 
started its operations.^^ Gradually the mission gained the confidence and cooperation 
of the Saudi officers. During the first year of its operations, the BMM seemed to 
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satisfy the Saudis to some extent, particularly when it started to show some signs of 
its potentiality in "creating the foundations of a Saudi Arabian Army".^° However, in 
broader reach, the Saudi-Hashemite issue obscured the initial success of the BMM. 
Indeed, the works of the mission could be easily undervalued when looked at, 
alongside King Ibn Saud's point of view - a vital opinion that touched the heart of 
Saudi-British relations - when the King compared Britain military cooperations with 
Hashemites and his Kingdom.^' 
In addition to the military mission, the British government offered to provide an air 
training team in order to instruct Saudi Arabian pilots.^^ It took the British 
government a long time to decide about the matter of the air-training mission, 
particularly when the Treasury was not totally in its favour.Nevertheless, a small 
British Civil Air Training Mission of two training aircraft commenced training in 
Saudi Arabia in October 1947.^ '' The British Civil Air Training Mission continued its 
operations beside the British Military Mission throughout 1948 into the early 1950s.^ ^ 
Even i f the positive impact of British technical assistance to Saudi Arabia can be 
doubted, particularly when analysed next to the other factors that were to overshadow 
Saudi-British relations from 1946 onward, it has to be said that with the absence of 
the usual British financial assistance, the technical assistance had - at least - kept the 
chaimels of cooperation between Britain and Saudi Arabia functioning. The 
maintenance of British-Saudi cooperation could be regarded as no less than a helpful 
factor that could prevent Saudi-British relations from a total - or even immediate -
downfall. 
V. Ibn Saud's Views and Strategies on Saudi Arabian Relations with the US and 
Britain 
The focus in the immediate pages wil l be on King Ibn Saud's instructions to Prince 
Saud before the latter began an official visit to the USA as well as to Britain in the 
winter of 1947.^ ^ Particular focus will be on the instructions concerning Ibn Saud's 
opinions and strategies towards Britain and the USA.^' Additionally, the outcome of 
this procedure and its impact on Ibn Saud's assessment will be analysed. 
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King Ibn Saud instructed Prince Saud to perform the dialogues in Washington within 
specific guidelines. Saud was to "assure the US President and the American officials . 
. . about Saudi Arabia's sincere friendship . . . and of its determined desire to 
strengthen Saudi-US relations in all of the political and the economic fields".^^ In 
addition, Saud was to disclose to the Americans, Ibn Saud's delight and satisfaction as 
to the USA's complete "departure from its previous policy of isolation and that Saudi 
Arabia is putting great expectations on US involvement in Middle Eastern politics".^^ 
Emphasising the importance of this issue, Saud was told to convey King Ibn Saud's 
"wishes that the USA's political approach in this regard would be constantly lasting, 
hence Saudi Arabia could be assured on the stability of this strategy".^" 
Regarding the convergence of US and Saudi policies in the Middle East, Saud was 
instructed to "assure the Americans about the Kings desire in collaborating with them, 
in all matters that lead to the stability of peace in the Middle East"/' With exceptions 
to the US policy towards the Palestine issue, Ibn Saud believed that there "should not 
be any political difficulties between the USA and Saudi Arabia in regard to the 
Middle East"7^ 
In respect to Ibn Saud's views on Saudi-British relations, Saud was provided with a 
comprehensive account to be conveyed - only - to the Americans. The Prince was to 
introduce the King opinion on this subject to President Truman and the US 
administration officials, on the following careful lines: 
"That since the foundation of our country, we were - and still are - loyal 
friends to Britain. Despite circumstances and occasions that occurred during a 
long period of time, in which we both [Britain and Saudi Arabia] had faced a 
variety of problems and troubles, still the broader lines of the policy of each of 
us towards the other remained generally friendly. We [the Saudis] had 
experienced the British and they had as well experienced us, we knew them 
and they knew us. Therefore dealing between us became manageable, and 
understanding became reachable. Everyone knows the sincerity of our cordial 
stance alongside Britain during its difficulties in the last war, and how we did 
not abnegate our friendship with it, during a time in which even Britain's 
closest friends had let them down. Our recherche stance had caused the British 
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government to confess that it would never forget our attitude in these black 
days"7^ 
Though Ibn Saud was already disappointed - by 1947 - with the British government, 
particularly in regard to its treatment of the Saudi-Hashemite relations - as this 
chapter will show - still the King's technique in representing such a matter to the US 
government was watchful. Ibn Saud's carefulness here could be interpreted as a 
covering measure against any negative reaction by the British government i f such 
information were passed to London by any means. Indeed, the King, who was aware 
that the security of his country was still associated with Britain at that time, was very 
careful not to irritate London, particularly when the USA had not replaced Britain in 
this regard yet. Ultimately, exaggeration of British and Saudi Arabian friendship was 
evident in the representations, which Saud intended to press in Washington. The 
careftilly designed introduction of Saudi-British relations goes on, in which, to some 
extent, certain contradictions could be observed: 
"We are loyal friends to Britain. As well as that Britain is generally friendly 
with us, regardless of the existence of difficulties from time to time, and 
despite Britain's adoption of negative or even unfriendly stances in some of 
the cases in which our policies at odds with those of the Ashraf [Hashemites]. 
. . for instance".^ "* 
Nevertheless, the instructions, which were communicated by the Crown Prince to the 
Americans, explained that the King had experienced a change in Britain's attitude 
towards Saudi Arabia. According to Ibn Saud, this change could not be fully 
comprehended without putting the USA into the equation: 
"The end of the war, and the entrance of an active and effective American role 
in the Middle East, had made us realise what could explain some of the 
changes in Britain traditional policy toward us. Everyone is aware that the 
British officials compete and contend with the activities of American 
politicians and businessmen . . . No doubt that Britain was cautious on the 
preservation of the Middle East within its political and economical sphere of 
influence. But the USA entrance [into the Middle East, and into Saudi Arabia 
in particular] by means of noticeable activities had aggravated British anxiety. 
Accordingly we [in Saudi Arabia] began to feel Britain's deflection from us. 
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into that of our enemies. We can therefore verify that without the USA's 
dynamic entrance into the Middle East, and without us [Saudi Arabia] 
becoming one of the first countries that the USA had intensified its political 
and economical relations with, Britain would not even consider deviating its 
traditional and cordial relations with us. Indication of this deflection had 
emerged in several forms. One of the principal signs was Britain deviation 
from the policy of a balance of power between us and our opponents, and its 
conduct in strengthening them by direct and indirect means".^ ^ 
The instructions on this subject had concluded by insisting on the necessity of a 
comprehensive understanding between the Saudi and the US governments in case of 
radical changes in the Saudi-British relations; a matter which revealed that Ibn Saud 
was attempting to identify the range of policies and actions that the US government 
was willing to undertake in such circumstances. This particular action by Ibn Saud, 
which can be seen as 'testing' fixture USA policy in this regard, could be also seen as 
an 'all-inclusive' attempt. Hence in addition to its focus on the future of Saudi 
Arabian relations with Britain and the USA, it was also aiming to find out the range of 
direct policies and actions that the US government was willing to take in regard to the 
maintenance of Saudi Arabian security. On this it was stated in the 'carefully 
inscribed' instructions: 
"As indicated we - still - consider Britain as our traditional friend. In addition, 
we do not want to adhere to any policy that would contradict with Britain. 
However, i f critical circumstances have to force us to revise this policy - as 
because of our ties with the USA, and because of Britain's sponsorship of our 
enemies against us - we need to be in frank and plain advanced understanding 
with the Americans, particularly in regard to US government opinion on the 
necessity of agreement and alliance between Saudi Arabia and the USA in 
such a situation. Understanding between the US government and us on this 
concern, is a crucial issue. We need to know at the present time the degree to 
which the US government could agree upon in case of such circumstance".'^ 
Unlike the comprehensive instructions on Saud's mission to the USA, the King did 
not instruct his son on equivalentiy fundamental issues in regard to the UK mission.'^ 
Accordingly, Saud's visit to Britain, which took place between 20 February and 1 
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March 1947, became less important in comparison to his visit to the USA.^ ^ The 
differences in Ibn Saud's views regarding Saudi Arabian ties with Britain and the 
USA, and Ibn Saud's desire to strengthen his ties with the Americans and not with the 
British, had become a neutral consideration to the performance of Saud's visits to 
each of the capitals; a fiirther indication of the general course of Saudi Arabian 
relations with each of those World Powers. 
In Washington the Saudi delegates could not get the precise and the ambitious reply 
that they were looking for; however indistinct US assurance was attained.'^ The US 
secretary of State, James Byrnes, assured Prince Saud and his companions, in mid-
January 1947 that one of the principal policies of the USA in the Middle East was "to 
support the territorial integrity and political independence of Saudi Arabia".^" In this 
regard the US government would "make sure that the principles of the United Nations 
Charter be fully applied to the countries of the Near East, including Saudi Arabia".*' 
Hence, "King Ibn Saud could therefore depend upon the full active support of the 
United States in the United Nations in case any outside forces were to threaten or 
endeavor to undermine the integrity and independence of Saudi Arabia".*^ 
The Americans were not convinced about the Saudi suspicions of the British 
government as siding with the Hashemites against Saudi Arabia or against any other 
countries in the Middle East. On this Byrnes illustrated that the US government had 
no "information causing it to believe that the British government was supporting [the 
Hashemites] . . . On the contrary, the US government believed that the British would 
not. . . desire developments that might disturb the status quo in the Near and Middle 
East".^ ^ Moreover, the US government informed the Saudi government at a later stage 
in 1947, that there were no indications that could even prove that the Hashemites were 
intending to harm "Saudi Arabia merely because King Ibn Saud continued to be 
friendly to the United States".*^ 
The Saudi inputs and the ultimate American outputs had obviously provided King Ibn 
Saud with certain facts. The security of the Kingdom was - to some extent positively -
assured, as the USA would support "the integrity and independence of Saudi Arabia". 
However, that assurance was not the exact or the expected one in accordance to Ibn 
Saud's opinion.*^ The USA assurance - which was obviously better than nothing - was 
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to be implemented indirectly, as it would be coming through the UN and according to 
its "principles" and "Charter". Hence, such help might come after being diluted in the 
passageway of the international organisation, a matter that could be translated in Ibn 
Saud's thoughts as a weak assurance.^ ^ Furthermore, it became a fact that the 
Americans were not sharing Ibn Saud's opinions that the British were intending to 
harm Saudi Arabia by siding with the Hashemites, on the contrary a positive opinion 
about the British was explained to the Saudis. Ibn Saud's point of view - that forms a 
fundamental part of his views in the instructions - which linked anti-Saudi Arabian 
attitude to the improvement of the Saudi-American ties, was also dismissed. 
It could be said that the differences of opinion between Saudi Arabia and the USA, 
alongside the weakness of the USA assurance, had left Ibn Saud with few options but 
to reconsider. Ibn Saud might have realised that it was still early for the US 
government to become fully associated with all matters that concern Saudi Arabia. 
Though, US-Saudi economic relations were increasing rapidly, still the King was 
realising that the US government could not yet ful f i l the responsibility of becoming 
the sole protector which would insure the future of the Kingdom's security. 
Ultimately, Ibn Saud might comprehend that i f he wanted the US government to fulfi l 
such a task he still needed to boost the Saudi-American interests, including additional 
enhancement to the already dashing tie in the economic sphere. 
Though Ibn Saud was already disappointed with what he believed to be unfair British 
polices towards his case with the Hashemites, he was still left with no other choice but 
to try and work on Britain for his own national ends. Hence few tactics that included 
attempting to get a British assurance in regard to Saudi Arabia security were on the 
agenda of Saudi Arabia policy towards Britain. Moreover, Ibn Saud was struggling to 
win Britain to his side vis-a-vis what he believed to be a deflection from him towards 
the Hashemites. King Ibn Saud's measures included efforts to improve Saudi-British 
relations by any means. Indeed, the upgrading of the Saudi-British diplomatic 
channels from that of Legations to that of Embassies in October 1947 cannot be 
understood i f it was not measured from this perspective. 
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C. The Saudi-Hashemite Contention and its Implications for Saudi-British 
Relations, 1946-1948 
When the British government was about to publicly announce its "decision to 
establish Trans-Jordan as a sovereign independent State", Ibn Saud was presented on 
on 
14 January 1946, with "advance news of this intention". Along with the news, the 
British government "formerly assured [Ibn Saud] that the interests of Saudi Arabia 
would be borne in mind during the negotiation of an Anglo-Transjordan treaty".^" 
Despite the British government promises - for the related Saudi Arabian interests - it 
could be said that the news by itself was disturbing. The Saudi monarch who used to 
prefer to have "his personal rivals conspicuously under British control", was about to 
see the security of his Kingdom become exposed to - what he used to call -
"Abdullah's intrigues".^' The preservation of Saudi Arabian security, which was a 
priority issue to Ibn Saud, must have been under careful consideration within the 
Saudi government immediate to the receipt of the news. At that particular time, the 
Saudis might have thought about all kind of reactions that they could possibly take, 
nevertheless, it could be said that their rational alternatives were in fact limited. King 
Ibn Saud, who "regards the Amir Abdullah [of Jordan], the head of Hashemites 
family, as his greatest enemy . . . [could not at that time] reasonably object to . . . 
[Abdullah] becoming King";^^ or indeed, was not in a position to object to Jordan 
becoming independent. 
In a memorandum to the British government on 18 January, Ibn Saud delicately - one 
may say reluctantly - welcomed the grant of independence to Jordan.'^ Nonetheless, 
the King expressed his worry of future Jordanian hostile activities towards Saudi 
Arabia, "especially i f undertaken in cooperation with the Iraqi government".^'' In this 
regard, Ibn Saud demanded "clear assurances that the change of status of Transjordan 
would not be allowed by . . .[the British government] to have such consequences".^ ^ 
In addition, Ibn Saud put forward certain territorial claims against Jordan. On this it 
was stated that, the "Hadda agreement of 1925, defining the frontier between Najd 
and Transjordan, was, by Article 14, valid only for so long as His Majesty's 
Government hold the mandate for Transjordan".^^ Hence, the termination of the 
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mandate gaye Saudi Arabia the "right to claim frontier modifications in 
consequence".'' Therefore, Saudi Arabia claims Aqaba and Maan, as those two towns 
were tiaditionally considered as a part of Hijaz, additionally Saudi Arabia claims a 
right to "a direct territorial" passageway into Syria.'* 
It could be said that the Saudi territorial claims, which were well thought out before 
being presented to the British government, were directed towards more than one goal. 
In addition to them being a gateway for purely territorial gains, these claims could be 
seen as a tactical measure that was aiming to weaken the emergence of Jordan.'' 
Moreover, the timing of putting forward such claims could never have been better, 
with Britain reminded of its previous obligation to Saudi Arabia. Hence, by pushing 
forward such claims, while Britain was in the process of negotiations with Jordan, Ibn 
Saud may have optimistically thought that he could achieve the two goals - weaken 
the emerging Hashemite State, and gaining territories - at once. But, i f the British left 
Jordan before settling the issue, Ibn Saud might have expected that the British 
government would at least - according to its promise of considering Saudi Arabian 
interests during the Jordanian-British negations - leave behind the basis for a 
settlement. 
From this early stage of the development of the Saudi-Hashemites issue in 1946 it 
could be said that the impact of the Saudi-Hashemite issue on Saudi-British relations 
would mainly occur as a result of British government policies in regard to Saudi 
Arabian concerns. Indeed, Britain's responses to Saudi Arabia's request for "clear 
assurances" as well as to the Saudi's territorial claims could impact on Saudi-British 
relations either positively or negatively, depending on the course of action that Britain 
might take. 
The initial sign of a negative impact was noticeable by the spring of 1946. On 16 
March, Ibn Saud sent a message to Grafftey-Smith pressing for a British reply to the 
Saudi memorandum of 18 January .As the King was already losing his patience 
with the British government delay, the tone of the message was noticeably 
" e x c i t e d " . I t could be said that the King, who was already - by that time -
anticipating immediate proclamation of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty, was also under 
the impression that Britain might have neglected Saudi Arabian concerns. Moreover, 
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the King who was distantly watching the development of British-Jordanian 
negotiations was, by that time, noticing the incomparability of the ties that linked 
Britain with each of Jordan and Saudi Arabia. The well-equipped Jordanian - British 
made - Army, the Arab Legion - with over 8,000 officers by 1946 - was an evident 
sign of the advancement of Anglo-Jordanian ties.'°^ Furthermore, the continuity of the 
British financial subsidy - of about 2 million pounds annually - to Jordan was further 
evidence, at least in Ibn Saud point of view, of the close Anglo-Jordanian ties.'°^ King 
Ibn Saud's point of view on this was explained to the US Minister to Saudi Arabia. 
After an audience with the King on 19 March, Eddy telegrammed the State 
Department, that Ibn Saud had expressed his "resentment against the British for 
keeping AbduUa supplied with trained troops and arms while at the same time 
keeping Saudi Arabia unarmed".'*'^  
On 22 March 1946, Britain and Jordan signed a treaty of Alliance and fiiendship. This 
treaty had terminated the 1928 Transjordan-Britain agreement and ended the British 
mandate on Jordan.'°^ Ultimately, the Jordanian legislative Council held a meeting on 
25 May 1946 in which it declared Jordan as an independent state and Abdullah as its 
King.'"^ The Anglo-Jordanian treaty, which was announced before the Saudis 
received a response to their January memorandum, was unpopular - and could be 
considered as 'a bad fortune' - in Riyadh.'"^ 
Furthermore, when the British government responded to the Saudi Arabian King at a 
later stage, the feedback was not what the King had hoped for. Saudi Arabia was not 
given any "guarantees" against "aggression" by Hashemites. However, "a general 
assurance of British interest in friendly Saudi-Hashemite relations was conveyed". 
Moreover, it became clear that, the British government did not care for the Saudi 
Arabian territorial claims.'°^ The Saudis were "given no hope of British 
encouragement" on this issue, in fact they were informed that, "it was open to the 
Saudi Arabian and Transjordan Governments to reach a settlement of outstanding 
frontier questions by direct discussion, or by employing the methods laid down in the 
United Nations Charter for the peaceful settlement of disputes"."° Ibn Saud 
resentment of the British government attitude was evident to Grafftey-Smith who 
summarised it as follow: 
182 
"By their manner of withdrawing from their mandatory position in 
Transjordan His Majesty's Government appeared to Ibn Saud to have 
unilaterally disengaged themselves from a specific treaty-relationship with 
himself and, as a result of their new detachment, to have left him to settle the 
thorniest of frontier problems with a sworn enemy of his person and 
dynasty"."' 
King Ibn Saud who had been left to resolve his dispute directly with Abdullah still 
preferred to deal with the British government rather than dealing directly with the 
Jordanian government. Hence, in spite of Ibn Saud's bitterness towards the British 
government response, he kept pressing for it to become associated "with the 
discussion of the developments resulting from their abandonment of the mandate"."^ 
Yet, the British government "no less consistently, refused to have any part in such 
discussions"."^ Nevertheless, a tactic by the Saudi government had persuaded the 
British government to agree to act - at least - as a channel of communication between 
Riyadh and Amman on this issue. The Saudi tactic, which had achieved this, was the 
refusal of the Saudi government "even to recognise a change in the diplomatic 
representation of Transjordan in . . . [Saudi Arabia], and insist on regarding . . . [the 
British] Minister as still protecting Transjordan interests"."'* Hence, the British 
government had - at the end - no choice but to act as an intermediary between the 
Saudis and the Jordanians on this issue. 
On 25 June 1946, the Saudi territorial claims were forwarded - by the British 
government - to the Jordanian government."^ In a reply, the Jordanian Foreign 
Minister, Mr Samir Rifai wrote - to the British government - on 11 July, arguing that 
the present frontiers, which were inherited from the mandatory regime, are the final 
and acceptable frontiers for Jordan."^ When the Jordanian government reply was 
conveyed to the Saudi government, the Saudi Foreign Minister, Prince Faisal wrote 
back - to the British government - on 4 August, confirming the Saudi government 
rejection of "all that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Transjordan have expressed, 
and we persist in our claim"."' 
By the end of August, the British government realised that, the negative impacts of 
the Saudi-Jordanian frontier dispute, would not only affect the already poor Saudi-
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Jordanian relations but also would affect Saudi-British relations. Therefore, it became 
British policy to press the Saudis and the Jordanians to agree on holding direct talks 
between them on this subject."* The UK government efforts resulted in success, when 
both parties had agreed to make an informal and private exchange of views between 
the Saudi Foreign Minister and the Jordanian Foreign Minister, while both Ministers 
were attending "the Palestine Conference in London", in October 1946."^ On 6 
October, Faisal and Samir Rifai held a session of unsuccessful talks. Nevertheless, it 
was agreed to postpone the talks, until Faisal's proposed visit to Amman had taken 
place around the end of the year.'^° 
In addition to the Saudi-Jordanian territorial dispute, Ibn Saud's nervousness about 
the Hashemites was increasing as signs of Abdullah's antagonistic activities were 
appearing, during the first year of Jordanian independence. Abdullah's propaganda in 
regard to the scheme of Greater Syria was a key issue. In particular the Jordanian 
King's declaration in the autumn of 1946 that, "the primary goal of his new 
Kingdom's foreign policy to be the establishment of a Greater Syria".'^' 
It could be said that by the end of 1946, the Saudi-Hashemite case had overshadowed 
the Saudi-British relations. Though the signs of what the Saudis would regard as 
intimidating acts by the Hashemites were at a premature stage, it could be said that 
such acts were bound to bring about further harm to Saudi-British relations. But, most 
clearly, Britain's policies towards Jordan in 1946 - which included the emergence of 
Jordan as an independent State, British treatment of all the issues that related Jordan 
to Saudi Arabia, etc. - had brought about a negative impact on Saudi-British relations. 
A dispatch from the British Legation in Jeddah to the Foreign Office on 30 
November, clarified this: 
"The Saudi Arabian Government feel that in negotiating and signing the 
Treaty with Transjordan we have presented them with a fait accompli in which 
their own interests were involved but were not considered, and that, in this 
Treaty, we have given formal recognition to a situation which the Saudi 
Arabian Government have never accepted as more than a temporary 
arrangement, involving questions which they consider still outstanding 
between themselves and ourselves, namely their northern frontier and the 
question of a corridor into Syria. They consequently hold us responsible for 
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finding a solution for the problems existing in their relations with 
Transjordan".'^^ 
Being unsatisfied with the British government treatment of this case, and being more 
anxious of Abdullah's plans for Greater Syria - a scheme that could strengthen the 
Hashemites vis-a-vis the Saudis - Ibn Saud was reconsidering, by the end of 1946, the 
configuration of his policies. On one side, he was preparing - as this chapter explained 
previously - to turn the USA into a solo powerful patron for Saudi Arabia.'^^ On the 
other side, he had considered making Faisal's visit to Amman a pure friendship visit, 
hence - at least - anti-Saudi propaganda could be avoided by maintaining a minimum 
friendship with Jordan. The question of the frontier was never mentioned during 
Faisal's visit to Jordan, which took place between 30 December 1946 and 1 January 
1947. Faisal had explained to the Jordanians that King Ibn Saud had instructed him 
not to bring about any conflicting issue during what should be a pure friendship 
visit.'^^ 
Nevertheless, being unable to obtain a satisfactory security arrangement with the 
USA, as well as seeing no positive upshot to the diplomacy of Faisal's mission. King 
Ibn Saud considered going back to the British government on this subject.'^ ^ With the 
intensification of Abdullah's propaganda on the Greater Syria plan, that included 
some anti-Saudi publicity, which was simultaneous to the negotiations of alliance 
between Iraq and Jordan in March-April, Ibn Saud was considering an appeal to the 
British government.Besides, being inspired by the signing of a tieaty of alliance 
between Iraq and Jordan on 14 April, Ibn Saud wrote to the British government.'^' 
In his message to the British Foreign Secretary on 24 April 1947, the Saudi King re-
explaihed the nature of his anxiety in regards to the Hashemite in general as well as 
his concern about the latest developments. Reintroducing this issue to the British, it 
was stated in that letter: 
"As your Excellency knows, there . . . [have existed for] many years strained 
relations between us and the Hashimite [Hashemite] family, this, in spite of all 
our efforts to come to an imderstanding with them. But as you also know, our 
efforts have constantly been met with aloofness and coldness, and by 
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malicious propaganda that was carried on against us". 
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It was also explained in the King's letter that "The old activities about the project of 
Greater Syria are still carried on as strongly as ever".'^ ^ Additionally, it was stressed 
that: 
"The new military and political union between Transjordan and Iraq could not 
have been inspired by any intention of stopping outside aggression, but is in 
itself a beginning of an aggression against us and Syria as well. It aims at 
changing the status quo, a thing we can never tolerate under any 
circumstances". 
The main objective of Ibn Saud's message, which included - once again - a clear 
demand of a British guarantee and assurance, was in the conclusion of the dispatch: 
"We . . . beg your Excellency to reconsider the question of the union between 
Iraq and Transjordan and assure us beyond any shadow of doubt that the 
British Government will never agree to any change in the Middle East, and to 
guarantee that no harm shall come to our country or our interests".''" 
On 6 of June, Bevin wrote back to Ibn Saud.'^ ^ Bevin's letter did not bring about the 
assurance - or the guarantee - that Ibn Saud was looking for. Instead of giving 
assurance against any hostile act by the Hashemite, Bevin mentioned that Britain did 
not want to intervene directly or indirectly in the Greater Syria matter. Nonetheless, 
the letter brought about an explanation for the new treaty between Iraq and Jordan as 
it, "does not in fact amount to a union between . . . [them], but is very similar to the 
Treaty of 1936 between Saudi Arabia and Iraq. There seems no reason to think that it 
is directed against Saudi Arabia or against Syria".'^^ In addition, Bevin stated that he 
believed that the policy of Iraq and Jordan was "not in any way directed against your 
Majesty or inspired by any intention to commit an act of aggression against 
neighbouring states".'^ "^  As Britain desired the improvement of relations between 
Saudi Arabia and its Hashemite neighbours, Bevin advised for "personal discussion 
and direct negotiation", in which the differences could be settled "in a spirit of mutual 
goodwill".'^^ Regarding the publication of the Abdullah White Paper on the Greater 
Syria scheme, - which came out after Ibn Saud had sent his letter to Bevin - the 
Foreign Secretary mentioned, to the Saudi Minister in London as he was handing him 
the reply, that the White Paper does not deserve "any particular attention' 
186 
136 
At this stage and as advised by Bevin, - and in order to show goodwill - the Saudi 
government initiated the reopening of the suspended frontier negotiations with the 
Jordanian government. On 8 June 1947 the Saudi Foreign Minister wrote to the 
Jordanian Foreign Minister, and invited him for direct discussions.'^' On 19 June 
Samir Rifai replied to Faisal accepting the reopening of negotiations.'^* Moreover, 
Faisal and Rifai carried out further correspondences until they scheduled the 
negotiations to be held in Jeddah in October 1947.'^' However, the proposed 
negotiations did not take place. The cancellation of the anticipated negotiations was 
not only because both Foreign Ministers were busy with other matters, such as the 
Palestinian question, at that time, but also because Saudi-Jordanian relations were 
deteriorating as Abdullah was escalating his plans and propaganda.'''° 
Though Ibn Saud took Bevin's advice for the reopening of the suspended Saudi-
Jordanian negotiations, still the King was not generally satisfied with the British 
Foreign Secretary's reply of 6 of June, as it did not bring about any British assurance 
and as it was not convincing on the subject of the Hashemites' activities. Thus the 
Saudi Minister in London was instructed to convey King Ibn Saud's dissatisfaction to 
the British government.''" Hafiz Wahba called into the Foreign Office on 25 June 
1947 and notified the head of the Eastern Department, Mr Charles Baxter, that Ibn 
Saud was not pleased with the contents of the reply. Wahba mentioned that the King 
could not agree with the Foreign Secretary's remarks about the intentions of the 
Hashemites, in fact Saudi Arabia was convinced that the alliance between Iraq and 
Jordan was i l l intentioned. In reply Baxter expressed his sorrow that "Ibn Saud did not 
seem to like the terms o f . . . Bevin's letter, but that, whatever Ibn Saud might think of 
the Hashemites, it w a s . . . [the British government's] genuine opinion that they were 
not planning any aggression against Saudi Arabia".''*^ 
Baxter's remarks were considered by Ibn Saud to be only an "interim reply", therefore 
he re-instructed Wahba to see Bevin on this matter.''*^ When Wahba met Bevin on 23 
July, he was told to convey to Ibn Saud that the British government "has no reason 
whatever to believe that there is any secret article of a military character in the Iraqi 
Transjordan treaty".''^ In addition, Bevin asked Wahba to inform Ibn Saud that the 
British government has continually impressed upon Abdullah its "desire that he 
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should develop closer relations with King Ibn Saud".'"*^  More importantly the 
Secretary of State reminded Wahba of the 14"" of July statement in the House of 
Commons which illustrated that the British were not intervening in the Greater Syria 
issue and that the British government "attached prime importance to tranquillity and 
stability in the Middle East"."*^ 
No matter how the British responded, it seems that nothing would satisfy Ibn Saud, 
except a clear assurance. Despite the Foreign Office efforts, and despite the British 
government statement in the House of Commons, Ibn Saud's "obsession" in regard to 
his dilemma with the Hashemite was still unsolved.''*' Moreover, when Abdullah 
issued a proclamation in mid-August, a strong manifesto that called for the union of 
the Syrian territories, and when Abdullah sent an aggressive letter to the Syrian 
President, - a letter which Ibn Saud regarded as an ultimatum - Ibn Saud's anxieties 
were multiplied.'''* 
At this junction Ibn Saud appealed to the British government - through its charge 
d'affaires in Jeddah, Mr Clarke - and asked for "a categorical assurance that. . .[the 
British government] would not permit the Arab Legion to be used in any operation 
against Syria or any other Arab States"."*' In addition, Ibn Saud asked the British 
government to use its influence upon "Abdullah to persuade him to put an end to his 
constant provocative utterances and to military manoeuvres on the Syrian frontier".'^° 
The British government reply to Ibn Saud came out on 5 September 1947. Yet again, 
the reply cannot be regarded as adequate for the King, as it did not contain the 
requested categorical assurance. Nonetheless, the Saudi King was assured that "His 
Majesty's Government will continue to use all their influence for the maintenance of 
stable and tranquil conditions in the Middle East".''' The reason for not giving Ibn 
Saud "the categorical assurance . . . which he asked for" was - exclusively - explained 
to Clarke as "Transjordan is an independent State (notwithstanding . . . [the British-
Jordanian] treaty relations and the special arrangements regarding the Arab Legion) 
and His Majesty's Government cannot undertake to speak on behalf of King Abdullah 
and his Army".''^ A further statement was conveyed to Ibn Saud - through the British 
Legation in Jeddah - on 25 October. This stated that: 
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"His Majesty's Government did not supply war material or lend their military 
personnel to any Arab State with the idea that they should be used against any 
other Arab State, but only in order to contribute to the internal security of the 
State in question or to the joint defence of the whole area against any possible 
aggression from outside. His Majesty's Government have no reason to believe 
that the military assistance which they have afforded to any Arab State is 
being used for any improper purpose".'^ ^ 
Both statements seemed unsatisfactory to the King. In fact the last one had reached 
him when he was already anguished by his dilemma with the Hashemites. The unrest 
among tribes on the Saudi-Iraqi borders, which was causing some unneeded incidents, 
and the recent flight of members of the Al-Rashid family (the former rulers of Hail) to 
Iraq, were additional problems to this quandary.'^'' 
In a memorandum to the British government on 23 November, Ibn Saud expounded at 
great length his "thorny" history with the Hashemites.'^ ^ In addition and on the recent 
developments, it was elucidated that the Saudis were not fearful of the Hashemites, 
"But the support of the British and their protection, and their grants of weapons and 
money to them, . . . is what frightens us".'^ ^ After indicating that the Hashemite 
"question touches . . .[the Saudi-British] relations" King Ibn Saud frankly added - in 
his memorandum - that "I 'm anxious about my friendship with the British and I fear 
lest changing circumstances should infroduce between us anything which might 
diminish . . .[this] relations".'^' After restating some of the phrases of the 25 October 
statement - in particular the indications that Britain "did not give . . . weapons except 
for internal security and defence" - Ibn Saud inquired; "But is a threat to my frontiers, 
and the spread of intrigues, to be reckoned as legitimate measures of defence?".'^ * 
Additionally, Ibn Saud rationalised the British statement according to his point of 
view and his case: 
" I see myself compelled to point out to the British that they have given a force 
to Iraq and Transjordan in order that they should help in preserving security 
and defend themselves against any other Power. Now i f that force comes 
against me, then "there is no might and no power save [but] in God".'^' 
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Though it was apparent that Ibn Saud was not yet fully assured by Britain, it could be 
said that he was already tired of pushing for British assurances at this time. Indeed, 
Ibn Saud's experience with the British on this issue - particularly during most of 1947 
- had given him all the indications that they were not willing to provide Saudi Arabia 
with the exact assurance that it needed. Hence, at this stage he refrained from asking 
for assurances, but instead he demanded for equal treatment to that of the Hashemites. 
On this, Ibn Saud specified that as a "friend of the British . . . I think I 'm entitled to 
claim at least equal treatment with that granted to the Ashraf [Hashemites], and to ask 
that they [the British] should give me help and weapons similar to what they have 
given to them [the Hashemites]". 
After some consultation with Mr Alan Trott, the then British Ambassador in Saudi 
Arabia, the British government concluded at the end of the year that the best reply to 
Ibn Saud's latest request was to offer him a kind of treaty similar to that with Jordan 
and Iraq. Thus the matter of an Anglo-Saudi treaty was under final consideration in 
London by the end of 1947.'^' Though Ibn Saud's request was the entry that allowed 
Britain to offer Saudi Arabia an alliance treaty in 1948, it should be noted that the 
request was not the only initiator of such an issue. Britain was already - by the autumn 
of 1947 - considering securing its position in the Middle East by setting up a network 
of alliances with the Arab States.'*^ Furthermore, Britain was already by the first 
week of November 1947, minded to include Saudi Arabia in such an arrangement. As 
indicated earlier, the British representatives at the Washington conference, which took 
place from 16 October to 7 November 1947, had already obtained American consent 
in including Saudi Arabia in the British "regional security arrangements in the Middle 
East".'" Accordingly, it could be said that Britain had justified the fulfilment of Ibn 
Saud's request in accordance to criteria that fit better within its own objectives -
ultimately interests - rather than the Saudi Arabian's. 
At the same time as offering Saudi Arabia a treaty, Britain had also endeavoured to 
bring about reconciliation between Ibn Saud and Abdullah.'^ Though this chapter 
will deal later with the treaty proposal and its consequences, the implications of this 
proposal with the Hashemite issue will be dealt with in the current section. 
190 
Subsequent to the British government offer, Ibn Saud wrote back on 31 January 1948. 
In his message the King indicated that the British government had misunderstood his 
original intention. He explained that his eariier approach was intended "to deal with . . 
. the supply of new arms and military equipment... [on lines of what had been] given 
to neighbouring countr ies" . In addition the approach was based on the hope "that 
the British Govermnent would use its good influence to preserve peace and mutual 
understanding with those of our neighbours who value them".'^^ 
In a despatch from the Foreign Office on 5 April, Britain's diplomatic representatives 
in Jeddah were asked to illustrate to Ibn Saud the objectives of the British offer within 
certain lines. Among other explanations it was printed in the Foreign Office despatch 
that: 
"we hoped, by proposing a treaty similar to those with Iraq and Transjordan to 
convince Ibn Saud of our desire for equally close relations with him and our 
readiness to guarantee him assistance against external aggression. He has 
asked us to use our influence to preserve peace and understanding with his 
neighbours but he must realise that [we] . . . are no longer responsible for the 
foreign policies of Iraq and Transjordan. Apart from offering him a guarantee 
identical to that given to those countries, the only remaining way of 
responding to his request is for us to use our influence and our good offices to 
promote friendship between the Arab States. This we are very willing to do . . 
. and we should welcome his suggestions on the best method of furthering 
good relations between him and his neighbours, whether by arranging personal 
meetings or in any other way".'^^ 
When Mr Rogers, of the British Embassy at Jeddah, delivered the message to King 
Ibn Saud in Riyadh on 12 April, the King rambled on the British government 
treatment of the whole issue. During the audience Ibn Saud commented that he could 
not understand the British policies towards him and the Hashemites. The British 
government had told him "that they had guaranteed the Hashimites against 
aggression, but that without a treaty such as they had with the Hashimites they could 
not give such a guarantee to . . .[Saudi Arabia]". Ibn Saud thought it was odd that, 
though he "had proved his friendship for His Majesty's Government in two wars, yet 
he had received no such guarantee".'*' At this junction the King clearly indicated that 
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he believed that the Hashemites hostilities against him could not have occurred unless 
they knew that Britain backed them. To Rogers Ibn Saud frankly said that: 
"There was no one . . . who would support the Hashimites against himself, 
unless His Majesty's Government encouraged them to do it. The Hashimites 
could do nothing without the support of His Majesty's Government. In fact the 
treaties which they had with His Majesty's Government were an 
encouragement to them to indulge in activities against himself 
The immediate British response to Ibn Saud's remarks came out from Rodgers while 
he was in Riyadh. During the last day of his mission Rodgers stated to Yusuf Yassin 
that: 
"His Majesty's Govenmient had offered a treaty because they thought that the 
offer would be a proof of their sincerity. His Majesty [Ibn Saud] thought it 
inopportune. But to try to interpret that to mean that His Majesty's 
Govenmient would support Iraq or Transjordan in an attack on Saudi Arabia 
was absurd. The treaties with those countries were defensive treaties, and His 
Majesty [Ibn Saud] had been offered a similar one. The fact that there was no 
formal treaty in no wise lessened His Majesty's Government's feelings towards 
His Majesty [Ibn Saud]".'^' 
According to Rodgers, Ibn Saud "ignored . . . [the British] hint about the possibility of 
a personal reconciliation with his traditional enemies".Nonetheless, in a 
memorandum to the British government on 17 April, Ibn Saud stated that he: 
"has tried and is always trying to improve his relations with the Hashimites 
and has not initiated any hostility and has never thought of any aggression 
against any of them. But the position is that i f they thought of hostility the 
British Government has maintained and is still maintaining a negative attitude 
towards . . . [us] this attitude, i f it remains as it is, is a very discriminatory 
attitude".''^ 
Ibn Saud's remarks about British ties with Jordan and Iraq, as being the basis that 
encouraged the Hashemites aggressive activities against Saudi Arabia, were 
completely ignored by the British government. It seems that the British government 
had looked at Rodgers statement to Yassin as a sufficient response, at this stage.'^ "^  
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On 28 April - the opening day of discussions on the proposed treaty, which Trott and 
General J Crocker, The British Commander-in-Chief Middle East Land Force 
(CCMELF), had carried out with the Saudis - Trott conveyed to Ibn Saud the British 
govenmient's explicit desire for reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and the 
Hashemite States. Trott asked i f Ibn Saud would agree to a meeting with Abdullah as 
a step towards a genuine appeasement. Though Ibn Saud remarked that "he did not 
mind meeting anyone", he still could not understand how Britain was trying to 
persuade him to meet with Abdullah; without bothering to give a "guarantee" against 
the Hashemite "hostility".'^^ Likewise, in a memorandum that was handed to Trott on 
30 April, Ibn Saud wrote; that he "does not expect that there will be any outcome to 
the proposed meeting".'^^ Particularly when Abdullah had "never . . . concealed his 
wishes for aggression against Syria and Hejaz".'^* Without directly re-asking for a 
British guarantee, Ibn Saud justified his rejection of the British proposition, as to its 
lacking of any explicit guarantee that could deter such an aggression.Following the 
end of the Saudi-British talks, Trott noted on 2 May that: 
"The chief burden of the King's remarks was always . . .[the subject of 
Transjordan and Iraq]: it has I fear become a permanent obsession with him. 
He has evidently been much disturbed by the thought that His Majesty's 
Government cannot guarantee him against either country: he regards their 
rulers as British puppets . . . he firmly believes that King Abdullah intends to 
annex the Hejaz [Hijaz] whenever he can and that the Regent of Iraq is helping 
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his enemies of the Rashidi family and Shammer tribes". 
Moreover, the British Ambassador wrote that " I fear it wil l be of little use to continue 
. . . [the recent] discussions . . . unless something to satisfy . . .[Ibn Saud] can be 
f o u n d " . T r o t t suggested that: 
"although we have already told the King most categorically that we cannot 
guarantee what we cannot control, and that the foreign policy of both of the 
Hashimite countries is not in our hands, it might perhaps be possible to find 
some formula to set the King's fears at rest. On military grounds it seems most 
unlikely that either country either could or would attack this country in the 
near future: and even a statement that we would use our best endeavours to 
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restrain those two countries i f ever they did show signs of such aggression 
might be sufficient to reassure the King".'^^ 
Trott's recommendations were not considered in London, instead the British 
government kept pressing for its policy of reconciliation between Ibn Saud and the 
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Hashemites. Hence, during Faisal's visit to the British capital in mid-June 1948, the 
Assistant Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, Mr Michael Wright, 
explained the necessity for reconciliation between Ibn Saud and the Hashemites. 
Wright remarked that the British government is willing to mediate and arrange for a 
personal meeting between the three heads of States. Wright stressed the necessity for 
the establishment of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Jordan. 
Nonetheless, on 17 June the surprising news of Ibn Saud's invitation to Abdullah 
reached London while Faisal and Wright's discussions were still on, a matter which 
meant that Abdullah and Ibn Saud did take the initiatives on their reconciliation by 
themselves and without a direct involvement from the British government.'*^ So how 
did that happen? 
Abdullah initiated the friendly atmosphere when he sent Ibn Saud a verbal message at 
the beginning of June. Abdullah told Fuad Hamza - who was representing Saudi 
Arabia in the meeting of the political committee of the Arab League at Amman then -
that "there would be no objection raised by Transjordan authorities to the passage 
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through Transjordan of any detachments of Saudi troops destined for Palestine". 
Abdullah's message evoked a written reply from Ibn Saud on 11 June 1948.'*^ The 
reply, which was written in a "friendly and conciliatory tone", was an expression of 
gratitude for Abdullah's message.'** In addition, Ibn Saud "proposed" in that letter, 
that the Al-Saud and the Hashemite "families should endeavour to recover the early 
happy relations which had existed prior to the unfortunate events, which both sides 
regretted, which had led to a conflict between them".'*' Upon receiving the letter, 
Abdullah telegraphed Ibn Saud with an "acknowledgement" in which he stated that 
"the gratitude and pleasure which its [the letter] terms had caused . . . could only be 
expressed in the course of a personal visit at some convenient time"."° Subsequently, 
King Ibn Saud replied to King Abdullah with a formal invitation for an immediate 
summit in Riyadh."' 
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No doubt that Ibn Saud invitation to Abdullah was a turning point in his policy 
towards the Hashemites. Indeed, this course of action was a "great surprise", not just 
to the British, but also to "Amir Faisal, who . . . clearly had no knowledge that it had 
been a r ranged" . I f Ibn Saud was not willing to meet with Abdullah when he was 
frequently asked by the British - clearly up until the end of April - why did he change 
his mind within less than two months? Furthermore, why did Ibn Saud decide to 
reconcile directly with Abdullah and without involving the British? 
Trott admitted that the "question why Ibn Saud suddenly decided to forget all his 
previous tirades against the Hashimite family and invite their senior representative to 
visit him is one which I find difficult to answer".'^ ^ Nevertheless, Trott thought that 
some or all of the following considerations might have influenced Ibn Saud: 
"(i) He knows, from several explicit statements fi-om British sources, that his 
Majesty's Government are very anxious that such a reconciliation should take 
place . . . he takes a great deal of notice of everything we [the British] say and 
now that he feels that his relations with the Americans are going to be difficult 
he may be thinking that it will be prudent to improve his relations with us in 
any possible way. 
(ii) . . . certain number of tribesmen have been clamouring to be sent to 
Palestine for some time, but hitherto the undeclared attitude of the Transjordan 
government has prevented their departure. 
(iii) It may be that the King is feeling old, that he fears that Abdullah may 
survive him and take a firmer line about the Hejaz with the new Saudi King 
than he thought it politic to take with Ibn Saud. A reconciliation now would 
insure against that unpleasant contingency. 
(iv) Hitherto Ibn Saud has been very sensitive about the inadequacy of his own 
army, especially when compared with that of Transjordan. But now that some 
of his army is in Palestine the King may feel that he is on more equal terms 
than previously: and he seems to have staged a parade of tribal riflemen which 
was designed to impress the visitor and may have succeeded in so doing. 
(v) He may even have felt that i f he staged a reconciliation he would be more 
likely to receive arms, ammunition, and instructors from us for his army, and 
eventually for his Air Force. 
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(vi) Most probably it was the Palestine struggle which marked the turning-
point: Ibn Saud may have considered that King Abdullah was more likely to 
expand towards Palestine and Syria than towards the south, and I do not think 
that Ibn Saud would really care much i f he did, as long as he left the Hejaz 
alone"."'' 
Some of Trott's points are relatively accurate, but some are probably wrong. The 
relatively right points are taken as given; nonetheless the misguided points ought to be 
rationalised within the course of the present study. The second point, in which Trott 
thought that Saudi Arabia was in need of using Jordan as a passageway for its 
tribesmen troops, could be re-argued. It is true that the troops case was the key point 
which opened Ibn Saud-Abdullah friendly correspondences in June 1948, but its way 
to Palestine cannot be regarded as a main point that influenced the reconciliation. 
These troops never were sent to Palestine even after Abdullah agreed to them passing 
through Jordan. In fact they were stationed in the northern border of Saudi Arabia 
until July 1949."^ The reason for stationing these troops in the north of Saudi Arabia 
is another matter. It could be because Ibn Saud was thinking that the Zionists might be 
winning in Palestine and they might cross Jordan into Saudi Arabia."* Or indeed, 
they could be stationed there to restrain Abdullah from thinking of making any kind 
of aggressive move towards Saudi Arabia, especially before June 1948. 
It could be said that the most proper reference among Trott's line of reasoning was his 
reference to "the Palestine struggle" as being a principle cause for this "turning-
point". However, the Ambassador's account for the entire point needs to be re-
adjusted. Not the least, Trott was mistaken when he thought that Ibn Saud would not 
"care" about Abdullah expanding towards Palestine and Syria. In contrary, Ibn Saud 
was always worried about any Hashemite expansion. In fact, the Saudi ruler was 
constantly considering any Hashemite gains as a potential threat to his own throne, 
particularly in Hijaz. Therefore, Ibn Saud had opposed the possibility of Hashemite 
expansion towards Syria or even Palestine, as he - for example - did in 1936,1937,"^ 
1939,"* and in 1947."' 
But no doubt the developments in Palestine - particularly in May-June 1948 - were the 
most considerable factor that could explain the swift modification of Ibn Saud's 
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attitude towards Abdullah. Indeed, the development of events in Palestine could make 
any head of an Arab State reshuffle his political cards, at least at the regional level.^°° 
The new Saudi regional foreign policy, which had led to the reconciliation with 
Jordan, could be seen as a product of Saudi Arabian resentment to the Great Powers 
policy towards the Palestine question. To this point, it could be argued that the US's 
unqualified (unconditional) support for Zionism and its speedy recognition of the 
State of Israel on 15 May 1948, was a core concern.^"' Additionally it could be added 
that the establishment of Israel and the developments of the Israeli-Arab war had set 
Ibn Saud and Abdullah in an unexpected united alliance; vis-a-vis the threat of this 
common enemy. 
Moreover, the British government's stance and treatment of Ibn Saud's ever-
increasing concerns in regard to the Hashemite could be also seen as a principle factor 
that influenced him to reconcile, at that particular time directly with Abdullah and 
without involving the British in such an issue. King Ibn Saud's experience with the 
British since the spring of 1946, could make him conclude - by June 1948 - that 
Britain would not grant his Kingdom the kind of assurances that he desired; not least 
that Ibn Saud was already deeming that the Hashemites association with Britain was 
motivating their anti-Saudi activities. Likewise, Ibn Saud was openly blaming the 
British government - by 1948 - for such a matter, as he was also secretly suspecting it 
as standing by the Hashemites side. By living through all that as well as seeing no 
light of hope through the end of the British tunnel, Ibn Saud may indeed have been 
orientated to implement a new strategy by the middle of 1948. Furthermore, Ibn 
Saud's increasing anxiety, in concert with what he perceived as growing Hashemite 
violence, might have caused him to decide upon ending this inertia whenever the 
circumstances permitted. Hence when the opportunity came about in June 1948, Ibn 
Saud did not waste any effort in trying to be fiiendly with Abdullah, and that resulted 
in what Trott titled "the most striking event".^°^ Al l that goes without mentioning that 
Ibn Saud might also have thought that a direct personal reconciliation might be more 
successfiil than a reconciliation that involved a mediator. 
During Abdullah's visit to Riyadh, which lasted for four days from 27 June 1948, Ibn 
Saud tried his best to make the occasion lead to a successful reconciliation.^"'' No 
direct mention of the outstanding questions, between Saudi Arabia and Jordan, was 
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made. Instead, Ibn Saud told Abdullah repeatedly - and Abdullah agreed - that 
"everything which had been at issue between them was dead and forgotten".^°^ They 
both understood that Ibn Saud would never go back to his territorial claims and 
Abdullah would never go back to his previous policy towards Saudi Arabia.'^ "* In 
order to make this understanding comprehensive, so it would include all the 
Hashemites, Abdullah's was supposed to let the Hashemites of Iraq end their 
outstanding questions with Saudi Arabia.^"^ Besides, Ibn Saud took the opportunity of 
Abdullah's visit and sent a cordial letter to the Regent of Iraq, Abdulilah. In return, 
the King received a forthright letter from the Regent. 
At the conclusion of the visit, a joint declaration was announced. The introduction of 
the declaration stated that, "The first object of our meeting is our sincere desire to 
strengthen the links of brotherhood and to establish friendship between us and 
between our two peoples as long as the peoples and the House of God exist".^"' The 
declaration expressed the support of the two leaders for the Arab League and its 
efforts and determination of insuring the independence of Palestine.^'" Following the 
Ibn Saud-Abdullah meeting, Jordan and Saudi Arabia exchanged diplomatic 
representation.^" 
Despite the pleasing part of this reconciliation to the Saudi-Hashemites relations, it 
could be said that the foundations of such an appeasement were not totally 
invulnerable. Indeed, the swift 'gentlemen's agreement' which was led by the 
developments of certain events, could become vulnerable to the revival of previous 
events. Moreover, though the two Kings had agreed to end their direct differences, 
such as the Saudi claims and the Jordanian propaganda, still they did not clarify - or 
indeed mention - the other conflicting issues. For example, Abdullah's plans in regard 
to Greater Syria, which could bring the Saudi-Hashemite conflict back to the normal 
track were not discussed. Generally, it can be said, that though the rapprochement 
brings about a pleasant result to Ibn Saud's problem with the Hashemites, still the 
vague accord cannot be regarded as a final settlement. 
As a final conclusion, it could be said, that the entire development of the Saudi-
Hashemite contention - from 1946 and throughout 1948 - was negatively impacting 
on Saudi-British relations. Ironically, the negative side was not only apparent when 
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the Saudi-Hashemite controversy was at its peak, but was also there even when those 
two opponents were reaching a settlement. The impact - which was noticeable 
throughout the stages of this development - was wounding the principles of Saudi 
Arabian relations with Britain, particularly when such a negative impact was touching 
Saudi Arabian security concems. '^^  
D. The Palestine Issue and its Impact on Saudi Arabian Relations with Britain 
and the USA, 1946-1948 
The outlook of the chapter hitherto, would imply that most of the post-war 
developments were generally enhancing the Saudi-US relations at the expense of 
Saudi-British relations. Nevertheless, the same epoch was not entirely free from an 
adverse development. The Palestine question could be regarded as a balancing factor 
against unrestricted advancement of Saudi-US relations. Though the development of 
this issue was not so helpfiil for the course of Saudi-British relations - as Britain's 
course of action was to some extent not pro-Arab, particularly in 1946 and 1947 - still 
the far worse impact of this development on Saudi Arabian relations with the USA 
was more noticeable. 
The implications of the Palestine issue on Saudi Arabia's relations with Britain and 
the USA caimot be fiilly analysed without taking into account the formalisation of 
Saudi policy in this respect. Notably, there were two assumptions that had forged 
Saudi policy on such an issue. First, ideological principle, particularly in relation to 
Islam and Arab Nationalism, had formed the foundations of Saudi Arabia's strong 
stand vis-a-vis the Zionist movement in Palestine. The ideology, which had instigated 
a common Arab policy, had involuntarily harmonised Saudi Arabia's policy alongside 
the policies of the other Arab states, even with those who were considered to be Saudi 
Arabia's opponents; i.e. the Hashemite states. The ideological creed had also activated 
negative sentiments against certain powers which had conducted pro-Zionist policies; 
i.e. mostly the USA and to some extent Britain. Second, realpolitik principles on the 
other hand, were forcing Saudi Arabia to employ a relaxed policy with regard to 
Britain and the USA, despite their pro-Zionist stances. Hence, in order to safeguard its 
vital relations with the USA, Saudi Arabia - as highlighted previously for example -
desired fiirther close ties. Moreover, the Saudi government conducted a reasonable 
199 
and a careful policy towards Britain in order to avoid a harmful impact that might 
threaten the security of the Kingdom. Though, it could be said that the general outlook 
of Saudi Arabian foreign policy was overbalanced by the rational mode. Yet, it could 
also be said that those two assumptions were swinging the Saudi approach whenever 
the Palestine issue was attached. 
Despite the success of Ibn Saud's meeting with RooseveU, the Saudi-US 
understanding in regard to Palestine was short-lived. King Ibn Saud's optimism for an 
adequate US policy towards Palestine began to disappear within less than two months 
of his conference with President Roosevelt. Shortly after Roosevelt's death on 12 
April 1945, it became apparent that his successor, Harry Truman, was enthusiastic to 
implement a policy in "support for the aims of political Zionism".^''' When a number 
of US Ministers to Middle Eastern States briefed Truman at the White House on 
Palestine the advantages of a pro-Arab policy were highlighted. To this, Truman 
"summed up his position" with the well-known statement; " I am sorry, gentlemen, but 
I have to answer to hundreds of thousands who are serious for the success of Zionism; 
I do not have hundreds of thousands of Arabs among my constituents".^'^ In addition 
to Truman's policies the American Congressional debates became increasingly - by 
the begiiming of 1946 - in favour of Zionist wishes.^'^ The new US attitude, which 
was further exaggerated by the Zionist propaganda in the Middle East, was 
astonishing to Ibn Saud.^ '^  In reaction, the King wrote to the US President reminding 
him about his predecessor's promises. However, the Saudi King did not receive any 
positive response from the US President. 
Britain's attitude to Palestine was unsatisfactory too. The "evidences of the 
abandonment" of the White Paper policy, and the British government's "failure to 
stem the tide of Jewish immigration" into Palestine, had caused Ibn Saud to be more 
dissatisfied.^'^ During a conversation with the British Ambassador in Cairo, Lord 
Killeam, on 14 January 1946, King Ibn Saud "delivers a fiiendly warning" about the 
British government's unfair policy towards the Palestinians. 220 
Saudi views on the whole issue became clear during the spring of 1946. On 9 March 
King Ibn Saud clarified his opinion to the visiting members of the Anglo-American 
Commission of Inquiry, which called on Riyadh to look into the King's 
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observations.^^' During the talk Ibn Saud expounded that he was extremely attached 
to the Palestine question. The importance of this issue to him "is based on the fact that 
he is an Arab and a Muslim, prior to any other considerations".^^^ Moreover, the King 
elucidated that; "He and all the Arabs are friends of the Allies . . . In his view, it is in 
the Arabs and the Allies best interests to maintain friendship and consensus". 
Additionally, he stated that this issue, "which is concerning the Arabs and the 
Muslims in general, is also concerning him in particular".^ '^* Nonetheless, "he is one 
of the Arabs [and the Muslims], and his view would be in accordance to their 
consensus".^ ^^ 
Though during the presentation the King was repeating his resentment with the British 
government's mistreatment of the whole issue, still he was careful to cite that his 
relations with Britain were "cordial" as it had been "historically" so as well.^^^ 
According to the presentation, two subjects seemed to be the most important for Ibn 
Saud at that particular time; namely, Britain's attitude towards the sale of Palestinian 
lands and Jewish immigration. At the end of his lecture to the members of the 
commission, the King summarised his opinion by concluding: 
" I f Britain cares for the maintenance of its cordial relations with the Arabs, it 
should instantly make an end to the [Jewish] immigration and to the sale of 
lands . . . just then and then only, it would be possible for the other problems 
in Palestine to be resolved".^ ^^ 
Later when he learnt about the final findings of the Anglo-American Commission of 
Inquiry, which was generally pro-Zionist, Ibn Saud was not in a position to repress his 
dissatisfaction. The committee reported on 20 April recommending the continuation 
of the mandate of Palestine, the admission of 100,000 Jewish immigrants into 
Palestine, and the rescission of the "land transfer limitations".^^^ In May several Saudi 
protests were conveyed to the US and the British governments. On 5 May Yassin 
protested to both countries' diplomatic representatives in Jeddah.^ ^^  Meanwhile, the 
diplomatic representatives of Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Egypt, were 
already delivering common protests in Washington and London.^^" Furthermore, on 
28 June the Saudi government announced a statement that rejected all the 
recommendations of the committee. 
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To some extent the British government was more considerate to the Arabs reactions. 
Particularly, when the Arabs received pledges that the British would not implement 
the commission recommendations before conversing with the Arabs and the Jews.^ ^^  
For such a purpose the British government arranged for a conference to be held in 
October 1946. Nevertheless, the London conference failed as a result of the US 
government position, which favoured the commission recommendations.^ ^^ 
On 4 October 1946, President Truman aimounced the immediate need of admission of 
the 100,000 Jews into Palestine, he also issued a statement supporting the Jewish 
Agency proposal for the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. In reaction, Ibn 
Saud tried on two occasions to convince the US President to be fairer towards the 
Palestinian issue. Thus on 15 October and on 2 November Ibn Saud wrote to Truman 
in this regard. Nevertheless, Truman insisted on allowing at least 100,000 Jews into 
Palestine and also expressed his support of Zionism in Palestine.^ '^* 
In reaction to developments in Palestine and in order to protect Arab Palestinian 
rights, the Arab States worked collectively within the framework of the Arab League. 
Several meetings were held in 1946 for this purpose, such as the Arab states 
representatives meeting in Egypt on 10 May, the Inshas meeting in Egypt on 28 May, 
and the Bludan meeting in Syria on 12 June. In all these meetings the Arab states 
issued statements supporting Arab rights in Palestine and denying Jewish rights 
there.^ ^^ 
When it became apparent to the British government in February 1947 that the 
mandate over Palestine was unworkable, it turned the whole issue to the UN. The 
British government decision over this came out when it realised that control of the 
flow of Jewish immigration and control of the internal unrest were impossible, and 
when the whole issue was damaging Britain relations with the Arab states. Thus, on 
18 February the British government asked the UN Security Council to put the 
Palestinian issue for debate at the coming session of the General Assembly.^ ^* 
The UN General Assembly held a special session on Palestine on 28 April. During 
this session the Arab states delegations from Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and 
Egypt requested the immediate termination of the British mandate over Palestine and 
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the establishment of a Palestinian independent State. However, the Arab states 
demands were rejected and a UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) was set 
up during the UN General Assembly regular session on 15 May. UNSCOP's main job 
was to investigate and to report to the General Assembly on all issues related to 
Palestine.^" 
As they "had little confidence that reference to the United Nation would result in a 
decision favourable" to their wishes, Saudi Arabia and other Arab states urged Britain 
and USA to consider the Arabs demands. In July Saudi Arabia requested the British 
and the US govenmients to come to understanding with the Arabs on the future of 
Palestine as an independent state before the matter came up for another discussion in 
the UN General Assembly. Furthermore, in September, the Saudi government 
appealed to the British government to reconsider the Palestinian question "in the light 
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of reason and justice". Additionally, the Arab states had made efforts between 
themselves - within the frame of the Arab League - in order to foil any unfavourable 
plan in the UN. Special meetings for the Arab League on this purpose were held in 
Lebanon in September and in October 1947.^ ^^  
Despite the Arab states efforts, the development of the issue took a direction (that 
was) contrary to their requirements. On 29 November 1947 the UN General 
Assembly adopted its famous resolution for the partition of Palestine.^ ""^  All Arab 
states including Saudi Arabia publicly rejected this resolution at once. The Saudi 
Arabian Foreign Minister expressed the disappointment of his government and 
blamed the superpowers - including Britain and the USA - for the adoption of this 
resolution. Faisal's representations were made while the General Assembly session 
was still on: 
"We have felt, like many others, the pressure exerted on various 
representatives . . . by some of the big powers so that the vote should be in 
favour of partition. My Government holds responsible those parties that 
hampered all means of cooperation and understanding".^'" 
Nevertheless, Ibn Saud stated privately to the British that "although he was at one 
with the Arab states in their determination not to see the establishment of a Jewish 
state, he was equally determined not to let the Palestine problem embarrass his 
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relations with the British and American Governments".^ '*^ Assurances were also given 
that Saudi Arabia would not take any military action as long as the British 
government "remained responsible for law and order in Palestine".'^ ''^  Likewise, 
comments were conveyed to the US government. King Ibn Saud told the US Minister 
in Jeddah, Mr J. Rives Childs,^'"' that "although we [Saudi Arabia and the USA] differ 
enormously on the question of Palestine but we still have our own mutual interests 
and friendship to safeguard".^"*^Additionally, when a rumour came about (in the Arab 
world) that Saudi Arabia would cancel the oil concession agreement in protest at 
Western policies.in Palestine, the Saudi government announced in a formal denial, 
that it would never threaten the Saudi-American Oil Company.^ '** 
Following the adoption of the UN resolution, the British and the US governments 
took different courses of action in regard to Palestine. While the USA was eager to 
support the partition resolution publicly, Britain maintained a neutral position towards 
both Arab rejections and Jewish demands for its implementation. Moreover, when the 
guerrilla war broke out - between Arabs and Jews - at the end of 1947, the British 
forces maintained a neutral position.^ '*^ Furthermore, the British forces in Palestine 
had implemented a notable sea blockade against Jewish immigrants who were seeking 
to enter Palestine.^ '** In contrast to the US government stance, it could be said that the 
British government attitude was generally helpfiil for the broad course of British-Arab 
relations at that particular time. 
The dissimilarity between the US and the British governments' involvement in the 
Palestine issue had caused the US Minister in Saudi Arabia to point out the likelihood 
of some changes to US-Saudi relations. In mid-January 1948, Childs wrote to the 
State Department warning that Ibn Saud "may be influenced to abandon hopes of 
close political relations with [the] U.S. and return to his previous policy of relying 
more particularly upon his relations with Great Britain".^'" 
On various occasions Ibn Saud hoped, and tried to convince, the US government to 
change its policy towards the Palestine issue. For example, during a conversation with 
the American Minister in Jeddah, on 21 February 1948, Ibn Saud argued that the 
Palestine partition should be set aside, as it was incompatible with Arab rights and 
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interests. 
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By early March 1948, it became apparent to the State Department that US support for 
the partition resolution had resulted in a serious decline of US influence, not only in 
Saudi Arabia, but also in the entire Middle East. Hence, the State Department 
considered the advantages of an alternative policy.^^' The new US policy was 
announced on 19 of March by the Secretary of State, General George Marshall, in 
which the US introduced a proposal to the Security Council. The proposal called for a 
temporary trusteeship under the UN over Palestine subsequent to the proposed British 
withdrawal.^^^ Though the proposal was not as attractive as it should be, still any such 
positive action by the US administration would be regarded as a welcome relief in 
Riyadh. Immediately when Ibn Saud heard of the announcement he sent a telegram to 
the US Secretary of State in which he expressed his satisfaction with the American 
government decision on this. 
Nonetheless King Ibn Saud's contentment did not last for long. Just eleven minutes 
after the announcement of the establishment of the State of Israel on 15 May 1948, 
President Truman extended an immediate de facto recognition to the newly emerged 
Zionist State.^ '^* As the news of the US recognition of Israel had shocked Saudi 
Arabia, Ibn Saud sent the US government a letter on 21 May 1948, which was strong 
in language. It was stated in that letter that Ibn Saud "used to advise the Arabs to be 
patient but after what happened [in Palestine] . . . [he] thought the Arabs should do 
what they could . . . i f the United State is challenging the Arabs right, . . . the Arabs 
prefer to die rather than to lose their rights".^^^ Furthermore, Saudi officials started to 
criticise US government policy. Such a criticism was - in most cases - connected to 
the Saudis comparison with the appreciated British policy. For example, during 
conversations at the Foreign Office in June 1948, Faisal expressed to Wright the 
appreciation of Saudi Arabia and the entire Arab world for British government help 
over the Palestine question in the UN. Faisal fiirther expressed his anger towards US's 
negative policy.^^^ 
There is a little doubt that Saudi Arabian annoyance at the US policy towards 
Palestine - in May 1948 - was driven by ideological rather than realist values. Such a 
fact was noticeable in the King's and his Foreign Affairs Minister's presentations. 
Nevertheless, realist principles were further effective on the Saudi policy in such a 
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course. As such principles were the factual force in Saudi Arabian foreign policy, Ibn 
Saud exercised extreme caution in his Kingdom's relations with the USA.^ ^^ By the 
end of 1948 it became obvious that Saudi-US relations had got a bright future, 
particularly as it had not collapsed over the Palestine crisis. Childs remarked on 27 
December 1948, that i f ties between Saudi Arabia and the US were not broken over 
Palestine, "one can only imagine the extent of relations in normal period".^^* 
Generally, it could be said that ideological and realpolitik principles and differences 
in British and the US policies towards Palestine were impacting on the orientation of 
Saudi Arabian foreign policy to some degree. In addition, it could also be said that the 
general development of the Palestinian issue did not bring Saudi-US relations to a 
complete halt nor did it bring about a helpfiil recovery to declining Saudi-British 
relations. Nevertheless, it could be concluded that the overall US government 
approach towards Palestine - particularly when compared with the British 
government's attitude - was at least a considerable reason to cause the Saudi 
government to slow the process of giving up its cormection with Britain in favour of 
the growing Saudi-US connection.^^' 
E . The Saudi-British Strategic Connections 
I . The Definition of the Security Concept by the end of 1947 
As previous chapters illustrated, Saudi Arabia had played a major role with regard to 
British security concerns during World War Two. Saudi Arabia's positive neutrality 
was considered - and treated - as a valuable asset for the British cause. The 
potentiality of a Saudi Arabian declaration of war alongside the Allies was not the 
only positive advantage, but so also was Ibn Saud's potential influence upon the 
British Empire's Muslim populations, particularly those in India. Indeed, Ibn Saud's 
influence was looked at as a comfortable instrument that could be mobilised for the 
purpose of security and order in the British Empire during the crucial period of the 
war.^*° Starting from this defined perspective and ending with the broader interests of 
the British Empire, the preceding two chapters also showed that Britain was 
ultimately considerate when the question came to the maintenance of Saudi Arabian 
security.^*' 
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However, the concept of the security in Britain's pohcy towards Saudi Arabia had 
altered to a degree by the fourth quarter of 1947, from that which directly involved 
solely the British Empire to that which concerned the general security of the Middle 
East. It could be said that the direct linkage between Saudi Arabia's stance and the 
security of the British Empire had started to shift from the end of the war onwards, as 
did the British government concept in linking the necessity for maintaining Saudi 
Arabian security and the security of the British Empire. 
Certain developments give the impression of being the routes that made such a shift 
occur. Obviously the end of the war was one phenomenon which reduced the 
importance of Saudi Arabia's role for the security of the British Empire. Likewise, the 
same could be said with regard to Britain's withdrawal from India in the summer of 
ig^j ^ei Additional developments had also fiirther twisted the attachment of the 
security assumption in Britain's foreign policy towards Saudi Arabia. The most 
remarkable was the emergence of the USSR as a new danger for the West and the 
ultimate formation of such a threat to the security of the Middle East in general.^ ^^ 
Though Britain had to admit in February 1947 that its economic difficulties had put it 
in a situation were it had to end its economic and military assistance to Greece and 
Turkey, still London was determined to counter the USSR threat to the Middle East 
when it was possible.^^'' The British government determination on this was enhanced 
by the Truman Doctrine, on the 12 March 1947, which extended US economic and 
military assistance to Greece and Turkey.^^^ Further enrichment of Britain's attitude 
was apparent as it got into more common ground with the USA on the risky situation 
in the Middle East. The general security of the Middle East and the protection of the 
area from the danger of commimism were considered, during the Anglo-American 
talks in Washington in the autumn of 1947 to be "vital" for the security of Britain and 
the USA.^^^ Such a consideration was fixrther legitimised by both governments' 
beliefs in the importance of maintaining Middle East security for "world peace".^ ^^  
Despite the fact that Britain's policy towards the Saudi-Hashemite issue was not that 
successfiil by the fourth quarter of 1947, still the British government was considering 
it "as most important that their ties of fiiendship with King Ibn Saud should be 
maintained and ftirther strengthened".Within this perspective, the British 
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representatives at Washington talks had justified the advantages in including Saudi 
Arabia within Britain's regional security arrangements chain.^ ^^ As explained earlier 
this precise policy was put into action when Ibn Saud had asked for similar assistance 
to that which had been given to the Hashemites.'^^° 
For Saudi Arabia the concept of security was still directly connected to the 
fiindamental nature of the safety of the Saudi State. Furthermore, Saudi Arabian 
security concerns remained mostly hooked up to that of regional power 
intimidation. As the current chapter has demonstrated the Saudi-Hashemite 
problem was the flame that instigated Ibn Saud's security unease in 1946-47.^ ''^  In 
actual fact Ibn Saud's quandary with the Hashemites became a real dilemma by the 
end of 1947, as the British who were supposed to ensure the security of Saudi Arabia 
were somehow - at least in Ibn Saud's point of view - linked with the Hashemites. 
Such a dilemma was harmful to any beliefs that Ibn Saud might have had about 
Britain being the guardian of his Kingdom. 
In spite of King Ibn Saud's umbrage at British goverrmient conduct, still he realised 
that he must deal with London for the sake of his Kingdom's security. Moreover, the 
King was enthusiastic to offset, or even replace, his British connection with an 
American one, but was, without any other alternative, compelled to deal with 
Britain.^^^ Indeed, despite indications of further US involvement in the Middle East, 
such as The Truman Doctrine, and despite revised indications of that of Britain, such 
as the withdrawal from India, Ibn Saud still recognised that Britain, in spite of 
everything, was the Great Power which was circling his Kingdom. Al l this meant, 
without the need of re-mentioning that Ibn Saud's attempt, in the beginning of 1947, 
to secure a clear and precise American assurance for the security of the Kingdom, had 
by all means failed.^'''* 
I I . The Proposed Treaty and its Development in 1948 
As mentioned earlier, Ibn Saud's request for military assistance on the same scale that 
was given to the Hashemites had been understood in London as i f a defensive treaty 
with Britain would be acceptable to Saudi Arabia.^^^ When the King first learnt about 
the British proposal he did not react; thus he waited until he received a draft of that 
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proposal.^^^ On 28 January 1984 the Saudi government received a draft treaty, which 
was almost identical to the treaty just concluded between Iraq and Britain on 15 
January 1948."^ 
Ibn Saud's complete refusal was clear in his memorandum to the British government 
on 31 January.^ ^^ In fact the King's resentment at being offered a similar treaty to that 
of Iraq was even clearer. After mentioning that friendship and cooperation existed 
between Saudi Arabia and Britain despite the fact that there had been no treaties of 
alliance apart from the purely friendship treaty of Jeddah, Ibn Saud stated in the 
memorandum that: 
" . . . the treaty which has been produced to me is in no way different from the 
new Iraqi treaty. You know well that the political and social characteristics of 
our country . . . differ completely from the present position of Iraq and other 
countries. For that reason I see no possibiHty of discussing it".^'^ 
Moreover, the King had re-emphasised the meaning of his previous approach, as it 
was not intended to deal with such a treaty, but was mainly aimed "to deal with . . . 
the preparation of means of defence for our country, and of the preservation of 
internal security, and that was to be done by the supply of new arms and military 
equipment".^^° 
Despite the evidence of Ibn Saud's refiisal, it seems that the British were willing to 
push the treaty case fiirther. Even, when Faisal told Trott that Saudi Arabia "did not 
want a treaty even i f . . . [Britain] made treaties with all the other Arab countries", the 
British Ambassador was still hopeful that the King might change his mind. In a 
despatch to the Foreign Office on 5 February, Trott commented; " I doubt i f he 
[Faisal] was speaking in his father's name".^ *' Thus instead of suggesting closing the 
treaty file, Trott recommended to keep it open for fiarther consideration. 
On 5 April 1948 the Foreign Office instructed the British Embassy in Jeddah to re-
explain to King Ibn Saud the advantages of the proposed treaty.^ ^^ In order to make 
the explanation more convincing the King had to be warned about the severity of the 
new international threat for the security of his Kingdom. According to the despatch, 
the "proposal of a formal treaty" was mainly motivated by: 
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" . . . the need created by the increasingly tense international situation for all 
peace-loving states to consider political measures for protecting their common 
interests. Saudi Arabia's emergence as a major oil producing country has 
entirely altered her international position and has made her an obvious target 
for aggression in the event of war, while the nature of modem weapons has 
destroyed the value of distance and desert as a protection against attack by a 
great power. We are anxious to help Ibn Saud to guard against these dangers, 
but it will be impossible for us to do this effectively without making some 
preparations. We did not and do not want to impose any rigid formula on Ibn 
Saud, but only to find the best way o f . . . preparations which may be required 
in Saudi Arabia in order to defend that country and the whole Middle Eastem 
area from aggression".^ *"* 
When Rogers made the communication at Riyadh on 12 April, Ibn Saud expressed his 
awareness of the danger of 'political Communism' to the Middle East in general.^ *^ 
Nevertheless, during the conversation with the British diplomat, the King did not 
indicate that the USSR was (or is) forming a direct military threat to his Kingdom. In 
his view, Political Communism could spread "like cholera, or a plague of locusts", 
and indeed it might also "run over the Middle East". However, the King also 
explained that such a threat might be appealing to the other Middle Eastem countries, 
but not necessarily to Saudi Arabia. Public politics was the central element that forced 
the King to distinguish between the characteristic of his Kingdom and that of the 
others. On this, Ibn Saud explained that the circumstances in some of the other states 
had created "a class of professional politicians who were a blight [to the current 
situation]".^*' The case of Saudi Arabia was distinct, because he did "all he could to 
promote the welfare of his people, and their education, but [had kept] them clear of 
politics . . .[therefor] there were no public politics in his Kingdom". Broadly 
speaking, a carefiil reading of the Rogers report on his visit to Riyadh would clarify 
that Ibn Saud was more concerned with regional politics rather than international, 
when it came to the security of Saudi Arabia. In fact Ibn Saud had concentrated most 
of his talks with the British diplomat - as mentioned eariier in this chapter - on the 
Hashemites rather than the Soviets. A matter, which indicates that the priority of the 
King's security concerns were still mainly regional.^^^ 
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Once more, the King had stressed that he was not in a position to conclude such a 
treaty with Britain. In fact he was surprised that the British government had not yet 
put this proposal aside.^ ^" In writing, the King had stressed that such a treaty would 
not do any good for him either for Britain or even any other Arab states. But, the "best 
way to give confidence to the Arabs is to assist them in strengthening themselves in 
their own countries and to provide them with arms".^ '^ Nevertheless, in order to come 
in some way near to the British proposal, the King had said that he was prepared to 
arrange with the Arab States, through the Arab League, a united plan for cooperation 
with the USA and Britain on the following basis: 
"a. Inviolability of the sovereignty of the Arab states and preservation of their 
territories from any occupation. 
b. That they [the USA and Britain] should provide the necessary assistance to 
the Arab states, to each according to its needs and what is required to ftilfil 
them. 
c. Should war break out and any aggression be made against an Arab State, the 
Arab States should co-operate among themselves and co-operate with Britain 
and America by doing what the two parties agree upon to be necessary, at that 
time for their defence against aggression". '^^  
Ibn Saud's proposal seems to be a fiirther indication of his desire to strengthen the 
capability of his country, particularly in respect to arms and military utilities. But 
more importantly, the inclusion of the USA in such a proposal was in fact a new -
additional - tactic to the King's previous efforts in bringing the Americans to such a 
responsibility. Indeed, it was the USA rather than Britain whom the Saudi Monarch 
was looking forward to concluding a treaty with. On 16 April the King revealed the 
new proposal to the US Minister to Saudi Arabia, and added that a "Saudi treaty with . 
. . [USA is] more important... [to him] than one with Britain".^'^ 
The US government was still some distance from fulfilling Ibn Saud's minimum 
wishes on this. On the question of the general treaty, Childs conveyed - at a later stage 
- to Ibn Saud an off-putting reply from Washington: "While the United States 
Government can give no assurances whatsoever about this, they would be glad to be 
kept informed of the ideas of the Arab Governments on security matters of common 
interest to them".^''* The US government was reluctant to go further on the subject of 
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the general treaty, because at that time there was not a clear approach towards all the 
Arab countries. According to the State Department the consideration of such a matter 
was difficult because with some exception in "the case of Saudi Arabia . . . the United 
States services had not as yet formulated any definite policy for the Middle East".^ ^^  
The British government reply to the Saudis proposal was conveyed during Crocker 
and Trott's visit to Riyadh. On 28 April Trott read out the British communication to 
Ibn Saud: 
"His Majesty's Goverrmient... do not,. . . consider that either Saudi Arabia 
or even all the Arab States together could defend themselves against attack by 
a Great Power long enough to enable British help to reach them in time, unless 
detailed preparations for such assistance are made in advance. Nor do they 
consider that the Arab States could raise, train and equip sufficiently large and 
modem armed forces to make them independent of outside aid for some time 
to come . . . [Moreover] I f His Majesty's Government were now to guarantee 
Ibn Saud against aggression without making any detailed preparations to 
implement this promise, they would be acting dishonestly, since this guarantee 
would be worth nothing to Ibn Saud".^ ^^ 
Reinforcing and amplifying those points the CCMELF, further explained - to the King 
- the nature and the scope of the likely Russian threat. Crocker remarked that such 
aggression could happen without any waming and that modem warfare would play a 
major role in it, such as the use of airbome forces. In such a case all the states of the 
area - including Iraq, Transjordan, Iran, and Saudi Arabia - must cooperate and work 
together with the help of the British and Allied forces. Crocker also explained that it 
would be impossible to deploy British or other Allied forces without prior 
preparation, indeed i f a Russian attack happened it would be difficult to liberate any 
occupied territories otherwise.^ ^^ 
Despite the strength of the British arguments in regard to the threat of the Great 
Power, it soon became apparent to both Crocker and Trott that Ibn Saud "was cleariy 
thinking more about a possible attack by his Hashimite [Hashemite] enemies than of 
the common danger from Soviet Russia".^'* As the forgoing pages have illustrated, 
the King had spent most of his talks with the British officials on the Hashemites. 
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Among other points - on the Hashemites - Ibn Saud stated that "it was galling to him 
to see that the British had given arms to his enemies . . . but they could not even give 
him arms for training".^^^ At this juncture the British Ambassador had to explain the 
reasons for the arms embargo. As instmcted by the Foreign Office, Trott illustrated 
that: 
"It is the policy of his Majesty's Government to refuse permission for the 
export of military material to any part of the Middle East, except under 
existing contracts, which have been undertaken as a result of our treaty 
obligations to certain Arab Govenmients, . . . this policy is essential to the 
maintenance of the . . . embargo . . . without which arms and ammunition 
would inevitably pour into Palestine for the Jews . . . our refusal to supply . . . 
[arms and] ammunition at present is dictated solely by our declared policy in 
respect of Palestine and that, once the situation in that country improves 
sufficiently to enable us to remove this embargo, we shall do our best to meet 
his requirements".^"" 
According to Trott, on the whole Ibn Saud was not "very pleased with the message . . 
. [Besides] on hearing of the embargo . . . the King was obviously very put out".^"' In 
any case, Ibn Saud had instmcted Yusuf Yassin to hold a comprehensive conversation 
with the British visitors regarding the proposed "detailed preparation".''"^ Among 
other questions, Yassin asked Crocker, about what he "considered it necessary to do 
to ensure the protection of Saudi Arabia".^"^ In reply, the CCMELF believed that two 
main matters should be dealt with. Firstly, the need to "build up the Saudi Arabian 
forces to the size and scale already recommended by the head of the B.M.M. [British 
Military Mission]".^"'* Secondly, that the Saudi Arabian government should agree to 
consult with the British government on the facilities needed to enable the British 
forces to come to the assistance of Saudi Arabia in the event of aggression.''"^ Crocker 
also explained that in the meantime it wil l be impossible to equip the Saudi forces 
with arms as far as the arms embargo is in place, however the British government 
would supply the arms required after the embargo had been lifted. When Yassin asked 
for an exact definition of the meaning of 'the facilities', Crocker explained that it 
"might include airfields sites, . . .accommodation and some form of joint defence 
consultation . . . [nonetheless] there was no thought of stationing forces in the 
country".^"^ 
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In a second comprehensive discussion, the Saudi Defence Minister, Amir Mansour 
had joined Yassin and the British for a further session of tougher talks during which 
both parties were firm on their points of view; the British would not go further than 
Crocker had suggested and the Saudi's were asking for the building of larger forces 
than the proposed one and for the immediate lifting of the arms embargo (on Saudi 
Arabia). Nonetheless, in regard to the facilities Yassin mentioned during the 
discussions that Ibn Saud might agree about the facilities matter "but only on 
condition that it was kept secret and never published".''*'^  
As it was the only successful outcome of the April talks, Yassin's remark on Ibn 
Saud's possible agreement on the facilities matter was carefully considered at the 
Foreign Office.^°* On 25 May the Foreign Office wrote to Trott requesting him to 
follow the matter up with the Saudi government. Six days later, the British 
Ambassador wrote back to the Foreign Office. In his dispatch Trott advised his 
government to work out the details of the sfrategic plan, and to send an inspection 
team of officers to study the feasibility of the project and to discuss matters with Ibn 
Saud.^'° By 14 July 1948 Ibn Saud had agreed in principle to the dispatch of the 
inspections party to study the details of the sfrategic facilities.^" Nevertheless, - as the 
following chapter wil l reveal - further development before the end of 1948, in which 
the Saudi government had proposed a new Saudi-American-Anglo treaty, had delayed 
the mobilisation of the British expedition until 1949. 
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Summary and conclusions 
The development of American-Anglo relations over Saudi Arabia had led, by the 
autumn of 1947, to a comprehensive understanding between the British and the US 
governments in that country. Undoubtedly the improvement of Anglo-American 
relations in Saudi Arabia - and the absence of the usual frouble - would help the 
general course of Saudi Arabian relations with the power which actually was 
intended, capable, and welcomed (by the Saudis) to increase its commitments in the 
Kingdom. Hence, it seems that, at the expense of Anglo-Saudi relations, the overall 
direction of this progress was rewarding the general conduct of Saudi-American 
relations. 
Indeed, beside Saudi Arabian and US desires in strengthening their economic ties, it 
was apparent that the end of the US-British rivalry was also a boost for the increment 
of these ties. Moreover, the post-war improvement of Saudi Arabian income had also 
further increased American economic involvement in the Kingdom; at the same time 
it had ended the theories which used to relate Saudi Arabian financial needs to 
Britain. 
Despite the fact that the British government had ceased its financial assistance to 
Saudi Arabia in 1945, the following year had witnessed the initiation of a modest 
British technical assistance to the Kingdom. Though the impact of this technical 
assistance on Saudi-British relations would not be the same as the usual financial 
assistance, and though the Hashemite issue had overshadowed the achievement of 
such assistance, its role in keeping the channel of cooperation between Saudi Arabia 
and Britain open should not be ignored. 
King Ibn Saud's desire in sfrengthening his Kingdom's sfrategic connections with the 
USA and not with the UK was obvious during Prince Saud's call on Washington and 
London at the begirming of 1947. Indeed, the Kings instructions to the Crown Prince 
on this subject had made the issue clearer. In any case, because the US government 
response was not that which was expected at Ibn Saud's end, Saudi Arabia had been 
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left with no altemative but to work on Britain in order to insure the maintenance of its 
own security vis-a-vis any potential Hashemite aggression. 
Nonetheless, it was also noticeable during the same period which this chapter has 
covered, that the Saudi-Hashemite dilemma had negatively impacted the demeanour 
of Saudi-British relations. Indeed, the independence of Jordan, and the revival of 
conflicting relations between Ibn Saud and Abdullah, had brought about certain 
difficulties in Saudi-British relations. The imperative for this had emerged when the 
British government first mishandled the Saudis' concems during the process of 
Jordanian independence. Further intensification accmed from the manifestation of the 
Saudi-Jordanian frontier disagreement and Abdullah's plans and propaganda. In 
several attempts, Ibn Saud had endeavoured to obtain a clear British assurance against 
any Hashemite threat, however the King's goal remained unachievable. 
Moreover, Ibn Saud's anxiety was not limited to what he recognised as a visible 
Hashemite threat, but also towards what he considered as a special relationship 
between the Hashemite States and Britain. The financial and the military assistance, 
which Britain was extending to the Hashemites was anathema for Ibn Saud, 
particularly when Saudi Arabia was not receiving equal treatment. When the King 
became almost pessimistic about getting any categorical assurance, he asked for equal 
treatment to that of the Hashemites. As in the case of the assurance, Saudi Arabia did 
not get what its King had asked for, however an unacceptable treaty was offered. 
When the British government failed to give Ibn Saud what he was looking for, and 
when certain circumstances allowed for a direct reconciliation with the Hashemites, 
Ibn Saud considered it without considering British participation - as a mediator - in 
such an event. Hence he blocked any positive British move in his dilemma with the 
Hashemite. The development of the Saud-Hashemite contention had caused Ibn Saud 
to question British policy towards his Kingdom. Al l in all, it could be said that the 
general look of this development was not helpful for the progress of Saudi-Anglo 
relations. In fact, it was the most harmful development that accmed to Saudi-British 
relations during the period covered in this chapter. 
The developments in Palestine, and the policies of each of the US and British 
governments towards it, had some impact on Saudi Arabian foreign policy towards 
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both Britain and the USA. In 1946 and 1947 Saudi Arabia was dissatisfied with both 
States' policy towards Palestine. However, in 1948, as the US continued its pro-
Jewish policy, and as Britain took a neufral position, the Arab States, including Saudi 
Arabia, started to feel the differences between US and British policies. This 
development resulted in Ibn Saud reconsidering, in 1948, the speed of his policy of 
giving up his British relations for his US relations, and to proceed on a rather slower 
basis than he previously intended. Hence, it could be said that the Palestine factor was 
the most visible which was not totally negative for the development of Saudi-British 
relations, particularly in 1948. 
By the end of 1947, British security concerns had changed from that which was 
mainly attached to the security of the British Empire, to that which was associated 
with the security of the area as a whole, particularly against a Soviet threat. On the 
other hand, Saudi Arabian security concerns remained mainly connected to the 
security of the Kingdom itself, and against a regional threat rather than an 
international one. The concept of security for Saudi Arabia and Britain had put each 
of them on a different footing when they negotiated the proposed treaty in 1948. 
However, it seems that such differences did not completely erase the consideration of 
building sfrategic facilities in Saudi Arabia, particularly when such facilities were - to 
some extent - compatible with the fulfilment of the security requirements of each 
country. Nonetheless, until the end of 1948 Saudi Arabia remained outside any British 
defensive commitments. 
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pipeline, despite the restriction on US steel exports at that time. Middle East Joumal Chronology, 
January, 1948. 
Gold, Isadore Jay. op. cit., p. 224-225. 
Ibid., P. 233. Also, see Childs J. Rives. Foreign Service Farewell. Charlottesville: The University 
Press of Virginia. 1969, p. 155. 
This matter was elucidated in the preceding pages. 
See from Jeddah (Trott) to Foreign Office, 29 April 1948, FO 371/68785. Also see Annual Report on 
Saudi Arabia for 1946, fi-om Jeddah (Grafftey-Smith) to Foreign Office, 26 January 1947, FO 
371/62095. Also, see Annual Report on Saudi Arabia for 1948, from Jeddah (Trott) to Foreign Office, 
2 Febraary 1949, FO 371/75505. 
'" See Annual Report on Saudi Arabia for 1946, from Jeddah (Grafftey-Smith) to Foreign Office, 26 
January 1947, FO 371/62095. Also, see Annual Report on Saudi Arabia for 1947, from Jeddah (Trott) 
to Foreign Office, 12 Febraary 1948, FO 371/68779. Also, see Annual Report on Saudi Arabia for 
1948, from Jeddah (Trott) to Foreign Office, 2 Febraary 1949, FO 371/75505. 
' ' The total sum of the joint US-British assistance programme to the Kingdom in 1945 was $10 million. 
See Joint Note by the US and the British Ministers at Jeddah addressed to the Saudi Arabian Acting 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, 29 July 1945, FO 371/45528. 
" Foreign Office Memorandum on Anglo-American relations in Saudi Arabia, 30 November 1945, 
371/45543. 
" I b i d . 
Annual Report on Saudi Arabia for 1946, from Jeddah (Grafftey-Smith) to Foreign Office, 26 
January 1947, FO 371/62095, the report also, in: Foreign Office Annual Reports from Arabia 1930-
1960. Chippenham (England): Archive Editions: 1993, pp. 289-295. 
While the preparation for the mission - which was to be sent to Saudi Arabia - was under way by 
May 1946, still the Saudis - despite their inquiries - were not informed about the final British decision 
on this. At that time the British government - which was intending to improve its relations with the US 
govemment over Saudi Arabia - was consulting the US Administration about its intention. From 
Foreign Office to Washington (the British Embassy), 29 May 1946, FO 371/52809. In fact the British 
govemment did not give the Saudi govemment a final reply until after the US govemment gave its 
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approval (of no objection) on 20 July 1946. From Jeddah (Grafftey-Smith) to Prince Faisal, 20 July 
1946, FO 371/52809. 
From Foreign Office to Washington (the British Embassy), 29 May 1946, FO 371/52809. 
" From Foreign Office to Treasury, 18 October 1946, FO 371/52810. 
Military Mission to Saudi Arabia, Secretary of State, 29 January 1947, FO 371/62078. 
Annual Report on Saudi Arabia for 1947, from Jeddah (Trott) to Foreign Office, 12 February 1948, 
FO 371/68779. The story of the setting up of the British Military Mission in Saudi Arabia is as follows: 
Though, the idea of providing Saudi Arabia with a military mission became a fundamental part of 
British government policy in co-operating with Saudi Arabia from 1946 onward, it should be said that 
it was Ibn Saud who had initiated such an idea. In November 1945 Ibn Saud had asked the British 
government to provide his Kingdom with a military mission for the purpose of setting and training a 
Saudi Arabian Army. While the idea was under consideration in London, Ibn Saud pressed for a final 
reply in May 1946. As Britain was determined to improve its relations with the USA over Saudi Arabia 
at that time, London informed the US Administration about its intention. From Foreign Office to 
Washington (the British Embassy), 29 May 1946, FO 371/52809. Following the approval of the US 
government, the Saudi government was informed on 20 July 1946, that a mission would be provided. 
From Jeddah (Grafftey-Smith) to Prince Faisal, 20 July 1946, FO 371/52809. During the rest of 1946 
the British and Saudi governments concentrated their efforts in order to set up the mission. In the 
period between the 8th and the 11th of September 1946 Major-General Oliver, Chief of General staff, 
Middle East Land Forces visited Saudi Arabia and negotiated with the Saudi Defence Minister, Prince 
Mansour, the detail of the proposed British Military Mission. From Jeddah to Foreign Office, 15 
September 1946, FO 371/52809. On 7 December 1946 Brigadier Baird who was to head the mission 
arrived in Jeddah in order to make the final arrangements for the establishment of the mission. From 
Jeddah to Foreign Office, 16 December 1946, FO 371/52810. By the end of January 1947 the mission 
was in operation in Taif after it was successfully formed. Aimual Report on Saudi Arabia for 1946, 
from Jeddah (Grafftey-Smith) to Foreign Office, 26 January 1947, FO 371/62095. Also, from Jeddah to 
Foreign Office, 26 April 1947, FO 371/62079. Also, Annual Report on Saudi Arabia for 1947, from 
Jeddah (Trott) to Foreign Office, 12 February 1948, FO 371/68779. 
°^ Annual Report on Saudi Arabia for 1946, from Jeddah (Grafftey-Smith) to Foreign Office, 26 
January 1947, FO 371/62095. Also, from Jeddah to Foreign Office, 26 April 1947, FO 371/62079. 
Also, Annual Report on Saudi Arabia for 1947, from Jeddah (Trott) to Foreign Office, 12 February 
1948, FO 371/68779. 
^' See for example Al-Zarkali, Khairaldin. op. cit., p. 777. Also, see section C of this chapter. 
Annual Report on Saudi Arabia for 1946, from Jeddah (Grafftey-Smith) to Foreign Office, 26 
January 1947, FO 371/62095. 
Annual Report on Saudi Arabia for 1947, from Jeddah (Trott) to Foreign Office, 12 February 1948, 
FO 371/68779. Though the Treasiuy was enthusiastic - in December 1945 - to provide Saudi Arabia 
with such a service, the continuity of Britain's economic decline had caused some reluctance within the 
Treasury. 
" Annual Report on Saudi Arabia for 1947, from Jeddah (Trott) to Foreign Office, 12 February 1948, 
FO 371/68779. 
See Annual Report on Saudi Arabia for 1948, from Jeddah (Trott) to Foreign Office, 2 February 
1949, FO 371/75505. 
In the beginning of 1947 Prince Saud Bin Abdulaziz had paid an official visit to the USA as well as 
to Britain. Various pages of this chapter are dealing with Saud's tour in accordance with the nature of 
the issues that were brought up. For example the economic issue that Saud had dealt with in 
Washington had already been mentioned in the previous section, so other issues will be dealt with in 
the sections that contain them. 
" See Al-Zarkali, Khairaldin. op. cit., pp. 775-781. 
Translated from Ibid. 
^^Ibid. 
™Ibid. 
" Ibid. 
'^Ibid. 
'^Ibid. 
^^Ibid. 
The term of opponents here is mainly concerning the Hashemites. See Ibid. 
' '•Ibid. 
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See Ibid. In fact the Crown Prince was instracted to leave the discussions in London to Fuad Hamza, 
with indications that the Saudi-British discussions would be on - relatively - less important topics. See 
Ibid. 
Saud's visit to London became ceremonial. Many British officials including the Prime Minister and 
the Foreign Secretary entertained Saud during the visit. From Foreign Office (Baxter) to Jeddah 
(Grafftey-Smith), 17 March 1947, FO 371/62080. (In what seems like an attempt at bringing about 
some kind of political activity in this official visit) Saud was asked to convey a message from Ibn Saud. 
In that message, the King had extended his willingness to mediate in "the Anglo-Egyptian treaty 
dispute" which was at its peak at that time. It could be said that the only talk that can be considered as 
political and important that Saud had undertook in London, was the Prince's conversation with the 
British Foreign Secretary in regard to this message. See from Foreign Office to Cairo, 26 Febraary 
1947, FO 371/62942. At that time there was an Anglo-Egyptian dispute over the future of their treaty, 
in particular to the future of Sudan and the fiiture of the British military extent in Egypt. Ibn Saud was 
concemed in solving this dispute because it involved Britain and an Arab State that was in good 
relations with Saudi Arabia. The British govemment was pleased with Ibn Saud's offer. However 
Saudi Arabian efforts on this subject became fraitless, as both the British and the Egyptian 
governments were not willing to give any concessions that could facilitate an agreement. See Annual 
Report on Saudi Arabia for 1947, from Jeddah (Trott) to Foreign Office, 12 Febraary 1948, FO 
371/68779. 
" See Hart, Parker, op. cit., pp. 43-47. Also, see Gold, Isadore Jay. op. cit., p. 228-229. 
FRUS, 1947, vol. 5, pp. 738-41, quoted in Hart, Parker, op. cit., p. 44. In a memorandum that was 
submitted to the US president on 18 Febraary 1947, it was reported that, "The Crown Prince was 
assured that the United States would support the integrity and independence of the countries of the 
Near East in the United Nations in the event their countries should be threatened by aggression". 
Memorandum for the President, 18 Febraary 1947. In Al-Rashid, Ibrahim. Saudi Arabia Enters the 
Modern World: Secret U.S. Documents on the Emergence of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as a 
World Power. 1936-1949. Part I I . Salisbury, N.C.: Documentary Publications, 1980, p. 73. Also, see 
Nadav, Safran. Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security. London: Comell University Press, 
1988, p. 63. 
FRUS, 1947, vol. 5, pp. 738-41, quoted in Hart, Parker, op. cit., pp. 44. 
^^Ibid. 
Hart, Parker, op. cit., p. 44. It should be also noted that the Americans told the British govemment -
through the American Embassy in London - that they were disturbed by a report from a Middle Eastem 
Capital in regards to Abdullah's plans for Great Syria. Nadav, Safran. op. cit., pp. 63-64. Also 
Memorandum for the President, 18 Febraary 1947. In Al-Rashid, Ibrahim. Saudi Arabia Enters the 
Modern World: Secret U.S. Documents on the Emergence of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as a 
World Power. 1936-1949. Part I I . Salisbury, N.C.: Documentary Publications, 1980, p. 73. Also it 
should be noted, that Ibn Saud's suspicion of the British govemment as backing the Hashemites, came 
about when Abdullah was trying to give the impression that he was backed by Britain on his plan 
regarding Great Syria. Baxter stated that "the King [Abdullah] . . . prepared to give the impression, 
whenever it suits him, that he has our backing". Minute by Baxter, 25 April 1947, FO 371/61492, 
quoted in Louis, Wm. Roger. The British Empire in the Middle East: 1945-1951. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1988, p. 361. 
*" Hart, Parker, op. cit., p. 47. 
Particularly King Ibn Saud's opinion when the instractions for Saud were under preparation in 
Riyadh. Indeed, a 'frank and plain' reply to Ibn Saud's obvious instiTictions to his son, in which Saud 
could not report back to his father that it was not stated cleariy in Washington, could have been the 
great hope that the King was waiting for. 
It became obvious in this thesis that King Ibn Saud was not so keen about the UN performance in 
such a case. The King, who subconsciously was acting and reacting in his Kingdom's foreign policy 
with a notable degree of harmony to most of the assumptions that tiie classic and neo-realists agreed 
upon, was a natural believer in the anarchism of the intemational system. Moreover, the rational 
Monarch was more concemed about his Kingdom's security in regard to external states. Also, see the 
main inti-oduction to the thesis. 
It should be noted that Ibn Saud was unaware - by that time - of the improvement of American-
British relations in regard to Saudi Arabia. 
The story of the elevation of the diplomatic representation between Saudi Arabia and Britain is as 
follows: On 17 July 1947 Saudi Arabia suggested through its Minister in London to the British 
govemment to raise the diplomatic representation from that of legations into Embassies. Mr Michael 
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Wright, the Assistant Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, ironically minuted on 21 of July that "in 
view of our close and friendly relations with Saudi Arabia and King Ibn Saud . . . there would seem to 
be a strong case for agreeing to the Saudi Arabian request". Foreign Office Minutes, 21 July 1947, FO 
371/62096. By the end of October 1947 both government's approved the elevation proposal. Foreign 
Office Minutes, 15 October 1947, FO 371/62096. Also, Foreign Office Minutes, 27 October 1947, FO 
371/62096. On 24 November 1947 Mr Alan Trott submitted the Letters of Credence as Ambassador 
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to King Ibn Saud. Ultimately Mr Hafiz Wahba submitted his Letters 
of Credence as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to King George the Sixth in February 
1948. From Jeddah (Trott) to Foreign Office, 10 December 1947, FO 371/62096. It should be noted 
that Trott replaced Minister Grafftey-Smith, who in fact was transferred from Saudi Arabia in the 
spring of 1947. See Grafftey-Smith, Laurence, op. cit., p. 285. Also, see From Foreign Office to the 
Buckingham Palace, 12 February 1948, FO 371/68778. The delay of Hafiz's submission was because 
he was travelling outside the UK until February 1940, see Ibid. 
Aiuiual Report on Saudi Arabia for 1946, fi-om Jeddah (Grafftey-Smith) to Foreign Office, 26 
January 1947, FO 371/62095. The British Ambassador in Cairo, Lord Killeam conveyed this "advance 
news" to Ibn Saud, during the Saudi King's visit to Egypt then. See Ibid. Also, see Evans, Trefor. The 
Killearn Diaries 1934-1946. London: Sidgwick and Jackson. 1972, pp. 365-368. 
Annual Report on Saudi Arabia for 1946, from Jeddah (Grafftey-Smith) to Foreign Office, 26 
January 1947, FO 371/62095. 
" Leatherdale, Clive. Britain and Saudi Arabia 1925-1939. London: Frank Cass, 1983, p. 275. 
Foreign office Minute (by Baxter), 6 March 1946, FO 371/52573, quoted in Louis, Wm. Roger, op, 
cit., p. 352. 
See Annual Report on Saudi Arabia for 1946, from Grafftey-Smith (Jeddah) to Foreign Office, 26 
January 1947, FO 371/62095. 
'^Ibid. 
'^Ibid. 
Ibid. It should be noted that article 14 of the Hadda agreement states "This agreement will remain in 
force for so long as His Britannic Majesty's Government are entrusted with the mandate of Trans-
Jordan". Leatherdale, Clive. op. cit., p. 378. 
Annual Report on Saudi Arabia for 1946, from Jeddah (Grafftey-Smith) to Foreign Office, 26 
January 1947, FO 371/62095. 
Ibid. Also, see Louis, Wm. Roger, op. cit., p. 353. 
Certain facts about the Saudi territorial claims could indicate that the weakness of the new Hashemite 
State was intended. Indeed, i f Saudi Arabia obtained the Port of Aqaba, Jordan would remain without a 
sea outlet. Moreover, i f Saudi Arabia takes Maan over, the southern Jordanian strategic town, which 
used to be the head of the Hijaz railway, would give Saudi Arabia strategic gains in the expanse of 
Jordan. Though, the Saudi's did not give clear explanations for their claim regarding the passageway 
between Saudi Arabia and Syria, it might be said that Saudi Arabia was going to put at later stage 
formats that could weaken the Hashemites in general. Indeed, i f Saudi Arabia insisted in a fiill right of 
passageway alongside the Iraqi-Jordanian frontier Iraq and Jordan would be cut of f (separated) from 
each other. In conclusion, it should be stressed that the emergence of Jordan as a weak state could be 
regarded as a safeguarding measure against the possibility of direct Hashemite aggression against Saudi 
Arabia. 
From Jeddah (Grafftey- smith) to Foreign Office, 16 March 1946. In King Abdul Aziz Political 
Correspondence: 1904-1953. Chippenham (UK): Archive Editions, 1996, Vol. 4. p. 410. 
Ibid. 
'"^ Louis, Wm. Roger, op. cit., p. 355. It should be noted that Britain continued its sponsorship of the 
Arab Legion throughout the period covered in this study. By 1956 the sfrength of the Arab Legion was 
in the region of 25,000 officers and men. Ibid. 
'"^Ibid. 
'"^ From the US Minister (Jeddah) to Department of State, 21 March 1946. In Al-Rashid, Ibrahim. 
Saudi Arabia Enters the Modern World; Secret U.S. Documents on the Emergence of the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as a World Power. 1936-1949. Part I I . Salisbury, N.C.: Documentary 
Publications, 1980, p. 34. 
'"^ Al-Mhafadhah, A l i . ^ H ^ j j l ' ^ ^ ^ ^ 1 (Jordanian-British Relations). Beirut: jU^l J\ 1973, p. 
131. 
Ibid., pp. 134-135. Also, see Louis, Wm. Roger, op. cit., p. 358. 
Also, see Louis, Wm. Roger, op. cit., p. 359. 
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Annual Report on Saudi Arabia for 1946, from Jeddah (Graffley-Smith) to Foreign Office, 26 
January 1947, FO 371/62095. 
In fact Britain was in complete disagreement with the Saudis claims. Though, the British 
government attitude on this was kept secret from the Saudi as well as the Hashemites, it is worth 
mentioning here. In a Foreign Office Memorandum dated 7 September 1946 it was stated that "we 
certainly do not want to see any change in the western frontier . . . between Transjordan and the Hijaz. 
The loss of the port of Aqaba to Transjordan would be a serious blow to that country and it would 
deprive it of its only outlet to the sea. Besides there may be strong strategic reasons why we want to 
keep that port in Transjordan". Foreign Office Memorandum, 7 September 1946, FO 371/52797. The 
British "Chiefs of Staff in particular attached importance to the potential value of Aqaba as a major 
)ort". Louis, Wm. Roger, op. cit., p. 355. 
Annual Report on Saudi Arabia for 1946, from Jeddah (Grafftey-Smith) to Foreign Office, 26 
January 1947, FO 371/62095. 
' " I b i d . 
"^Ibid . 
• " Ib id . 
"^Ibid . 
It should be noted, that though the British government had initially told the Jordanians about the 
Saudi territorial claims, it did not officially write to them regarding it until June 1946. See from 
Amman (the British Legation) to Foreign Office, 17 July 1946, FO 371/52797. 
' Ibid. Also From the Jordanian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the British Minister in Amman, 15 
July 1946, FO 371/52797. By that, the Jordanian government was regarding the Hadda agreement of 
1925 to be in force between Saudi Arabia and Jordan. See Ibid. 
From the Saudi Minister for Foreign Affairs to the British Minister in Jeddah, 4 August 1946, FO 
371/52797. 
Foreign Office Memorandum, 7 September 1946, FO 371/52797. 
From Foreign Office to Jeddah, 2 October 1946, FO 371/52797. Also From Palestine (Cunningham) 
to Foreign Office, 26 September 1946, FO 371/52797. It should be noted that the British government 
had clearly informed Ibn Saud at the beginning of October 1946 that they would not participate in the 
proposed conversations but would rather keep it between the Saudi and the Jordanian delegations. 
From Foreign Office to Jeddah, 2 October 1946, FO 371/52797. 
From Jeddah to Foreign Office, 7 October 1946, FO 371/52797. Also, from Foreign Office to 
Jeddah, 10 October 1946, FO 371/52797. Also, from Amman to Foreign Office, 10 October 1946, FO 
371/52797. It seems that it was the Jordanians who were not so keen in making the London talk 
successful. During - the only one session of - the talk on 6 October, Samir told Faisal that, "he would 
not be able to do justice to the subject both on account of the fact that he was leaving England the next 
day and because he had not had an opportunity of studying the papers relating to the frontier". Ibid. 
Gold, Isadore Jay. op. cit., p. 226. Also, see Annual Report on Saudi Arabia for 1946,. from Jeddah 
(Grafftey-Smith) to Foreign Office, 26 January 1947, FO 371/62095. Furthermore, signs of what Ibn 
Saud might understand as being connected with the Hashemite propaganda, started to appear in Hijaz, 
"protesting the discrimination practiced by the Saudis against the Hijazis and calling for overthrow of 
the Saudi regime". Gold, Isadore Jay. op. cit., p. 227. Also, see from Jeddah (Graffrey-Smith) to 
Foreign Office, 22 June 1946, FO 371/52828. 
'^ ^ From Jeddah to Foreign Office, 30 November 1946, FO 371/52835. 
'^ ^ Particularly, in accordance with King Ibn Saud's instruction to Prince Saud in January 1947. See 
section B: V of this chapter. 
'^ ^ From Amman to Foreign Office, 2 January 1947, FO 371/62080. Also, from Jeddah to Foreign 
Office, 7 January 1947, FO 371/62087. Following Faisal's visit, the boundary issue was, de facto, 
suspended, as both parties did not mention it until June 1947, when the Saudi government initiated the 
reopening of the suspended negotiations. See From the Saudi Foreign Minister to the Transjordan 
Foreign Minister, 8 June 1947, FO 371/62087. 
See section B: V of this chapter. Ibn Saud had realised that no matter how friendly he could be 
towards Abdullah at this stage, the latter would not put the Great Syria plan down, or indeed might not 
prevent the anti-Saudi propaganda that could accompany such a plan. In fact "Abdullah informed 
Faisal that he had no intention of abandoning his efforts to obtain greater Syria and had even asked for 
Ibn Saud's support and assistance to this end [!]" . From Jeddah to Foreign Office, 7 January 1947, FO 
371/62087. 
'^ ^ See from Ibn Saud to Bevin, 24 April 1947, FO 371/61493. Also, see Annual Report on Saudi 
Arabia for 1947, from Jeddah (Trott) to Foreign Office, 12 February 1948, FO 371/68779. It should be 
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noted that "the unification of Iraq and Transjordan . . . and Abdullah's claim to Syria, both of which 
Ibn Saud considers to be inspired by hostile intentions towards himself. From Jeddah to Foreign 
Office, 7 January 1947, FO 371/62087. 
Mostyn stated that the Iraqi-Transjordanian Treaty was signed on 4 May 1947, However, the annual 
report for 1947 on Saudi Arabia stated that the treaty was signed on the 14 April 1947. See Mostyn, 
Trevor Major Political Events in Iran, Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula: 1945-1990. Oxford: Facts 
on File, 1991, p. 5. Also see Annual Report on Saudi Arabia for 1947, from Jeddah (Trott) to Foreign 
Office, 12 February 1948, FO 371/68779. 
From Ibn Saud to Bevin, 24 April 1947, FO 371/61493. Additionally, Ibn Saud explained that he 
did not retaliate to the Hashemites propaganda because of his consideration for Britain's interests. On 
this Ibn Saud wrote: "It was only because of our consideration for British interests in the lands ruled by 
the Hashimite family that we have not dealt with the matter in a different way . . . we are quite capable 
of carrying on . . . a much stronger and more effective propaganda than . . . [them]. But only Britain's 
vital interests in these lands, as well as the strong ties of fiiendship existing between our countries 
[Saudi Arabia and Britain], that made us adhere to a quiet and peaceful policy". Ibid. 
Ibid. 
'^"Ibid. 
Ibid. 
See from Bevin to Ibn Saud, 6 June 1947, FO 371/61493. 
'^ ^ Ibid. In April 1936 Saudi Arabia and Iraq signed a "Treaty of Arab Brotherhood and Alliance". 
Despite the mentioning of "alliance", the treaty "was seen as little more than a gesture of sympathy 
between two Arab states". Leatherdale, Clive. op. cit., pp. 267-268. 
From Bevin to Ibn Saud, 6 June 1947, FO 371/61493. 
'^^Ibid. 
It seems that the Foreign Secretary was regarding the White Paper as a foolish propaganda tool. 
Foreign Office minute, 5 June 1947, FO 371/61493. Also Conversation with Saudi Arabian Minister, 6 
June 1947, FO 371/61493. Abdullah's publication of the White Paper in May 1947 caused Ibn Saud's 
anxieties to even go fiirther. The White Paper discussed in detail the historical and the geographical 
basis of Jordan and Syria as one country. See Louis, Wm. Roger, op. cit., p. 362. 
'^ ^ The negotiations would only concern the frontier dispute and related subjects to them. From The 
Saudi Foreign Minister to the Transjordan Foreign Mmister, 8 June 1947, FO 371/62087. Unlike their 
correspondences in 1946, Faisal and Samir were addressing each other directly by the names, 
nevertheless these communications were transmitted through the British. See Ibid. Also, see from 
Foreign Office to Amman, 19 June 1947, FO 371/62087. 
From the Transjordan Foreign Minister to the Saudi Foreign Minister, 8 June 1947, FO 371/62087. 
From The Saudi Foreign Minister to the Transjordan Foreign Minister, 4 July 1947, FO 371/62087. 
Also From the Transjordan Foreign Minister to the Saudi Foreign Minister, 10 July 1947, FO 
371/62087. Also From The Saudi Foreign Minister to the Transjordan Foreign Minister, 31 July 1947, 
FO 371/68765. Also From the Transjordan Foreign Minister to the Saudi Foreign Minister, 7 August 
1947, FO 371/68765. 
"'° Annual Report on Saudi Arabia for 1947, from Jeddah (Trott) to Foreign Office, 12 February 1948, 
FO 371/68779. 
Foreign Office minute, 25 June 1947, FO 371/61493. It should be noted, that it was unusual for Ibn 
Saud to deal with the British government in such a matter through the Saudi Minister in London 
(Wahba), as Ibn Saud always preferred to deal with the British government through its Minister in 
Jeddah. However, the reason for dealing with the British government through Wahba at this particular 
time was because the British Legation in Jeddah was without a minister. Grafftey-Smith left Jeddah in 
the spring of 1947 and Ambassador Trott did not submit his Letters of Credence until November 1947. 
See Grafftey-Smith, Laurence, op. cit., p. 285. Also, From Jeddah (Trott) to Foreign Office, 10 
December 1947, FO 371/62096. 
'••^  Foreign Office minute, 25 June 1947, FO 371/61493. It should be noted that at the precise time 
when Wahba visited the Foreign Office, Bevin was on an overseas tour. See Foreign Office minute, 3 
July 1947, FO 371/61494. 
'^ 'Ibid. 
'"^ Note for the Secretary of State's conversation with the Saudi Arabian Minister, 23 July 1947, FO 
371/61493. 
'^ ' Ibid. 
Ibid. Also, Foreign Office minute, 17 July 1947, FO 371/61494. 
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The British officials and diplomats used to - by the summer of 1947 - refer to Ibn Saud's case with 
the Hashemite as being an "obsession". For instance, it was stated in the 1947 annual report that "the 
consolidation and the growth of the power of the Hashimite family" had become a great fear that 
"governed all the King's political thinking, and appears indeed to have became an obsession with him". 
Annual Report on Saudi Arabia for 1947, from Jeddah (Trott) to Foreign Office, 12 February 1948, FO 
371/68779. Despite this being observed by the British still Ibn Saud's fear was not assuaged. 
Annual Report on Saudi Arabia for 1947, from Jeddah (Trott) to Foreign Office, 12 February 1948, 
FO 371/68779. 
Foreign Office Note on Greater Syria, 3 September 1947, FO 371/61495. 
Ibid. Also, see Annual Report on Saudi Arabia for 1947, from Jeddah (Trott) to Foreign Office, 12 
February 1948, FO 371/68779. 
From Foreign Office to Jeddah, 5 September 1947, FO 371/61495. 
'^ ^ Ibid. It seemed that this point was explained to Ibn Saud also, as Clark explained at a later stage that 
Ibn Saud had "failed to understand that, as an independent sovereign. King Abdullah was not subject to 
the control of His Majesty's Government". Armual Report on Saudi Arabia for 1947, from Jeddah 
(Trott) to Foreign Office, 12 February 1948, FO 371/68779. 
'^ ^ From Jeddah (Clarke) to Ibn Saud, 25 October 1947, as Enclosure in from Jeddah to Foreign Office 
(Arab Differences: British Policy), 12 December 1947, FO 371/62112. 
Though the tribes disturbances could be justified according to various explanations, such as tribal 
wars and revenge, etc. Ibn Saud was inclined to believe that the Hashemites were motivating these 
tribes "to raise forays on the frontiers, to stop frade, and to threaten security". Memorandum from Ibn 
Saud, 23 November 1947, as Enclosure in from Jeddah to Foreign Office (Arab Differences: British 
Policy), 12 December 1947, FO 371/62112. Also, see from Baghdad (the British Embassy) to Foreign 
Office, 23 August 1947, FO 371/61495. Also, see from Jeddah to Foreign Office (Arab Differences: 
British Policy), 12 December 1947, FO 371/62112. Ibn Saud stated in the 23 November memorandum 
that, "Recently some of [the] Ashraf [Hashemite] have sent secret messengers to our country to play 
tricks with the minds of two young men of the house of Rashid. They deceived them with wiles and 
attracted them with inducement so that they went to Iraq . . . the only object of the Ashraf in seizing 
those two persons was to make use of them as stalking-horses for various evil persons of the tribes on 
our frontiers". Memorandum from Ibn Saud, 23 November 1947, as Enclosure in from Jeddah to 
Foreign Office (Arab Differences: British Policy), 12 December 1947, FO 371/62112. Also, see from 
the US Minister (Jeddah) to Department of State, 10 December 1947. In Al-Rashid, Ibrahim. Saudi 
Arabia Enters the Modern World: Secret U.S. Documents on the Emergence of the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia as a World Power. 1936-1949. Part I I . Salisbury, N.C.: Documentary Publications, 
1980, pp. 124-125. Also, see Annual Report on Saudi Arabia for 1947, from Jeddah (Trott) to Foreign 
Office, 12 February 1948, FO 371/68779. 
'^ ^ Memorandum from Ibn Saud, 23 November 1947, as Enclosure in from Jeddah to Foreign Office 
(Arab Differences: British Policy), 12 December 1947, FO 371/62112. 
'^^Ibid. 
' " I b i d . 
•^Mbid. 
Ibid. Ibn Saud's use of the Islamic proverb - " •^ W's" J ja-V (there is no might and no power save 
[but] in God)" - in this order means that i f the Hashemite forces attacked Saudi Arabia then the matter 
wil l be a fact. Additionally, as Trott explained "the phrase is used for one who is forced to do an 
unpleasant thing contrary to his wi l l " . From Jeddah to Foreign Office (Arab Differences: British 
Policy), 12 December 1947, FO 371/62112. 
Memorandum from Ibn Saud, 23 November 1947, as Enclosure in from Jeddah to Foreign Office 
(Arab Differences: British Policy), 12 December 1947, FO 371/62112. It should be noted that the 
assistance that Ibn Saud is referring to, is military and political aid rather than fmancial assistance; he 
means protection and military equipment, arms, etc. See from Jeddah to Foreign Office (Arab 
Differences: British Policy), 12 December 1947, FO 371/62112. Moreover, when the new British 
Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Mr Alan Trott, submitted his letters of Credence to King Ibn Saud on 24 
November 1947, the Hashemite was the "only" subject that the King spoke to the Ambassador about. 
Trott summarised's Ibn Saud whole argument - during this conversation - as it was "based on his 
contention that we [the British] had helped Hashimites more than him, and that we ought therefore to 
repair the omission and help him on the same scale as we had helped them". From Jeddah to Foreign 
Office (Arab Differences: British Policy), 12 December 1947, FO 371/62112. Also, see from Jeddah 
(Trott) to Foreign Office, 10 December 1947, FO 371/62096. 
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Annual Report on Saudi Arabia for 1947, from Jeddah (Trott) to Foreign Office, 12 February 1948, 
FO 371/68779. Also From Jeddah (Trott) to Foreign Office, 28 December 1947, FO 371/62096. 
'^ ^ See Devereux, David. The Formulation of British Defence Policy Towards the Middle 
East: 1948-56. London: Macmillan, 1990, pp. 15-24. 
General Statement on Washington Talks on Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean, November 
1947, FO 371/61114. Also see section A of this chapter. 
From the beginning of 1948 the British government was very concerned about reconciliation 
between King Ibn Saud and King Abdullah. On 8 February 1948 the Foreign Office wrote to the 
British Embassy in Jeddah and to the British Legation in Amman, asking for opinions on the best way 
and time of making a rapprochement between Jordan and Saudi Arabia. The Foreign Office idea of 
encouraging reconciliation between both monarchs was to urge for the reopening of frontier question 
negotiations and to urge for a personal meeting between Ibn Saud and Abdullah. See From Foreign 
Office to Amman, 8 February 1948, FO 371/68765. The British Ambassador in Saudi Arabia did not 
think that the right time had come yet for the reconciliation. Trott thought such arrangements would 
fail, just as the previous efforts had failed. Moreover, Trott thought that discussion of the frontier 
dispute was likely to be complicated and would cause more trouble. In addition, he thought that Ibn 
Saud would not accept any such approach at the present time. See from Jeddah (Trott) to Foreign 
Office, 11 February 1948, FO 371/68765. Unlike Trott, the British Minister in Amman, Sir Kirkbride, 
thought the present time was good for such a rapprochement, as it seems that Abdullah was ready for it. 
Kirkbride informed the Foreign Office that Abdullah had mentioned his readiness for reconciliation 
with Ibn Saud on more than one occasion. Kirkbride also informed the Foreign Office that he might be 
able to convince Abdullah to take the initiative. See from Amman to Foreign Office, 13 February 1948, 
371/68765. From the feedback that the Foreign Office received, it became clear that Abdullah was 
ready for rapprochement while Ibn Saud was not yet ready. Therefore, the Foreign Office considered 
convincing Ibn Saud to make a rapprochement with Abdullah. Ibid. 
'^ ^ Memorandum received from His Majesty King Ibn Saud, attached to: From Jeddah to Foreign 
Office, 2 February 1948, FO 371/68765. Also, from Jeddah to Foreign Office, 2 February 1948, FO 
371/68765. 
Memorandum received from His Majesty King Ibn Saud, attached to: From Jeddah to Foreign 
Office, 2 February 1948, FO 371/68765. Also, from Jeddah to Foreign Office, 2 February 1948, FO 
371/68765. It should be noted that the Saudi memorandum on 23 November, did not explicidy bring 
about the same hope - as indicated in the latest memorandum - that Britain should influence the 
Hashemites positively. See Memorandum from Ibn Saud, 23 November 1947, as Enclosure in from 
Jeddah to Foreign Office (Arab Differences: British Policy), 12 December 1947, FO 371/62112. 
From Foreign Office to Jeddah, 5 April 1948, FO 371/68767. 
Report on visit to Riyadh, 12th-14th April 1948, As enclosure in from Jeddah to Foreign Office, 17 
April 1948, FO 371/68767. 
"^'Ibid. 
™ Ibid. Ibn Saud's statement to Rodgers goes on; "What did His Majesty's Government expect him to 
do i f the Hashimites continued to carry on activities against him? For instance in the last fortnight 
detachments of the Iraqi army had appeared on his frontiers marking out airfields and sites for 
buildings; they had even penetrated the neutral zone. They [the Hashemite] had also been inciting 
Shammar in Iraq to make trouble for him". Ibid. 
Report on visit to Riyadh, 12th-14th April 1948, As enclosure in from Jeddah to Foreign Office, 17 
April 1948, FO 371/68767. 
''^ From Jeddah to Foreign Office, 17 April 1948, FO 371/68767. 
'^ ^ Copy in Translation of Ibn Saud Memorandum, As enclosure in from Jeddah to Foreign Office, 17 
April 1948, FO 371/68767. 
" The British documents had failed to address such an issue, a matter that indicates that Ibn Saud 
remarks were not treated properly, or indeed were underestimated. See for example from Jeddah to 
Foreign Office, 17 April 1948, FO 371/68767. Also, see from Jeddah to Foreign Office, 15 April 1948, 
FO 371/68767. 
From Foreign Office to Jeddah, 24 April 1948, FO 371/68767. Also, Summary of Conversations, 
28-30 April 1948, as enclosure in from Jeddah (Trott) to Foreign Office, 2 May 1948, FO 371/68767. 
Ibid. Also, Aide Memoire, 30 April 1948, as enclosure in from Jeddah (Trott) to Foreign Office, 2 
May 1948, FO 371/68767. 
' " I b i d . 
"«Ibid. 
' " I b i d . 
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From Jeddah (Trott) to Foreign Office, 2 May 1948, FO 371/68767. 
From Jeddah (Trott) to Foreign Office, 1 May 1948, FO 371/68767. The discussions that Trott was 
referring to were those concerning the treaty and the strategic facilities. See section E: I I of this 
chapter. 
From Jeddah (Trott) to Foreign Office, 2 May 1948, FO 371/68767. 
'^ ^ See for example Foreign Office Minute, 1 June 1948, as an Appendix to Discussion with the Amir 
Faisal, 1 June 1948, FO 371/68768. 
Minutes of a meeting between H.R.H the ^ OT/> Faisal of Saudi Arabia and Mr Wright, 14 June 1948, 
FO 371/68770. 
'^ ^ From Foreign Office to the Saudi Arabian Embassy in London, 19 June 1948, FO 371/68770. Also, 
from Amman to Foreign Office, 17 June 1948, FO 371/68770. Also, Draft Brief for the Secretary of 
State's meeting with Amir Faisal, June 1948, FO 371/68770. Faisal and the British officials who were 
in fact surprised about the news received it with satisfaction. Ibid. 
From Amman to Foreign Office, 12 June 1948, FO 371/68768. During 1947 and 1948 the Saudi 
government gathered in the northern Saudi town of Al-Jauf traditional tribal troops. With a formal 
intention of sending those troops into Palestine, their numbers reached the region of 7000 men. 
Additionally, it was said that about 3000 Saudi froops were being mobilised in the winter of 1948 by 
the Saudi-Jordanian borders. See Dispatch of US Consul (Dhahran), July 1949, In Al-Rashid, Ibrahim. 
Saudi Arabia Enters the Modern World: Secret U.S. Documents on the Emergence of the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as a World Power. 1936-1949. Part I I . Salisbury, N.C.: Documentary 
Publications, 1980, p. 213. Also, Al-Anqari, Abdalrahman. The Palestine Issue in Saudi Arabian 
Foreign Policy: 1936-1981. Ph.D. thesis. University of Exeter, 1989, pp. 200-201. Also, from Foreign 
Office to Jeddah, 29 July 1948. FO 371/38788. Also, Annual Report on Saudi Arabia for 1948, from 
Trott (Jeddah) to Foreign Office, 2 February 1949, FO 371/75505. Even without being asked for 
permission Abdullah informed the Saudis in April 1948 that he would not give his consent for any 
Saudi troops to pass through Jordan. Abdullah's message which was conveyed to the Saudi 
government through the British diplomats, in Amman and Jeddah, warned that i f those troops 
attempted to pass through Jordan, the Jordanian army would fight them instead of fighting the 
Jews/Israelis. See Al-Zarkali, Khairaldin. op. cit., pp. 1288-1289. Also, Al-Anqari, Abdalrahman. op. 
cit., pp. 200-201. 
From Amman to Foreign Office, 12 June 1948, FO 371/68768. 
'^^Ibid. 
'« ' lbid. 
"°Ibid. 
From Amman to Foreign Office, 17 June 1948, FO 371/68770. Also, Draft Brief for the Secretary of 
State's meeting with Amir Faisal, June 1948, FO 371/68770. 
Annual Report on Saudi Arabia for 1948, from Trott (Jeddah) to Foreign Office, 2 February 1949, 
FO 371/75505. 
'^ "^  Trott added " I have to admit that I did not expect it, and that I was very surprised when it took place. 
From Jeddah (Trott) to Foreign Office, 11 July 1948, FO 371/68770. 
•'^Ibid. 
Dispatch of US Consul (Dhahran), July 1949, In Al-Rashid, Ibrahim. Saudi Arabia Enters the 
Modern World: Secret U.S. Documents on the Emergence of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as a 
World Power. 1936-1949. Part I I . Salisbury, N.C.: Documentary Publications, 1980, p. 213. Also, 
Al-Anqari, Abdalrahman. op. cit., pp. 200-201. Al-Anqari stated the fact correctly, but wrongly 
(although it could be a typing mistake) stated that the troops were withdrawn in July 1948. See Ibid. 
Some time in 1947, Ibn Saud remarked to Childs that the Arabs fear "that once a Jewish state was 
created extending over most of Palestine there would be no holding back Jewish pressure for further 
lebensraum". Childs commented on Ibn Saud's remark by writing later in his book; Foreign Service 
FarevyeU. that, "the existing limits of Palestine were, in his [Ibn Saud] opinion, quite insufficient for 
that Jewish in-gathering which was the announced Zionist objective". Childs J. Rives, op. cit., p. 149. 
See section 2: B: I I o f the infroductory chapter. Also, see Leatherdale, Clive. op. cit., p. 284. Also, 
see Kedourie, Elie. Great Britain and Palestine: The Turning Point. In Kedourie, Elie. Islam in the 
Modern World. London: Mansell, 1980, p. 144. & p. 150. 
See section C of chapter one. Also, see Statement made to Ibn Saud at Riyadh by His Majesty's 
Minister on, 13 October 1939, FO 371/23271. Also, see from Jeddah (Bullard) to Foreign Office, 29 
October 1939, FO 371/23271. 
See Ibn Saud's correspondences with the British government in 1947, as they are laid out within this 
section. 
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For Abdullah as well, this reason could be countable in his new attitude towards Ibn Saud at that 
particular time. In addition, the engagement of the Arab legion in Palestine could be also considered as 
one of the potential motives in Abdullah's policy. Moreover, Kirkbride rationalised Abdullah's move -
on 17 June 1948 - by stating that "The only ulterior motive which I can detect in King Abdullah's mind 
is to drive a wedge between the King, Abdel Aziz and Syrian Leaders". See from Amman to Foreign 
Office, 17 June 1948, FO 371/68770. 
See section D of this chapter. It could also be said, that Ibn Saud was not - at that time - so keen to 
ask for US help in his dilemma with the Hashemite. Ibn Saud dismissed the US factor, not just because 
he was aware, from his experience at the beginning of 1947, that the US government might not be 
ready to help, but also because of his - and the Arabs - dislike of the US government policy in 
Palestine, particularly in 1948. 
"^^  See section D of this chapter. 
Annual Report on Saudi Arabia for 1948, from Trott (Jeddah) to Foreign Office, 2 February 1949, 
FO 371/75505. 
It could also be said that Abdullah had the same intention as that of Ibn Saud. See from Jeddah to 
Foreign Office, 11 July 1948, FO 371/68770. Also from Amman to Foreign Office, 6 July 1948, FO 
371/68770. 
From Amman to Foreign Office, 6 July 1948, FO 371/68770. 
^•"^Ibid. 
Ibid., The outstanding issues between Iraq and Saudi Arabia at that time were: first - according to 
the Saudis - the cooperation between the Saudi and Iraqi frontier officers was not satisfactory; second, 
the Iraqi objection against Rashid Al-Kailani existence in Riyadh; third, the existence of the two 
members of the Al-Rashid family in Iraq. Regarding the frontier officer co-operation Ibn Saud asked 
Abdullah to request the Iraqis to cooperate on this. In regard to Al-Kailani Ibn Saud told Abdullah that 
he did not want Al-Kailani to stay in Saudi Arabia anymore, thus i f Abdullah could have him, political 
asylum in Jordan would be better for Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Nevertheless, Abdullah explained the 
difficulty that he himself might face with the Iraqi government i f he did so. With regard to Al-Rashid 
Ibn Saud asked Abdullah to make the Iraqis ensure that they would not be permitted to act against 
Saudi Arabia. Ibid. 
See Al-Zarkali, Khairaldin. op. cit., pp. 1372-1374. 
Exti-act from Umm-al-Qura NO. 1217, 2 July 1948, as enclosure in from Jeddah to Foreign Office, 
11 July 1948, FO 371/68770. 
^'"Ibid. 
^" From Amman to Foreign Office, 16 August 1948, FO 371/68770. From Jeddah to Foreign Office, 
11 December 1948, 371/68770. Also, Annual Report on Saudi Arabia for 1948, from Trott (Jeddah) to 
Foreign Office, 2 February 1949, FO 371/75505. 
'^^  Also see section E: I I of this chapter. 
'^^  Isadore Gold had also realised these two points. See Gold, Isadore Jay. op. cit., pp. 236-237. 
^''' Annual Report on Saudi Arabia for 1946, from Jeddah (Grafftey-Smith) to Foreign Office, 26 
January 1947, FO 371/62095. Also, Al-Anqari, Abdalrahman. op. cit., pp. 193-196. Also, Palmer, Alan 
Who's Who in World Politics. London: Routledge. 1996, p. 301. According to Parker Hart: As early 
as "April 20 [1945]" Truman was adapting a supportive policy for the aims of Zionism. See Hart, 
Parker, op. cit., p. 48. 
'^^  Eddy. F.D.R Meets Ibn Saud, p. 37, quoted in Ibid., pp. 41-42. Also, see Al-Anqari, Abdalrahman. 
op. cit., p. 194. 
^'^ See Al-Zarkali, Khairaldin. op. cit., p. 1223. 
^" Ib id . 
See Ibid., pp. 1221-1224. Ibn Saud wrote to Truman on 23 August 1945, and 4 January 1946. See 
Ibid. 
Annual Report on Saudi Arabia for 1946, from Jeddah (Graffiey-Smith) to Foreign Office, 26 
January 1947, FO 371/62095. 
Evans, Trefor. op. cit., pp. 365-368. 
^ '^ By that time the members of the commission had already toured several countiies in and outside the 
Middle East. See Al-Zarkali, Khairaldin. op. cit., pp. 1251-1259. The main task of the joint 
commission, which consisted of six Americans and six British, was to study the nahire of the Palestine 
problem, and its associated subjects. Three members of the commission had toured most of the Arab 
world, which included Saudi Arabia. The mission to Riyadh consisted of Sir John Singleton, (UK) 
High Court Judge and the chairman of the mission, Reginald Manningham Buller, (UK) a Tory MP, 
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and Frank Buxton, (USA) the editor of Boston Herald. See Ibid. Also, see Louis, Wm. Roger, op. cit., 
pp. 397-398. 
Translated from Al-Zarkali, Khairaldin. op. cit., pp. 1251-1259. 
^^^Ibid. 
^^^Ibid. 
^^^Ibid. 
Ibid. Most of Ibn Saud's presentation was devoted to Britain, and its involvement in Palestine. It 
could be said that Ibn Saud's concentration on Britain during this conversation might have been 
because he was unsatisfied with Britain at that particular time, not just in regard to Palestine, but also in 
regard to the Hashemites as well. See section C of this chapter. Equally, it could be said that the King 
might have done so because the important delegates of this particular mission were British. 
Furthermore, the King might have preferred not to criticise the US government - in details - in the 
presence of British politicians, particularly when his explanations might be seen in London, as a sign of 
weakness in his relations with the USA. 
Translated from Al-Zarkali, Khairaldin. op. cit., pp. 1251-1259. 
Al-Anqari, Abdalrahman. op. cit., p. 170. 
Ibid. Also, Al-Zarkali, Khairaldin. op. cit., pp. 1263-1264. Al-Anqari added, that Yassin had also 
notified the American Legation that "the situation was made even worse by the alleged efforts of 
British diplomats to convince the Saudis that the proposal to admit 100,000 refugees had been pushed 
by the U.S. over the unsuccessful resistance of British members of the Commission". See Al-Anqari, 
Abdalrahman. op. cit., p. 170. On 10 May Eddy reported to the State Department that Ibn Saud "said 
that he and his sons wil l die in battle before they will permit Palestine to receive major increments of 
Jewish immigration". Eddy to Secretary of State, 10 May 1946, quoted in Louis, Wm. Roger, op. cit., 
p. 196. 
Al-Zarkali, Khairaldin. op. cit., pp. 1263-1264. Also, Al-Anqari, Abdalrahman. op. cit., p. 171. 
Ibid. 
Al-Zarkali, Khairaldin. op. cit., p. 1264. 
Ibid., P. 1283. Also, Annual Report on Saudi Arabia for 1946, from Jeddah (Graffiey-Smith) to 
Foreign Office, 26 January 1947, FO 371/62095. Also, from Foreign Office to Jeddah, 2 October 1946, 
FO 371/52797. 
Al-Anqari, Abdalrahman. op. cit., pp. 195-196. 
See Al-Anqari, Abdalrahman. op. cit., pp. 171-176. 
Louis, Wm. Roger, op. cit., p. 753. Also, Al-Anqari, Abdalrahman. op. cit., p. 179. 
^ " Al-Anqari, Abdalrahman. op. cit., pp. 179-180. 
Annual Report on Saudi Arabia for 1947, from Jeddah (Trott) to Foreign Office, 12 February 1948, 
FO 371/68779. Also, see Al-Anqari, Abdalrahman. op. cit., pp. 196-197. 
See Al-Anqari, Abdalrahman. op. cit., pp. 174-177. 
Louis, Wm. Roger, op. cit., p. 754. It should be noted that on 26 September 1947 Britain announced 
its intention to withdraw from Palestine. Ibid., p. 754. 
United Nations General Assembly Official Records, 2nd session, 128th Plenary Meeting, 29 
November 1947, p. 1425. Also Umm Al-Qura, 26 December 1947, quoted in Al-Anqari, Abdalrahman. 
op. cit., p. 182 & p. 214. 
"^^  Annual Report on Saudi Arabia for 1947, from Jeddah (Trott) to Foreign Office, 12 February 1948, 
FO 371/68779. 
^«Ibid. 
'^^  Mr J. Rives Childs replaced Eddy as the US Minister to Saudi Arabia on 29 June 1946. Childs J. 
Rives, op. cit., p. 137. From Jeddah (Grafftey-Smith) to Foreign Office, Report on heads of Foreign 
Missions in Jeddah, 9 July 1946, FO 371/52831. It should be noted that Eddy was transferred from 
Jeddah to the State Department because his wife had suffered a mental breakdown, a matter that meant 
she should be freated in the USA. See Ibid. 
Childs to Marshall, 4 December 1947, quoted in Gold, Isadore Jay. op. cit., p. 238. 
From Baghdad (the British Embassy) to Foreign Office, 24 December 1948, FO 371/68762. With a 
reference to his contention with the Hashemites, Ibn Saud explained this precise matter to Childs: " I 
shall be entirely at one with the Arab states as far as our dispute with Zionism is concerned. There is no 
difference of opinion among us on that score. I do desire, however, to make a distinction between such 
an attitude and the attempts being made by my antagonists in the Arab world to draw me into direct 
conflict politically or economically with the United States". From the US minister (Jeddah) to the State 
Department, 4 December 1947, In Al-Rashid, Ibrahim. Saudi Arabia Enters the Modern World: 
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Secret U.S. Documents on the Emergence of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as a World Power. 
1936-1949. Part I I . Salisbury, N.C.: Documentary Publications, 1980, pp. 114-117. 
"^^  See Ovendale, Ritchie, op. cit., pp. 41-42. See also Rubin, Barry. The Arab States and the 
Palestine Conflict. Syracuse (New York): Syracuse University, 1981, p. 185. 
'^'^  This sea blockade continued until the British forces withdraw on 14 May 1948. Rubin, Barry, op. 
cit., p. 188. British government neutrality, the sea blockade against new Jewish immigration, and the 
continuation of British govenmient arms supply to some Arab states despite the arms embargo (these 
arms were not supposed to be used in Palestine and were delivered because of earlier commitinents) 
had made some Arab leaders go all the way and state that Britain was working in favour of the Arab. 
Nuri Al-Said of Iraq told the Iraqis parliament "it became clear to us that Britain viewed with favour to 
Arab aims regarding Palestine". Ibid., p. 189. The British government policy gave it more respect in 
the Arab worid at the beginning of 1948. For instance, though the Arabs States were eager to fight the 
Jews in Palestine, they did not fight the Jews officially (by using their official armies) as they all 
promised to Britain as far as it was the mandatory. Thus the official Arab States armies did not enter 
Palestine until the mid-night of the 14th May 1948. See Ovendale, Ritchie, op. cit., pp. 41-42. Also, see 
also Rubin, Barry, op. ci t , p. 185. 
'^'^  Childs to Marshall, 13 January 1948, quoted in Gold, Isadore Jay. op. cit., p. 242. Also, see Miller, 
Aaron David. Search for Security: Saudi Arabian Oil and American Foreign Policy. 1939-1949. 
Chapel Hi l l : The University of North Carolina Press, 1980, pp. 191-192. 
From the US minister (Jeddah) to the State Department, 21 February 1948, In Al-Rashid, Ibrahim. 
Saudi Arabia Enters the Modern World: Secret U.S. Documents on the Emergence of the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as a World Power. 1936-1949. Part I I . Salisbury, N.C.: Documentary 
Publications, 1980, p. 151. 
Miller, Aaron David, op. cit., pp. 193-194. 
^" Ibid., p. 194. Also Childs J. Rives, op. cit., pp. 150-151 .Also Bullard, Reader. Britain and the 
Middle East: From the Earliest Time to 1950. London: Hutchinson House, 1951, p. 152. 
^" Al-ZarkaH, Khairaldin. op. cit., p. 1285. 
^^ "^  Miller, Aaron David, op. cit., p. 199. According to Aaron David Miller, the US President was in fact 
eager to support the Jews by all means. As Truman was pressured by US public opinion and by the 
supporters of the Jews among Congress members, he was going to do more for the Jewish interests, 
even i f it was going to involve the US in the military crisis. However without the State and the 
Defence Department lobbying for the importance of Saudi oil, Truman might have done what he 
intended to do in this matter. See Ibid., p. 184 & p. 199. The USSR also recognised Israel on 17 May 
1948. Louis, Wm. Roger, op. cit., p. 755. The British government did not recognise Israel until 29 
January 1949, and its recognition was a de facto recognition. Ibid., p. 756. On 31 January 1949 the US 
extended a de jure recognition to Israel. Ibid., p. 756. The British government de jure recognition to 
Israel did not take place until April 1950. Bullard, Reader, op. cit., p. 157. Moreover, Bullard stated 
that following the USA and USSR recognition of Israel, the newly independent Jewish state had 
expressed a desire to maintain friendly relations with both of them. However, Israel did not express the 
same desire towards Britain, a matter that meant hostility, according to Bullard. At the same time 
Jewish propaganda was strongly criticising the British government for not helping the Jews during the 
last few months of the British mandate over Palestine. Ibid., pp. 153-156. 
Translated from Al-Zarkali, Khairaldin. op. cit., p. 1290. Nonetheless, King Ibn Saud's direct 
protest to the US government did not go beyond this letter. See Ibid. Also, see Miller, Aaron David, op. 
cit., p. 201. After the announcement of the creation of the State of Israel the Saudi troops entered 
Palestine as a part of the Egyptian forces. Nevertheless, the Saudi troop participation in Palestine was 
limited, as its number did not exceed 1,200 soldiers. See from Jeddah (Trott) to Foreign Office, 11 July 
1948, FO 371/68788. Also, see Al-Anqari, Abdakahman. op. cit., pp. 198-201. Despite the fact that 
Iraq implemented an oil embargo on the West shortly after the creation of Israel, Saudi Arabia did not 
participate in such an embargo. Saudi Arabia objected to the use of oil as a weapon, because it thought 
that such a course of action would bring about economic difficulties for the Arabs without seriously 
putting pressure on the West. Al-Anqari, Abdafrahman. op. cit., pp. 203-205. 
Minutes of a meeting between H.R.H the Amir Faisal of Saudi Arabia and Mr Wright, 4 June 1948, 
FO 371/68768. Faisal's comment was a reply to Wright's statement, in which the latter had said that 
the British government "had employed their influence to prevent the adoption of any measures unfair to 
the Arab countiies. But for H.M.G's efforts the United Nations would have followed very unwise 
advice. H.M.G. had been able to persuade the United States Government to modify their policy". Ibid. 
See Miller, Aaron David, op. cit., p. 201. Childs observed that the Hashemites rather than tiie Jews 
remained Ibn Saud's extemal anxiety. Louis, Wm. Roger, op. cit., p. 201. 
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Childs to Secretary of State, 27 December 1948, quoted in Miller, Aaron David, op. cit., p. 202. 
Also see Gold, Isadore Jay. op. cit., p. 242. After analysing similar points. Gold Isadore Jay 
observed that "The Saudi never gave up their British connection as their relations grew closer to the 
United States". Ibid. 
See for example from India Office to Foreign Office, 25 June 1940. FO 371/24590. Also, From 
Foreign Office to India Office, 1 July 1940. FO 371/24590. Also see chapter one and two. Hence, it 
could be said that Britain was regarding Saudi Arabia's stance as an instrument to be used for the war 
effort and for the security of the British Empire whenever necessary. 
See chapter one and two. 
The fransfer of power in India was on 15 August 1947. See Louis, Wm. Roger, op, cit., p. 477 & p. 
754. Though that was the transparent case as it involved a direct linkage to British Empire security, 
such a matter should not be treated as an absolute. Indeed, even i f Britain had withdrawn from India, it 
still did not entirely relinquish its responsibility in certain countries of the Middle East, in particular the 
cases of the Arab entities in the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsular. Moreover, Ibn Saud's political 
influence in the Arab world and the potential advantage for its implementation by the British 
government was still viewed with some value in London, though such a value was considered to be 
more into the line of political interests rather than that of a pure security. See for example Foreign 
Office memorandum on Anglo-American relations in Saudi Arabia, 30 November 1945, FO 
371/45543. 
See Miller, Aaron David, op. cit., pp. 166-175. Also see Rubin, Barry. The Great Powers in the 
Middle East. 1941-1947. London: Frank Cass, 1980, pp. 223-238. 
The announcement was made on 21 February. See Ibid. 
Ibid., p. 753. Also, Miller, Aaron David, op. cit., pp. 175-178. 
See Memorandum on Washington Talks on Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean, November 
1947, FO 371/61114. 
^<*'lbid. 
General Statement on Washington Talks on Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean, November 
1947, FO 371/61114. 
^^'Ibid. 
™^ See section C of this chapter. 
For example of Saudi Arabia anxiety prior to 1945 see section A of chapter one. 
See section C of this chapter. 
See section B: I I I o f this chapter. Also, see Gold, Isadore Jay. op. cit., pp. 221-222. 
See section B: I I I of this chapter. 
See Annual Report on Saudi Arabia for 1947, from Jeddah (Trott) to Foreign Office, 12 February 
1948, FO 371/68779. Also from Jeddah to Foreign Office (Arab Differences: British Policy), 12 
December 1947, FO 371/62112. Also Annual Report on Saudi Arabia for 1948, from Jeddah (Trott) to 
Foreign Office, 2 February 1949, FO 371/75505. 
See Gold, Isadore Jay. op. cit., p. 243. 
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Chapter Four: Shifting Allegiances, 1949-1951 
This chapter will concentrate on the causes that furthered the changing relationship 
between Saudi Arabia and Britain during 1949, 1950 and 1951. The chapter will 
examine the mainstream of Saudi-British relations by focusing on particular 
developments that created a new trend in these relations. 
Strategic issues that involved Saudi Arabia, Britain, and the USA will be studied 
along with the development of Anglo-Saudi military cooperations. The return of the 
Saudi-Hashemite problem and its impact will be examined. The frontier dispute and 
its implications to Saudi Arabian and British relations will be researched. Finally, the 
strengthening of US-Saudi ties and its impact on Saudi-British relations will be dealt 
with. 
A. Strategic Issues, and the Status of Saudi-British Military Cooperation, 1949-
1950 
I. The Proposed Tripartite Treaty and its Consequences 
In November 1948 Ibn Saud proposed a defence treaty between Saudi Arabia, Britain, 
and the USA.' In principle, the proposal was in terms of alliance between these three 
States, during which Saudi Arabia would allow for the building of strategic facilities 
on its mainland. In return for those facilities, Britain and USA should provide at their 
own expense "all the arms and equipment required by Saudi Arabia".^  
The King's proposal seems to be a further attempt to strengthen the military capability 
of his Kingdom as well as to bring about a firm strategic commitment between Saudi 
Arabia and the USA even if Britain was to be included. Indeed, it seems that this 
proposal was a hunt for US involvement, particularly when it had a built in criteria 
that clearly avoided the main reason that made the US government dismiss the April 
1948 proposal, i.e. the enclosure of the other Arab States.^  
Neither the British nor the US governments were enthused about the Saudi Arabian 
proposal.'' The State Department's initial reaction was explained - exclusively - to the 
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British government in mid-January 1949.^  The Americans "did not feel the proposed 
tripartite alliance would be practicable at this time and wish instead to continue co-
operation with Saudi Arabia along the present lines which have [in their view] already 
brought substantial benefits to Saudi Arabia".^  Also it was explained - to the British -
that though the American's were still looking into the case, their response "will 
probably be in [the] negative", particularly when the USA "general policy . . . [was 
still based on avoiding] such commitments".^  
Meanwhile, the British had a similar idea to that of the Americans about the 
impracticability of the Saudi proposal. Though the British and the US governments 
were at the peak of cooperating and coordinating their defensive policies at that time, 
still the British were inclined to believe that the USA attachment to such a treaty 
could "militate against the negotiation of a pact in due course embracing all the Arab 
States".^  On this the British Chiefs of Staff considered that the "main disadvantage . . 
. is that the inclusion of the United States would involve considerable complications 
when . . . [Britain] reach the stage of trying to weld all . . .[its] separate treaties into 
one pact with all the Arab States".^  For that reason, "the interests of all three countries 
might best be served by a bipartite treaty between the United Kingdom and Saudi 
Arabia under which the United Kingdom would be able to obtain for the United States 
the facilities she needs".'" While the broader view within the British government was 
in line with of that of the Chiefs of Staff on the impracticability of the treaty, yet the 
general policy at that particular time did not seem to value a bipartite treaty with 
Saudi Arabia." 
Unlike the situation at the beginning of 1948, circumstances had diminished the 
British government's passion in concluding a treaty with Saudi Arabia. Several 
reasons seemed to account for such a change. First, the sublimation of the Cold War 
and the USSR's blockade of Berlin in the summer of 1948 seemed to compel the 
British government to give security priority to the heart of Europe rather to that of the 
Middle East.'^ Second, the preparation of the North Atlantic Pact and its associated 
developments, which preoccupied Britain's thinking, had also made the British 
government reconsider the outline of the defence arrangements in the Middle East. 
Under these circumstances, Saudi Arabia had become secondary in line of importance 
to the States to its north, such as Greece, Turkey, and Iran, and presumably even the 
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Hashemite States.'^  Third, the British government was reluctant at that specific time 
to enter into such a treaty, which plainly required it to supply Saudi Arabia with a 
huge quantity of war materials.''' 
For his part, and as he was worrying about the delay and the return of the Hashemite 
trouble. King Ibn Saud pressed for an immediate reply to his proposal at the end of 
February.'^ Accordingly, the British government replied not just for itself but also on 
behalf of the USA. On 16 Ivlay 1949, Trott met Ibn Saud and handed him the reply, 
which stated:'^  
"as the Saudi Government will be aware His Majesty's Government and the 
United States Government have just launched themselves on the novel 
conception of the Atlantic Pact which represents a great landmark in American 
policy . . . [consequently] it is not possible to make any definite new 
commitments at this stage . . . the tripartite treaty proposal. . . presents some 
difficulties to H.M.G. and, . . . also to the United States Government".'^  
Nonetheless, from its side the British government did not completely close the door 
on any strategic cooperation with Saudi Arabia. On this concem the message 
continued: 
"In these circumstances there seem to be two possible alternatives before his 
Majesty's Government and the Saudi Arabian Government. [1] They can either 
leave things as they stand now relying on the background of friendly feelings 
between the two governments and such practical expressions of this friendship 
as it has been possible to provide by means of e.g. the British Military Mission 
and the British Civil Air Training Mission, but leaving the question of the 
precise form of the relationship between the two governments to be settled at 
some later date. [2] Or alternatively H.M.G. and the Saudi Arabian 
Government could proceed without any fiirther general commitments on either 
side to more detailed examination of their joint strategic needs in Saudi Arabia 
by means of the dispatch of a small British reconnaissance party as H.M.G. 
1 S 
had originally proposed". 
It could be said that the indication of the first alternative on the possibility of a future 
arrangement between Saudi Arabia and Britain could not sound to Ibn Saud as a case 
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for consideration. Particularly when he was not so considerate to the previous British 
approach in this regard, and when his proposal was - more - targeting the USA rather 
than Britain. Nevertheless, Ibn Saud was more concerned about the possible 
advantages of the reconnaissance party visit, - an issue, which he had agreed upon in 
principle in 1948 - as it could at least provide a means to balance what he observed as 
unequal British treatment to his Kingdom and the Hashemite Kingdoms. Hence, he 
replied to Trott that he wished to give up the idea of a tripartite treaty at once, and to 
go on with the suggestion of sending a reconnaissance party to study the details of the 
strategic facilities.'^ 
Upon the King's final agreement on this, the Saudi government made its view clear 
regarding the main task of the reconnaissance party.^ " Mr Fuad Hamza told Trott that 
Saudi Arabia did not want to build military bases which would be "expensive and 
might provoke Nationalist agitation".^ ' But, Saudi Arabia needed to build and -
exclusively - won three airfields, which should be constructed by Saudi labour with 
technical advice from British specialist. The Saudis would use these airfields as civil 
airfields during peacetime and by the Saudis, the American, and the British during 
actual wartime.^ ^ 
The British Recormaissance Party visited Saudi Arabia between the 7th and 19th of 
August 1949.^ '' The party travelled by air throughout the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
and visited more than seven possible locations for the proposed airfields.^ '' Following 
its departure fi^om Saudi Arabia, the reconnaissance party reported confidentially to 
the British government, that:^ ^ 
1. As the Americans were very well established in Saudi Arabia, it seems that 
any development or construction of such airfields could not be carried out 
without Joint Anglo-American cooperation. 
2. The most suitable locations to construct the new airfields would be at 
Duwaid (North), Hofiif (Hasa), and Riyadh. 
3. If the aim of these new airfields was to defend the Western oil interests in 
Saudi Arabia, the existing airfields at Dhahran and Bahrain could do the job. 
It took the British government sometime before they conveyed the final conclusion to 
the Saudi govermnent in February 1950.^ ^ It was concluded that from the military 
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point of view there was no need to develop the proposed airfields in Saudi Arabia. 
However, minor improvements to the existing airfields in Dhahran and Jeddah would 
be recommended to be carried out by the Americans who were in fact in a better 
military working position than the British in these airfields.^^ 
It could be said that the negative outcome of the reconnaissance party study was an 
additional cause for declining Saudi-British relations at that specific time; particularly 
when it came out at a crucial point in time in which not just the Hashemite issue but 
also the newly opened frontiers dispute were already hurting Anglo-Saudi relations. 
Moreover, it would not be surprising i f Ibn Saud would look at the British 
government policy after this as an empty gesture. This was particularly so when 
despite positive expectations that he might have had about the reconnaissance party 
visit it had produced nothing. Moreover, it could be argued that such a negative result 
was likely to discourage the Saudis from requesting any fiirther help from Britain in 
the future; subsequently blocking the way for the initiation of any prospective Saudi-
British cooperation, or indeed for any improvement in their relations. 
I I . The State of Anglo-Saudi Military Cooperation by 1950 
In mid-January 1950, the British government approved the extension of the duration 
of the British Military Mission in Saudi Arabia for a further two years starting from 
31 March 1950. Despite the encouraging sound of this extension to the mission, it 
should be mentioned that a proposed plan of increasing and expanding its size was 
objected to and dismissed within the British government before this extension was 
approved.^ ^ 
The proposal of the necessity of expanding the size of the mission came from the head 
of the BMM in January 1949. This proposal was strongly supported by the British 
Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, the War Office, and the Foreign Office during the 
period between January and October 1949.''° Nevertheless, In November 1949, when 
the Treasury rejected such an idea, the Foreign Office did not challenge the decision 
on this.''' In fact, the Foreign Office, by the end of 1949, did not consider the Treasury 
decision on this as inappropriate.^^ This indicates that the Foreign Office principles of 
supporting the proposal in the period before November-December 1949 had changed, 
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perhaps accordingly with the increment of tension between Saudi Arabia and Britain 
over the southeast frontiers of Saudi Arabia. 
When the matter came to a proposal for reducing the size of the BMM in October 
1950, the Foreign Office took a strong stand against such a plan. With the effective 
argument of the Foreign Office, the Treasury was successfully convinced of the 
importance of the continuity of the BMM works in Saudi Arabia as the only existing 
channel of cooperation between Britain and Saudi Arabia.^^ However, In September 
1950, the small British Civil Air Training Mission was withdrawn from Saudi Arabia, 
as it had completed its three-year program by then. '^' Nonetheless, the withdrawal of 
the Civil Air Mission went through without that much concern from either Saudi 
Arabia or Britain, as the mission was relatively small.^^ 
When the arms embargo was lifted in August 1949, the British government then 
decided to supply Saudi Arabia with the "limited" arms that were requested through 
the BMM in April 1948.^ ^ On I September 1949, the British Ambassador to Saudi 
Arabia informed Ibn Saud that the requested arms were now available for supply.^ ^ 
Nevertheless, due to the lack of availability of cash at that time the Saudi government 
preferred not to ask for immediate shipment of these arms.''^  
In mid-March 1950 Yusuf Yassin asked Trott i f the British government would accept 
either of the following proposals for payment for the arms. The first proposal was to 
pay by instalment over three years. The second method was that the Saudi 
government would ask for the arms to be delivered in several shipments during which 
each would be paid in advance.''^  On 19 April 1950, the British government agreed 
with the second payment proposal.'*" Nevertheless, it took the Saudi Defence Ministry 
quite a long time before it secured the funds for the delivery of the arms. Thus, it was 
not until the beginning of October 1950 that the Saudi government sent the British 
government an advance payment for the first quantity. In the beginning of 1951, the 
arms started to reach Saudi Arabia.'*' 
Some scholars were a little confiised to see that while the state of Saudi-British 
relations was deteriorating, both states were still cooperating on arms sales.''^  
Nevertheless, the matter of arms sales seems to be clearer to understand i f three 
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factors are taken into consideration. The first is that the arms request and the promises 
for its delivery did take a place a long time before the reopening of the frontier issue. 
Second, as an effect of the arms embargo, Saudi Arabia was at that time in needs of 
any arms, whatever channel they should come from, particularly when the Saudi 
government had not secured any arms deal from anywhere else by that time (from the 
USA for example). Third, despite the fact that Britain was facing a frontier dispute 
with Saudi Arabia at the same time the arms were being delivered it was still 
advantageous for the British government to maintain this minimal tie of cooperation 
as it did in the case of the continuity of the works of BMM. It should also be 
understood that the new arms would enhance the training programs of the BMM. 
B. The Return of Ibn Saud's Anxiety About the Hashemites and its Impact on 
Saudi-British Relations, 1949-1951 
Despite the reconciliation between Ibn Saud and Abdullah during the past year, the 
Hashemites remained a problematic phenomenon for Ibn Saud. The first sign of worry 
for Ibn Saud occurred at the beginning of February 1949, when he heard a radio 
broadcast regarding a plan for unity between Lebanon, Syria, Transjordan, Iraq, and 
Palestine.'*^ On this subject Ibn Saud sent a message to the British government 
drawing its attention to the news. In his message, Ibn Saud connected this new 
scheme to the Greater Syrian scheme and pointed out that this new plan would bring 
nothing but trouble. Hence, he asked the British government to use its influence to 
suppress it.'*^ 
In June 1949 it became apparent to the Saudis that Abdullah was returning to his 
previous propaganda against Saudi Arabia. On 9 June, Saut al Umma Radio broadcast 
that King Abdullah had told a gathering of Palestinian refiigees that he strongly 
understood their situation as he himself was "a refugee from the Hejaz, my country, 
which Ibn Saud raided and from which he drove us [the Hashemites Family]".''^ 
Abdullah added that he would "pray to the Lord and implore him to send me and my 
family back to our country and homes''.''^ Furthermore, on 12 June, the same radio 
station broadcast that Abdullah had likened the Saudi occupation of Hijaz to the 
Israeli occupation of Palestine, during an address to a refiigees delegation, and that 
Palestine "is not the only place which is occupied; my country, the Hijaz, is also 
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occupied".^^ When the leader of the delegation mentioned to Abdullah that it was the 
Jews who are the occupiers of the holy Arab and Muslim country, Abdullah replied, 
" I do not care who the occupiers happen to be; Palestine is not holier than Mecca, and 
the latter is occupied too"."*^  
During an audience with Ibn Saud in Riyadh on 17 June, the King told Mr David 
Scott-Fox of the British Embassy that "Abdullah had not kept to the agreement which 
he had made last year".'*^ After complaining about Abdullah's latest propaganda, Ibn 
Saud requested Scott-Fox to ask his government either to supply Saudi Arabia with 
sufficient arms so it could protect itself, or alternatively, provide Saudi Arabia with 
assurance against Hashemite aggression.^" However, i f Britain was not prepared to 
help Saudi Arabia in either of these cases then, Ibn Saud - as a fiiend - thought he had 
the right to ask the British government to explain to him what it had against him and 
why it was "discriminating against him in this way".^ * 
The British government reply came in the form of a message. On 6 August the 
Foreign Office wrote to the British Ambassador at Jeddah; a message to be conveyed 
to Ibn Saud. Regarding the British government assurance, it was stated in that 
message that: 
"His Majesty's Government policy that Middle East countries should become 
increasingly strong and prosperous and should compose the differences which 
at present weaken them. His Majesty's Government are strongly opposed to 
the use of force by one Middle East country against another, and would 
naturally use all their influence to prevent any such happening".^^ 
Despite the fact that this assurance showed that Britain was opposing the use of force 
by any Middle Eastern state against another, the general terms of the assurance still 
appeared to be unsatisfactory to Ibn Saud, particularly when it referred to the Middle 
East countries in general, and when it failed to address specifically the matter, which 
concerned Saudi Arabia, namely the dilemma over the Hashemites. Though Ibn Saud 
did not reply to the British government directly about whether he was satisfied with 
this assurance or not, his later actions in regard to the Hashemites showed that he was 
not that satisfied with it. At the end of August Ibn Saud wrote again to the British 
government asking it to prevent the Hashemite actions in regard to the plan for union 
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with Syria.^ '* Moreover, Ibn Saud appealed, in November, to the USA for a guarantee 
for the security of Saudi Arabia against any Hashemite aggression.^ ^ 
Unlike the British government, the US government took Ibn Saud's worries about the 
Hashemites more seriously. The State Department asked the Conference of the US 
representatives in the Middle East, which took place in November in Istanbul, to 
study Ibn Saud's fears of the Hashemites and to forward recommendations on that.^ ^ 
The Conference recommended that when the US Ambassador returned to Jeddah in 
December he should provide Ibn Saud with certain reassurances from the USA. In 
addition, the conference recommended that it would be helpftil i f the British 
government could echo these reassurances." After some correspondence with the 
British government regarding the final form of these reassurances, the US 
Ambassador at Jeddah made the following statement to King Ibn Saud on 6 December 
1949.58 
"(a) Problems of Saudi Arabia were extensively discussed at the Istanbul 
Conference. It was agreed that our Ambassadors in neighbouring states will 
work to prevent any situation which might arise which would threaten Saudi 
Arabian integrity and would report immediately to Washington any such 
situations which might arise. They did not at present find any situation 
existing which would cause Saudi Arabia concern in the immediate or 
foreseeable ftiture. They were all agreed it should be the continuing aim of 
United States Government to develop particularly close relations with Saudi 
Arabia, (b) With respect to His Majesty's concern about the 'encirclement' of 
Saudi Arabia, we have informed the British Government that one of the 
subjects discussed at Istanbul was the question of our traditionally close 
relationship with Saudi Arabia. It was brought out that the Saudi Arabian 
Government over a considerable period of time had expressed concern to 
United States Government over the possibility of aggression against it by one 
or more of its neighbours... The British Government has informed the United 
States Government that it gave an assurance to the Saudi Arabian Government 
in August that it would use its influence to prevent the use of force by one 
Middle East country against another. The United States Government has been 
further informed that the British Government policy remains exactly the same 
as at that time. On its part the United States Government desires to give an 
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assurance that it will continue to make clear to the Arab States concerned that 
it would be contrary to the policy of both governments and the stability of the 
area as well as inconsistent with the principles and purpose of the United 
Nations for any state to take aggressive measures against another".^' 
The explicit and precise terms of the US government assurance seemed to be 
satisfactory to Ibn Saud. Soon after this statement was delivered, Yusuf Yassin 
informed the US Minister that Ibn Saud "had been very pleased with it".^° Indeed, 
King Ibn Saud was more pleased with the US part of the assurance than the British 
part, as the Saudis at any rate made no reference to the British part. Particularly when 
the British part was the same as the already noted August assurance.^ ' 
Ibn Saud's worries and suspicions about the British stand on the Hashemite issue and 
the newly emerged border dispute made the US Ambassador in Saudi Arabia realise 
that there had been some changes in Ibn Saud's extemal policy in December 1949. It 
became apparent to Childs that Ibn Saud was no longer relying on Britain, compared 
with five years ago. Likewise, it seemed to Childs, that Ibn Saud had lost confidence 
in Britain and now he considered the USA as the only world power on whom he could 
rely. The Hashemite issue seemed to be the strongest factor behind Ibn Saud's new 
attitude according to Childs' observations.^^ 
In 1950 the Hashemites continued to be a problematic phenomenon for Ibn Saud. At 
the begirming of the year Ibn Saud tried by all means to prevent any possibility of 
Syrian unity with Iraq and/or Jordan. Ibn Saud's counter measures against any 
possibility of such unity even took the form of extending a loan of six million dollars 
to Syria on 31 January 1950, despite the critical shortage of cash Saudi Arabia was 
facing at that time.^^ 
Saudi Arabia's loan to Syria brought about anxiety within the British government, as 
Ibn Saud was seen in London as directly interfering in Syria. During an audience with 
King Ibn Saud on 1 March 1950, Scott-Fox explained the British government's 
worries about such an intervention.^ For his part. King Ibn Saud could not understand 
the motivation for the British government message in this regard. In fact, such a 
message had caused the King to grasp the importance that the British government 
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gave to the Hashemites and their interests. Whatever the case may be, without asking 
Scott-Fox about the basis of the British government worries, Ibn Saud tried to explain 
the danger of the Hashemites policies on his country.^^ 
It could be said that the British message - of the 1 '^ of March - had caused Ibn Saud to 
ftirther suspect Britain as being on the Hashemite side. During a conversation in April 
with a high ranking US official, Mr George McGhee, Ibn Saud stated frankly that he 
did not trust the British government anymore in regard to the Hashemite issue.^ ^ 
Moreover, Ibn Saud's suspicions of the British government policy in regard to the 
Hashemites made him stop complaining and asking for British assurances in 1950. 
Instead, Ibn Saud concentrated his efforts over this issue on the US government and 
on new foreign policies within the Arab world. Nevertheless the Saudis had kept 
informing the British government from time to time about the Hashemites aggressive 
policy, but without any request for assurances.^ ^ 
Instead of getting any help or assurances from Britain against the Hashemites, Ibn 
Saud tried to counter the Hashemites with a new alliance with Egypt. Thus when 
Jordan annexed the West Bank on 24 April 1950, all Saudi Arabian efforts against 
that was by working hand in hand with Egypt, within the framework of the Arab 
League.^ ^ The only mention to the British government about the Hashemites 
aggressive policy against Saudi Arabia was made in May. Yusuf Yassin told Trott on 
24 May that the Saudi government is not happy about King Abdullah's invitation to 
the two Saudi dissidents of the Alrashid family during that month.^^ 
Apart from Ibn Saud's fears of the existence of some Jordanian soldiers in the Levy 
Force, it could be said that his direct anxiety about the Hashemites was almost 
unapparent in 1951.^° Indeed, Abdullah's usual propaganda was relatively quiet 
during the first seven months of the year. The absence of anti-Saudi propaganda was 
not because of any improvement in the Saudis-Hashemites relations, but because 
Abdullah was completely occupied with his peace negotiations with the Israelis.^' 
King Abdullah's assassination on 20 July 1951 brought about a new phase in Saudi-
Hashemite relations.^^ Abdullah's death removed the main obstacles to 
rapprochement between the Saudis and the Hashemites. This was the case when 
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Abdullah's successors (Talal and then Hussain Bin Talal) dropped any notion of 
expansion, as they became "totally preoccupied by the struggle for the very survival 
of the Jordanian entity".^^ Hence, the project of Great Syria was totally abandoned 
and the Hashemites concern about the regaining of Hijaz was completely buried.^'' 
Moreover, Jordan moved closer than ever before in its relations and cooperation with 
the Arab States in general.'^ 
The death of Abdullah brought about a clear end to Ibn Saud's anxiety about the 
potentiality of the Hashemites direct threat to Saudi Aruba. Nevertheless, the end of 
such phenomenon came a little late for any recovery in Saudi-British relations. 
Indeed, by July 1951, other factors - including Ibn Saud's previous experience with 
the British government policy towards his anxiety regarding the Hashemites - such as 
the frontier issue, the impact of Saudi-US relations, etc., led to a cooling off in Saudi-
British relations in general. 
C. The Frontier Issue and its Complications for Saudi-British Relations, 1949-
1951 
This thesis is not intended to study the complication of the frontier dispute at great 
length.^^ However, a clear vision of the frontier story is needed in order to understand 
the impact of this development on Saudi-British relations.^' 
I . The Reopening of a Complicated Dispute 
It seems that it was the Saudis who were more accountable for the revival of the 
sleeping frontier dispute in 1949. By indulging in a variety of activities alongside its 
south-eastern frontiers, Saudi Arabia initiated events that led to the reopening of this 
issue. In the early days of February 1949, the Saudi government dispatched its agents 
to collect Zakat from tribes in and around Buraimi, Liwa, and Dhahirah areas (the 
southern sector of the disputed frontiers, see map one). At the same time, survey 
parties in Aramco - which was protected by Saudi guards - started to explore the 
northern part of the disputed area, in particular in the area south of Khaur Al-Udaid 
and west of Sabkhat Matti (see map one). 
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Map 1: The Disputed Area 
The first sign of protest against the Saudi activities came from the Ruler of Abu 
Dhabi, Sheikh Shakhbut Ibn Sultan, when he complained to the British Political 
Officer at Sharjah, Mr Patrick Stobart, on 9 March about the Saudis Zakat collectors' 
valuations of Abu Dhabi territories.^^ Moreover, the Iraq Pefroleum and Associated 
Companies IPC - who had the oil concessions on the Gulf Protectorates - protested 
against Aramco activities and asked the British government to preserve the British oil 
companies' interests in the area.^ " While the British officials were debating in which 
way they would protest to the Saudi government, and in which way they might open 
the frontier dispute issue, the so-called 'Stobart incident' occurred. This incident 
forced both governments to re-open the frontier negotiations.^' 
The Political Officer at Sharjah, a Member of IPC, and a brother of the Ruler of Abu 
Dhabi - Sheikh Hazz'a - discovered on 21 April 1949 several Aramco camps in the 
area around Sufuk (see map one), an area which they considered as being a part of 
Abu Dhabi territories. When Stobart protested to the head of Aramco camps, Mr 
John Holm, about working in Abu Dhabi territories, the latter replied "that their 
explorations were being conducted with the approval of the Saudi Government. . . 
[who] had sent with him an Emir [Amir] and 20 armed Saudi guards". Besides, 
when Stobart protested to the Amir of the camps. Amir Hayif of the Ajman tribe, the 
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latter replied that he had been sent by the Saudi government in order to protect the 
survey parties and he could say nothing else.*"* On the following day when Stobart 
returned to the main camp in order to deliver a written protest, the Saudi guards 
disarmed his guards and held him captive. Hayif was thinking about sending Stobart 
and his guards as prisoners to Amir Ibn Jalawi in Al-Hasa with the charge of entering 
Saudi territories armed and without permission. Nevertheless, after some discussions, 
in which Aramco officials helped, Stobart's guards' rifies were returned and the 
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political officer and his guards were set free and allowed to leave. 
Following the 'Stobart incident' the Saudi government sent a note to the British 
government. In that note the Saudis formally protested against Stobart's action, and 
insisted that Aramco activities were undoubtedly within Saudi Arabia territories. The 
note, which had asked for the opening of friendly discussions on the disputed frontier, 
also indicated that orders had been given to Aramco to withdraw temporarily from the 
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disputed area until when a complete understanding had been achieved. On 11 May, 
The British Embassy - at Jeddah - sent the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
a reply, which indicated that, the British government, "consider that complaint which 
the Saudi Arabian authorities have made against Mr Stobart's action is inadmissible. 
The locality in question is within the territory which His Majesty's Government 
recognise . . . as being under the sovereignty of the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi".^^ 
Nevertheless, the same note expressed the British government's willingness to 
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commence the proposed "fiiendly" discussions over the frontier question. 
Though King Ibn Saud might had been aware that activities alongside the disputed 
area would bring the unsolved issue to its old track, he was yet keen - at the same time 
- not to let such an issue completely damage his Kingdom's relations with Britain. It 
could be said that the King was not willing to risk these relations, particularly when 
he was in need of Britain at that time. Security issues that related Saudi Arabia to 
Britain were still vital, particulariy when the King was still waiting for responses to 
the treaty proposal, and when the revival of the Hashemite problem had persuaded 
him to reconsider British assurances. 
Prior to the 'Stobart incident' the King had already attempted to formulate a fiiendly 
background to relations with Britain, in case of a negative eruption in the frontier 
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dispute. On 18 April Ibn Saud sent the British government a friendly message in 
which he stressed the importance that Saudi Arabia was attaching to its fiiendship 
with Britain "both now and in the fiiture".*^ Into the bargain, Ibn Saud's message had 
also emphasised that: 
" . . . we like to express to Great Britain the fact that we wish to stand by her 
side, just as we have done in the past, and to reach agreement with her in all 
matters touching the strengthening of our relations on a sound, firm, and clear 
basis and to sfrengthen our friendship and our relations with her in such a way 
that the essential interests of both of us shall be guaranteed".'" 
Ibn Saud's message provoked a positive reply from London on 12 May in which the 
British government expressed its gratification in receiving Ibn Saud's "assurances of. 
. . fiiendship" and in return it "reciprocate these assurances".'' Indeed, King Ibn 
Saud's caution seemed to be - at least - working, particularly when it kept Saudi-
British relations relatively intact from the consequences of the first episode over the 
frontier question. 
In preparation for the proposed discussions the British government sent the Saudi 
government a memorandum on 17 June 1949.'^ The memorandum explained that 
Britain wished to carry out the frontier discussion on/from the basis of the 1913-1914 
Anglo-Turkish Convention. Moreover, on political aspects it was indicated that the 
British government had gained the impression that Ibn Saud may have thought that 
because Britain had "relinquished their position in India they were also prepared to 
withdraw from their long association with the Persian Gulf . . . His Majesty's 
Government in the United Kingdom have, however, no intention of withdrawing from 
their long association with and special position in the Persian G u l f .'^ When Scott-
Fox presented the memorandum, Ibn Saud instructed Fuad Hamza to discuss its 
details with the British diplomat, a clear sign that the King did not want to involve 
himself in the details of the issue. However Ibn Saud briefly indicated to Scott-Fox, 
that his conquest of Hasa in 1913 was providing a suitable starting point for the 
negotiations, as he was not a part of the Anglo-Turkish Convention. Moreover, Ibn 
Saud stated that nothing had been done or would be done to put pressure on Britain's 
position in the Gulf, as Saudi Arabia "had done nothing which might suggest that they 
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[the Saudis] wish to exert any form of pressure on the British Government in order to 
drive them out of the Persian Gulf'.''* 
Initial discussion was held in August between Saudi and British representatives. 
Nevertheless, because of the position of each side about the basis for the negotiations, 
this meeting resulted in nothing. As the Saudis were referring to the tribal areas as the 
basis that should be considered for any frontier negotiations, the British 
representatives could not get a clear vision of the whole Saudis argument. Thus, the 
British representatives asked the Saudis for a clear written statement.'^  
On 14 October 1949, Saudi Arabia presented a comprehensive set of claims regarding 
the frontiers (see map two).^^ For the frontier between Saudi Arabia and Qatar the 
Saudi Arabian government statement indicated that it: 
"starts from a point at the coast of Dohat Salwa at 24° 56' North . . . [then] 
the line runs due East until it intersects longitude 51° . . . [then] runs in a 
straight line . . . until it reaches the sea coast at latitude 24° 48' North".'' 
For the frontier between Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia the statement state that it: 
"starts from a point on the Persian G u l f . . . two kilometers east of Bandar Al 
Mirfa . . . [then] the boundary runs in a straight line to the South West until it 
reaches latitude 23° 56' North . . .[then] it runs due East till it intersects 
longitude 54° East . . . from that intersection it runs in a sfraight line as far as 
latitiide 24° 25' North and longitiide 55° 36' East".'^ 
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Map 2: Saudi Arabian Claim of October 1949 
For the rest of the southeastern frontier, the statement indicates that it would be 
resolved directly between Saudi Arabia and the other independent Sheikdoms. A clear 
reference to Oman. Thus, the Saudi government was informing the British 
government that it would not deal with it in regard to other lands, which were not 
considered to be a British protectorate. 99 
It became clear from the Saudi Arabian government claim - which exceeded any 
previous Saudi claims (see map three) - that the Saudis were putting forward a long-
term objective, rather than a short term one, thus, indicating that the Saudi Arabian 
government was intending to enter into a comprehensive bargaining negotiation. 
These negotiations would be more based on the interests of Saudi Arabian territories 
than on any other factor even i f it would have an impact on Saudi-British relations.'"" 
Nevertheless, the Saudi government continued formally mentioning (to the British 
government) its desire of preserving its relations with Britain from any sequence of 
misunderstanding on this issue.'"' 
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Map 3: Previous Claims 
The British government response came out on 30 November completely rejecting the 
Saudi Arabian c l a i m . I t was stated that the British government "have no option but 
to take up their position on the basis of the legal claim, namely the 'Blue Line' and the 
'Violet Line' as defined by the Anglo-Turkish Conventions of the 29th July, 1913 and 
the 9th March, 1914".'°^ Furthermore, the British government insisted that it was 
responsible for the other lands belonging to the Sultan of Muscat as the Sultan had 
asked Britain to represent him in any negotiations.'°'* 
The Saudi government replied on 10 December 1949.'°^ In its note the Saudi 
government stated that it had the opinion that: 
"the friendship which exists between them and the British Government cannot 
possibly be shaken in the solution of any problem as long as the guiding 
principle of the two parties remains the maintenance of friendship on the basis 
of justice and right". 
However, the same note mentioned that the Saudi Arabian government would never 
return to the consideration of the 'Blue Line and the Violet Line'. It also indicated, 
that the principle which its previous claim depended upon was that the territory 
claimed "is occupied by their subjects, on which they have jurisdiction and in which 
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their writ runs". Moreover, in this note the Saudi government suggested the 
establishment of a joint Committee to study the true state of the disputed area.'"' 
Despite the Saudi government mentioning its desire to protect friendly Saudi-British 
relations during the frontier dispute, it became clear by the end of 1949 that these 
would suffer from what seemed to be the beginning of an extensive and a long-term 
conflict. 
I I . The Continuity of the Frontier Issue in 1950, and the USA Role 
During 1950 the frontier dispute did not help the course of Saudi-British relations; in 
fact it brought about increasingly declining relations. Much of the year was spent on 
correspondence between the Saudi and the British governments, communications that 
were not free from resentments and complaints of each party against the other. 
Moreover, the seemingly endless frontier dispute witnessed the initiation of a US role 
in 1950, a role that may possibly have further complicated Saudi-British relations 
whilst improving Saudi-US relations. 
By the spring of 1950 the dispute was further worsened by the resumption of the 
disputed parties activities in the area. On 18 April the British government complained, 
on behalf of the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, against the activities of the Saudi's Zakat 
collectors in Liwa Oasis. On 11 May the Saudi government replied, rejecting the 
complaint and explaining that the Zakat collectors were merely doing their normal 
duties (as they had for years). The new element according to the Saudi government 
account was the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi's intervention in a matter which concerned only 
the Saudi government and its subjects.'"* Furthermore, on 21 May 1950, the Saudi 
government objected to the operations of the (British) oil companies in the disputed 
area. The British government replied later, rejecting the Saudi complaint on the 
grounds that the operations were carried out in an area, which did not belong to Saudi 
Arabia.'"^ 
On 25 July, The British government sent a memorandum to the Saudi government 
explaining the British point of view on the frontier dispute."" After insisting that the 
Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1913-14 was the point on which the frontiers should be 
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considered, the British government explained in that memorandum, that the collection 
of the Zakat from the moving nomadic tribes did not constitute an adequate proof in 
international law of sovereign rights. On a positive note, the British government 
agreed in this memorandum, about the idea of (10 December 1949) forming a joint 
technical commission to study without any obligation the whole issue of the frontier 
dispute. British agreement on setting up such a commission was conditional on three 
defined points. First, "that pending and during the Commission's investigations both 
sides will abstain from any measures of pressure or inducement on persons or tribes 
who may be called upon to give evidence before the commission"."' Second, "that 
the Commission should be empowered to discuss, as part of their general 
investigation, the situation in regard to Bureimi [Buraimi] and the areas claimed by 
the Sultan of Muscat"."^ Third, that "the Saudi Arabian Government are prepared to 
fiimish detailed evidence in support of the claims east of the Blue and Violet lines of 
the Anglo-Turkish Conventions of 1913 and 1914 which they have put forward"."^ 
In a detailed memorandum on 22 September the Saudi government replied to the 
British memorandum of 25 July.""* In it the Saudi government argued that the British 
government's persistence in referring to the Anglo-Turkish Conventions would not 
bring any result, as Saudi Arabia had nothing to do with such a commitment. 
Nevertheless, the Saudi government expressed its satisfaction about the British 
government's agreement regarding the establishment of the joint technical 
commission. Moreover, the Saudi Arabian government agreed upon the first two 
conditions which the British government had asked for. However, the Saudi 
government could not agree about submitting detailed proof for its claims. On this, 
the Saudi government indicated that it: 
"have been in possession of these places since olden times . . . [and therefore] 
cannot be requested to prove their sovereignty [on what it owns], and proofs 
are to be demanded only from him who claims ownership of what is not in his 
possession"."^ 
In this tone the Saudi and the British government continued exchanging notes and 
memorandums regarding the proposed frontier commission until they finally agreed 
about its establishment in April 1951."^ Nevertheless, this dialogue was not free of 
disagreement and conflict. Thus, without a successfiil American intervention, the 
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frontier commission proposal was about to be dropped by the British government in 
November 1950."^ 
The US govermnent's role in the Saudi-British conflict over the frontier came about as 
a result of several attempts made by the Saudi government and the Arabian American 
Oil Company. The first attempt to initiate a US governmental role over the frontier 
issue came fi-om the Saudis. In the summer of 1949 the Saudi goverrmient had asked 
the US govenmient for help in bringing pressure on Britain. Nevertheless, the US 
Ambassador in Saudi Arabia rejected the Saudi attempt at that time.^'^ Despite the 
American stand in 1949, the Saudi government and Aramco still had great 
expectations about a possible US role in this matter at future stages."' Therefore, 
Aramco executives made great efforts in 1950 to persuade the State Department to 
bring pressure on Britain in order to smooth its stand on the frontier issue. On these 
lines Aramco executives pressed the State Department, in April 1950, to persuade the 
British government to agree to direct negotiations between Ibn-Saud and the Sheikhs 
of the concerned Gulf Emirates. 
In May, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Mr Raymond Hare, suggested to 
Foreign Office officials that they should consider the idea of direct negotiations 
between the Saudis and the Gulf protectorate Sheikhs. Nevertheless, the head of the 
Eastern Department at the Foreign Office, Mr Geoffrey Furlonge, rejected Hare's 
proposal, on the grounds that Britain was responsible for the foreign policy of these 
121 
protectorates. 
Despite the failure of the first attempt made by the States Department in May 1950, 
the US role was more successful during the last two months of 1950. On 11 
November, the British government sent the Saudi government a message indicating 
that as the Saudi Authority had not yet produced any evidence in support of its claims 
east of the Blue Line, Britain regarded itself as free to exercise its right in these 
territories.Immediately after receiving this message, Ibn Saud asked the new 
American Ambassador, Mr Raymond Hare, to meet him at once. During Hare's 
audience with Ibn Saud on 18 November in Riyadh, the King complained about the 
British government's insulting insistence on him to provide evidence of what he 
owned. After explaining to Hare that the British were withdrawing from their 
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proposal of the 25th of July 1950, the King asked for US support in order to make the 
British government more reasonable in their policy. Following his arrival in Jeddah, 
Hare met Trott and suggested that the British government should establish a joint 
frontier commission as proposed. Hare also argued with Trott to take more effective 
steps towards settlements rather than indulging in endless correspondence.'^'' 
Hare's suggestion to Trott was fully endorsed by the State Department. In this regard 
the State Department argued that the Foreign Office should bring about a settlement 
by reviving the proposed joint commission scheme. Moreover, the State Department 
warned the Foreign Office that the Saudi's might take the whole issue of the dispute 
to the United Nations i f there was no progress. Following the American intervention 
and pressure on Britain, the Foreign Office reinstated the July 1950 proposal at the 
beginning of 1951. Thus, as a result of the US government's action the British 
government (on 1 January 1951) waived the condition for the establishment of the 
commission, which requested the Saudis to provide details of evidence of their claim 
before hand.'^ ^ 
The continuation of the frontier dispute without any positive result in 1950 did make a 
further negative impact on Saudi-British relations. The complaints, the explanations, 
and the insistence of each party on the right of its point of views, counted when it 
came to the assessment of their relations. Moreover, i f the newly adopted US role in 
this issue continued in the following years its impact would still contribute to 
declining Saudi-British relations. 
I I I . From the Complications of the Frontier Issue, with Establishment of the Trucial 
Levy Force to the Temporary Improvement at the End of 1951 
Toward the end of 1950 and the beginning of 1951 the British government was in the 
process of forming a small force of police for the Trucial Sheikdoms, which became 
known as the Levy Force .The British government intended to bring trainers for this 
force from the Jordanian Arab Legion. From a British point of view the training for 
the new force would be practicable i f Arab Jordanian soldiers carried it out. 
Nevertheless, such a policy was anathema to Ibn Saud as the creation of such a force 
would not only threaten the Saudi Arabian eastern frontier but also would 
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consequently bring Hashemite soldiers to it. It could be said that the impact of the 
frontier dispute on Saudi-British relations ironically collided with the other factor 
which was responsible for the deterioration in Saudi-British relations during the past 
few years, namely the Hashemite issue. 
It was clear to the British Ambassador to Saudi Arabia by the beginning of 1951 that 
Saudi-British relations were deteriorating. On this Trott wrote to the Foreign Office 
on 6 January 1951 stating that he was "disturbed at the deterioration of our relations 
with the Saudi Arabian Government over the past few months".'^* Trott warned the 
Foreign Office that the unsolved frontier dispute was not the only matter which was 
worsening Saudi-British relations; the recent creation of the Levy Force had brought a 
wind of change into Saudi-British relations.'^^ Clearly on this Trott indicated that 
"there is no doubt that it is the frontier negotiations and Levy Force that have 
combined to throw a shadow over our relations with these people [Saudi Arabian]". 
Trott argued that "unless we could get down to brass tacks about the frontier 
negotiations without delay their wrangle would be likely to prejudice relations 
generally".''^' Moreover, Trott indicated that the Levy Force would bring the Saudis to 
question the state of their relations with Britain, particularly when the formation of 
this force had something to do with the Arab Legion.'''^ 
Indeed the existence of some soldiers from the Arab Legion in the Levy Force had 
caused Saudi alarm about its formation. On 9 January Yusuf Yassin protested on 
behalf of the King about the formation of the Levy Force.Yassin informed Trott 
that: 
"It was completely incomprehensible to the King . . . why . . . [the British] 
had to call in the Arab Legion for the formation of this force. So long as there 
was one Arab Legion soldier on the Saudi Arabian Eastern frontier the King 
would consider this as an unfriendly act".'^'' 
In January 1951, Ibn Saud deviated from his own policy of not negotiating the details 
of the frontiers problem with the British himself, he had previously left that job for his 
advisers and Ministers to do.'^ ^ During an audience on 10 January, the King told the 
British Ambassador that he was extraordinarily concerned about the British 
government's intention of bringing soldiers from the Arab Legion to his eastem 
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frontier.'^^ Moreover, Ibn Saud said to Trott that, the creation of "this force could 
only be to cause trouble and exert pressure on him".'''^ The King pointed out to the 
British Ambassador that, " i f however . . . [the British Government] imagined that this 
would enable . . . [it] to 'kick out the tribes who had been there 1,000 years' then it 
was the same as i f . . .[the British government] threatened his Riyadh Palace or his 
own life".'^^ Speaking in sorrow, Ibn Saud indicated to Trott that the British 
government's recent moves in the creation of such a force was a very strange way to 
treat a "friend of the darker days".'''' The King stressed that he had always maintained 
his friendship with the British government and "he had always told the Arabs that 
their real friend was Britain . . . now however all the Arabs were asking what had 
happened to his friendship with Britain when the latter was threatening him in the 
Eastern territories".'''° Ibn Saud warned Trott that i f the British government was 
determined to go ahead with such a plan it would not be in its interests nor would it be 
fair in its relations with Saudi Arabia. The King stated that surely the British 
government had the upper hand as it had: 
"the tanks, guns and aeroplanes and he could not stop . . . [it from forming 
such a force] nor would he try . . . but he would no longer be in a position to 
try to influence the other Arabs in favour of friendship with . . . [the British] 
since they would say . . . that the British rewarded friends like him with 
threats".'^' 
Despite the fact that Trott assured Ibn Saud (during the conversation) that "no threat 
of any kind was intended and that this small police force would be in any case for 
purely internal purposes",''*^ the King's fears were not calmed. Indeed, the king stated 
that: 
"he, as an old friend, deserved better treatment a t . . . [the British] hands and . 
. . that to put the Jordanian soldiers on his frontiers in any guise was as bad for 
him as it would be for . . . [the British] i f he were to put Soviet soldiers on 
[theirs]".''*^ 
During all his arguments Ibn Saud clearly distinguished between two matters 
regarding his objection to the creation of the Levy Force. The first was the possible 
threat of such a force to the security of the southeastern frontier of Saudi Arabia. The 
second was the inclusion in the Levy Force of Jordanian solders. To some extent Ibn 
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Saud seemed to be willing to tolerate the first matter, but undoubtedly was unwilling 
to tolerate the second one. Hence, at the conclusion of the conversations with Trott, 
Ibn Saud was willing to accept the assurances conditionally i f the police force was to 
be small in number and did not contain any soldier from the Arab Legion.''*^ Ibn 
Saud's conditional acceptance was strongly supported by Trott when he wrote to the 
Foreign Office on 12 January, recommending a modification of the Levy Force plan. 
Trott argued that it was clear that Ibn Saud attached importance to the cooperation 
between the Levy Force and the Arab Legion and that considerable harm could be 
done to Saudi-British relations unless the British government modified it's plan on 
this.' ' ' -
The Foreign Office did not agree with either Ibn Saud's worries or with Trott's 
recommendations. In fact it was thought that the Levy Force matter should not be 
exaggerated. Mr H. A. Dudgeon of the Eastem Department minuted on 22 January 
that Ibn Saud's worries were irrational and unreasonable and that "since our policy in 
regard to this matter has already been decided . . . no further comment is called 
for".''*^ Indeed, as in the case of Ibn Saud's worries about the Hashemites, the British 
government continued to misunderstand the King's anxieties in this particular case. 
Though the Trucial Levy Force continued to be a problem for Ibn Saud, the two 
parties seemed to make some progress on the issue of the frontier commission. 
Exchange of notes between the Saudi and the British governments continued until 
they both agreed in April 1951 on the setting up of the commission in the autumn of 
1951.'^^ 
Disturbed by his anxiety about the Levy Force Ibn Saud asked the US government to 
help in persuading the British government to modify its policy. Backing Ibn Saud on 
this, Mr Lewis Jones, the Director of the Office of Eastem Affairs of the State 
Department, took the opportunity to hold talks in this regard with Mr Geoffrey 
Furlonge, the head of the Eastem Department of the Foreign Office during the latter's 
visit to Washington in April 1951. Without any pressure at this time, the American 
hoped that the British government would modify their policy towards Saudi Arabia, 
particularly in the two question concerning Ibn Saud, namely the frontier dispute and 
the Levy Force.'''^ 
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On 18 April, Yusuf Yassin re-complained to the British on behalf of the King about 
the case of the Levy Force. Yassin indicated to Trott, that the British government 
intention of going ahead with its plan to include Hashemite soldiers in the Levy Force 
was indeed an unfriendly act, especially when it was against King Ibn Saud's 
wishes.''*' Moreover, on 2 May, the Saudi Ambassador to London presented to 
Furlonge a note containing the same complaint about the Levy Force and elucidating 
Ibn Saud's general dissatisfaction about the present state of the frontiers negotiations. 
The note also reflected Ibn Saud's view that the British government was less friendly 
towards him than in the past.' 
The continuous Saudi complaints and the State Department's advice seemed to 
produce an outcome from the Foreign Office in May 1951. At this stage, Furlonge 
wrote a minute on 21 May, illustrating the frontier dispute issue in particular and 
Saudi-British relations in general.'^' The frontier negotiations were a complicated 
matter and would continue to be a more difficult issue in Furlonge's point of view. On 
this Furlonge explained that as far as the Saudis were exaggerating their claims and as 
far as the British were obliged to protect the interests of their Gulf Protectorates, it 
seemed that they would not satisfy Ibn Saud on the issue, at least in the short term. On 
the Levy Force, Furlonge indicated that it seemed that it was "Ibn Saud's anti-
Hashemite obsession [which] makes him particularly sensitive to the operation of 
Jordan persoimel along his frontiers".'^^ Furlonge's minute goes on to explain the 
recent complexity of these two issues for Saudi-British relations and Ibn Saud's stand 
and the British government position: 
"The crux of the matter is, however, that as Ibn Saud grows older he becomes 
more fixed in his ideas and less amenable to reason. He has been a loyal friend 
of His Majesty's Government, and his counsels in the Arab League have 
frequently been helpful. Of late years he has paid more attention to the 
Americans, but still values his friendship with this coimtry, although the price 
of that friendship has been increasing. He seems now to have got it into his 
head . . . [that] H.M.G's attitude towards him is less friendly than of old. The 
fact is that we are just as well-disposed to him, but cannot give him 
satisfaction over his present complaints without betraying the interests of our 
Protectorates or weakening our position in the G u l f .'^ ^ 
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Therefore, Furlonge saw no point at this stage in giving Saudi Arabia any concession 
on either the Levy Force matter or the frontier issue. Nevertheless, in order to 
safeguard Saudi-British relations Furlonge argued that "it seems therefore desirable . . 
. to do something to reassure him [Ibn Saud] of our continued friendship".''" At this 
stage the only possible action that the British government could take, in Furlonge's 
opinion, was to extend an invitation to the Saudi Arabian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Amir Faisal, to pay an official visit to London for general discussions on Anglo-Saudi 
relations and outstanding problems.'^^ 
In an audience with the King on 28 May, the British Ambassador to Saudi Arabia 
extended the invitation formally.''^ Combining the invitation, Trott conveyed to Ibn 
Saud a message from the Foreign Office indicating that, the British government 
regretted that: 
"Ibn Saud should feel that our traditional friendship for him has in any way 
declined and that he should doubt our good intentions, since our feelings 
towards him and his people are as cordial as ever. It seems that he is under 
some misunderstanding as to our attitude towards the questions at issue. For 
that reason . . . [we] feel that it would be of advantage i f . . . Amir Faisal, 
could come to London to have general talks with us on any subject of mutual 
interest which either side might wish to raise".''' 
The potential outcome of Faisal's visit to London was a matter of concern for both the 
British and the Saudi Arabian governments. Hence, both governments sincerely 
intended, by that time, to make such an occasion a success."^ For Britain it was 
advantageous to improve its relations with Saudi Arabia, not just for the sake of 
Saudi-British relations, which was an important matter, but also for the benefit of 
improving Britain's position in the Middle East at that precise time; particularly when 
Britain was facing a serious crisis with Iran in mid-1951 (the well known Musaddiqi 
Crisis)."^ The Saudi government was also seeking a positive result from the visit, 
particularly when Ibn Saud was apprehensive that a negative result from the visit 
might further worsen an already complicated situation.'^° 
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During Amir Faisal's visit to London from the 7^ to the 25"^  of August 1951, several 
meetings were held between the Saudi delegation and the British officials at the 
Foreign Office. During these meetings several topics were raised for discussion, in 
particular, the Gulf Islands, the Southeast Arabia frontier, and the Levy Force.'*' 
In spite of the fact that the Hashemite issue had become of less concern to Ibn Saud 
by August 1951, still the Saudis were not willing to leave the issue of the Trucial 
Levy Force aside.'^ ^ In fact such an issue was high on the Saudi Arabian delegation's 
agenda. In the first session of the meetings, Amir Faisal indicated that the British 
government policy of including military persoimel fi-om Jordan in the Levy Force was 
considered to be an anti- Saudi Arabian act.'*^ Mr R. Bowker, the Assistant Under-
Secretary, who led the UK party, stated that the Saudi Arabian government 
misunderstood the case of the Levy Force. Bowker explained that the "secondment of 
Jordanian personnel to this Force had been a purely practical measure . . . [and] the 
purpose of the Force was to control slave traffic, to provide political representatives 
with escorts and to maintain internal security in the Trucial States".'^ Bowker 
assured Faisal that the total number of the force was small, as it was less than a 
hundred men including thirty-five Jordanian instructors. Furthermore, the thirty-five 
"personnel seconded from Jordan would return as soon as they had completed their 
duties in training the members of the Force who had been recruited locally".'*^ 
Further assurance was given to Faisal - by Bowker - that "the Levy Force had strict 
instructions to avoid all political activity and his Majesty's Government would ensure 
that they were carried out".'** 
Bowker's remarks and assurances about the Levy Force seemed to be satisfactory for 
the Saudis, particularly when the Hashemite issue was less troublesome to them by 
that time. Hence the Saudi-Anglo discussion went over the delimitation of the Gulf 
Islands and the seabed between Saudi Arabia and both Bahrain and Kuwait.'*^ The 
Islands and seabed discussion - which both parties decided to deal with separately to 
the land frontier issue - were a great success. Both parties agreed, during several 
sessions, about the delimitation of the Gulf seabed and the allocation of its Islands 
between Saudi Arabia and each of Bahrain and Kuwait.'*^ 
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On the land frontier issue the British representatives accepted a suggestion by Faisal 
of holding a round-table conference in the following winter between a Saudi Arabian 
delegation and a Gulf delegation headed by a United Kingdom representative. 
Moreover, it was agreed that both sides would suspend all their activities, including 
force movements and oil companies operations, in the disputed areas until when the 
agreed conference had taken place. By this agreement they both also decided to 
temporarily suspend the previously agreed frontier commission, until when the 
conference commenced.'^ ^ 
As it happens the issue of the Levy Force, which was a matter of concem for Ibn Saud 
at the opening of the year, was the vehicle that brought about the London Conference 
in August 1951. Before the London meetings the British government did not relieve 
Ibn Saud's anxiety about the Levy Force issue. Therefore the state of Saudi-British 
relations had worsened at least in Ibn Saudi's view. Nevertheless, the outcomes of the 
London Conference were to some extent generally positive as far as Saudi-British 
relations were concerned. Thus, the Levy Force issue was at last rested, though it 
should be mentioned that its resolution was a little late, particularly when the 
Hashemites no longer formed the usual threat to Saudi Arabia.''" Moreover, the 
London conference was positive in solving the Gulf Islands and the seabed dispute 
between Saudi Arabia and its neighbours, a matter which had it not been solved might 
have further complicated an already complex frontier dispute. Finally, even though 
the conference did not totally solve the land frontier issue, the proposed round-table 
conference made the future of this issue look bright. A l l in all, it could be said that the 
overall result of the London Conference was positive for Saudi-British relations. 
Therefore, it could also be said that relations were at least temporarily saved from the 
gravity of a full collapse. 
D. The Reinforcement of Saudi-US Relations 
The upgrading of diplomatic relations, from that of legations to that of embassies, 
between Saudi Arabia and the USA in the spring of 1949, was a good omen for those 
two States' relations.''' It seems that Ambassador Childs' audience with King Ibn 
Saud in May 1949 was the initial point at which the US government started to 
consider the possibility of forming a military alliance with Saudi Arabia. During that 
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audience Ibn Saud explained to Childs the danger that Saudi Arabia was facing, 
especially with the Hashemites problems and with the cooling off of Anglo-Saudi 
relations.'^^ After mentioning his desire for USA help and assistance militarily, the 
King warned the Ambassador that he "was now coming to . . . [the USA] for the last 
time to ask . . .for help".'^^ Following the audience Childs cabled his government 
recommending that they give a very thoughtful consideration to Ibn Saud's needs.'^ '' 
Though, Ibn Saud did not receive a direct reply to his request fi-om the US 
government in 1949, he started to see some optimistic developments when an 
American Reconnaissance Party visited Saudi Arabia in mid-August 1949, in order to 
study the future of the Dhahran Airfield.'^^ 
In March 1950, the US government sent the Assistant Secretary of State for Near 
Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Mr George McGhee, to Saudi Arabia 
especially to discuss Saudi Arabian security requirements.'^* Several discussions were 
held between McGhee and the Saudis during the visit, which lasted for six days from 
the 18* of March. The overall Saudi message during these discussions was that Saudi 
Arabia wanted "to convert its economic partnership with the United States into a fi i l l 
military alliance".'^^ 
At great length Ibn Saud explained to McGhee his concern about the possibility of 
Hashemite aggression against Saudi Arabia. The King highlighted Saudi Arabia's 
need for strong military forces in order to protect itself against such an attack. When 
McGhee tried to calm Ibn Saud's fears about the Hashemites by remarking that the 
British government were capable of preventing any Hashemite aggression, Ibn Saud 
replied by stating that he did not trust the British government anymore, as they were, 
in fact, protecting the Hashemites by means of treaty relations. Ibn Saud expounded to 
McGhee, that he had refused a treaty of alliance with Britain because he preferred to 
have such a treaty with the United States of America instead. Thus, as he had given 
the oil concessions to the Americans, and as the Americans existed in Saudi Arabia 
not just through their oil interests but also by their involvement in the Dhahran 
Airfield, Saudi Arabia therefore, needed and preferred to conclude a military alliance 
with the United States. As well as that Saudi Arabia needed to obtain military 
assistance from the USA on a grant basis. 
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McGhee replied that the US government was aware of the importance of the 
maintenance of Saudi Arabian security and was also willing to assist. Moreover, he 
emphasised how vital were the interests of the US in Saudi Arabia and how unique 
was the relationship between Saudi Arabia and the USA, particularly when this type 
of unique relationship only existed with Saudi Arabia rather than any other Middle 
Eastern country. Nevertheless, the US government could not conclude a treaty of 
alliance with Saudi Arabia, as that would be contrary to its traditional policy in the 
Middle East. McGhee explained - to Ibn Saud - that the USA's policy in the Middle 
East still differed from British policy there, as the USA had not concluded any 
alliance treaty with any state in the Middle East yet.'^' 
Instead of an alliance treaty McGhee suggested other measures, which would achieve 
the same end (as such a treaty). Those measures that McGhee offered to Ibn Saud 
included:'^° 
1. The conclusion of a treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation. 
2. The providing of technicians to Saudi Arabia under the Point Four Program. 
3. Loans by the Export-Import Bank. 
4. The conclusion of a long-term Dhahran Airfield Agreement. 
5. The providing of a military aid program on a cash-reimbursable basis. 
6. The providing of a military mission to train Saudi Arabian forces. 
Though Saudi Arabia could not get an American alliance during McGhee's visit, it 
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seemed that the Saudis were finally satisfied with the whole package. Moreover, 
the gradual implementation of this comprehensive package was pleasing to the Saudi 
Arabians. Indeed, when it was put into practice - next to the reality of the US 
government intention of backing Saudi Arabia - a remarkable enhancement in Saudi-
US relations was an obvious phenomenon vis-a-vis the antithesis of developments in 
Saudi-British relations. 
In July 1950 President Truman signed a new law, which amended the USA Mutual 
Defence Assistant Act. This amendment allowed the US Administration to transfer 
military equipment, materials, and services - at no cost to the US - to states that had 
not joined the US in any defence arrangement "but whose security was important to 
the United States".'^ ^ Thus, Saudi Arabia became eligible for cash reimbursable 
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military assistance under this new law.'^^ Moreover, in August 1950 the Saudi 
government obtained a new loan of $15 million from the Import Export Bank. The 
loan which was to be repaid over a 15 year period had given the US private sector a 
further boost in the Kingdom as almost all of its capital had been put into 
development projects which were carried out by American companies.'*'* 
To demonstrate the importance of Saudi-US relations, the US President nominated a 
high ranking US official to be the new Ambassador to Saudi Arabia. On 28 August 
1950, President Tmman nominated the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Raymond 
Hare, as Ambassador to Saudi Arabia.'*' Furthermore, on 31 October 1950, President 
Tmman wrote to King Ibn Saud with a new assurance for the preservation of Saudi 
Arabian security: 
"The United States is interested in the preservation of the independence and 
territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia. No threat to your Kingdom could occur 
which would not be a matter of immediate concem to the United States".'*^ 
The enrichment of the Saudi-US relationship did not stop at that, which was of a 
relatively new nature, but it also touched the basis on which the original relationship 
was built, namely the American oil interests in Saudi Arabia. In order to comprehend 
this point, the development of Saudi government relations with Aramco in 1950 need 
to be briefly explained. 
It became apparent to the Saudi government in 1950 that the royalties that it was 
receiving from Aramco were not satisfactory to meet their financial needs. Under 
these considerations, and as a tactic by the Saudi government in order to persuade 
Aramco to increase its payment to the Kingdom, the Saudi Finance Minister, Mr 
Abdullah Ibn Sulaiman, put great pressure on Aramco to finance nearly all the 
development projects in the Eastem province of Saudi Arabia.'*' Ibn Sulaiman's 
actions were aimed at persuading the company executives to re-negotiate the basis of 
the 1933 oil concession, in particular the sections related to the royalty payment.'** 
The Saudi Arabian government's new policy towards Aramco was motivated by two 
factors. First, the Saudi government knew that Aramco's taxation payment to the US 
government in 1949 was larger than the yield that Saudi Arabia was getting in 
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royalties.'^' Second, Saudi Arabia thought that its efforts would succeed in persuading 
Aramco to agree on a fifty-fifty division of profits, particularly when the Venezuelan 
success in this direction - in 1948 - was well knovra to the Saudis."" 
When the State Department learned of this, it argued that Aramco should either 
increase its payment to the Saudi Arabian government or renegotiate the basis of the 
royalty payments. The State Department argued that it was necessary to increase 
Saudi Arabian income in order to stabilise Aramco's future position there.'" Hence, 
by July 1950, Aramco was convinced that it should negotiate a new basis of the oil 
income payment with the Saudi Arabian government."^ The Saudi-Aramco 
negotiations - in November and December - resulted in the aimouncement of an 
agreement on 30 December 1950. According to this agreement the net profits of the 
oil income would be shared between Saudi Arabia and Aramco on a fifty-fifty 
basis."^ 
Undoubtedly the Saudi-Aramco agreement had secured the fliture of Aramco in Saudi 
Arabia. Thus when the upheaval of the nationalisation of the Persian oil industry took 
place at the beginning of 1951, Saudi Arabia announced publicly that the future of the 
Saudi Arabian oil field would not be affected by what was happening in Persia."'' 
Moreover, it could be said that the US government policy - which was well knovm to 
the Saudis - in encouraging Aramco to reach an agreement with Saudi Arabia had in 
fact enhanced Saudi-US relations."^ Ultimately the positive US policy towards the 
process of Saudi-Aramco relations in 1950 had caused the Saudi government to be 
more ambitious in increasing ties with the USA vis-a-vis declining Saudi-British 
relations. Moreover, it would not be impossible to envisage that the Saudi government 
had compared the US government policy towards Aramco with the British 
government policy towards the Gulf Protectorates, particularly on the issues that had 
arisen between Saudi Arabia and these elements. No doubt the comparison of these 
policies would give the US govenmient more credit than the British government in 
the eyes of the Saudi Arabian officials. 
Furthermore, the swift implementation of almost all McGhee's package points by the 
end of 1951 was a further visible improvement in the well-being of Saudi-American 
relations. On 17 January 1951 the Saudi Arabian government and the US government 
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signed an agreement for technical cooperation under the Point Four Programme.'^ ^ 
According to this agreement the USA would supply Saudi Arabia with numbers of 
technical advisers who would help in almost all the sectors of developments in the 
Kingdom.'^' Consequently, in 1951 American advisers and experts began to arrive in 
Saudi Arabia; among them there were experts on agriculture, irrigation, accountancy, 
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and a financial adviser. The significant of this development was that it enhanced 
USA penetration in Saudi Arabia at all levels. On this Scott-Fox remarked that "since 
once American experts have installed themselves here they wil l probably try to 
influence the Saudi Arabia Government in the direction of obtaining still further 
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American advice and assistance". It should be remembered here that the case of the 
financial adviser was a point of major conflict between the USA and Britain in Saudi 
Arabia in the mid-1940s.^°° Nevertheless, in 1951 the case was deferred as the British 
government concluded that it did not "wish to make too much of any local differences 
. . . with the Americans, lest such differences be magnified and have an adverse effect 
on the general collaboration . . . with them over the wider Middle East sphere".^ *" Of 
course at this particular time the Saudi-British relationship itself did not help the 
British government to make such a move against the Americans. 
In the first half of 1951 the Saudis and the Americans undertook negotiations for a 
long-term agreement for the Dhahran airfield. The negotiations were extensive and 
difficult at the beginning, as the US officials were interested in a twenty-five year 
lease, whereas the Saudis were reluctant to give such a long-term commitment.^°^ 
Nevertheless, on 18 June 1951 both parties reached a final agreement, which renewed 
the Dhahran airfield agreement for a lease of five years.^°^ 
Combining the agreement the USA extended an American Military Mission (AMM) 
to Saudi Arabia with the task of training all sectors of the Saudi Military Force. This 
mission was far larger and more ambitious than the existing BMM, particularly as it 
contained US Army, Navy, and Air Force personnel.^ *^ Moreover, the agreement 
entitled Saudi Arabia "to procurement assistance for military supplies on a cash 
reimbursable basis".^°' On top of all that, the USA promised Saudi Arabia further 
arms grant-in-aid worth almost $15 million.^"* 
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The renewal of the Dhahran airfield agreement for a further five years indicates the 
continuity of a strong US military interest in Saudi Arabia. Moreover, there is little 
doubt that the new American Military Mission would have an effect on the existing 
British Military Mission in Saudi Arabia, particularly when the scope of the AMM 
was far more ambitious than that of the BMM. On the whole, the new military 
commitments between Saudi Arabia and the USA were bound to have a significant 
impact on Saudi-British military cooperation and thereafter Saudi-British relations. 
Broadly speaking, Saudi-US relations were strengthening by the end of 1951. The 
conclusion of a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation in August 1951, was 
the last step in the completion of McGhee package.^°' Indeed, the implementation of 
McGhee's package led to the USA becoming - even in the view of British diplomats -
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"overwhelmingly the predominant foreign influence in the country [Saudi Arabia]". 
E . The End of Saudi-British Military Cooperation by the End ofl951 
The delivery of the previously agreed British arms to Saudi Arabia was not a trouble 
free task in 1951. The misunderstanding between Saudi and British officials about the 
arms prices, the Saudis dissatisfaction about the quality of the arms, and the shortages 
in British arms production, seemed to overshadow this issue during a time when 
Saudi-British relations were already witnessing a decline. Furthermore, it became 
apparent during the last quarter of 1951 that Saudi-US military cooperation had a 
tremendous impact not only on the British arms supply to Saudi Arabia but also in all 
aspects of Saudi-British Military cooperation. 
At the beginning of 1951, Saudi officials were surprised by the increase in British 
arms prices compared to the original quoted prices. On this, Yassin inquired during a 
meeting with Trott in mid-January 1951, that as "the supplies were the same as what 
had been previously offered", why did its price increase?^'" Trott could not answer 
Yassin without instmctions from London.^" After correspondences between the 
Foreign Office and the War Office, the British government concluded that it did not 
"think that the Saudis have any case in the matter".^'^ Furthermore, the War office 
argued that i f a concession was given to the Saudis on this, they might be encouraged 
to ask for further quantities of arms, something that Britain could not fulfil l at that 
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precise time, as it was facing acute shortages in the production of arms vis-a-vis 
worldwide commitments.^'^ 
When the first consigrmient of arms arrived in Jeddah in February, it produced 
amazement in both British and Saudi officers to note that it was in a "disgraceful 
condition".^''' The Head of the BMM and the British Ambassador moved swiftly in 
order to avoid a formal Saudi protest and hence a political disaster. Baird and Trott's 
notion was to exchange the whole shipment with a more appropriate one at no extra 
cost to Saudi Arabia.^'^ When the entire consigimient was successftil replaced the 
Saudi Defence Minister expressed gratitude to the head of the BMM for the prompt 
replacement action. Amir Mansour stated to Baird that "Ibn Saud had been extremely 
angry on hearing of the poor condition of the equipment but the immediately 
following news . . . had more than restored his good humoiu-".^'* 
The second shipment of arms arrived in September 1951, ironically arriving just a few 
days before the BMM was to cease activities.^'^ The British govenunent cancelled the 
last quantity of the arms, which was supposed to have consisted of armoured cars, as 
it was in need of these vehicles for its own use at that particular time. This 
cancellation did not lead to any Saudi objection, as the Saudis were engaged in 
receiving the newly acquired USA arms and equipment and as it seems that they were 
no longer interested in any British arms and equipment by that time. 
In 1951 the B M M faced certain difficulties. The relationship between the head of the 
B M M and the Saudi Defence Minister was uncooperative at the outset of the year, 
particularly there were disagreements between them about some of the training 
strategies. Nevertheless, Amir Mansour and Brigadier Baird improved their 
relationship at a later stage.^" Another difficulty that faced the BMM during 1951 
was the shortage of training officers. The shortage of officers occurred when some of 
the officers left the Mission without being replaced.^^° 
Despite these difficulties the British government assessed that the Saudi Arabian 
officials were generally satisfied with the work of the BMM. Hence, the British 
government was not worried about these matters.^ '^ What was disturbing to the 
British government was the fiiture of the B M M when the proposed American military 
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mission commenced its work in Saudi Arabia. Trying to secure the future of the 
BMM, the British government assured both the Saudi and US governments, on 
several occasions, about its intention of implementing a healthy coordination and 
cooperation between the BMM and the AMM.^ ^^ 
Nonetheless, it seemed that the British government's emphasis on coordination and 
cooperation between its military mission and the American mission had had a 
negative impact on the Saudis. This particularly strengthened the Saudi government 
intention of stopping the work of the BMM. It is likely that the Saudi government did 
not want to give the British any excuse for interfering in its newly strengthened 
military ties with the USA. Therefore, it could be said that the newly agreed AMM 
caused the Saudis to make an end to BMM operations, not just because it replaced 
Saudi Arabian militarily needs - for that of Britain - but also because the Saudis were 
careful not to let the British disturb Saudi-US military cooperation. Moreover, 
contrary to British govenmient beliefs, it seems that the Saudis had a just cause to 
discard the BMM, which was in fact their dissatisfaction with the general outcome of 
its whole operation. These reasons, next to the general decline of Saudi-Anglo 
relations had paved the way for the Saudi government's decision to make an end to 
the existence of the BMM in the Kingdom.^ ^^ On 23 September 1951 the new Saudi 
Defence Minister, Amir Mishal asked the head of the BMM to cease all the training 
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activities at once. 
In conclusion, it could be said that the impact of Saudi-US military cooperation was 
tremendous on the Saudi-British military cooperation, especially when that impact 
occurred during a critical period in which Saudi-British relations were already 
declining. Moreover, this impact was the latest in a series that made a clear end to any 
sign of cooperation between Britain and Saudi Arabia. 
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Summary and Conclusions 
As Ibn Saud's proposal of a tripartite treaty was not accepted, the British government 
offered - as an alternative - to send a reconnaissance party in order to study projects of 
strategic facilities in Saudi Arabia. The negative outcome of the reconnaissance party 
survey made the Saudis unwilling to initiate any new proposal for fiirther Saudi-
British cooperations. Moreover, it could be said that, the already existing Saudi-
British Military cooperation, through the means of the BMM, was not that impressive. 
Although the mission had faced several difficulties in expanding and enhancing its 
operations, and as it seems that the Saudi's were not intensely happy with the general 
result of its work (since its arrival), the British did supply Saudi Arabia, in 1950-1951, 
with arms as obliged by previous commitments. Even so, the delivery of these arms 
was not free from some embarrassments. 
Broadly speaking, it could be said that the general look, and hence the general 
outcome of Saudi-British military cooperation did not meet the Saudi government's 
high expectations. Thus, when Saudi-US military cooperation was formally extended 
in June 1951, the Saudi government decided to make an end to its military 
cooperation with Britain. Therefore, it could be said that the Saudis disaffection about 
the general outlook of Saudi-British military cooperation was a factor in its end beside 
the other direct factor which was the establishment of Saudi-US military cooperation. 
It should not be forgotten that an additional factor strengthened the Saudi government 
decision to terminate Saudi-British military cooperation. Indeed, the decline of Saudi-
British relations, particularly over the frontier dispute and the Hashemites question, 
made it suitable for the Saudi government to take such an action towards Saudi-
British military cooperation by the last quarter of 1951. Undoubtedly the departure of 
the BMM, which marked the end of Saudi-British cooperation, would make a 
tremendous impact on the future of Saudi-British relation. Surely, this development 
makes relations less meaningful, particularly in the light of conflicting relations over 
the frontier issue. 
Ibn Saud's difficulty with the Hashemites had returned in 1949 and at a worse level 
than before. British government policy in regard to this issue remained unsatisfactory 
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for the King and the security of his Kingdom. Indeed, the British government's failure 
to give Ibn Saud a convincing assurance - in regard to his worries from the 
Hashemites - was one of the matters that made the King seek a solution elsewhere. No 
doubt the USA's positive assurance of December 1949 was advantageous to the 
American's vis-a-vis British. The Hashemite issue remained, continuously harming 
Saudi-British relations throughout 1950. When the British government regarded the 
Saudi loan to Syria as being a means of interference in Syrian affairs, Ibn Saud 
became more convinced that Britain was indeed siding with the Hashemites. Hence as 
his suspicion came close to becoming fact from his point of view, Ibn Saud 
completely stopped asking for any British assurances. Instead, he concentrated his 
efforts on facing the Hashemites potential danger through his enhanced relations with 
the USA and with collaboration with Egypt. The British position towards the Saudi 
Kingdom's anxiety over the Hashemites had a great impact on King Ibn Saud's 
thinking regarding his friendship with Britain. Thus when this dilemma ended with 
the death of King Abdullah in July 1951, its effects were not easily removed from the 
already deteriorating Saudi-British relationship. 
The revival of the sleeping frontier dispute in 1949 was motivated by the activities of 
Saudi Arabia along its southeastern frontiers. A matter which indicated this was that 
the Saudis initiated the revival of the issue though it was noted that the Saudis action 
was carefully preceded by a cordial message from the King; emphasizing the 
benevolence of his intentions towards Britain. This measure indicated that the King 
did not want the reopening of the frontier issue to devastate relations at that particular 
time especially when most of the Kingdom's security concerns were still relatively 
dependent on Britain. The Saudi government's claim of October 1949, which 
exceeded any previous claims, meant that understanding between Britain and Saudi 
Arabia would be difficult to reach in the short-term. Hence, as each party took an 
extreme stand on this issue, the fi-ontier dispute continued to fuel a deterioration in 
Saudi-British relations through 1950. At the begirming of 1951 the complicated 
frontier issue had ironically joined with the other matter responsible for declining 
Saudi-British relations, namely the Hashemite issue. Indeed, the existence of 
Jordanian Arab Legion soldiers among the personnel of the Levy Force had alarmed 
Ibn Saud. The British government did not ease the King of Saudi Arabia's anxiety 
about such a development until the London Conference took place in August 1951, a 
273 
late solution that came after the end of his real worries about the Hashemites. Though, 
it was unknown to both the Saudi and the British governments at the end of 1951 
where the frontier issue would lead them, still both were hoping that the proposed 
conference in 1952 would help in finding a solution to the dispute. 
The impact of Saudi-US cooperation on Saudi-British relations was evident in the 
period covered in this chapter. McGhee's visit to Saudi Arabia, which took place 
during a time of decline in Saudi-British relations, was effective in strengthening 
cooperation between Saudi Arabia and the United States of America. Certainly, the 
fulfilment of the McGhee package during 1950-1951 further consolidated Saudi-US 
relations at all levels. Thus, the Export Bank Loan intensified the work of US private 
companies in the development of Saudi Arabia. Moreover, Saudi-US ties were 
strengthened militarily by the signing of the five years Dhahran airfield agreement, by 
the extension of the AMM and by the supply of various kinds of American arms. 
Moreover, Saudi-US technical cooperation, through the means of the Point Four 
Program Agreement, had opened the way for further US penetration into the 
Kingdom. In addition, the significance of the Saudi government agreement with 
Aramco in 1950 should not be underestimated when we look at it from the point of 
view of Saudi-US relations. The State Department role in encouraging Aramco to 
make a deal with the Saudi government was fruitful by all means. The agreement 
meant an increase in the income of Saudi Arabia, more opportunities for US private 
companies in getting a larger stake in the development of the Kingdom, and a more 
stable future for US oil interests in Saudi Arabia. As well as that, the State 
Department's positive and helpful role had also caused the Saudi government to 
increase its trust in US government policy towards it. 
It could be generally concluded that, in addition to the impact of previous experience 
of Saudi-British relations, all the above factors jointly contributed to adding a further 
apparent deterioration to Saudi British relations. 
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Chapter Five: Troubled Relations, 1952-1953 
This chapter will focus on Saudi-British relations during the last two years of King 
Ibn Saud's reign. As all forms of Saudi-British cooperation had ended in 1951, the 
chapter will study Saudi-British relations during the period of conflict over the 
frontier issue. Alongside the study of the impact of growing USA influence in Saudi 
Arabia, the chapter will determine the state that the conflict had caused Saudi-British 
relations to reach by November 1953. 
The Dammam Conference, the basis of its failure, and its aftermath will be analysed. 
The establishment of Saudi Arabian authority in Buraimi and its consequences will be 
examined alongside the conflict's development towards the British blockade of 
Buraimi. The blockade and the developments that tagged-along will be examined and 
analysed at length. Following a look at the effect of the scope of Saudi-US relations in 
the development of the Saudi-British conflict, the development of the conflict during 
the final months of Ibn Saud's life will be studied. 
A. The Failure of the Dammam Conference and its Aftermath 
It was hoped that the proposed conference would produce positive progress in regard 
to the complex frontier issue. Nevertheless, because of the unwillingness of the Saudi 
and the British representatives to compromise, the conference was an evident failure. 
Before, embarking on the developments of the conference, it would be worthwhile to 
digest the basis on which the Saudis and the British representatives had formed their 
firm positions upon.' 
The Saudi Arabian position was not just formulated around their objectives of getting 
territorial gains, but was also formulated in accordance with the reality of the new 
cycle that had occurred in Saudi-British relations before the end of 1951. As the 
previous chapter revealed, by the end of that year, Saudi Arabian reliance on Britain 
was almost demolished by the termination of Saudi-British military cooperation, the 
natural ending of Ibn Saud's anxiety about the Hashemite issue, and the 
intensification of Saudi-US ties.^  Ultimately - and from the Saudi point of view - the 
attachment of the Kingdom's security to Saudi-British relations had been severely 
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weakened in accordance to the changes within these factors. Moreover, as they were 
approaching the conference the Saudis might have weighted the possibility of 
territorial gains - if a strong position was maintained - against further deterioration in 
Saudi-British relations. Hence, it might have been obvious to the Saudis that there 
could be territorial gains if a firm position was maintained, particularly when there 
were no such equal gains from a positive improvement in the Saudi-British relations. 
For the British, it seems that there was not any new consideration which might make 
them soften their position over the frontier issue. Thus, it was apparent that Britain 
would continue to maintain its usual firm position vis-a-vis Saudi Arabian ambitions 
in the protectorate territories. Moreover, it became obvious that the British had 
approached the conference without looking at the possibility of a further deterioration 
in Saudi-British relations. This is the case when the British records do not show any 
attempt at investigating the frontier issue within the changes that accrued to Saudi-
British relations in the second half of 1951. Likewise, the appointment of the Political 
Resident in the Gulf as the head of the British delegation to the conference showed 
that Britain was obviously dealing with this issue on considerations that were related 
to the interests of its Gulf Protectorates rather than anything else.'' 
As agreed in London in August 1951, the Dammam Conference assembled on 28 
January 1952.'' Amir Faisal headed the Saudi delegation to the conference and Sir 
Rupert Hay, the Political Resident in the Gulf, headed the British delegation. The 
ruler of Abu Dhabi, Sheikh Shakhbut Ibn Sultan, and the ruler of Qatar, Sheikh Ali 
Al-Thani, attended the conference. Both rulers, who were considered to be a part of 
the British delegation, were present purely on consultative terms. The ruler of Oman 
was neither present nor represented, a matter which excluded the issue of the Saudi-
Omani frontiers - for the time being - from the agenda of the conference discussions. 
The conference concentrated on the Saudi-Qatari frontier and on the northern sector 
of Saudi Arabia's frontier with Abu Dhabi.^  
The first sign of misunderstanding between the Saudi and British representatives 
occurred on the second day of the conference. At the initiation of the discussions of 
the Saudi-Qatari frontier on 29 January, Sheikh Ali of Qatar declared that as he had 
always regarded King Abdulaziz as his own father, Qatar's frontier with Saudi Arabia 
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would be left for the King's judgement. Al i mentioned that he would unconditionally 
accept any decision taken by Ibn Saud in this regard.^ Being alarmed by Ali's 
unexpected remarks, Hay asked for instant private conversation with the ruler. Upon 
Ali and Hay returning to the main conference table, the British representative 
affirmed that he was the only one who was entitled to speak for Qatar and Abu Dhabi. 
At this stage Amir Faisal remarked that he would convey Sheikh Ali's statement to 
King Ibn Saud. Hay strongly objected to Faisal's suggestion and stated that the British 
government - as the guardian of Qatar interests - would reserve full rights on any 
decision taken by Ibn Saud in this regard.^ Faisal responded that the lands under 
discussion did not belong to Britain, and the best solution in regard to the whole issue 
could be reached in a peaceful and fiiendly, direct, negotiation between Saudi Arabia 
and its neighbours.^ Hay re-emphasised that the British government was the sole 
authority with the right to address any issue regarding the British Gulf Protectorates 
(with any foreign power).^ Concluding this issue Faisal warned Hay about the 
negative impact which would result from the British government's unnecessary 
interference in negotiations between friends and neighbours.'" 
On the same day (29 January), Hay proclaimed on behalf of Qatar a new frontier that 
exceeded any previous claims (see map four). The new British-Qatari claim, which 
would preserve for the Emirate a strip of territory, approximately twenty-five miles 
deep across the base of the Qatar peninsula, was shocking to the Saudi 
representatives. When the Saudi representatives asked the Sheikh of Qatar to confirm 
this claim, the latter reluctantly did so after mentioning hopes that this should not 
damage the brotherly relations between Qatar and Saudi Arabia.'' At this junction, the 
Saudi delegates became aware that the British representatives were responsible for the 
extreme position in regard to Qatar's new claim.'^ 
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Map 4: The 1952 Claims 
On 30 January, the British representatives presented another extreme claim on behalf 
of Abu Dhabi (see map four). Abu Dhabi's new claim, which surpassed all former 
claims, put a vast tract of land that was obviously within the Saudi territories, into 
Abu Dhabi confines. After, objecting to and rejecting such a claim the Saudi 
representatives asked the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi - who was less friendly towards the 
Saudis compared to the Sheikh of Qatar - to confirm the latest claim, with evidence. 
In his turn Shakhbut referred the entire matter to the British representative, with 
explanation that Hay was the only authority to speak formally on behalf of Abu 
Dhabi. 
Following those two claims, the delegates spent several meetings exchanging proofs 
and explaining the basis of their claims. A l l in all, the Saudis maintained the basis of 
their 1949 claim, and the British representatives would not ask for less than the newly 
placed claims. Nevertheless, in the last session of the conference, on 14 February, 
Hay offered to continue the negotiations on the basis of the Saudi claim of 1935, 
excluding Khaur al-Udaid from the 1935 line, as the British delegates saw the coastal 
village as belonging to Abu Dhabi. Though, the Saudi representatives did not accept 
the latest British proposal, still Amir Faisal promised to convey the proposal to Ibn 
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Saud for fiirther instructions.''' In addition, the Saudis and the British representatives 
agreed upon the maintenance of the August 1951 agreement, which had restricted all 
kind of activities in the disputed area.'^  On 14 February 1952, the conference was 
adjourned for one month, but never reconvened.'^ 
The developments of the conference revealed the concepts and the expectations of 
both the Saudi and the British governments about the outcome of such a formal 
discussion. As both parties approached the conference without any modest intention 
of making any concessions, both were hoping that the sessions of the conference 
might bring about a magical solution. The Saudi representatives were estimating that 
the participation of Abu Dhabi and Qatar rulers might bring about an understanding i f 
direct negotiations were held. However, the second day of the conference confirmed 
to the Saudis that the British representatives would form an obstacle against any 
attempt at direct agreement between them and these rulers. On the other side, the 
British representatives thought that an extensive counter claim might bring about 
some change to the principles of the Saudis 1949 claim. However, the outcome of 
both parties' strategies and policies, which were based according to the positions of 
each of them on the frontier issue, brought about a negative end to the conference. 
The failure of the Dammam Conference made each party rethink the whole policy in 
regard to the frontier as fiiture pages will reveal. 
Indeed, the negative result of the Dammam Conference added to the complexity of the 
policies and sfrategies of the main conflicting parties. For the Saudi government, it 
became recognisable that negotiations - with the British - would not achieve any 
positive result, thus without an implementation of new tactics no breakthrough would 
be reached.'^ The same thing could be said about the British government position on 
this. The head of the British delegation to Dammam included in his report to London 
a recommendation to refer the frontier dispute to arbitration.'^ Furthermore, the 
possibility of changes in the tactics of each party was apparent when the US 
Ambassador to Saudi Arabia attempted to encourage both parties - following the 
adjournment of the conference - to reach a mutual political agreement.'^ At that time, 
it became evident that neither was interested in the American suggestion. The British 
Ambassador replied to his American colleague that, his government "had abandoned 
hope of negotiated settlement and was preparing to seek arbitration".^" The Saudi 
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government reply to the American Ambassador revealed that it had also lost hope of 
reaching settlement by means of negotiation, and hinted that it may refer the whole 
dispute to the United Nations.^' Regardless of the style of the new tactics that the 
Saudi and the British were about to adopt, it could be said that their course of action -
as following paragraphs will reveal - would explain that the failure of the conference 
to reach a settlement was the paddle which would accelerate the deterioration of the 
situation. 
By 12 March, the British government was examining the possibility of unilaterally 
declaring a boundary line, similar to the Ryan line, i f the Saudi government did not 
relinquish its 1949 claim.^^ Meanwhile, the British government was encouraging and 
assisting the Petroleum Concessions to acquire the right of the oil concession for the 
Buraimi area. For this purpose the Sultan of Muscat was encouraged by the British 
authority to establish political control over Buraimi.^^ 
Though both parties agreed in Dammam that the restriction of activities in the 
disputed area should remain in force, it could be said that neither fiilfilled their 
commitments. In February, the Petroleum Concessions officials, who were touring the 
area as well, reported the presence of Saudi Arabian agents and Zakat collectors in the 
disputed areas.^ '* On 14 March, the British Political Agent in Shaijah, who was 
accompanied by representatives of the Sultan of Muscat and the Petroleum 
Concessions, visited Buraimi in order to convince the local tribal Sheikhs to declare 
allegiance to the Sultan.^ ^ Moreover, in the spring of the same year a British 
expedition toured the whole disputed area in order to gather some detailed facts about 
it.^^ 
The British activities and in particular the Political Agent in Sharjah's visit to Buraimi 
brought about a strong Saudi protest. On 29 March 1952, the Saudi government 
protested that the political agent's visit was a clear violation of the London 
Agreement and that Saudi Arabia did not recognise the sovereignty of the Sultan of 
Muscat or Trucial Sheikhs over the area of Buraimi. Furthermore, the Saudi 
government statement explained that the Buraimi local tribal Sheikhs were in fact 
Saudi citizens who acknowledged loyalty to King Ibn Saud and who allowed the 
King's sovereignty over them.^'' In reply, the British government sent a counter 
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protest to the Saudi government, rejecting any assumption of Saudi sovereignty over 
the Buraimi area. Furthermore, the same British statement brought about a new 
British interpretation of the meaning of the London Agreement when it explained that 
the London Agreement did not resfrict political officers from touring the disputed area 
as part of normal official duties.^ ^ The exchange of protests did not help the situation. 
In fact the situation continued to deteriorate towards the middle of the summer of 
1952 as both parties extended their activities in the disputed area.^ ^ 
The activities in the disputed area were not the only warning of fiirther deterioration. 
The USA's diplomafic difficulties in bringing a successfiil solution to the situation 
were a fiirther indicator. The US government became more concerned about the 
deterioration of Saudi-British relations, especially over the frontier issue. Thus, during 
the first half of 1952, the US government tried to encourage the British government to 
ease the situation. Nevertheless, the failure of the US government's efforts made a 
fiarther worsening in the situation inevitable. 
In March 1952, King Ibn Saud sent Amir Faisal to Jeddah to complain to the 
American Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Raymond Hare, about the exfreme and 
difficult policies that the British government was imposing upon Saudi Arabia in 
regard to the frontier issue.^° The British government's antagonistic attitude proved 
for Ibn Saud, that Britain had become "indifferent" to Saudi Arabian territorial 
integrity. Ibn Saud's complaint went fiirther saying that the British government was 
now probably conspiring against his Kingdom, as British influence was surrounding 
Saudi Arabia not only from the northern side, but also from the eastern and southern 
sides. Faisal expressed Ibn Saud's desire to prevent the situation declining, not just for 
the sake of Saudi Arabia and Britain, but also for the sake of Middle Eastern security. 
In his oral message to Hare, - which Faisal conveyed - Ibn Saud insisted on the 
immediate need for US government intervention in this issue, as the USA was the 
only power which was capable of rescuing this explosive situation.^' 
Ibn Saud's anxiety was taken to heart, particularly when the State Department 
estimated that the deterioration of Saudi-British relations might produce negative 
impacts on the overall US-British position in the Middle East. On 7 April, the State 
Department sent the US Embassy in London an Aide-Memoire to be conveyed to the 
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Foreign Office.^^ In that memoire the Americans were very carefiil to explain the 
motivation in sending such a detailed suggestion: 
"As the Foreign Office knows, the United States Government attaches great 
importance to the maintenance of the British position in the Near East, which 
is considered a source of great stability in the area. It is for this reason that we 
are concerned about a deterioration in UK-Saudi relations which might 
adversely affect the British position in the area".^ ^ 
Moreover, it was emphasised in the memoire that "the [State] Department hopes that 
the Foreign Office will not misconstrue its purpose as supporting the Saudi 
position".^'* In fact it was believed by the State Department that, "a solution of this 
problem would go a long way towards bringing about an improvement of relations 
between the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia".^^ The State Department warned the 
Foreign Office that unless quick and smoothly determined plans are implemented 
Saudi Arabia might be "seriously alienated" from Britain.^ 36 
In order to reassure Ibn Saud about the goodwill of the British government policy 
towards his Kingdom, the State Department suggested that Churchill send a frank and 
friendly message to Ibn Saud expressing warm sentiment and assuring that Britain's 
policy in the Middle East was not inimical to Saudi Arabia. Moreover, the State 
Department suggested the necessity for a settlement of the frontier dispute by friendly 
negotiations, during which the British should make some compromises including:^' 
1. Giving Saudi Arabia an outlet on the Gulf east of Qatar; 
2. The partition of the disputed area, including Buraimi area; 
3. American and British oil companies to be given equal opportunity in this 
area. 
Despite the State Department's carefiil explanations about its motivation in regard to 
these detailed suggestions, the British were still suspicious about American 
motivations. It was thought in the Foreign Office that the State Department 
suggestions were taken on the basis of American interests and growing influence in 
Saudi Arabia, without any consideration to Britain's interests in the area. Excepting 
the kind of message to be sent to the Saudi King, the State Department suggestions 
were inept and unfair in the Foreign Office's point of view. Indeed, the Foreign Office 
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deemed that the State Department suggestions would lead to a fundamental surrender 
of all kind of British claims in the area.^ ^ 
On 8 May, The Foreign Office replied, objecting to the State Department's initiative. 
In that reply, it was explained that Britain had made several compromise offers 
previously, and that Saudi Arabia was the one which would not moderate its position. 
The Foreign Office did not miss the opportunity to state in its reply that Buraimi had 
never been a Saudi territory and had never been recognised as such."*" 
On the same day (8 May 1952), the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Anthony Eden, sent 
King Ibn Saud a personal message expressing Britain's aspiration to maintain long 
lasting cordial relations with Saudi Arabia. Eden's message did not mention the 
frontier dispute, but was an attempt by the British government to confirm its goodwill 
towards Ibn Saud and his Kingdom in general.'" It should be mentioned that, Eden's 
message to Ibn Saud was not only motivated by the Americans, but was also inspired 
by a suggestion from the British Ambassador in Saudi Arabia."*^ 
On 12 May the US government made another attempt when its Embassy in London 
endeavoured to encourage the Foreign Office to improve the relations between Saudi 
Arabia and the Gulf Sheikhdoms. Nevertheless, the American diplomat's argument 
failed to impress the Foreign Office officials.''^ 
It could be said that the British government's negative responses were associated with 
its anxiety about the growing US influence in Saudi Arabia. Increasing US-Saudi 
cooperation at all levels, including military, economic, and political cooperations, had 
led the Foreign Office to suppose that the State Department and Aramco were 
conspiring against Britain in Saudi Arabia. Moreover, the British government was 
inclined to believe that Ibn Saud's sfrong position in regard to the frontier dispute 
could not be maintained without American sympathy and support."*^  
To conclude, it could be assumed that the US government's mediation failure paved 
the way for a fiirther decline in the whole situation of the conflict. Thus, toward the 
middle of the summer of 1952, the frontier dispute was already sliding towards fiirther 
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dangerous developments, particularly when the area was witnessing accelerating 
activity from both of the conflicting parties. 
B. The Establishment of a Saudi Arabian Authority in Buraimi, and its 
Consequences in 1952 
The Saudi government decision to establish its authority in Buraimi was taken some 
time after the failure of the Dammam Conference. Though, the precise timing in 
which the Saudis took such a decision remains, to some extent mysterious, still, as 
was previously indicated, the Saudis were processing new tactics and sfrategies within 
a few weeks of the adjournment of the conference. Hence, it could be argued that the 
Saudi government might have been considering the establishment of a kind of formal 
base in Buraimi as early as February 1952.'*^  Nevertheless, the implementation of such 
action was delayed until the circumstances left no alternative but its implementation. 
The British official's activity in Buraimi in March 1952 was one of the motives 
behind the Saudi government's implementation of its hard-line policy in regard to 
Buraimi, particularly when the Saudi government began to believe that the British 
officials and their affiliates were already eyeing that area.'*^  Moreover, it could be said 
that the failure of US government mediation was another factor that motivated the 
Saudi regime to go ahead with its plan. 
No doubt that the Saudi government's decision in forming an authority over Buraimi 
was a turning point in its policy, not just in regard to the frontier dispute, but also 
towards Britain. The extreme end of the establishment of a Saudi post in Buraimi - or 
indeed, the Saudi occupation of Buraimi according to the expected British accusation 
- might result in a direct military confrontation between Saudi Arabia on the one side 
and Britain and its satellites on the other, thus, revolutionising the concept of security 
in the Saudi-British relationship from that which was considered as a helpful factor to 
that which would turn into a disfracting one. Indeed, this action would easily turn the 
security concerns between Saudi Arabia and Britain to one which could involve a 
direct-armed confrontation between them. However, it could be said that the Saudi's 
had decided to take such an action with the hope that the British would not respond 
aggressively. In any case, by choosing such a risky direction, it could be said, that the 
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Saudi government was already neglecting any hope of improving its relations with 
Britain for, perhaps, more rewarding territorial gains from its point of view. It should 
also be noted that the dramatic developments in the frontier dispute in 1952 had also 
made the British government - like the Saudi government - neglect the effect of this 
issue on Saudi-British relations. Hence, apart from the British Foreign Secretary's 
message to Ibn Saud in May 1952, no other action was taken by Britain in order to 
insure that there was no effect from the frontier dispute on its relations with Saudi 
Arabia.''^ 
In July 1952, Rashid Bin Hamad Al Bu Shamis, the Sheikh of Hamasa - one of the 
major settlements in Buraimi Oasis - left for Saudi Arabia. On 31 August, he returned, 
accompanied by a Saudi party under the leadership of Turki Ibn Utaishan, a Saudi 
agent who took over the duties of Hamasa Sheikh and armounced that he was the 
Saudi Amir for the entire Buraimi area.'** According to a British report, the Saudi 
party consisted of fifty armed men and thirty civil servants. Nevertheless, the Saudi 
government claimed that none of the individuals were troops and that their total 
number did not exceed forty."*^ Ibn Utaishan brought with him letters from the 
Governor of Al-Hasa, Amir Saud Ibn Jalawi, addressed to several principal Sheikhs of 
the Buraimi area. These letters were carefully written in order to legitimise - and 
explain to the inhabitants who were considered, in these letters, as Saudi citizens - the 
Saudi government's lawfiil move. An exfract from these letters read: 
"In view of the repeated request made by our towan/[subjects] in Oman and 
the arrival of Rashid Bin Hamad Al-Shamisi for himself and on behalf of them 
for the appointment by us of a . . . representative in their country, we have 
appointed our servant Turki Bin Abdullah Bin Ataishan [Utaishan], and have 
supplied him with the necessary instructions which he should observe. We 
have fiill trust in him. As you are one of our tawarif and belonging to us, your 
help in this connection caimot be spared. You will see from him, by the will of 
God, what will please you".^ ** 
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On 15 September, the British charge d'affaires in Jeddah, Mr D. M . Riches, delivered 
a protest note to King Ibn Saud in Riyadh.^' The British government strongly 
protested against the infroduction of Ibn Utaishan and his party into Buraimi. It was 
stated that Buraimi was a part of an area covered by the 1951 London restrictions 
agreement. In addition to Abu Dhabi rights in Buraimi Oasis a part of Buraimi 
belonged to the Sultan of Muscat, who had asked the British government to frilly 
represent him in any issue regarding such a right. Ibn Utaishan's immediate 
withdrawal was requested. Moreover, it was stated in that note, and was also restated 
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orally by Riches, that "In the absence of a very urgent reply and prompt withdrawal of 
Turki as requested Her Majesty's Government will be compelled to take such action 
as may be necessary to protect their positions"^^ 
The first Saudi reaction to the British government note came from Ibn Saud himself 
Immediately after when Riches delivered the note, Ibn Saud remarked to the British 
diplomat that: 
"Churchill used to call me the "friend of the dark days". But now he comes to 
demand my lands. Go back to my history with your country and look how I 
used to treat Britain . . . But now the British government wanted to give the 
lands which belonged to me and to my grandfathers to someone who did not 
help Britain in the same way that I did. Where is the friendship? I 'm not 
willing to give away any part of my lands. Do you prefer the honesty and 
justice? I f so let's discuss the matter in a fiiendly manner and solve it in one 
hour on the basis of what belonged to my grandfathers and what belongs to me 
now"." 
Furthermore, on 17 September, the Saudi government sent the British government a 
replying note.^ '* It was indicated in that note, that none of the rulers of the entire 
Omani Coast have or had any actual authority in Buraimi. Hence, the British 
government had no political right in expressing concern in a matter that only 
concerned the Saudi government and its own subjects in Buraimi. The Saudi Arabian 
government never accepted the possibility of making Buraimi a subject of 
negotiations between it and the British government. Buraimi was never mentioned 
during either London or Dammam Conferences as it was considered to be a de facto 
Saudi Arabian territory. Broadly speaking, the Saudi government note completely 
rejected the British government protest and considered the withdrawal of Ibn Utaishan 
to be out of the question. Moreover, - in that note - the Saudi government expressed 
its deep regret at hearing about the British government threat of using whatever means 
necessary (i.e. the use of force) to remove Ibn Utaishan from Buraimi. It was stated 
that such a threat "does not accord with the friendship existing between the two 
countries . . . the Saudi Arabian Government did not expect such a statement to be 
made by the friendly British Govemment".^^ Though the Saudi note was dry and 
negative response to the British government protests, and though the Saudi 
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government did consider Buraimi as a de facto Saudi territory, still the note did not 
end without stating that "the Saudi Arabian Government is entirely ready to solve 
these problems in accordance with the requirements of friendship on the principles of 
the United Nations".^^ 
Subsequent to the Saudi government reply the British government gave immediate 
instructions to the Political Resident in the Gulf to despatch an armed force to the 
Buraimi area.^ ^ By. 18 September, a military post for the Trucial Oman Levies was 
established just four kilometres from Hamasa. Additionally, armed forces from the 
Sultan of Oman and the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi arrived in the Buraimi region. 
Moreover, orders were given to the British Royal Air Force (RAF) in Sharjah, to fly 
over Hamasa at a very low altitude, in order to intimidate the Saudis and in order to 
drop messages provoking the inhabitants against them.^ ^ 
The Saudi government was alarmed when it first heard about the RAF's threatening 
manoeuvres over Hamasa. On 19 September, a note from the Saudi Arabian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs was delivered to the British Embassy in Jeddah.^ ^ In that note, the 
manoeuvre of the RAF airplanes was intensely objected to. Immediate cessation of 
what the Saudi government regarded as clear act of aggression against its sovereignty 
was requested. In addition, the note explained that i f the British government did not 
stop this aggressive act, the matter would be taken to the Security Council of the 
UN'' 
On the same day that the Saudi government note was delivered to the British Embassy 
in Jeddah a similar but more important message from Ibn Saud to Eden was on the 
way via the Saudi Embassy in London.^' In the beginning of the message, Ibn Saud's 
resentment about the deterioration of his Kingdom relations with Britain was clearly 
stated: 
"There is nothing more painful to me than to have the situation between us and 
the British Government deteriorate to a point where we are threatened by the 
airplanes of a government headed by our friend Mr. Churchill and his Deputy 
and Minister of Foreign Affairs, our friend Mr. Eden".^ ^ 
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Ibn Saud's message goes on; "we are in our own country and we have not committed 
aggression against any . . . British territory".^^ After mentioning that it was in the 
interests of both governments to solve this crisis, Ibn Saud stated that: 
" I f Mr. Eden desires to maintain friendship between them [Britain] and us, let 
the British Government cease to allow its officials in the Gulf to engage in 
such hostile action. Otherwise, we shall be forced to announce what has 
happened and will consider this action as directed against us, against Najd, and 
against our Kingdom. We shall also be obliged to take our complaint to the 
Security Council and to defend our right as vigorously as we can".^ 
It appeared that though the Saudi government was aware of the RAF operations over 
Hamasa, it did not notice the existence of the ground forces until after its protest had 
been despatched. Hence, on 23 September the Saudi government sent the British 
government a fiirther protest regarding the newly created military posts near 
Hamasa.^ ^ It was stated in the new message that the Saudi government considered the 
movements of the ground forces in the Buraimi area as "an act of aggression against 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and a threat to peace and security, and it requests that 
this be stopped".^ ^ The new protest did not repeat the former clear threat to take the 
matter to the Security Council, but it again indicated that the Saudi government "is 
ready to solve the problems by peacefiil means in accordance with the requirements of 
friendship and the principles of the United Nations".^^ 
On 3 October, the British government replied to the Saudi note of the 17 September 
and to the two Saudi government protests of 19 and 23 of September.^ * The reply 
began: 
"Her Majesty's Government welcome the expression of fiiendship of the 
Saudi Arabian Government's and note in particular the Saudi Arabian 
Government's determination to solve the frontier problem in accordance with 
the requirements of fiiendship".^' 
In response to the Saudi government point of view that Buraimi was not an area of 
dispute, as it was not mentioned in the London and Dammam Conferences, the British 
government gave a contrary point of view. It was illustrated that though the name 
Buraimi was not in the record of London discussions, yet the name was mentioned in 
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the correspondence preceding those discussions. In addition, it was logically 
recognised that the London discussion in regard to the disputed areas applied at least 
by implication to Buraimi. Furthermore, it was indicated that it was "purely 
fortuitous" that Buraimi was not discussed at the Dammam Conference.^^ It was 
remarked that the Saudi Arabian government action of sending armed men into 
territories belonging to the Trucial Sheikhdoms and the Sultan of Muscat had "no 
justifications whatever".^' Saudi Arabia's claim to Buraimi was not accepted and the 
Saudi government was requested once more to withdraw Ibn Utaishan and his party 
from the Buraimi Oasis immediately. Moreover, the RAF flight and the movement of 
Levies, which were made at the request of the Sultan of Oman and the Sheikhs of the 
Trucial Coast, cannot be regarded as "an act of aggression against Saudi Arabia or 
any infringement of Saudi Arabian sovereignty".^^ In fact, "Her Majesty's 
Government would emphasise that the decision to send levies into Bureimi [Buraimi] 
was forced upon them by the action of the Saudi Arabian Government".'^ At the 
conclusion of the note the British government mentioned its intention of reaching a 
solution by means of discussions and hoped that "it will shortly be possible to resume 
such discussions in an atmosphere of harmony and goodwill".^'' 
Eden's reply to Ibn Saud's message of the 19 September was still to come. On 9 
October, the British Foreign Secretary wrote positively to Ibn Saud offering the desire 
of his government to settle the frontier dispute "amiably and equitably" by the 
reopening of the suspended discussions.'^ Moreover, in his message Eden informed 
Ibn Saud that the RAF flights had ceased. However, it was indicated in the message 
that the Levies forces would not be withdrawn unless Ibn Utaishan withdrew at the 
same time.'* 
Despite the mentioning of both governments' desire for a solution, the actual crisis in 
the area of the dispute continued to worsen. Hence, no positive effort was made from 
either side in order to prevent fiirther declination. Instead, both sides continued to 
reinforce their position in Buraimi during the first half of October 1952." It became 
apparent that neither party involved was willing to withdraw from the area. Indeed, 
Ibn Saud's insistence that "he would rather see Turki dead than withdrawn" had 
caused the British government to facilitate the reinforcement of its forces near the 
village.'* Whether it was inspired by the British government or not, the reinforcement 
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of the Sultan of Muscat's forces, and his declaration of a Jihad against Ibn Utaishan, 
brought the situation to a climax. Thus, the "imminent possibility of an armed clash" 
was foreseen.^ ^ 
Comprehension of the possibility of a military clash, and inspired by a Saudi request, 
led the US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia to propose, on 10 October, a standstill 
SO 
agreement. The principle acceptance of Hare's proposal by both parties had led to a 
comprehensive negotiation in Riyadh between the British Ambassador to Saudi 
Arabia, Mr George Pelham, and the Saudi officials.*' On 26 October y4wi> Faisal and 
Ambassador Pelham signed the Buraimi Standstill Agreement.*^ The agreement, 
which lulled the tense situation, called for all parties in Buraimi to remain in their 
position without any further military reinforcement. In addition, all parties were to 
abstain from any provocative actions and the Saudi and British governments were to 
resume discussion over a settlement.*^ 
Despite the Standstill Agreement's call for the resumption of discussions no progress 
was made during the remaining months of 1952 so as to bring about a real solution to 
the conflict. In fact most of the time was spent on several correspondences during 
which the British and the Saudis fielded new proposals in order to support their 
positions. Following the signing of the standstill agreement, the Saudi government 
proposed the setting up of a Tripartite Commission composed of Saudis, British, and 
US representatives in order to hold a plebiscite in Buraimi. For the remaining frontiers 
the Saudis proposed the resumption of the Dammam Conference with the intention of 
forming a fact-finding commission.*'* The Saudi proposal was completely rejected by 
the British government, instead they proposed "an impartial settlement of the whole 
problem by arbitration".*^ As the Saudi government also refiised the British 
government proposal they remained divided. 
Each government had its own reasons and explanations for insisting on its own 
proposal and for rejecting the other side's proposal. The Saudi government 
maintained that the population of the area allied themselves to Saudi Arabia rather 
than to any other country, particularly when nearly all of the Buraimi area tribes were 
historically considered to be Saudis, and when they were in fact genuinely loyal to 
King Ibn Saud.*^ Thus their opinions should be taken into consideration by holding an 
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open plebiscite before anyone could impose his will upon them. The former were also 
the grounds on which the Saudi government rejected the arbitration proposal, 
additional to the argument that Buraimi was a part of Saudi Arabia, and thus was not 
subject to such practice.** For the British government, arbitration was the safest 
procedure that might bring a favourable settlement for all parties involved.*^ The 
British government's rejection of the Saudi proposal was related to its apprehension 
that the Saudi influence upon the tribes of the area might allow the Saudis to win the 
case illegally. The British government was almost certain that Ibn Utaishan conduct, 
in spending lavishly on the people of the area, had in fact created such influence.^" 
Signs of further deterioration were visible during the last months of 1952 when both 
sides failed to fully preserve the principles of the Standstill Agreement. Each of the 
them engaged in several actions that were considered - by the other party - as contrary 
to the principles of the agreement. Each side accused the other of indulging in 
activities that included those to gain the loyalty of the tribes of the area, manoeuvre of 
forces, punishment of the other's supporters, etc. '^ 
In conclusion for this section, it can be said that the arrival of Turki Ibn Utaishan in 
Buraimi marked the beginning of a serious crisis between Saudi Arabia and Britain 
over the Oasis. Though, armed clashes were prevented by the Standstill Agreement, 
the development of the crisis toward the end of 1952 was not conducive to optimism. 
The Saudi and the British correspondences since 15 September 1952, reflected the 
impact of the crisis on the state of their relations. There is little doubt about the 
damage that had been done to Saudi-British relations from the sublimation of the 
frontier issue. Depending on which direction the crisis would follow in 1953, Saudi-
British relations would be effected accordingly. 
C. Firmness of Policies and Further Deterioration in the Buraimi Crisis 
The Saudi government's refusal to accept - even in principle - the settlement of the 
frontier dispute through arbifration had in fact made the British government harden its 
position. As early as the beginning of December 1952, the Foreign Office was 
formulating a new tactic in order to persuade the Saudis to agree about arbih-ation.^ ^ 
Two methods were considered; the first was to win US government support in 
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advising and encouraging the Saudi government to settle the issue through the means 
of arbitration,^^ the second was to demonstrate the use of force in order to put pressure 
on the Saudis. In this regard the British government was considering the 
reinforcement of the forces in the Buraimi area in an attempt to ease the Saudi 
government's intransigent position. '^* 
Composing its new approach the British government renewed on 5 January 1953 the 
offer of submitting the entire dispute to arbitration.'^ However, the Saudi government 
response on the new arbitration offer was tactically delayed. Explaining that it was 
studying the proposal the Saudi Arabian government was also trying to obtain US 
government support for its plebiscite proposal.'^ Without waiting for the Saudi reply 
the British government began to quietly reinforce its forces in the Trucial Coast 
area.'^  Meanwhile, the US government favoured the arbitration proposal. The US 
government made it plain to both sides that it had no intention to support any of them 
against the other. But in its point of view arbitration offered the most equitable 
method of resolving the dispute. 
During the second half of February 1953, the Saudi government started to discover 
the British plans for building up of its military capability in the area. The arrival of a 
warship on 18 February in Dubai, the arrival of 180 soldiers on 21 February at the 
Sharjah Airport, and the arrival of an additional 380 troops on 26 February to Sharjah 
led the Saudi government to assume that the British government was indeed planning 
for aggression.^' It became a routine that in lesser circumstances the Saudi 
government would protest to the British government as violating the Standstill 
Agreement. However, the Saudi government considered a new method in addition to 
the usual one. Thus after a formal protest, the British government was told that the 
Saudi government had decided to publish the Standstill Agreement and the related 
documents and any violation act accordingly. 
It is imperative to highlight the Saudi decision to launch a propaganda campaign 
against Britain, particularly when it could be regarded as the second major anti-British 
decision that was taken by the Saudi government alongside its decision to send Ibn 
Utaishan to Hamasa during the previous year. The Saudi Arabian government 
formally explained to the British authority that it was compelled to take such a 
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decision because of the continuous British violation of the Standstill Agreement and 
because of the existence of a state of anxiety throughout the Kingdom."" Nonetheless, 
"the Saudi Arabian Government express their regret for the necessity of publishing 
the occurrences when her past procedure in solving her differences with the British 
Government was without publishing them".'°^ The British government anticipated the 
new Saudi actions as i f the Saudi government intended to excuse in advance its 
rejection of the arbitration offer, along with representing the British government as 
"acting throughout in bad faith". 
It could be said that the new policy of media propaganda was taken by the Saudi 
government in order to deter any British aggression against the Saudi authority in 
Buraimi, as well as to stop Britain from reinforcing its military capability in the area 
by disclosing such activity. Moreover, the Saudis might have thought that the 
publishing of details of what they firmly considered as an aggressive British act, 
might possibly mobilise international, Muslim, Arab, and - maybe - American public 
opinion against what could be regarded as British imperialism. This argument could 
be reinforced by Ibn Saud's previously mentioned threat to Eden on 19 September 
1952, when the former wrote to the latter with reference to the RAF manoeuvre over 
Hamasa, " . . . we shall be forced to announce what has happened and will consider 
this action as directed against us . . . However, the negative sides of putting this 
theme into practice were not difficult to predict, as it would bring about more damage 
to the deteriorated Saudi-British relations, but it seems that this matter was not a 
concern for the Saudis at that stage. One additional matter that seemed to be missing 
from the Saudi government calculation when it was about to adopt this policy was the 
consideration of the possibility of a negative impact on Saudi Arabia itself 
Propaganda in this case is a double-edged sword, thus i f it succeeded in deterring the 
likely British aggression, it was working positively, but i f it failed the humiliations of 
a Saudi Arabian defeat would be highlighted. 
The British government reacted to the new Saudi policy of publicity by deciding to 
take the same step.'°^ On this, Mr D. A. Greenhill of the Foreign Office minuted that: 
"It looks very much as i f the Saudis are getting rattled by the action we have 
taken to strengthen our position in the Trucial Oman States, and I think we 
should continue to stand firm. We are in fact in a relatively strong position for 
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the following reasons: (a) Our consistent offers of arbitration will be 
understood by international opinion as fair and equitable, (b) The activities of 
the Saudi representative in Buraimi have contravened the stand-still 
agreement, and we can make this clear in any statement". 
On 6 March 1953, the BBC Radio broadcast the first formal British announcement in 
regard to the Buraimi d i s p u t e . O n the following day, the Saudi government 
published several documents including the Standstill Agreement and the incidents that 
were regarded as a violation to it. From then on a war of propaganda ensued 
bringing about more deterioration in the conflict and to Saudi-British relations. As 
each side was publishing its point of view and denouncing the contrary published 
view, the disagreement and misunderstanding in regard to the gloomy conflict became 
a public phenomenon. 
D. The British Blockade of Hamasa 
By 12 March 1953, it became apparent to the British government that the Saudis were 
not ready to agree about the arbitration o f fe r . Indeed , the Saudi government was 
still promising to reply to the 5 January note until that particular day.'" Instead, of 
receiving a positive Saudi reply, Britain was continuously receiving protests against 
the British military movements in the Trucial Coast. 
The Saudi government's refiasal of the arbitration proposal compounded with the 
increasing anti-British propaganda campaign, and British fears of the growing Saudi 
influence in Buraimi, had hardened British government policy in regard to the 
dispute."^ Additionally, the likelihood of further Saudi Arabian expansion in the 
territories of the Trucial Protectorates had made the possibility of an extra hard-line 
policy a definite prospect.Indeed, the importance of maintaining the security and 
the interests of these Sheikdoms was a clear driving force behind British policies at 
that juncture. According to the Foreign office, the: 
"Saudi Arabian Government have continued to exploit their wrongfiil 
occupation of Buraimi for the purpose of advancing still further their territorial 
claims. It is quite clear that they aim at absorbing the whole of the Trucial 
Shaikdoms except for the coastal towns . . . The effect of this increasing Saudi 
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encroachment would be to deprive the people of the Trucial States of their 
right to enjoy independence and benefits which come from economic 
development of their lands"."' 
Accordingly, by mid-March, the British government began studying a new policy that 
would include:"^ 
1. The renewal of the arbitration offer to the Saudi government. 
2. The cancellation of the Standstill Agreement and the 1951 London 
Understanding. 
3. The reservation of the freedom of action in all areas considered by the 
British government to belong to Abu Dhabi and Oman. 
4. The blockade of Ibn Utaishan and his followers in Hamasa. 
Subsequent to intensive - but swift - examinations and communications between the 
British government departments and missions, the new policy was ready to be carried 
out by the end of March 1953."^ On 2 April the British government communicated 
the implementation of its new policy to the Saudi government."^ In an extended note 
that was handed to the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the British 
government gave an explanation along with its view, on the development of the 
frontier issue since the opening of negotiations in 1949. In brief the note held the 
Saudi government accountable for the failure to reach a settlement. After emphasising 
the Saudi occupation of Hamasa as being the spark that fired the issue, the note 
emphasised that the Saudi government had been abusing the Standstill Agreement 
since it was agreed."' The main message of the note was in its conclusion: 
"Her Majesty's Government are bound to conclude that the Saudi Arabian 
Government have destroyed the basis of the London Agreement and have not 
observed and do not intend to observe the Buraimi "Standstill" Agreement, 
and that their territorial claims are continually being increased. In these 
circumstances they and the Rulers under their protection are obliged to reserve 
complete freedom of action in regard to all matters covered by the aforesaid 
Agreements. They are authorised to state on behalf of the Sultan of Muscat 
that His Highness reserve freedom of action in respect of matters covered by 
the Buraimi "Standstill" Agreement. At the same time they wish to inform the 
Saudi Arabian Government that they regard it as a matter of urgency that the 
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question of the frontiers should be settled and for this purpose they renew once 
again their offer to submit the whole question to impartial arbitration". 
The British government predictions on the subject of Saudi Arabian reactions were 
unclear. Pelham estimated that the Saudis might appeal to the UN or might introduce 
irregular forces into Buraimi, or indeed may do both.'^' By way of trying to limit the 
Saudi reaction to an agreement with the arbitration offer, as well as in order to 
sweeten the note of bitterness the British government considered sending a friendly 
message from Churchill to Ibn Saud.'^ ^ The Prime Minister's letter to the King, which 
was handed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Jeddah together with the note on 2 
April, read: 
"Her Majesty's Government... have today authorised the despatch of a Note 
to Your Majesty's Government which I have no doubt will be displeasing to 
You . . . permit me to add these few personal words as an old friend and 
comrade in the war. It is my personal wish . . . that the friendship between the 
peoples of our two countries, which has been a source of strength and comfort 
in days of adversity, should prosper and continue ever firmer. I do not intend 
for my part to allow it to be disturbed by events which I trust will prove only 
temporary. But it is my duty as Prime Minister and as a friend to point out that 
Her Majesty's Government stand in friendly relations to Your Majesty's 
neighbours, to whom indeed they are for the most part bound by solenm 
obligations. Her Majesty's Government have every intention of maintaining 
those relations and of honouring those obligations. I f in so doing they grieve 
another valued friend, that is a matter for great regret, but it cannot be a reason 
for inaction. What would the friendship of Great Britain be worth i f she 
abandoned the weaker of her friends for the sake of the stronger? We shall 
stand up for what we believe to be right. Your Majesty will undoubtedly do 
the same, and neither of us shall think the worse of the other for it. I f neither 
of us can convince the other, is it beyond the power of statesmanship to find 
the means of reconciling our view, with justice and honour?".'^'' 
It must be pointed out that the overall connotation of the British government message 
to Ibn Saud and his government was rather ambiguous. The messages did not give a 
clue as to what the British government intended to do next, apart from the arguable 
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terms of freedom of action and honouring of obligations to the protectorates, the 
messages left a set of unanswered questions. Another matter that was questionable 
was the method of the delivery of these important messages. The British Ambassador 
delivered these messages to the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Jeddah 
without any comment or explanation, as i f the British government wanted the Saudi 
government to react to them as they were.'^" Nevertheless, what Ibn Saud and his 
government clearly knew from the note is that, the London and Standstill Agreements 
were completely abandoned from the British side, and the British authority now was 
free to do whatever it wished in the disputed area. Even worse, the British government 
was putting pressure on Saudi Arabia to accept the impartial arbitration proposal, or 
indeed issuing a dictate to the Saudi government. Moreover, from Churchill's 
message they knew that the British government was determined to protect the right of 
its Trucial Coast protectorates even i f that would "grieve" Saudi Arabia. 
It is true that in the messages there was no mention of force and indeed no hint of 
threat to the Saudi post in Hamasa, but at the same time there were no indications to 
the contrary. According to information already known to the Saudi government there 
had been a troop build-up in the Trucial Coast since the beginning of the year.'^' 
Hence, the cancellation of the previous agreements at this particular time was 
intentionally done to allow Britain and her satellites to march their forces into 
Hamasa. In short, every possibility was explicable and the crisis was reaching a 
frightening point. 
When these messages reached Riyadh, someone might possibly have enquired, what 
should Saudi Arabia do? Or indeed what are the available altematives for Saudi 
Arabia to take? Should it simply agree to the arbifration offer, and let the British 
government obtain what it wishes from a strong position? Or should it adopt a very 
tough policy? This would include: 
1. Request for immediate help from the USA with a full demand for the 
implementation of Truman's assurance of 31 October 1950. 
2. Reinforce the propaganda campaign against the British government's 
imperialism. 
3. Reinforce Ibn Utaishan's position with additional forces. 
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4. Protest at the way that the British government had cancelled the 
agreements partially (from one side). 
5. Take the whole issue to the UN with a strong complaint. 
A look at Saudi Arabia's position, particularly on the same day when the messages 
arrived, would help in answering these speculations. Moreover, a close look at Ibn 
Saud's way of thinking in such a case would also be useful. 
The obvious fact is that the British government's messages had reached Ibn Saud at 
the worst time he could have wanted to hear such news. The option of requesting help 
from the US government was remote at that particular time, at least in Ibn Saud's 
view. Though Saudi-US relations were gaining in strength, the Saudi government 
could not convince the US government to support its case in regard to the frontier 
issue. During Faisal's stay in the USA from 19 November 1952 to 6 April 1953, he 
tried in various conversations to encourage the State Department to aid the Saudi 
government proposal of a plebiscite; however the State department was convinced 
that the best procedure to employ was arbitration.'^^ Moreover, when the Eisenhower 
administration (Republican replacing Democrat) took office in January 1953, Faisal 
requested the reaffirmation of Truman's assurance of 31 October 1950, yet - by 2 
April - the Saudi government was still waiting for a reply.'^^ Thus, it seems that Ibn 
Saud was far from the USA option during that specific time. Indeed he did not bother 
about asking Faisal to talk to the State Department about the new development, 
though Faisal was still in the US; also the King did not request an immediate meeting 
with the US Ambassador. 
The other courses of action within the 'tough policy' seemed to be discouraging. 
Indeed, the use of propaganda was a failure so far, particularly when it did not achieve 
its main objective in stopping the British government from building up its military 
capability in the area. Beside, the messages that Ibn Saud and his government had just 
received proved that such a propaganda campaign was not effective in stopping the 
British government in its intentions. More relevantiy, the propaganda campaign had 
just shown a negative result, thus i f Ibn Saud simply agreed about the arbitration now, 
it would be universally known that he had been forced to agree, and it would be even 
worse, i f Ibn Utaishan was forced out of Hamasa. 
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Sending forces to Hamasa may indeed have brought about ftirther negative results. No 
matter how many soldiers Ibn Saud sent to that tiny village the British forces could 
still get them out easily. As a warrior himself Ibn Saud had never underestimated 
British power, particularly when in this case acknowledgement was coming from the 
head of the British government. Indeed, Ibn Saud wrote to Churchill at a later stage 
stating " I am not ignorant of the strength of Great Britain which makes her capable to 
dictate her wishes".'^' 
The remaining two courses of action seemed to be weak i f they were implemented 
without the others. Hence protest to the British government usually did not bring a 
positive result. In fact all the Saudi government's previous protests were either 
denounced or neglected. Appealing to the UN seemed to be a weak option i f it was 
implemented alone although it might irritate the British government and force it to 
take speedy action over the Hamasa case.'^° 
The other alternative, of agreeing to the arbifration offer, would be the last recourse 
for Ibn Saud to take. But still, Ibn Saud would not let himself be defeated publicly 
simply because the British government was in a position of sfrength. Honour to Ibn 
Saud was a very important issue and he would do his best in order to protect it. 
Indeed, Ibn Saud had stated on various occasions, that even he would fight in a war 
that he was going to lose i f the matter came to his honour.'^' Beside, a quick Saudi 
agreement to the arbitration - under these circumstances - might weaken the concept 
of Saudi Arabian sfrength in the eyes of the international community, a matter which 
would impact upon the image that maintained the Kingdom's security. 
The action that Ibn Saud adopted was clear from his forthcoming reply. He chose to 
adopt a very tactful reply based on the messages he received; a reply that could help 
his state avoid a humiliating response; a reply that would allow him to contain the 
risky situation within diplomatic boundaries and correspondence; a reply that would 
not force him to weakly agree to arbitration immediately; a reply that might bring an 
honourable result from his point of view. Accordingly, Ibn Saud was seriously 
reviewing his government policies in this crisis. In fact the King gave immediate 
instructions to his government to stop the whole publicity campaign at once.' 
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Tactfully, the Saudi government reply to the British government note of 2 April had 
been temporarily neglected perhaps for the following three reasons.'^ ^ First, the King 
might have reserved the entire case to be dealt by himself and the British Prime 
Minister at this stage, especially when Ibn Saud was aiming to contain any British 
aggression through correspondence and diplomacy.''''' Second, while the note 
contained the new offer for arbitration, Churchill's message to Ibn Saud did not 
mention the arbitration. Thus, a specific reply from Ibn Saud to Churchill's message 
would make it possible for the king to avoid replying about the arbitration offer at this 
critical stage without losing the ability to deter any possible British attack on Hamasa. 
Finally, Churchill's letter was a more comfortable route of honour for Ibn Saud to 
take, particularly when its opening contained clear references to the friendship of the 
old days, a matter which Ibn Saud was trying to persuade the British government to 
consider when dealing with Saudi Arabia in regard to the dispute. 
Unlike Ibn Saud's message to Eden on 19 September 1952, Ibn Saud's reply to 
Churchill on 4 April 1953 was well thought out, even though the circumstances at the 
time of sending the latter were even worse than when the former was sent.'^ ^ Ibn 
Saud's reply to Churchill contained no words of objection, no complaints, and no 
mention of threat. More surprising, there was not even a proposal for a solution; in 
fact Ibn Saud provided Churchill with a kind of limited 'power of attorney' to put a 
proposal forward. Emphasis on the old friendship and the need for its continuity were 
the major details in the message, despite the fact that Ibn Saud may have felt that 
April 1953 was the lowest that his relations with Britain had ever reached.'^ ^ Ibn 
Saud's reply on 4 April, read: 
" I have received your friendly message to which I have given my fiiU 
attention. The fine expressions which it contains have reminded me of that 
dear friendship on both sides on which, for tens of years, the policies of our 
two countries have centred in the service of peace and humanity, and in those 
hard times when we stood together side by side and during which you called 
us the friends of the dark nights. A l l this makes me do everything possible for 
the maintenance and continuation of this friendship. The Biu-aimi question, in 
which I believe we have the right and in which Your Excellency sees 
otherwise, should not be a reason for the collapse and destruction of this deep-
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rooted friendship . . . [in your] message the following is stated " i f neither of us 
can convince the other, is it difficult for political wisdom to find means to 
bring together view and understanding on basis of justice and honour". This 
desire finds in me a strong echo. Therefore I request Your Excellency to point 
out to us ways and means leading to that, so that we may all follow them to 
reach our desired goal in a way which maintains justice and preserves 
honour".'^' 
For military purposes the operation to blockade Hamasa was concealed until it 
became a fact during the second week of April 1953.'^ ^ Following the creation of a 
military ring around Hamasa a strict blockade was established. Further, military posts 
were established in most of the disputed area including Liwa Oasis. Meanwhile, 
permission was given to the Petroleum Concessions to explore oil in all the disputed 
area up to the Ryan line.'^' 
£ . The Aftermath of the Blockade and the 'Crisis Diplomacy' 
The days and months after the British Blockade of Hamasa could be categorised as 
the hardest time for Saudi-British relations. The long and hard negotiations that the 
shrewd British Ambassador carried out in Riyadh and the several correspondences 
between Churchill and Ibn Saud were most unpleasant for the ageing King.''*" 
Ibn Saud's message - of 4 April 1953 - was viewed in London as "encouraging".''" 
On 8 April, the Foreign Office instructed the British Ambassador at Jeddah to work 
"directly on the King" in order to get his agreement on a solution by arbitration. 
Moreover, Pelham was instructed to deliver at once a brief reply from Churchill to Ibn 
Saud.'"^ To the King's request that the Prime Minister should propose a just and 
honourable solution, Churchill replied in his message of 8 April that Pelham, who had 
his " f i i l l confidence", would soon come to Riyadh to explain what Churchill "has in 
mind".'^^ 
On 10 April, Ibn Saud received disturbing news from Buraimi, coincidentally on the 
same day that Churchill's reply reached him.'"*^ Immediately on the same day, Ibn 
Saud wrote to Churchill that he had just learned that the British forces were 
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blockading Hamasa from every side and denying entry for "motor vehicles carrying 
food" to Ibn Utaishan and his people.''*^ It was stated that the king "did not expect this 
to be done at a moment when . . . [Churchill] had sent him a message, and suggested 
that Her Majesty's Ambassador should go to see [him in Riyadh] . . . in order to 
discuss ways of settiing the problem".'''^ On the same day (10 April 1953), Ibn Saud 
wrote an additional message to Churchill, a matter, which demonstrate that the King's 
anxiety about the blockade had resulted in a panic situation.''*^ In the second message, 
Ibn Saud inquired i f Churchill: 
"was aware of all the actions of British officials in the Persian Gulf, especially 
after the recent exchange of communications with him. I f . . . no t . . . [then Ibn 
Saud] expected him to stop their aggressive and provocative activities in order 
to re-establish mutual trust and the old friendship between the two countries. I f 
. . . [Churchill] is aware of what has happened and wants these aggressive 
activities to continue, then . . . [Ibn Saud].. . believes that the atmosphere for. 
. . [the] meeting [with the British Ambassador] would not be suitable. Even so, 
he would be ready to receive Mr. Pelham".'"^^ 
On 15 April, The British Prime Minister replied with what King Ibn Saud presumably 
did not want to hear. Indeed, Churchill confirmed that the British government over 
which he himself "presides ordered certain action in conformity with the decision 
which was conveyed to the Saudi Arabian Government . . . on April 2nd".'''' 
Nonetheless, Churchill remarked that he and the British government "still hope for the 
friendliest relations between the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia and for a just 
solution of all problems arising between them".'^° Moreover, Churchill submitted that 
the Ambassador's meeting with the King "would still be in the best interests of the 
two countries and would prevent further misunderstandings arising".'^' 
At an audience with King Ibn Saud in Riyadh on 19 April, the British Ambassador 
emphasised "the complete impartiality of arbitration and . . . [explained] how it was 
the only method of settlement consonant with justice and honour".'^^ Pelham 
illustrated to Ibn Saud that both parties would be treated equally and the tribunal body 
should consider all the related factors including Saudi Arabia's "historical claims and 
the wishes of the people concerned".'^^ Despite the fact that Ibn Saud attempted once 
more to direct the conversation to the new situation created after 2 April, Pelham 
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"refused to be drawn" to this. But he explained briefly that the British government's 
latest action was taken because the "deterioration of the situation left us with no 
alternative".'''' According to Pelham, "It was soon evident that to . . . [Ibn Saud] the 
main problem was not so much a matter of procedure as the maintenance of what he 
conceived to be his honour and his reputation".'^^ Hence when the conversation 
retumed to arbitration with a convincing argument by Pelham that such procedure 
would end both states differences whilst maintaining honour and justice, Ibn Saud 
seemed to concur. In fact, the King "responded with an agreement to accept the 
decision of a number of impartial arbifrators provided it was done with agreement 
between . . . [Saudi Arabia and the UK] and it did not impugn his honour".''^ 
Later on in the same day. Ambassador Pelham held a second audience with King Ibn 
Saud, during which the atmosphere of the conversations was tense. Pelham described 
the audience as being a: 
"tortuous and exhausting course. Scarcely a sentence of mine was permitted to 
pass without at least one and often several interruptions. The King was 
insistent and repetitive to a degree that seriously impeded any orderly 
discussion. I was forced to be equally insistenf.'" 
At the opening of the conversation, Pelham assured Ibn Saud that "there was no 
thought on the part o f . . . Her Majesty's Government... of aggression against Saudi 
Arabia".''^ The King who was already annoyed about an incident at Sa'ara village 
Mosque, said what happened in Sa'ara was an aggression.'^ ^ During the course of the 
conversation, Ibn Saud clearly reiterated his view that he could not imagine that such 
a situation would ever exist between his Kingdom and Britain, relating that to his 
honour and religion. Pelham recorded Ibn Saud remarks: 
"He could have dreamed of nothing which could have induced him to go to 
war with Britain, but he would expend every last man in Najd and himself as 
well rather than allow any blemish upon his honour. Striking his chest and 
pointing his finger at me he said several times in the most emphatic manner: 
'My honour and my religion, my honour and my religion'".'^° 
Later in that audience, Pelham "had attempted to impress upon" Ibn Saud a three-
stage solution, during which Saudi Arabia would first declare its "readiness to be 
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bound by the decision of impartial adjudication. Thereafter the arbifrators could be 
agreed upon and then the term of reference".'^' Ibn Saud was "very interested in 
finding a practical solution . . . and he seemed to think this lay in the agreed 
appointment of impartial arbitration".'^^ 
From the first two meetings on 19 April, it became obvious that Ibn Saud was already 
agreeing about the appointment of an impartial arbitration body conditional upon it 
being created by both governments accord and that it would not slur his honour. In 
view of that, Pelham was optimistic and was planning to press on ftirther, on the 
following day, to obtain a formal declaration of Saudi Arabia's full acceptance of the 
principle of arbitration.'^^ 
Whatever the case might be, it should be realised that Ibn Saud's swift agreement on 
arbitration - to Pelham - was the reverse of what the King had decided upon when he 
replied to Churchill on 4 April 1953. As previously illusfrated. King Ibn Saud had 
reached a decision by 4 April, to alter his policy with Britain - over Buraimi - from 
confrontation to compromise. However, Ibn Saud at that juncture was not willing to 
agree to the arbitration proposal, because such an agreement then was confrary to 
honour and the image of his Kingdom's security shield. Pelham's justifications on 19 
April, for arbifration as the best practical technique of settlement consistent with 
justice and honour, may have positively influenced Ibn Saud. But still, Pelham's 
presentation was not the only factor that caused Ibn Saud to mull over impartial 
arbitration. It could be argued that the new factor that instigated Ibn Saud to consider 
the arbitration was the news of the Buraimi blockade on 10 April. Indeed, Ibn Saud 
did shift his policy on 4 April, on the basis of the possibility that the British might 
commence hostilities over Hamasa. Now he knew as a fact, that Hamasa was 
surrounded by troops on every side. Hence an armed offensive on Hamasa was closer 
than ever before, despite Pelham's assurance. Thus, i f such an attack occurred the 
concepts of honour - and security - would be totally destroyed. Ibn Saud, who was 
well informed about the strength of the British forces, knew that his few men in 
Hamasa were defenceless. Thus, he might have believed that i f Pelham left Riyadh 
without a result the worse would be inevitable. I f Hamasa were invaded at that 
particular time, the King would have only two altematives. Either to wage unequal -
and irrational - war against Britain in the same style that he explained to Pelham on 19 
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April, or to survive with the humiliation of a defeat, that could bring internal and 
external intimidation to his own throne. Definitely, both alternatives were far worse 
than i f he agreed with Pelham on the principle of arbitration. 
Nevertheless, on the same evening (of 19 April) the Saudi Deputy Foreign Minister, 
Yusuf Yassin, called upon Pelham. During the conversation Yassin argued that what 
the King had said was no more than his idea of a plebiscite. In his turn Pelham 
completely refused to accept Yassin's argument. During the course of the talk Pelham 
realised that Yassin was aiming to restore the status quo of 26 October 1952, before 
further discussions. In fact Yassin in some form "threatened the breaking o f f of the 
dialogues unless the British government withdrew its forces.'^ 
Does Yassin's conversation with Pelham mean that the former did not know what he 
was talking about? Or does it mean that the king had changed his opinion dramatically 
within hours? The development of the discussions that were to follow answer those 
two questions negatively. In fact, the discussions reveal that Yassin enjoyed King Ibn 
Saud's confidence and was trying to maximise gains before Saudi Arabia disclosed 
agreement to the arbitration.'^^ Yassin must have convinced the King that they should 
not put Pelham in the fi i l l picture about their intention of agreeing on arbitration until 
when they had at least obtained essential concessions. Yassin may have supported 
this, when explaining to the King, with Pelham's assurance as clear indication that no 
harm would be done at least as the negotiations continued. As the following 
discussions confirmed, Yassin was permitted to complete the discussions with 
Pelham, with the implementation of his idea, but perhaps with one clear condition -
made by Ibn Saud - that whatever happened, that Pelham should not leave Riyadh 
without anything to stop a British strike on Hamasa. Yassin's idea was the same as his 
proposal to Pelham, namely the need for the restoration of the pre-2 April status quo 
before the Saudi government could grant their agreement on arbitration. As Pelham 
observed and recorded the King's willingness on agreement to arbitration on 19 April, 
the only way out of that, perhaps in Yassin's point of view, was to send a letter from 
Ibn Saud to Churchill. This letter would be a reply to his letter and give information 
on the Riyadh discussions during which two matters would be solved: First the 
reversing of Ibn Saud remarks to Pelham on the arbitration (on 19 April); Second a 
clear statement requesting Churchill for the restoration of the situation before 2 April. 
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Indeed, on the same night Yassin had made his diplomatic coup. Thus, by the 
morning of 20 April 1953, a message from Ibn Saud was on its way to Churchill. In 
the message which was transmitted through the Saudi Embassy in London on 20 April 
1953, it was stated that: 
" I expressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador my willingness to discuss with him 
the possibilities of finding a middle course which would combine the British 
Government's suggestion for arbitration and mine for plebiscite. Would it not 
be possible for my old friend [Churchill] to re-examine the present sitiiation 
and help to restore it to what it was when the agreement [was] reached in 
London in August 1951 and that of Riyadh [ i n ] . . . October 1952. It would not 
be possible for an international body to act freely i f . . . [the] situation remains 
as it is at the present".'^ ^ 
During a meeting on the morning of 20 April, Yassin handed Pelham a copy of Ibn 
Saud's message to Churchill and explained that the message "expressed the essence of 
the King's words of the previous day".'^ ^ Pelham diplomatically did not allude to the 
differences between what the King had said and the text of the message. However, he 
"refused to accept this inconclusive statement as the answer to . . . [his] 
representations and insisted on [an] unequivocal note stating that the Saudis . . . 
[accepted] the principle of arbitration".'^^ When Yassin enquired i f the British 
government would restore the status quo in the disputed area to what it was before 2 
April, Pelham "insisted that the object of . . . [his] mission was to discover whether 
the King would declare the principle of arbifration. Everything else was irrelevant".'^' 
On the same evening another meeting with Yassin - or what Pelham called "battle"-
was taking place during which the Ambassador had adopted a "stiff tone".'^° The 
discussion started by covering the same points that were discussed previously without 
any constructive outcome from either side. When the atmosphere of the meeting was 
almost like a "fierce interview", Yassin said, "The Saudi Arabian Government could 
not negotiate under the threat of bayonets".'^' Furthermore, Yassin "infroduced the 
subjects of . . . British delinquencies, starvation, military threats, killing and 
occupation by force of Saudi Arabia".'^^ At this junction, Pelham restated the former 
assurance that the British government "had no hostile intention" and declined to 
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converse on these subjects.'^ ^ Moreover, Pelham stated that the essential issue at this 
instant was a declaration by all parties on their "willingness to settle the dispute by 
impartial arbitration and that Her Majesty's Government could not now consider 
anything before this principles had been agreed upon".'^" Ultimately, Yassin stated, 
"the Saudi Arabian Government had no objection to the principle of impartial 
arbitration". Nevertheless, Yassin refused to put anything in writing and insisted that 
the British government should first answer Ibn Saud's request on the restoration of the 
status quo prior to 2 April, before any further negotiations - in Riyadh - could take 
place.'^^ 
While in Riyadh, Pelham cabled the Foreign Office, with an update of the 
discussions.'^^ After mentioning that the Saudi government had temporarily 
suspended the discussions pending a satisfactory reply on Ibn Saud's question 
regarding the status quo, Pelham stated that he could still move the Saudis on this. 
Furthermore, Pelham advised his government to reply to Ibn Saud that without written 
acceptance of the principle of impartial arbitration and without agreement on the 
members of the tribunal and the terms of reference, there would be no discussion 
about any modification of the statue quo. In the conclusion of his telegram Pelham 
stated the "The general impression is that our position is strong and the Saudis [are] 
ready to agree to some form of neutral settlement".'^' 
While the Foreign Office was considering a reply on even better terms than Pelham 
had suggested, a surprising telegram arrived from Riyadh stating that "On 22 April 
the Saudi Arabian Government fully accepted the principle of arbitration".''* 
Apparently, the Saudis had modified their position even without getting the reply. 
Accompanying the acceptance the Saudi government submitted a draft of a joint 
public statement.''' The details of the Saudi government draft included several issues 
that needed to be discussed. One of the draft items was a reference to the restoration 
of the status quo pre-2 April.^^° It seems that, there were two reasons that made the 
Saudis act swiftly even before getting a reply. First, by submitting their acceptance 
with a draft stating their wish for the restoration of the status quo they kept the 
initiative successfully in their hands for further discussions and without perhaps 
getting obligations on that from the British government. But most important, the 
Saudi government was very concerned about the British forces' activities in Buraimi, 
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thus there was an immediate need for action in Riyadh in order to insure that no harm 
would be done in Buraimi. Indeed, in the same telegram from Riyadh to the Foreign 
office, Pelham wrote, "The Saudis showed anxiety about the situation of the dispute 
areas . . . it may be possible to avoid actions which might be construed as 
incidents".^^' 
Pelham and Yassin then concentrated their discussions on the draft of the joint 
statement, but could not reach a mutually satisfactory result. When Pelham left 
Riyadh on 24 April, it was agreed that ftirther negotiations regarding the draft, the 
creation of the arbitration body, and the terms of reference would be commenced 
soon:'' 
Subsequent to the conclusion of his mission to Riyadh, Pelham wrote to the Foreign 
office that, "the King . . . [said] that our friendship was most precious and I believe 
Yusuf Yasin [Yassin] knows that he has been defeated. He is in a more malleable 
frame of mind than I have ever known him before".'^^ Commenting on his position 
during the discussion Pelham, wrote " I felt all the advantage of British prestige and 
power just as I had noticed the lack of it when I was negotiating the Standstill 
Agreement last October".'^'' Indeed, the reality of the Saudis concerns over the 
Kingdom's security had made them do what might have been considered as 
impossible. 
It must be noted that Ibn Saud's assumption about the possibility of a British 
offensive on Hamasa i f Pelham left Riyadh without any constructive result, was a 
very wise point to be considered. Despite the fact that the British government did not 
rule out a clear decision whether to invade Hamasa or not at that stage, the possibility 
of such an issue was still not entirely dead until the Riyadh talks started to show a 
positive result for London. Indeed, on 23 April, it was noted in the Foreign Office 
that; "the use of forces" against the Saudis in Hamasa is not now a consideration, "at 
least so long as we are talking reasonably in Riyadh". Moreover, following the 
Riyadh discussions Pelham wrote in one of his despatches to the Foreign Office that, 
" I assume we do not now corisider the use of force".'^^ 
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Following the Saudi government's acceptance of the arbitration, it was in a better 
position to request US government support, especially when Saudi Arabia accepted 
the principle of arbitration, a matter which was recommended by the USA.'*^ On 1 
May, the State Department approached the Foreign Office, through the British 
Embassy in Washington, about the Saudi government concerns.'*^ The State 
Department suggested that the British government should consider giving Saudi 
Arabia a concession by the meaning of restoring the status quo of 26 October 1952 
when the arbitrators commenced their work. Moreover, the State Department 
recommended that the arbitration be made easier for Saudi Arabia by introducing the 
wishes of the disputed area's population in the term of reference.'^^ Nonetheless, the 
Foreign Office reacted negatively to the State Department suggestions. Despite the 
fact that the State Department's efforts did not get a fruitful outcome, the attempt was 
still viewed with some appreciation in Riyadh, particularly when this attempt was the 
first of its kind since the new US administration took office at the beginning of the 
year. Hence, this attempt had made the Saudi government become more optimistic 
about further US support.' ^ ° 
On 7 May, Pelham arrived in Riyadh in order to follow-up the April discussions. On 
his arrival the Ambassador handed the King a message from the British Prime 
Minister.'^' Churchill expressed his gratitude to Ibn Saud for his decision upon the 
acceptance of the arbitration then stated that, "While arbitration is taking place it shall 
be a matter of honour between us that no advantages are to be taken by either side in 
the military position".'^^ Concerning Ibn Utaishan and his men, Churchill assured Ibn 
Saud that they would be allowed to supply themselves from the local markets "while 
arbitration is being settled".'^^ 
Pelham observed the King's reaction, after the message was read to him: "He listened 
in silence, but the effect was somewhat disappointing, for he made no other reply than 
"we would agree upon the essentials of what we would discuss".'^'' The King was 
probably anticipating a British concession in regard to the military positions in 
Buraimi, particularly when Saudi Arabia had agreed to the arbitration. The King in 
"several long speeches" during this audience illustrated his general dissatisfaction 
about the British government attitude towards him. In addition, he emphasised his 
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goodwill towards Britain and how he felt let down.'^^ Pelham summarised these 
speeches as follow: 
"He would never have imagined that a difference could have arisen between 
himself and Her Majesty Government... He regarded Britain as he regarded 
his family . . . He had been embarrassed by requests from . . . [his subjects] 
and even from foreigners to know what they might do to help His Majesty in 
this dispute. He had constantly maintained that there was no dispute between 
our Governments, merely a local difference of opinion. He had done all he 
could to minimise the matter and avoid publicity . . . Al l he wanted was to 
achieve a final settlement with justices and honour on both sides. He asked for 
nothing but that each side should have its rights. These he seemed to consider 
were laid down in various treaties and agreements".'^ ^ 
Following the audience, Pelham discussed the details with Yusuf Yassin and Khalid 
Al-Qarqani. For Pelham these discussions were not as calm as the previous month's 
discussions. Thus, by 11 May, the talks reached a deadlock on most matters regarding 
the details of the preparation for the arbitration. However, the only matter that they 
agreed upon was a British government redrafting of the Saudi's proposed public 
statement. Still the Saudi agreement to the issuance of the statement was subject to it 
including a clear reference to the restoration of the status quo of 26 October 1952. 
On 11 May, Pelham had a second audience with Ibn Saud. During this meeting the 
King repeated - but with fiirther explanations - what he told Pelham on 7 May. 
According to Pelham, the main points were "categorical assertion that the land was 
his and the people were his people. He was blameless but the British had neglected 
their agreements and encroached upon his land".'^* It must be pointed out that Pelham 
had misunderstood Ibn Saud's reference to the agreements. Hence Pelham interpreted 
it as i f Ibn Saud was referring to all the treaties, with particular emphasis on the 
Jeddah treaty of 1927.'^ ^ But, i f the timing of such criticism was taken into 
consideration, it could be assumed that Ibn Saud was referring to the British 
government termination of the Standstill and London agreements. I f this were 
examined with Ibn Saud's disregard of Pelham's assurance on 19 April, as well as to 
Churchill's message on 7 May, it could be understood that Ibn Saud no longer tiiisted 
the British government, particularly when the King experienced Britain's simple 
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cancellation on 2 April 1953 of written contracts, compared to an aural assurance or a 
promise in a message. Moreover, Ibn Saud's comments, in his letter to Churchill on 
20 April 1953, about his own respect for the agreements that he had entered, would 
clearly reveal that the King was in fact questioning his trust of Britain explicitly. In 
that letter Ibn Saud wrote that " A l l those who followed my personal history from the 
beginning know that I houner [honour] the agreements I enter to most faithfully. I 
have never abrogated an agreement and never breached a promise"}^ 
During the same meeting Ibn Saud summed up Saudi Arabia's stance in regard to the 
dispute. The king explained that he wished "for a speedy settlement of the whole 
problem by arbitration and . . . would gladly accept the arbitrators' decision based on 
historical facts and the loyalties of the people, whatever that decision might be".^°' 
However, before he "could proceed further with arbitration Her Majesty's 
Government must accede to his request to withdraw their troops and raise the 
blockade".^°^ At this stage Pelham emphasised to Churchill the "desire and need to 
dea l . . . with His Majesty on the basis of honour" .King Ibn Saud commented that, 
"it is right that i f we are to have an impartial neutral settlement neither side should 
have any advantage. It was intolerable that the British should be blockading . . . [my] 
men".^ *''' Moreover, the King added that, i f Churchill: 
"has made it a matter of honour. Very well. I wil l solemnly give my word of 
honour and swear upon all that is holy that on my side of the agreement I will 
not send any more men to the disputed areas. Let Sir Winston Churchill 
withdraw his forces, raise the blockade and similarly give his word of honour. 
Then and only then can arbitration proceed".^°^ 
In contrast to the April 1953 discussion, Pelham could not get similar advantages 
during the May discussions. The reasons for this were that the topics of the 
discussions and the circumstances for the Saudi government were not the same as in 
April. Indeed, the pressure from the possibility of a British attack on Hamasa was 
weaker in May than in April, particularly as the Saudi government had agreed on 
arbitration, which was a principal demand for the British government, compared to 
the discussions of the details of the preparation of the arbitration body. Hence, the 
Saudis were more relaxed during May discussions in these respects. Moreover, 
contrasting with the situation in April the Saudis were aware now that the US 
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government was willing to help them, as it had approached the British government in 
this regard on 1 May 1953.^°^ Accordingly, the Saudis were hoping and waiting to 
push for ftirther US support during the scheduled visit of the US Secretary of State, 
Mr John Foster Dulles, to Riyadh on 18 May 1953.^ "^  
Before leaving Riyadh Pelham was handed a letter of reply from Ibn Saud to 
Church i l l .The contents of the message, which was dated 11 May, were similar to 
what the King had told the British Ambassador on 11 May, in regard to Saudi 
Arabia's attitude to the dispute. But furthermore, Ibn Saud emphasised the need for an 
equality of existence between both parties in the disputed areas.^ "^  With a reference to 
Churchill's message of 7 May, Ibn Saud stated: 
"The British Government has prejudiced the principles agreed upon [in the 
Standstill and London agreements] by securing for itself . . . military 
advantages in the disputed areas . . . We are confident that respect for the 
principle of equality . . .will be helpfiil in solving the dispute. Equality can be 
secured by continuing to carry out what was agreed upon in the standstill 
Agreement... and the London Conference . . . we are ready to exchange with 
Your Excellency honourable assurances that nothing shall be done by either 
side to prejudice this . . . i f anything happens to prejudice this, the neutral and 
impartial body . . . shall have the power to see that those two Agreements are 
enforced".^'" 
At the end of his mission to Riyadh, Pelham recommended that his government 
provide the Saudi govermnent with some concessions, in the Buraimi area only, in 
order to make the forthcoming discussions more successfiil for finalising the 
arbitration issue."^" In particular, Pelham suggested that Churchill reply to Ibn Saudi 
to include "something on lines of one of the following alternatives": 
"(a) proposal to raise blockade on Turki and to make substantial troop 
withdrawals after Arbitral Agreement has been concluded and subject to 
suitable safeguards . . . (b) the terms of the Standstill Agreement . . . shall 
apply to Buraimi Oasis from the day of the appointment of the Arbitrators,... 
until conclusion of arbitration".^^^ 
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Pelham supported his recommendation convincingly. In regard to the possibility of a 
negative result on British prestige he stated that, "the possible ill-effect on our 
prestige as a result of giving concessions in relation to arbitration might be off-set by 
Saudi retreat from plebiscite and would, in any case, be obliterated by arbitral 
award".^'^ Furthermore, Pelham emphasised that, this "may not be too a high price for 
a friendly settlement of a long outstanding dispute with a country of growing 
influence and with whom steady worsening of relations may do us no good in the 
Middle East".^ '^' Moreover, Pelham argued that by granting Saudi Arabia these 
"temporary concessions" we could attain a permanent solution of the entire dispute by 
arbitration. Pelham also added that, the "achievement of our object would greatly 
strengthen our position generally".^The only two "possible objections" to this in 
which Pelham himself did not believe, would be, "(a) that we do not trust the Saudis 
(and do not care about our relations with them); (b) that our prestige in the Gulf might 
suffer".^'^ 
In London the views were contrary to Pelham recommendations,^'^ a matter that 
logically would mean that the British government did not trust the Saudi, as well as 
that it did not care about relations with Saudi Arabia. Following a recommendation 
from the Foreign office in taking a fiirther hard line policy, Churchill wrote to Ibn 
Saud on 2 June.^ '^  The British Prime Minister agreed with the Saudi King on the 
significance of equality in the disputed areas, and stated: 
"True equality will best be established i f we both recall our forces. I f Turki 
and his men leave, our forces also shall leave the disputed areas. Thereafter, 
until the future of the areas has been decided in the maimer agreed, neither of 
us shall send forces . . . and it shall be a matter of honour between us that 
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neither side shall seek any military or political advantage". 
Moreover, The British Prime Minister proposed the abolition of the scheme for a 
neutral body. On this Churchill suggested, "We do not need any outside umpires to 
supervise this agreement, which shall be between friends. Will You Majesty agree to 
this?".220 
On 7 June, Pelham arrived in Riyadh for further talks with the Saudis on Churchill's 
new proposal.^^' During his five days stay in Riyadh Pelham could not reach any 
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agreement with the Saudis.^ ^^ Churchill's suggestion of the withdrawal of all forces 
was emphasised by Pelham repeatedly during all his discussions. Nevertheless, the 
Saudi government stood firmly that Ibn Utaishan would not be withdrawn under any 
circumstances, nor would Saudi Arabia proceed with arbitration unless the blockade 
was lifted. Moreover, i f the blockade was lifted and the arbitration commenced its 
work then both sides must keep equal numbers of officials and forces in the area.^ ^^  
The Saudi government position on this was clearly illustrated in Ibn Saud's message 
to Churchill, a message that was written while Pelham was in the middle of his 
mission in Riyadh; hence the British diplomat was struggling to convince the Saudis 
in a matter that they had already decided upon after hearing about Churchill's 
unacceptable proposal.^ "^* 
On 9 June, Ibn Saud's reply to Churchill was handed to Pelham.^ ^^ Following the 
usual friendly comments, Ibn Saud stated that, "it never occurred to me that any 
problem between me and Britain would reach the proportions which the frontier 
dispute has reached".^ ^^ Ibn Saud reminded Churchill that the promise of allowing Ibn 
Utaishan to "be supplied form the local market" was not being honoured. In regard to 
Churchill's proposal for the withdrawal of all forces, Ibn Saud insisted that it would 
not bring about equality; in his view, it created inequality: 
"for we are asked to withdraw Turki and the few men with him to al-Hasa, a 
distance over seven hundred kilometres from Buraimi, while the British forces 
will withdraw to . . . undetermined distances probably not more than fifty 
kilometres. We have no guarantee that the other forces will not return for 
reasons which they might create in the name of security . . . Moreover, 
security w i l l . . . be unbalanced . . . [thus we] will not be in a position to fulf i l 
our obligations to protect our subjects; whereas the other forces will be 
nearby".^" 
With respect to Churchill's suggestion on abolishing the neutral body Ibn Saud 
explained that: 
"it was implied in the standstill agreement . . . that the honour of both sides 
was bound up with the implementation of its provisions, yet this agreement 
was abolished unilaterally on the part of Britain on the basis of a judgment 
issued by Britain herself to herself; and there was no third party to say who the 
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wrongdoer was. So how can we repeat the situation without setting up over us 
an arbitrator who will ensure that neither party delivers judgment 
independently against the other?".^ ^^ 
After stating that he is "extremely anxious" to end this dispute, Ibn Saud put forward 
a proposal that included the following line:^^^ 
1. The removal of the blockade on Ibn Utaishan. 
2. Upon the commencement of the arbitral operations both sides "undertake 
to have equal number of officials" and all the extra forces would be 
withdrawn. 
3. Al l sides will refrain form any kind provocation and the neutral body will 
be authorised to oversee that. 
Ibn Saud's counter proposal of 9 June was completely rejected by the British 
government. Ibn Saud's proposal was viewed in London as "unacceptable" as it 
allowed Ibn Utaishan to remain in Buraimi while it limited the British government's 
actions in the disputed areas.^^° Moreover, the British government believed that i f Ibn 
Saud's proposals were implemented, it would be interpreted locally in the Trucial 
Coast as a major retreat fi:om its actions on 2 April 1953.^ '^ Thus, the British 
government was not willing to put forward any new proposals apart fi-om what had 
already been offered to the Saudis. Furthermore, a formal reply from Churchill to Ibn 
Saud was delayed temporarily, a matter that brought about a temporary deadlock on 
the whole issue.^ ''^  
Toward the end of June 1953, the British government was reconsidering its general 
policy towards the dispute. Al l possibilities were imder consideration and 
investigations within the British government departments, including studies of the 
advantages to the continuation of the deadlock and the possibility of removing Ibn 
Utaishan by force.^^^ 
Meanwhile, as a result of fiirther British tightening of the Buraimi Blockade the 
situation deteriorated. On 20 June 1953, the Saudi government protested against the 
detention and torture of 35 locals who were on their way to visit Ibn Utaishan.^ '^' 
Moreover, on 23 June, the Saudi government protested against a further act. Fire was 
326 
exchanged between fifteen local tribesmen who were on their way to Hamasa and one 
of the British force posts nearby. According to the Saudi government story those 
tribesmen were forced to retaliate in order to defend themselves. The incident resulted 
in "a few casualties and also some deaths".^ ^^ 
F. The Scope of Saudi-US Relations, and its Association with the Development of 
the Frontier Dispute 
By the end of 1952 it became apparent that the USA was the predominant foreign 
influence in Saudi Arabia. The British Ambassador to Saudi Arabia wrote in 
December 1952, that in the past "America was feeling her way to a position of 
paramountcy against those foreign nations taking an interest in Saudi Arabia: now in 
every field - military, economic and diplomatic - her influence is supreme".^ ^^ 
As a result of the developments of the unique and constructive relations between the 
USA and Saudi Arabia, the USA became naturally the sole foreign power that Ibn 
Saud could politically rely on. Indeed, the King's frequent requests for US 
government help - in almost all the political issues - had became a normal 
phenomenon by 1953. In fact the Saudi-American political association became even 
broader when the Saudi King became used to the counsel of the Americans on his 
Kingdom's affairs, a matter which used to be considered British business during the 
early 1940s. On this, Pelham commented that, "Ibn Saud has changed his solicitors 
and it is now to the American Embassy that he applies for general political advice or 
legal or economic aid. At the request of the King . . . Mr. Hare is frequently in 
Riyadh"."' 
As a consequence of the 1951 agreements, the USA militarily supremacy in Saudi 
Arabia had become more noticeable during 1952-53. The considerable American air 
base at Dhahran was expanding, American military equipment was arriving, and the 
A M M was functioning successftiUy. Moreover, the extent of the operations of the 
A M M had made the American military role - in the Kingdom - to be demonstrable, 
particularly when it embarked in a project that was designed to frain, organise, and 
equip over 17,000 troops. Likewise, the same thing could be said about the 
preparation for a relatively ambitious program for the creation of a Saudi Air Force, 
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which was underway by 1953.^ ''* In addition to all of that, the Kingdom had been 
given special consideration in regard to military grant aid, when President Eisenhower 
found Saudi Arabia "eligible for military assistance under the Mutual Defence 
Assistance Act of 1951" on 14 March 1953."^ 
The arrival of further American technical advisers had further enhanced the work of 
Saudi-US technical cooperation. Dr Young, a principle member of the American 
Technical Cooperation Mission became the chief financial adviser to the Saudi 
Arabian government. The first step for the success of the mission was the creation of 
the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency.^ "*" The predicted increment of US influence as a 
result of the work of the US advisers became a reality within a year of the 
establishment of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency. Indeed, the newly created state 
bank, which controlled the Saudi currency was headed by an American, Mr Dlowers, 
and advised by Young, a matter that tied the Saudi Riyal to the US dollar or indeed, 
made Saudi Arabia to be a part of the US dollar market.^ '*' Moreover, the Arabian 
American Oil Company - which was the main force in bringing US interests into 
Saudi Arabia - was also expanding in size with increased oil operations. This 
ultimately resulted in bringing in more US companies, not just as sub-contractors for 
Aramco, but also as participants in all the Saudi Arabian development projects. '^'^  The 
growing American involvement in the Saudi Arabian economy produced expectations 
of further involvement. Furthermore, the arrangement of the Saudi govenmient 
constructional engineering and plaiming became an exclusively American affair. For 
instance, the American Company, Michael Baker Junior, held "exclusive right to 
specify plans, materials and standards for government construction schemes".^ ''^  
By the begirming of 1953, Pelham described the US supremacy in Saudi Arabia as 
incomparable to Britain's position there. Moreover, Pelham stated that "the 
Americans are here as overwhelmingly the principal producers of wealth in the 
country . . . [they] have luxury, wealth and modernisation to offer".^'" The British 
Ambassador's comments go on: "America is putting in Advisers free of charge and 
American Enterprises is causing money to flow".^'*^ Whereas Britain has "little to 
offer".^'** Pelham observed that, in contrast with the USA, Britain's "position . . . may 
now be near its nadir". '^'^  Indeed, the impact of the enhancement of USA influence in 
Saudi Arabia was remarkable on Saudi-British relations, particularly when this is 
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judged alongside the deterioration of the situation over the frontier issue. On this, Mr 
R. Bowker, the Assistant Under-Secretary supervising Middle East affairs at the 
Foreign Office, minuted "The present state of Anglo-Saudi relations is unsatisfactory, 
affected as they are by rapidly growing American influence in Saudi-Arabia, and 
bedevilled . . . by the frontier dispute".^ "** 
Despite the fact that Saudi-American relations were growing at almost all levels - and 
despite the US government's previous efforts in trying to solve the Saudi-British 
dispute - the Saudi government was not that satisfied about the US attitude towards 
the Saudi-Anglo dispute in the first quarter of 1953. As was mentioned previously, the 
Saudi government's attempts to convince the US government to support the Saudi 
proposal of plebiscite before April 1953 were doomed to failure. Instead of 
considering the Saudi proposal the Americans had viewed the British proposal of 
arbitration as the best procedure for settlement. Though the US government had 
explained that it was not siding with the British but was merely convinced, according 
to its own independent study, that arbitration was the most equitable means of 
resolving the dispute, the Saudi government was still not totally satisfied about their 
attitude.^''^ In fact, by the end of April 1953 the Saudi government started to lose its 
patience about the US government's delay in reaffirming the Truman assurance of 
October 1950.^^° Furthermore, the Saudi government even saw itself in a position to 
attribute its weak stand vis-a-vis the British government act of April to the absence of 
a supportive US attitude.^^' Nonetheless, the State Department's fixiitless approach to 
the Foreign Office on 1 May was viewed optimistically in Riyadh; but the experience 
of the negotiations with the British government throughout the spring had made the 
Saudi government believe that without the f i i l l backing of the US government the 
frontier conflict would never be confroUed.^^^ 
When the US Secretary for State, Mr John Foster Dulles, visited Riyadh on 18 May 
1953, the Saudi government did not waste the opportunity to seek US backing for its 
case.^ '^^  In the evening of his arrival in Riyadh Dulles met King Ibn Saud. During the 
audience King Ibn Saud stated that Saudi-US fiiendship had received a "heavy 
blow".^ ^"* This was particularly so, as he personally was dissatisfied about the lack of 
US government support during his recent difficulties. The King remarked that; "his 
old friend the British government had turned against him because of his closer 
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friendship with the United States, to which he had awarded the oil concession. Now 
Britain had begun to chase Saudi subjects from their ovm country".^ ^^ Ibn Saud 
requested the US government's assistance in this case, as well as the immediate 
reaffirmation of the Truman letter of October 1950.^ ^^  Furthermore, disappointment 
and threats were evident during a talk between Yassin and Dulles. Yassin remarked to 
Dulles that unless the US government supported Saudi Arabia in the frontier dispute, 
there would be no option for the Saudi government but to reconsider its relations with 
the USA.'^" On his departure form Riyadh Dulles was handed a message form King 
Ibn Saudi to President Eisenhower. Ibn Saud's letter emphasised the necessity of 
mutual cooperation between Saudi Arabia and the USA, and the need for the US 
government's support for Saudi Arabia's case in the frontier dispute.^ ^^ 
The outcome of Dulles visit was fruitful for the Saudi Arabian government. The US 
administration became concerned at correcting the notion, which King Ibn Saud and 
his officials appeared to have, that the USA had "let them down".^^^ On 15 June, 
Eisenhower replied to Ibn Saud reaffirming the assurances included in the Truman 
letter of October 1950. Furthermore, Eisenhower's correspondence expressed concern 
at learning from Dulles that the King believed that the USA had not "adequately 
supported" him during recent difficulties. For this reason the President invited the 
King to correspond with him frankly and at anytime about any concem even i f it 
would be against the USA itself.^^" 
The US President's letter was well received in Riyadh when the US Ambassador 
delivered it to the King on 27 June.^ '^ Eisenhower's invitation for open dialogue 
between him and Ibn Saud resulted in numerous correspondences regarding the 
dispute between both heads of States until Ibn Saud's death in November 1953.^ ^^  
Accordingly, the US government became closely involved in the development of the 
Saudi-British dispute, as the following pages will reveal. 
G. Further Difficulty in Buraimi and the US Intervention 
On 11 July 1953, the US government put forward a proposal to the British 
government as follows: 
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"(1) It should be agreed that arbitration should take place with the Saudi and 
British forces remaining in the area on the understanding that the blockade 
would be lifted and that the Saudis would engage in no fiirther suboming 
activities. (2) An Observation Commission consisting of one Saudi, one 
British and one neufral representative should be set up immediately to proceed 
to the area and ensure that these conditions are carried ou t . . . (3) At the same 
time, the British and Saudi Governments should make a public announcement 
of their agreement to submit the frontier dispute to arbifration".^^ 
In London the American proposal was considered "misconceived" and unfair for 
British "prestige" in the Gulf In a despatch from the Foreign office, to the Acting 
British Secretary of State, Lord Robert Salisbury - who was about to hold talks with 
the Americans in Washington - an update of the British government position was 
expounded. Salisbury was requested to reject the proposal and to explain to the 
Americans that Ibn Utaishan's presence in Buraimi was the "crux" of the issue. 
Salisbury was requested to emphasis that, "Turki's move there was in the first place 
outrageous".^ ^^ The explanation to Salisbury goes on, that since Turki's arrival: 
"he has done endless harm to our fiiends, the effects of which cannot easily be 
eradicated. I f he is allowed to stay on, even supervised by a commission, the 
local tribes will interpret it as recognition of Saudi claims and a capitulation 
by us to the Saudis . . . [Hence the local tribes] answers to any questions put to 
them by the representatives of the arbifral tribunal will be coloured by this 
fact".^^' 
The proposed neutral commission, in the British government point of view, would not 
confrol Ibn Utaishan's "highly organised" activities. Furthermore, Turki's "personal 
contacts with tribal leaders wil l be renewed by the lifting of the blockade".^ ^* 
Therefore, the US government's proposal would not be acceptable to the British 
govenmient. In reply, Salisbury was asked to suggest to Eisenhower that he consider 
proposing the idea of complete mutual withdrawal to Ibn Saud. The British 
government "are not convinced that Ibn Saud will refiase to move Turki".^^^ 
In a meeting with Dulles in Washington on the morning of 14 July 1953, Salisbury 
argued the British government case and explained accordingly the basis for its 
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rejection of the US government proposal.^^° Dulles remarked that the US government 
was "convinced that Ibn Saud would not accept proposal involving the withdrawal of 
Turki".^^' Furthermore, Dulles' illustrated to Salisbury that, "The continuance of the 
dispute was having unfortunate effect on the relations of the United States 
Government with Ibn Saud who considered that . . . [the American] were under an 
obligation to defend his interest and that they had hitherto failed to do so".^ '^  Dulles 
explanation continued that, "it was . . . important from the American point of view to 
terminate the present deadlock. They had major interests in Saudi Arabia . . . They 
therefore appealed to us [the British] to reconsider their proposals".^ ^^ Salisbury 
remarked to Dulles that British interests and prestige in the Gulf was also "deeply 
involved". Nonetheless, his colleagues in the British government would look at the 
American proposal again when he returned to London.^ '"* 
At lunch on the same day Eisenhower raised the question with Salisbury.^'^ Without 
going into details, but with rather frank criticism, the President remarked that he felt 
that: 
"the possible tranquillization of the Middle East was prevented by the 
continuation of Great Britain's disputes with Iran, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. It 
was essential in his view to bring these disputes to an end so that the area 
might calm down and become an effective part of the fi^ee world".^'^ 
Subsequent to meetings of the Foreign Office and the British Cabinet, Salisbury wrote 
back to Dulles on 27 July.^ ^^ Though it was realised in London that a rejection of the 
American proposal "would place a considerable strain on Anglo-American relations" 
the British government saw no alternative but to reject the proposal.^ ^^ Salisbury's 
letter to Dulles, which again rejected the US proposal, reiterated British government 
views on similar grounds to Salisbury's argument in Washington on 14 July.^ ^^ 
Salisbury re-emphasised that in the British government's view, "Turki has no right to 
be in Hamasa; the village is one of those belonging to [the] Sultan of Muscat, who, 
with the Ruler of Abu Dhabi, objected most strongly to Turki's incursion into Buraimi 
Oasis".^^° The Saudi Arabian occupation of Hamasa in August 1953 had "no legal 
justification". Following emphasis on the legitimate right of the local rulers over the 
Oasis, Salisbury stated that: 
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"We had indeed every right to remove Turki many months ago. But as you 
know . . . we restrained [the] Sultan of Muscat from using forces against him, 
and in Buraimi Standstill Agreement we acquiesced in his remaining in Oasis 
temporarily until, as we hoped, an agreement was reached in regard to 
arbitration".^^' 
In details almost identical to Salisbury's previous explanation to Dulles on 14 July, 
the British Minster summed up that Ibn Utaishan's presence in Buraimi would result 
in the failure of the arbitration task. Furthermore, the lifting of the Blockade would 
make such a failure inevitable and "wil l have a disastrous effect on our relations with 
our old and tried friends".^^^ Moreover, British acceptance of the proposal was 
considered as a "risk" option that would weaken the British position in the whole 
Persian Gulf Salisbury illustrated that "Our position in the Persian Gulf States has 
been careftilly built up, we are trusted there, and to weaken it now would be 
detrimental . . . to us". At the conclusion Salisbury requested the US government 
for the second time to urge Ibn Saud to reconsider the mutual withdrawal proposal. 
On this it was stated that all the British government information was confirming that, 
"your advice would be accepted".^ '^* 
On 28 August 1953 Dulles replied to Salisbury.^ ^^ Dulles stated the US government's 
disappointment and concern about the British government's refiisal of the proposal. 
Moreover, Dulles pointed out that the British and the US governments "respective 
estimates of the situation differ" in two "important respects". First, while the 
British government considered that any compromise in accepting Turki to remain in 
Hamasa without the Blockade "wil l prejudice the issue"; the US government 
considered its proposal as a safeguard against any "suboming activities" by Turki.^*' 
Second, while the British government was convinced that Ibn Saud would accept US 
advice for mutual withdrawal, the US government was also convinced that Ibn Saud 
"would not accept such a proposal".^** Furthermore, Dulles emphasised the 
importance of maintaining a supportive attitude towards King Ibn Saud as well as the 
importance of Saudi Arabia itself: 
"Perhaps you were not aware, however, of the strain which our support 
imposed upon our friendly relationship with King Ibn Saud. I am sure you will 
agree that Saudi Arabia is assuming an increasingly important position in the 
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pattern of our conmion defense. While recognizing the importance of your 
position in the Persian Gulf, I feel strongly that in the days ahead of us it will 
be of paramount importance to both of us to have the friendship and 
confidence of the ruler of Saudi Arabia". 
Illustrating the US government's concem with solving the dispute with on agreeable 
arrangement for the Saudi Arabian government, Dulles pressurised: 
" I judge from your letter that we may not have made sufficiently clear, during 
our conversations in July, the seriousness with which we view the situation 
and the importance we attach to finding some means of settling the dispute 
which would have greater chance of being accepted by the Saudi government 
than those you have put forward. I feel that the possible consequences of 
inaction are so serious that I again urge your reconsideration of our proposals 
in the light of our understanding of the situation as I have set it forth 
above".2^° 
While the US and the British governments were corresponding about Buraimi, the 
actual situation on the ground in the oasis was deteriorating. As the British forces 
strengthened the blockade around Hamasa, shooting incidents between those entering 
Hamasa village and the British forces intensified. Throughout July and August the 
Saudi government kept protesting about these incidents to the British government 
without receiving a positive response.^ '^ By September 1953 the Saudi government 
began to realise that the British government was inclined to uphold the deadlock in 
Buraimi. Hence a new tactic by the Saudi government might compel the British 
government to speed the breaking of deadlock. 
The increasing number of shooting incidents and the British government's tendency 
to leave the situation as it was in Buraimi had motivated the Saudi government to 
retrieve its publicity p o l i c y . O n 20 September 1953, the Saudi government 
published the details of recent incidents in Buraimi.^''' Accompanying the publication 
of the occurrences the Saudi government issued an anti-British communique that 
ends: 
"in announcing this the Saudi Arabian Government reserve the right to act as 
they see fit to secure their interests. They are in possession of documents about 
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repeated acts of aggression which show the course of British policy and their 
colonialist plans".^ ^^  
The retrieval of the Saudi media campaign policy did not discourage the occurrences 
in Buraimi. In fact the immediate British response was also the renewal of their 
counter propaganda campaign. Furthermore, incidents in Buraimi continued to take 
place through September and October.^ ^^  
Until the last week of September 1953, the Foreign Office was still studying Dulles 
message of 28 August. Hence, pending a final decision of either accepting or refusing 
the American proposal, the British government was approaching a fixed policy in 
regard to the Buraimi dispute.^ '^ Eventually, the Foreign office concluded on 25 
September, that it was inclined to take a hard line policy in Buraimi, hence, rejecting 
the American proposal and taking necessary actions in order to control the 
situation. Such actions would include the improvement of the British defence 
capability in the entire area, encouraging the Sultan of Muscat to improve his 
position, and the tightening of the Blockade on Turki in order to eject him from the 
Oasis. Before taking a final decision on this policy and prior to informing the US and 
the Saudi governments, the British Ambassador at Jeddah and the British Resident in 
the Gulf were called to London for a consultation. 
Unexpectedly, on the same day, the 25 September 1953, the Foreign Office received 
through the British Embassy at Jeddah a new Saudi proposal.^°° The proposal was put 
forward by the Saudi Ambassador to London, who was lately in Taif, where King Ibn 
Saud was. Wahba explained that he managed after several talks with the King, the 
Crown Prince, and the Minster for Foreign Affairs, to convince them that he might put 
forward "a personal proposal" to the British government on the following lines: 
"Desiring to bring about a state of peace and quiet in the Buraimi area, the two 
parties shall - (i) replace the present forces by smaller, but equal forces (whose 
numbers will be agreed upon) to preserve security during the period of 
arbitration, and withdraw all their forces at present in those parts; (ii) 
undertake not to engage in any political or other activity in that area; (iii) 
undertake not to put any obstacles in the way of the return of inhabitants to the 
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places where they were Hving before abrogation of [the] Standstill Agreement 
by the British Government' 301 
It was clarified that King Ibn Saud preferred the proposal to be made by Wahba 
personally "in case it was rejected" but if the British government accepted it in 
principle the Saudi government "would also accept it".^ °^  
On 1 and 2 October, Wahba's proposal was already under extensive scrutiny in the 
Foreign Office. The proposal was considered as "worthy of serious consideration", 
particularly when it offered the withdrawal of Ibn Utaishan from Buraimi and when it 
would be a better alternative for the cause of British-US relations.^°^ Ultimately, the 
British government plan of hard lines actions in Buraimi was put on hold while the 
new proposal was under consideration.''''^  
On 9 October, Wahba was handed a note from the Foreign Office expressing the 
British government's intention "to examine the new proposal sympathetically 
provided" that the Saudi government agrees to some alterations to its implications. 
Moreover, on 13 October, Eden wrote to Dulles apologising for the delay in 
answering his letter of 28 August 1953. After informing Dulles about the recent 
optimistic Saudi proposal, Eden promised that his government was intending to make 
progress on this.^ "^  Throughout October and the beginning of November, the Saudis 
and the British official were extensively working on the new proposal. 307 
The Saudi proposal, which had suspended the British government plans of taking 
fiirther action against the Saudis in Buraimi, was a surprise move by the Saudi 
government. The timing of the proposal cannot be understood without adding some 
facts about King Ibn Saud's health situation. Though, the exact day when Ibn Saud's 
critical illness began was mysterious, yet this matter can be comprehended within the 
available data. According to Khairaldin Al-Zarkali, the King had been critically ill 
since his arrival in Taif on 8 August 1953.^ °^ However, according to the British 
documents, King Ibn Saud's critical illness started at the beginning of October.^ °^ As 
the exact date of Ibn Saud's illness cannot be proved, whether it took place before or 
after the 25 September 1953, it would be impossible to conclude that the Saudi 
proposal was made with or without Ibn Saud's knowledge, unless Wahba words were 
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treated as absolute. In any case, it could be said that the proposal was prompted either 
by King Ibn Saud or by his two senior sons: Saud and Faisal. If the proposal was the 
idea of Ibn Saud, it would be understood that while he was critically ill, he favoured a 
fast and secure ending for an issue that would challenge the future of his successors. If 
the proposal was initiated by Saud and Faisal they must have done so when their 
father was in a very critical situation during which they did not want to face any 
trouble in regard to the frontier question. Whoever promoted the proposal, it must be 
said that its promotion must have been taken from a vulnerable position that was 
similar to the Saudi Arabian decision in April 1953. This added a definite sense of 
disappointment into the Saudi government's view of its connection with Britain. 
Despite the fact that Ibn Saud's death on 9 November 1953 took place while the Saudi 
and British officials were trying to find their way to a solution,^ '" it must be said that 
the final year of Ibn Saud's rule was the year that ended all hopes for the return of the 
'good old days' of the Saudi-British relations.^ " 
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Summary and Conclusions 
The firm positions of the Saudi and the British negotiators at the Dammam 
Conference in January-February 1952, was the main cause of its failure. The Saudi 
representatives had insisted on the Saudi Arabian 1949 claim and the British 
representatives had "introduced new, exaggerated, claims for Qatar and Abu Dhabi. 
The rigidity of each attitude suggested that neither the British nor the Saudi 
governments were giving any weight to Saudi-British relations in contrast to their 
desired territorial gains. The outcome of the conference was negative on the fiiture 
development of the frontier dispute, as both sides became pessimistic about reaching a 
solution by means of negotiations. 
From the collapse of the conference until the end of August 1952, no direct attempt 
was made by the Saudis or the British in order to solve the fi-ontier dilemma directly 
between them; on the contrary they were both preparing secretly against each other. 
Britain was plarming from March to reinforce the Trucial Coast rulers' political 
control over the disputed area. Simultaneously, Saudi Arabia was intending to 
strengthen its position in the disputed area. In addition, the Saudi government had 
attempted to attain US government support, in order to exert pressure on the British 
government to modify its position. 
Following the increase in British activities in the disputed area and the failure of US 
government mediation, the Saudi govenmient established an authority in Buraimi. 
The Saudi government action of 31 August 1952 was a turning point, not just in its 
approach to the dispute, but also in its attitude towards Britain. Indeed, this action 
showed that Saudi Arabia cared less about its relations with Britain than about 
territorial gains. Moreover, the Saudi's presence in Buraimi had transformed the 
nature of the frontier issue from a dispute to a severe crisis that was fated to make an 
end to Saudi-British relations, particularly when the concept of security, that was 
positively associated with Saudi-British relations, had taken on a destructive 
character. By October 1952, the possibility of an armed clash in Buraimi between 
Britain and its allies in the Trucial Coast on one side, and Saudi Arabia on the other 
was imminent. However, the Standstill Agreement, which the USA had proposed, 
waived such a battle temporarily. 
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Although the Standstill agreement had called upon the Saudis and the British to bring 
about a peaceftil settlement via direct discussions, still that was not taken into 
consideration. Instead, each of them brought forward a new proposal in line with its 
own interests. The Saudi government had proposed the plebiscite as an instrument for 
settlement, whereas the British government had proposed the arbitration. The 
insistence of each side on its own proposal led to fiirther sfrains. 
At the beginning of 1953, the British government had attempted to soften the Saudi 
position in relation to the arbitration proposal with several measures, of which the 
most hazardous was the reinforcement of the British forces in the Trucial Coast. In its 
turn Saudi Arabia had launched an anti-British propaganda campaign that resulted in 
the launching of a counter campaign. In the meantime, the British and the Saudi 
governments had tried to convince the US government to support their proposals. The 
US government had informed both parties that it would maintain a neutral position, 
which according to its own independent studies arbitration was the best instrument to 
be implemented. 
Saudi Arabia's disregard of the arbitration proposal, the British fear of growing Saudi 
influence in Buraimi, the needs for the safeguarding of the security and the territorial 
interests of the Gulf Protectorates, and the increasing Saudi publicity campaign, 
induced the British government to adopt a new radical policy. The British government 
decision at the end of March 1953 was another turning point for Saudi-British 
relations (almost equal - if not more - to the Saudi government decision to send Ibn 
Utaishan to Buraimi). Specifically it included the cancellation of the Standstill 
Agreement, the reservation of freedom of action in all the disputed area, the blockade 
of Hamasa, and the persuading of the Saudi government to accept the arbitration by 
force. 
The British government conclusion on this was communicated to the Saudi 
government in a note on 2 April, which stated all the elements except for the 
blockade. Even though the note was supplemented by a cordial message from 
Churchill to Ibn Saud, the Saudis were still astonished and could not neglect the 
possibility of a British invasion of Hamasa. The British messages had reached the 
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Saudi government when all the effective means of countering such a policy were 
unavailable. Saudi Arabia was incapable of facing British military power. 
Additionally, Saudi Arabia was not certain if the USA would assist it against Britain 
at that stage, particularly when the US government had recently declared neutrality 
and preferred the arbitration proposal. Moreover, Saudi Arabia could not see the 
feasibility of reinforcing its propaganda campaign or even appealing to the United 
Nations. Hence, Ibn Saud attempted to contain the situation - through diplomacy and 
correspondence - without jeopardising the security of his Kingdom and without 
agreeing to the arbitration. Thus, Ibn Saud replied cordially to Churchill and hoped 
for a peaceful solution. Nevertheless, when it became certain that the British forces 
were blockading the Saudis in Buraimi, Saudi Arabia modified its position. During 
negotiations that the British Ambassador undertook in the third week of April, Saudi 
Arabia had accepted the principle of the arbitration reluctantly. 
Yet, preparation for the setting up of the arbitration body and the status quo in 
Buraimi were major disagreements. During the Saudi-British negotiations in May-
June 1953, it became evident that Britain was not willing to give Saudi Arabia any 
concessions, even if these concessions were temporary, such as lifting the blockade on 
Hamasa when the arbitration board began its work. The British government insistence 
on this - despite Pelham's recommendation of giving Saudi Arabia some concessions 
- confirm that it no longer gave relations with Saudi Arabia priority. 
At the same time, during which the frontier conflict was damaging Saudi-British 
relations, Saudi-US relations were being enhanced. By the end of 1952 it became 
noticeable that USA influence in Saudi Arabia was already colonising the Kingdom 
politically, economically, militarily, etc. There were two outcomes of this 
development. First, with an exception to the Saudis position in April 1953, the USA 
factor enabled Saudi Arabia to maintain a solid position in regard to the frontier 
conflict. Second, the enhancement of US influence in Saudi Arabia had negatively 
impacted on the general conduct of Saudi-British relations and thereafter on the 
development of the frontier conflict. 
Despite US government help in attempting to solve the Saudi-British dispute in 1952, 
the Saudis were not that happy about the American stand during the first quarter of 
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1953. During Dulles visit to Saudi Arabia in May 1953, the Saudis insisted on the 
necessity of full backing from the USA. In fact Dulles was told that unless the US 
government supported the Saudi case in the frontier conflict, Saudi-US relations 
would be reconsidered. Fearing the consequences of its neufral position on its 
relations with Saudi Arabia, the US government adopted a policy in favour of Saudi 
Arabia. The USA government endeavoured to persuade the British government to 
modify its position. Nonetheless, Britain was not willing to respond to USA pressure; 
in fact the British government was determined to implement several measures in order 
to eject the Saudis from Buraimi. However, a considerate Saudi proposal came out as 
a resuh of King Ibn Saud's critical illness. Subsequently the British government plans 
were put on hold. 
As misunderstanding was the main aspect of the frontier conflict, the impact of this 
development was remarkable on Saudi-British relations. Indeed, the firm position that 
the Saudi and the British governments maintained impacted negatively on Saudi-
British relations. Beside, the relational interaction between Saudi Arabia and Britain 
during the last two years of King Ibn Saud's reign was mainly conducted through 
their interaction over the frontier conflict. Undoubtedly the development of the 
frontier issue in 1952-53 was the last stage in the destruction of Saudi-British 
relations. 
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Conclusion 
Whether examined from a Saudi or a British prospective, the impact of security 
concerns was evident in Saudi-British relations. Indeed, the security concept was - in 
one way or another - impacting on virtually all of the developments that were 
associated with British and Saudi Arabian relations. 
During World War Two, the Saudi-British connection had provided a safe haven for 
the Saudi Arabian security concerns, especially regarding a regional threat. In the 
same era, Saudi Arabia was considered as imperative for the security of the British 
Empire. In fact, the maintenance of the security of Saudi Arabia was even regarded by 
the British government as an important issue that concerned the security of the 
Empire. Ultimately, the assumption of security was - then - helpful to the main course 
of the Saudi-Anglo relationship. Nonetheless, matters changed from the British 
perspective in the post-war era. In Britain's strategy, Saudi Arabia's importance 
altered - particularly upon Indian independence in 1947 - from that which was for the 
most part connected with the security of the British Empire, to that of the security of 
the area as a whole, particularly vis-a-vis a Soviet threat. With the occurrence of such 
a development, the Saudi and the British governments failed to establish any 
constructive arrangement for their concerns, resulting in a decline for the concept of 
security in Saudi-Anglo relations. Above and beyond, the security assumption became 
a hindrance rather than a help for the relationship when the Saudi and the British 
governments faced each other over the frontier conflict in the early 1950s. 
Though the effect of the development of the Saudi-American relationship on Saudi-
British relations was evident, it would be more appropriate to admit that - in 
accordance with the Saudi actions - the former were strengthened because of the 
deterioration of the latter, rather than that the latter deteriorating because of the 
strengthening of the former. This was the case as the deterioration of Saudi-British 
relations included a decline in the constructiveness of the security concept. 
Up to 1943, Saudi Arabian relations with the USA remained inconsequential; 
however, from that year onward Saudi-US relations gradually strengthened. In concert 
with the advancement of Saudi-US ties, the British and the Americans confronted 
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each other over certain issues in the Saudi Kingdom. Nevertheless, the development 
of such a conflict - alongside the British need for a broader cooperation with the 
Americans, particular that of wider security concerns - had influenced the British 
government to work towards an Anglo-American understanding in regard to Saudi 
Arabia; an accord that was finalised in 1947. Such an understanding was more 
positive - as later stages revealed - for the progress of American-Saudi ties rather than 
that of the Anglo-Saudi ties. 
Though Saudi Arabia welcomed the enrichment of Saudi-US ties, it was apparent that 
up to 1945 the Saudis were inclined to pay more attention to their relations with 
Britain rather than USA. Indeed, up to then the Saudis were to some extent contented 
over the British government's attitude towards most of their security concems. 
Nonetheless, by early 1947, when King Ibn Saud began to doubt the British 
government attitude towards his problem with the Hashemites, and ultimately his 
Kingdom's security concems, he considered enhancing relations with the USA; even 
if such enhancement would be at the expense of Saudi-Anglo relations. From then 
onwards, and in concert with the deterioration of Saudi-British relations, Saudi Arabia 
was looking towards and encouraging the strengthening of its relationship with the 
USA. In the early 1950s when Saudi-British relations were turned into purely 
conflicting relations, the Saudi-US relationship was evidently functioning in even 
better dynamic than that of the Saudi-Anglo relationship of the early 1940's. 
Furthermore, the American factor did not help ease the negative impact of Britain's 
economic deterioration on Saudi-Anglo relations. In fact, the US function alongside 
such a development was rather to help the course of American-Saudi ties at the 
expense of Anglo-Saudi ties. Indeed, in the case of British financial assistance to 
Saudi Arabia, which was helping the course of Saudi-Anglo relations during the early 
1940s, this had had begun to alter from 1944 onward. Britain's economic difficulty at 
the end of the war, alongside the American intention of increasing their financial 
assistance to Saudi Arabia, had discouraged the British government from considering 
any increase in - its part of - the assistance. Additionally, the Anglo-American conflict 
over Saudi Arabia had also persuaded the British government to modify the nature of 
the assistances from that of - which was mostly - financial to that of technical. 
Besides, the improvement of Saudi Arabian income, particularly from the oil royalty 
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in the pre-war era had also weakened the Saudi's reliance on the usual British aid. 
Though, the fiinctions of the British Military Mission had kept the channel of 
cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Britain open, the Saudis were not entirely 
satisfied with its modest overall achievement. In fact, the variety of difficulties that 
the BMM had faced - including financial - had limited the scope of its achievement. 
Hence, in 1951, when the US government provided Saudi Arabia with an altemative 
mission, the BMM operations came to an understandable end, particularly, as Saudi-
British relations had already declined by then. 
Though King Ibn Saud was not totally satisfied on Britain's policy towards the 
Palestine Issue during the early 1940s, he was able to confrol the negative impact of 
such a problem on Saudi-British relations by the means of realpolitik. Together with 
the implementation of the British proposal of the White Paper, the crucial war 
developments, and the positive aspects of the Saudi-Anglo relations, Ibn Saud 
managed to avoid the opening of such a complicated question with the British 
government. Hence, the Palestine problem had been kept aside from Saudi-British 
relations until Ibn Saud discussed the matter with Churchill in 1945. But with the 
Americans, the issue was raised - though without any constructive outcome - in 1943. 
In his historical meetings with Roosevelt and Churchill in February 1945, Ibn Saud 
conversed more positively with the former rather than with the latter, but in any case, 
the Palestine Issue remained a problematic question. During 1946-1947 both the 
British and the American polices towards the issue were unsatisfactory for the Saudis; 
nevertheless, the reality of the pragmatic approach saved the Kingdom's relations 
with both of them. When ideological values had associated the Arab States behaviour 
on the Palestine Issue in 1948, Saudi Arabia, as well as most of the Arab States, 
became more disappointed with the USA attitude than the British attitude on the same 
issue, a matter that had made most of them appreciate the neutral British attitude vis-
a-vis the aligned US policy. But in any case, it could be said that though the Saudi 
government was not generally pleased when it came to the Kingdom's main partners 
policies in Palestine, still realpolitik values were more impermeable than those of the 
ideological. Hence, Saudi Arabian relations with both Britain and the USA were 
saved from the gravity of such an issue. 
364 
The development of the Saudi-Hashemite dilemma and its implications for Saudi-
British relations was no doubt associated with the Saudi Arabian security concems. 
Up to 1945, Britain's policy on the Saudi-Hashemite problem and its related concems 
was generally satisfactory for the King of Saudi Arabia. Hence up to then, such an 
issue did not obstruct the goodwill in Saudi-British relafions. Nonetheless, the matter 
changed in 1946 when this issue began to challenge the main course of Anglo-Saudi 
relations. Jordan's independence, the Saudi-Jordanian frontier misunderstanding. 
King Abdullah activities, and the British government's mishandling of the ultimate 
Saudi security concems brought about nothing but trouble - to the relationship - as far 
as King Ibn Saud was concerned. The British government did not satisfy Ibn Saud on 
his anxiety vis-a-vis what he believed to be intrigues from the head of the Hashemites. 
In fact, Britain did not meet the Saudi king's request for an assurance against any 
Hashemite threat. Even when he attempted to cause the British govenmient to balance 
what he believed as an unequal - British - treatment of his Kingdom and of 
Abdullah's Kingdom, his effort was doomed to failure. By not getting a solution 
through Britain, and by knowing that the USA was not yet ready to fulfil Saudi 
Arabia's security obligations, Ibn Saud even tried to reconcile directly with Abdullah 
when circumstances allowed in 1948. However, Abdullah's actions in 1949 made the 
Saudi-Hashemite settlement short-lived. Even then, a further effort from Ibn Saud did 
not bring what he could regard as a convincing assurance from Britain. In fact, by the 
end of 1949 Ibn Saud was able to obtain what he deemed as a satisfactory assurance 
from the USA, instead. Besides, in 1950, when the British questioned the objectives 
of the Saudi Arabian loan to Syria, Ibn Saud became more convinced that the British 
government was siding with the Hashemite against himself The Saudi-Hashemite 
dilemma could not have been made worse as it collided with the frontier dispute in 
1951. Indeed, the inclusion of certain Jordanian soldiers in the Levy Force had 
worsened the issue fiirthermore. Despite the fact that the Saudis were enlightened by 
the British government on this subject, in August 1951, the British clarification came 
a bit late as Saudi-British relations had already deteriorated. 
Unlike their stance during the war when they were keen to maintain and to preserve 
their special relationship with the British, the Saudis took a different stance as their 
activities along the disputed borders were taking place during the first quarter of 1949. 
Indeed, by then the Saudis were already experiencing the phenomenal changes that 
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had occurred in Saudi-British relations; changes that did not exclude security aspects. 
But as they did not completely lose all hope for a positive correction from the British 
side in regard to this phenomenon, they wished that the reopening of the frontiers 
issue would not stand against any positive move in such a course. Nevertheless, the 
Saudi's aspiration did not go in accordance to their wishes, in fact, the frontiers 
conflict had twisted the general development of Saudi-British relations - including 
that of security - into further negative territories. 
Indeed, the reopening of the frontier dispute had brought about further complications 
in the Saudi-British relationship. The difficulties of the negotiations coupled with the 
inflexibility in the position of each party - such as the Saudi claims in October 1949 
and the British insistence in considering the Blue and the Violet lines as the basis for 
the negotiations - were in fact unhelpful for the progress of the already declining 
relations. Besides, throughout 1950 and into 1951, the frontier conflict and its 
associated elements had kept facilitating the deterioration of Britain's relations with 
Saudi Arabia. It was only during the London Conference of August 1951 that some 
signs of hope materialised, as the Saudis and the British agreed upon certain matters 
amongst which was the agreement to hold comprehensive talks at the beginning of 
1952. However, by the time that the Dammam Conference took place in January 
1952, Saudi-British relations had already entered into a new cycle that neutralised it 
from the negotiators considerations in reaching a constructive solution for all the 
parties involved. Hence, with the opening of the conference each side was determined 
to achieve an outcome that fitted its own interests, rather than the interests of all 
parties. Ultimately, the conference was doomed to a predictable failure. Subsequently, 
the frontier dispute continued to deteriorate until it was transformed into a visible 
crisis by the establishment of a Saudi formal post in Buraimi at the end of the summer 
of that year. Without the temporary solution that was reached - with the mediation of 
the Americans - by the signing of the Standstill Agreement, Saudi Arabia might have 
faced up to Britain - and its partners in the Trucial Coast - in an armed clash. Though 
in accordance with the Standstill Agreement the Saudis and the British were to have 
reached a settlement by the means of negotiations, the crisis was further inflated as 
each of the conflicting sides proposed a resolution that fit better with its own interests. 
Whereas the Saudis had insisted that plebiscite was the best method for a settlement, 
the British in their turn insisted on their own proposal of arbitration. In this tone the 
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crisis was further worsened - at the beginning of 1953 - as each side was attempting to 
implement the necessary measures for the implementation of its proposal. Propaganda 
campaigns were launched as the British forces were reinforced in the area. As the 
situation further intensified without a detectable solution, the British decided to force 
the Saudis to concur. With other measures, the British forces blockaded the village 
that contained the Saudi post - in April - and forced the Saudis to comply with the 
arbitration proposal. Under such pressure the Saudis had no choice but to concede 
from a weak position, and indeed during a time in which the Saudi-British 
relationship had reached its nadir. Still the Saudis and the British could not reach 
agreements on all the points that were involved. By the middle of 1953, it was evident 
whom the Saudis were regarding as a friend, and whom they were regarding as a foe. 
Indeed, it was with the Americans that the Saudis had sought a safe haven with vis-a-
vis what they experienced as obvious British hostility. Despite the fact that the USA 
had been involved with a policy that was in the best interest of Saudi Arabia, the 
timing of Ibn Saud's critical illness had forced the Saudis to give the British further 
concessions reluctantly. By all means, the frontier conflict represented the last phase 
of deterioration in Saudi-British relations during King Ibn Saud's reign. 
If King Ibn Saud was the most active in the practicality of the shift that occurred in 
his Kingdom's relations with Britain, it should be noted that Britain was also 
responsible for causing him to do so. Indeed, the British policy towards Saudi 
Arabia's interests - particularly that which was connected to the security concept -
was effective when it came to the orientation of the Kingdom's foreign policy. The 
Saudi move towards Germany in 1939 was associated with such concems, particularly 
when the Anglo-Italian connection was a matter of suspicion in Riyadh. On the other 
hand. King Ibn Saud was keen to keep the goodwill of his Kingdom's relations with 
Britain intact when the British government was accommodating Saudi security 
concems during World War Two. In the post-war era when the Saudi security 
situation was worsening - particularly in comprehension of a potential Hashemite 
threat - it was obvious that the Saudis were endeavouring to move towards the USA. 
So was the case, when Britain itself confronted Saudi Arabia over the frontier issue. 
Ultimately, it could be said that the motivations that were driving the orientation of 
Saudi Arabia's policy were not in fact contesting the British interests, rather than 
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complementing the Saudi interests, particular as those interests were built upon the 
imperative base of security. 
In accordance with the previous arguments it could be briefly concluded that there 
were a variety of issues that had dynamically facilitated the shift that had occurred in 
Saudi-British relations throughout 1939-1953. Indeed, the security concept, the 
American factor, the economic aspect, the Saudi-Hashemite problem, and the frontier 
conflict; had impacted on the main course of Saudi-British relations as those relations 
were transforming into their eventual structure by 1953. 
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